4 CONCLUSIONS
39. Aspirations for the public debate were high.
In its letter advising the Government about holding a public debate,
the AEBC said that
The principal objective of stimulating a public
debate … is to assess the nature and spectrum of the public's
views on the possible commercialisation of GM crops in the United
Kingdom … [But] an inevitable outcome of the debate will
be a better-informed public because that is what happens in good
debates. The relatively small proportion of people whom we would
envisage taking part in regional events or in focus groups as
part of the programme of debate will gain quite a lot of knowledge.
Our aspiration is that in addition, many people not participating
in these events would also become more aware of the science and
the wider issues around GM crops, gaining access to the information
they want and need to debate the issues.[93]
Similarly, in our earlier report we envisaged that
"at the very least the debate will provide a platform through
which the quality of public knowledge will be raised".[94]
40. In short the objectives of the debate were at
least twofold: to "clarify" and to "advance"
public views about GM.[95]
In its independent evaluation of the debate the Understanding
Risk team went further, identifying four objectives
to which the public debate might have contributed. It said that
the debate could have been an exercise in communication,
intended to inform the public; in consultation, with a
view to canvassing views; in participation, designed to
engage the lay public in policy-making; or as an experiment
in engagement, which would inform future such consultation exercises
and debates.[96]
41. The debate's success in achieving these objectives
was variable. It succeeded in consulting with a limited group
of already well-informed people about their views, and it encouraged
them to participate in policy-making. But it did not reach out
beyond this limited stratum of the public. However, its greatest
failure was in communication: no-one can seriously argue that
as a result of the public debate 'the public' at large is any
better informed about GM. The public debate was an imaginative
initiative, but nonetheless represents an opportunity missed.
Although other reasons for its failure can be found, including,
no doubt, a degree of public apathy, two principal problems resulted
from Government decisions: the tight deadline set for completion
of the process, which meant that relevant data (the reports from
the Strategy Unit and the GM Science Review Panel, and the outcome
of the FSEs) was not available, and the paltry resources allocated
to the debate. The Government, in its response to our report,
must allay the suspicion that, having agreed to undertake a public
debate, it did as little as it could to make it work.
42. We therefore come to the fourth objective of
the debate identified by the Understanding Risk team: that
it represented an experiment in participatory democracy from which
much might be learnt. The Government is committed to other public
debates and consultations - not least about the disposal of radioactive
waste, a debate about which we have previously commented[97]
- and we strongly hope that they will prove more successful than
this one. As the National Consumer Council put it, "this
isn't just about GM, it is also about the way in which government
handles matters of risk and uncertainty".[98]
We trust that the Government will look seriously at the lessons
to be learned from the conduct of the GM public debate. As we
have made clear in this report, the main lesson is that wide-ranging
consultative exercises such as the GM public debate must be adequately
resourced and must be given enough time to be conducted properly.
93 Letter from the Chairman of the AEBC to the Secretary
of State, 26 April 2002 Back
94
EFRA Committee (2002) Genetically modified organisms, HC
(2001-02) 767, para.39 Back
95
Letter from the Chairman of the AEBC to the Secretary of State,
26 April 2002, para.5 Back
96
Ev 51, para.10 Back
97
EFRA Committee (2002), Radioactive Waste: The Government's consultation
process, HC (2001-02) 407 Back
98
Ev 43, para.11 Back
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