Memorandum submitted by the Department
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (K11)
SUMMARY
1. This memorandum has been prepared by
DEFRA in consultation with Cabinet Office, FCO, HMT and DFID and
in agreement with the devolved administrations.
2. Last year's European Commission Green
Paper on the future of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was balanced
in its evaluation of the current policy. It identified the need
for a common fisheries policy and the positive aspects that are
often forgotten. The policy has managed, to a large extent, to
contain conflicts at sea. It has provided a welcome degree of
stability to the fisheries sector. So far, it has averted the
major collapse of stocks that we have seen in some parts of the
world.
3. The Green Paper was, however, perceptive
in its analysis of the failings of the current policy. These include
structural weaknesses in the form of a mixture of occasionally
contradictory objectives derived from a variety of sources and
operational weaknesses that fail to ensure sustainable exploitation.
While noting the failings of the CFP as it currently operates,
the Green Paper stimulated a debate about the way forward. It
included a number of suggestions for setting clearer objectives
for the future and a set of options to strengthen and improve
fisheries conservation policy. The Government consulted stakeholders
and interested parties and delivered its views to the Commission
in September last year. The government is pleased to see that
this year's proposals reflect many of the points we made.
4. Our response to the Committee's first
question examines the Commission's proposals to reorientate the
CFP around consistent policy objectives. The objectives the Commission
has chosen have consequences for the operation of the CFP. These
include expanding the menu of fisheries management tools available
and moving to a multi-annual management system for most fish stocks.
We have addressed these issues in our answer to the Committee's
second and fifth questions.
5. The reformed CFP's conservation policy
is aimed at bringing the capacity of the fleets to catch fish
better into line with the fishing opportunities available. Clearly,
in a situation where there is substantial over-capacity this has
implications for the structure of the fishing industry and potential
socio-economic consequences for communities especially dependent
on fishing. Our answers to the third and fourth questions deal
with this aspect of the Commission's proposals.
6. Our response to the Committee's final
question on control and enforcement deals with the measures the
Commission has proposed to ensure fair and consistent standards.
The Commission's approach, giving greater weight to effective
control and enforcement and a drive to improve standards, is very
much in line with the government's views on this issue.
Question 1: What effects will the Commission's
proposals have on the fundamental principles of the Common Fisheries
Policy?
7. The CFP has inherited a set of principles
derived from Treaty obligations and from Community legislation.
8. The Treaty establishing the European
Community has no specific fisheries chapter but gives the CFP
the same fundamental objectives as the common agricultural policy
(Article 33): to increase productivity by promoting technical
progress and by ensuring the rational development of production
and the optimum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular
labour; to ensure a fair standard of living for the (fishing)
community, in particular by increasing individual earnings; to
stabilise markets; to assure the availability of supplies; to
ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices and
to ensure the principle of non-discrimination (Article 34).
9. The CFP also has to ensure that environmental
protection requirements are integrated into the policy and that
policy on the environment be based on the precautionary principle.
The CFP must also consider consumer protection requirements, the
objectives of economic and social cohesion and of development
co-operation.
10. Article 2 of Council Regulation (EEC)
3760/92 defines the objectives of the CFP. These are "to
protect and conserve available and accessible living marine aquatic
resources, and to provide for rational and responsible exploitation
on a sustainable basis, in appropriate economic and social conditions
for the sector, taking into account of its implications for the
marine eco-system, and in particular taking account of the needs
of both producers and consumers."
11. These objectives are sometimes contradictory
and pull in opposite directions. As last year's Commission Green
Paper put it "the CFP aims at:
— ensuring the conservation of increasingly
fragile fish stocks while promoting the continuation of fishing
activities;
— modernising the means of production
while limiting fishing effort;
— ensuring the proper implementation
of conservation measures while Member States retain responsibility
in the field of monitoring and sanctions;
— maintaining employment while reducing
fleet capacity;
— ensuring a decent income for fishermen
even though the Community's own supply of fish products is declining
and the EU market depends more heavily on imports each year; and
— acquiring fishing rights in the waters
of third countries without threatening the sustainable exploitation
of fisheries."
12. The Commission's proposals for reform
of the CFP aim at providing clear and coherent objectives and
principles for the future. The new CFP (Com(02) 185 Article 2)
"shall ensure exploitation of living aquatic resources that
provides sustainable environmental, economic and social conditions."
The Commission's Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the draft
framework regulation makes it clear that these will be the underlying
objectives. The government agrees with this approach; the CFP
should have clear objectives and sustainability should be at the
heart of a reformed CFP.
13. Article 2 goes on to elaborate the way
in which, to serve these objectives, the Community shall apply
the precautionary principle to provide for sustainable exploitation
and to minimise the impact of fishing activities on marine ecosystems.
The new CFP will aim to progressively introduce an eco-system
based approach to fisheries management. The aim will be to develop
an economically viable and competitive fisheries and aquaculture
industry; a sector which will provide a fair standard of living
for those dependent on fishing activities and take account of
the needs of consumers. The government supports these revised
objectives. The UK formally endorsed an ecosystem-based approach
at the Fifth North Sea Conference in March 2002 and this strategy
was elaborated further in the first Marine Stewardship report,
"Safeguarding our Seas", published in May this year.
Question 2: To what extent will the proposals
improve quota management and conservation and what alternatives
might be considered?
14. The Commission's proposals do not include
any specific recommendations on day to day quota management. However,
they do cover a range of measures aimed at improved conservation
policy:
— a new multi-annual framework for
setting of TACs and quotas;
— strengthening of technical measures;
— an evaluation of the impact of industrial
fishing on marine eco-systems;
— fisheries management in the Mediterranean
Sea;
— incorporation of environmental concerns
into fisheries management; and
— an action plan for the improvement
of scientific advice for fisheries management.
15. A further alternative to the current
system of quota management would be the establishment of multi-species
TACs. The Commission proposal states that multi-annual management
plans should take account of the impact of exploiting these stocks
on other species.
16. The Government supports the adoption
of a long-term approach to fisheries management. It also welcomes
the adoption of the precautionary approach as the basis for a
multi-annual framework for fisheries management. Also welcome
is the intention to take account of the need to conserve biodiversity
and minimise the impact on habitats, as well as the establishment
of rules for the protection of non-commercial species such as
cetaceans and other marine mammals, including sea birds. An evaluation
of the impact of industrial fishing on marine eco-systems is long
overdue and therefore a welcome element of the package.
17. Improvements in the quality of scientific
advice for fisheries management will go a long way towards ensuring
that catch levels are fixed at sustainable levels. The Government
agrees with the Commission that reliable and consistent scientific
advice is essential for effective fisheries management.
18. The Commission has undertaken to maintain
the principle of relative stability for the time being as well
as continuing with the system of Total Allowable Catches (TACs)
and quotas. However, they recognise that the imbalance between
the size and power of fishing fleets and fisheries resources means
that normal market conditions cannot apply. The Commission wants
to move in this direction in the long-term. They, therefore, intend
to organise workshops in 2002 to look at systems for:
— individual or collective fishing
trading rights; and
— payment for the right to fish;
and will make proposals or recommendations in 2003
on the basis of the outcome of these debates.
19. The Government welcomes the proposed
continuation of the relative stability principle. It is willing
to discuss management options that effectively safeguard fish
stocks, and secure the long-term survival and profitability of
the fisheries sector and its fisheries-dependent communities.
Question 3: What will be the impact of the proposals
on the structure of the British fishing industry?
20. In response to advice from the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), that the cause
of the decline in stocks of a number of commercial fish species
is excessive fishing mortality, the Commission proposes that the
time the EU fleet spends at sea should be cut significantly. It
believes that much of the surplus fleet thereby created should
be decommissioned, to ensure the viability of the remainder.
21. The implications of this would be a
reduction in the size of the UK fleet, focused on whitefish vessels
and is likely to impact, in particular, on fisheries dependent
regions—eg north east Scotland, the Orkney and Shetland
Islands and Northern Ireland as well as north east and south west
England. The actual size and timing of any effects would depend
on the scale of cuts agreed by the Council, the period over which
the measures were introduced for the particular stocks and the
effects on individual vessels. The Commission produced a table
to support its proposals containing projections of the number
of vessels to be decommissioned in each Member State (and the
potential cost). These were however, purely indicative. We would,
of course, expect that any targets set for the UK would take account
of the significant reduction in the respective fleets already
achieved through this year's decommissioning schemes in England,
Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Commission have accepted this.
22. The Government accepts the scientific
advice that there needs to be a better balance between fishing
mortality/activity and available stocks, in order to ensure sustainable
commercial fisheries. We are currently consulting the industry
on how action should be taken in this regard and want a full review
of all the possible options.
23. As far as other Member States are concerned,
six (France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal) remain
opposed to the principle of using effort control in parallel with
the existing Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota mechanism.
Question 4: Are the plans for social help for
fishing communities adequate?
24. The Commission has estimated that some
28,000 fishermen (or 11 per cent of total employment at sea) could
be affected by these measures. They are not, however, in a position
to assess in detail the full consequences on employment in the
sector (both in terms of absolute numbers or regional distribution).
The Commission has therefore arranged a series of bilaterals with
Member States to review the position. This is with a view to producing
an Action Plan to deal with the socio-economic consequences. This
will be developed in the context of the current structural measures
and financial provision. The Commission are also looking to prepare
a long-term strategy for the integrated development of coastal
areas dependent on fishing.
25. The Commission recognises that the Financial
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) and the other structural
funds have provisions to assist fishermen to diversify into other
employment. In the UK, as well as FIFG, both the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) are
used, along with other sources of finance, by regional bodies
to encourage re-structuring. In addition, the work they are funding
in the areas particularly dependent on fishing will help to identify
suitable opportunities.
26. The Government does not consider that
there is a need to increase the overall projected expenditure
on the EU FIFG programmes. Any new expenditure requirements should
be met by re-targeting existing provisions.
27. In the light of the potentially significant
impact of cuts in the EU fleet, it is right that the Commission
should pay due regard to their socio-economic consequences: but
how to tackle them ought to remain a matter for the Member States
to decide.
Question 5: To what extent will the reforms allow
a more flexible system to develop, permitting short term adjustments
to quotas to be made to react to changes in fish biology and fishing
technology?
28. It is unlikely that the reforms will
allow for adjustments to be made in a shorter time-scale than
at present. This is because of the nature of the scientific advice
that underpins fisheries management decisions. The assessment
of the state of fish stocks undertaken by ICES takes place on
an annual basis. This advice is then taken into account when the
Council of Ministers meets to agree the levels of Total Allowable
Catches (TACs) for the following year. It would theoretically
be possible to conduct more frequent assessments of the state
of the stocks. It is doubtful, however, that the information gained
would justify the additional costs.
29. The proposals instead focus on securing
long-term stability. The Commission proposes that Multi-Annual
Management Plans be established for most stocks. These plans would
be established for a period of perhaps three to five years at
a time, depending on the life cycle and state of the stock. They
would be designed to avoid the risk of stock collapse by keeping
stock size and fishing mortality rates within long-term safe levels.
In addition they would take into account the need to conserve
bio-diversity and minimise the impact on habitats. Within these
constraints they would be designed to ensure high and stable yields.
30. The plans would first be introduced
for those stocks that are outside safe biological limits and would
aim to bring them rapidly within safe limits.
31. The Council would decide on the catch
and/or fishing effort limits for the first year of the plan. In
subsequent years the Commission, assisted by a Management Committee
composed of representatives from Member States, would set catch
and/or effort limits in line with the rules set out by the Council.
This aspect of the proposal has attracted a lot of criticism.
Many Member States feel these decisions should always be taken
by the Council. The government has indicated its willingness to
consider this proposal with an open mind. We consider that the
remit for matters to be decided in this fashion would have to
be very tightly defined, but that the possibility should be explored
rather than dismissed out of hand.
32. The Commission envisages that a range
of measures would be available to fisheries managers in setting
up Multi-Annual Management Plans. These would include familiar
tools such as the setting of TACs and technical measures including
maximum mesh net sizes and minimum landing sizes. In addition
the Commission envisages the ability to set targets for fishing
effort where appropriate. Fishing effort, in the context of the
CFP reform proposals, means the product of the fishing capacity
(expressed in gross tonnage and power in kilowatts) and the activity
of a fishing vessel. Thus the Multi-Annual Management Plans could
include references to the total "kilowatt-fishing days"
and "gross registered tonnage-fishing days" that vessels
would be allowed to operate in the fishery.
33. Multi-Annual Management Plans would,
if agreed, provide a greater degree of predictability for the
fishing industry and allow more forward planning than is available
under the current annual system. We support the development of
a multi-annual approach to fisheries management.
34. One area where the reforms do allow
for short-term adjustments is in response to emergencies. The
Commission would have the power to decide on emergency measures
lasting up to a year in the event of a serious threat to the conservation
of living aquatic resources or the ecosystem resulting from fishing
activities. In addition Member States would be able to take emergency
measures in waters falling under their sovereignty or jurisdiction
for up to three months. In the 12 mile zone Member States would
be able to take non-discriminatory measures applying to vessels
of all Member States for the conservation of resources and to
minimise the effect of fishing on the conservation of marine eco-systems.
These measures are not fundamentally different from the current
arrangements except for the length of time that emergency measures
can be put in place.
Question 6. Has enough emphasis been placed on
proper enforcement of the CFP?
35. Effective standards of control and enforcement,
applied fairly and even handedly, are essential to the success
of any fisheries regime: the Common Fisheries Policy is no exception.
36. Action on control and enforcement is
central to the Commission's proposals for the reform of the CFP.
In its Roadmap the Commission has stated that current control
and enforcement arrangements have been insufficient to ensure
a level-playing field across the Union thereby undermining the
credibility of the CFP. To improve standards of control and enforcement
it advocates a new regulatory framework for control and enforcement.
Section 3.4 of the Roadmap sets out plans for more robust measures
to deal with non-compliance, an action plan for improving co-operation
between Member States and the establishment of a Community Joint
Inspection Structure which would enable Member States and the
Commission to pool resources in order to undertake collaborative
inspection and surveillance activity in both Community and international
waters. Specific measures include:
— a code of conduct for inspections;
— admissibility of inspection reports
in any national court;
— rules for the suspension of fishing
vessel licences;
— a strengthening of the supervisory
powers of the Commission;
— minimum level of sanctions for serious
infringements;
— the phased extension of satellite
monitoring to fishing vessels over 10 metres;
— wider use of observers on board vessels;
and
— the gradual introduction of electronic
logbooks.
37. Much of the ground covered in Section
3.4 of the Roadmap is taken forward in Chapter V of the proposed
Council Regulation on the conservation and sustainable exploitation
of fisheries under the CFP. As well as providing a new framework
for control and defining the responsibilities and obligations
for the industry, Member States and the Commission, Chapter V
includes provisions for:
— enhanced controls at the point of
first sale of fish, including the registration of fish buyers;
— improved co-operation between Member
States;
— inspection and surveillance reports
drawn up by Commission inspectors or inspectors from another Member
State to constitute admissible evidence in administrative or criminal
proceedings of any Member State and to have the same value for
establishing the facts as inspection and surveillance reports
of the Member State;
— the appointment of a single authority
(point of contact) within each Member State to be responsible
for co-ordinating the collection and verification of information
on fishing activities and reporting these to the Commission;
— commission inspectors to undertake
audits, inquiries, verification and inspections to ensure that
Member States are implementing the rules of the CFP correctly
and have adequate control and enforcement systems;
— the setting of minimum levels of
sanction for serious infringements;
— the suspension of fishing activities
by the Commission in cases of non-compliance where this is having
an adverse effect on fish stocks; and
— reparations of any stock losses caused
by Member States failing to enforce the rules of the CFP.
Many of these measures will need to be under-pinned
by the adoption of detailed rules under Commission Regulations.
38. It is evident that the Commission is
giving more weight to effective control and enforcement and the
drive towards better and more uniform standards of enforcement
across the Community is consistent with the policies pursued by
this government over the past five years. We believe that the
Commission's proposals, which supplement the measures adopted
following the UK's Presidency in 1998, represent a major step
forward. The proposals will, of course, require careful evaluation.
In particular, we shall need to be satisfied that some of the
proposed measures such as those relating to harmonised sanctions,
suspending licences, enhancing the Commission's powers and admissibility
of inspection reports in national courts will not conflict with
national competence for jurisprudence matters.
39. Whilst the UK supports the strengthening
of fisheries enforcement across the Community, it is clear that
such action alone cannot deliver a successful fisheries policy.
Policies designed to secure conservation, structural and marketing
objectives must be capable of enforcement. All Member States must
be committed to ensuring effective enforcement and allocate sufficient
resources to that task. Fishermen must be confident that rules
and policies are being applied fairly across the Community. Other
factors may be important. For example, the divergence between
fleet capacity and fishing opportunities can create economic pressure
on fishermen to circumvent the rules. The greater the divergence
the more difficult the enforcement task, especially for Member
States such as the UK with an extensive sea area, a long coastline
and a large number of landing locations within its jurisdiction.
September 2002
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