APPENDIX 25
Memorandum submitted by the Farmers' Union
of Wales (P25)
INTRODUCTION
The Farmers' Union of Wales welcomes the invitation
to submit written evidence to the Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs Committee on the subject of badgers and Bovine Tuberculosis.
BACKGROUND
1. The FUW is profoundly concerned at the
increasing number of cattle herds in Wales which are testing positive
for TB, a situation which continues to deteriorate with the passage
of time and threatens the viability of many cattle holdings. There
has been a marked increased in incidence post 1997, corresponding
with the discontinuation of the Dunnet Strategy and Advisory Committee.
2. Independent scientific reviews conducted
under the Chairmanship of Lord Zuckerman in 1980, and by Professor
Dunnet in 1986, both concluded that there was a positive link
between TB in badgers and in cattle. The Zuckerman enquiry was
conducted against a background where 28 new herds had tested positive
for TB in Great Britain, and the Dunnet enquiry was completed
in 1986, a year in which there were 32 herd breakdowns. Latest
available statistics show that in the period 1 January to 30 November
2002, 258 new incidents of TB were confirmed in Wales alone, with
a total of 1,469 Great Britain wide.
3. Our members are entirely convinced, on
the basis of their practical experience and in the light of past
scientific enquiries, that there is a link between TB in badgers
and the transmission of the disease to cattle. It was conclusively
shown in the early 1980s that the "clean ring" strategy
which involved the elimination of badgers within a defined breakdown
zone reduced the incidence of TB in cattle. This effect was subsequently
re-affirmed by the Thornbury Research Programme which showed that
when badgers where wholly excluded from a defined area, the incidence
of TB in cattle declined.
4. The FUW welcomed the instigation of a
further independent scientific review into TB in cattle under
the chairmanship of Professor John Krebs in the belief that this
would provide a clear strategy for dealing with TB in cattle and
badgers. Despite the Krebs review conclusion "that the sum
of evidence strongly supports the view that, in Britain, badgers
are a significant source of TB infection in cattle", Government
proposals stemming from the report did nothing to tackle the immediate
economic and welfare consequences which result from the increasing
incidence of Bovine Tuberculosis.
5. Publicity over possible transmission
of Bovine TB to humans, particularly infants, together with a
very real risk that the UK's TB-free status is now in jeopardy,
further reinforces the need to take urgent action on this issue.
The Krebs Report states, in paragraph 1.2.11, "However, a
number of factors underline the importance of guarding against
complacency in assessing the potential threat of Bovine TB to
human health, including the considerations set out below:
(i) current increases in disease in cattle
may be causing asymptomatic human infections capable of reactivation
in later life;
(ii) there is an increasing number of immuno-compromised
individuals (those infected with HIV, for example) with enhanced
susceptibility to infection, including to Bovine TB;
(iii) strains of M.Bovis resistant to known
drugs have developed and have caused recent outbreaks of fatal
human disease in other countries.
6. In its submission responding to the Government's
proposals stemming from the Krebs report, the Union highlighted
the fact that the proposed culling trial would, by definition,
take at least five years to provide conclusive results, during
which time farmers outside the trial areas would have no means
of controlling an escalating badger population. The proposed time-span
has now been further delayed by outside interference to the trial
areas and the foot and mouth standstill period. These two factors
are likely to add another two and a half years to the trial's
completion date. Whilst the FUW has registered concern that the
Krebs trial period effectively represents a period of vacuum during
which there have been spiralling TB incidences, we, nevertheless,
recognise that this study is import, and have been disappointed
by the disruptive action of those who are seemingly afraid of
the report's conclusions.
7. Surveys have shown a substantial increase
in the badger population over the past 20 years. The experience
of our members has been of a steady increase in badger numbers,
with badger setts having been reported in areas where previously
there were none. The apparent increase in the number of dead badgers
on road-sides following accidents with motorised vehicles provides
circumstantial evidence which also lends credence to the notion
that the badger population continues to increase unabated.
8. The badger population survey undertaken
by Professor Harries of Bristol University compared badger numbers
in the period November 1985 and early 1988 with those recorded
in a period between October 1994 and January 1997. The results
showed that, nationally, annexe setts had increased by 87%, subsidiary
setts by 54%, and outlying setts by 55%, whereas the umber of
disused main setts had declined by 41%. These increases had occurred
in most regions including those which showed little or no change
in the number of badger social groups. The total number of all
types of sett had increased by some 43%.
9. There is no evidence to suggest that
an effective vaccine will be available during the next 15 to 20
years. The development of a test to distinguish infected from
vaccinated animals would be an essential component of any vaccine
development programme, and the Bacilic Calmette Guérin
(BCG) test does not appear to have any real application in cattle.
10. The FUW has argued that any vaccination
programme should therefore continue to focus on the development
of a vaccine to protect badgers against TB. Vaccination strategies
have been phased out for diseases such as foot and mouth, and
trade experience shows that a control programme based on vaccination
would be likely to undermine future exports of breeding cattle
from the UK. A programme of vaccination for those herds affected
by TB could also lead to a situation where farms became blighted
and stock rendered worthless without actually tackling the underlying
causal problems of TB. The Krebs report also notes that this course
of action could lead to the selection of strains of M.Bovis which
are resistant to vaccine.
11. A cattle vaccination programme could
only be countenanced, therefore, in the event of the development
of an effective diagnostic test capable of differentiating between
infected and vaccinated animals. There must also be clear evidence
which shows that UK exports would not be jeopardised through the
use of such control techniques. The UK cattle industry cannot
be sacrificed in a bid to sustain an ever expanding badger population.
Until such time as there is an effective strategy to control the
spread of bovine TB, there must be adequate provision to ensure
the management of a sustainable, healthy badger population.
12. The Protection of Badgers Act 1992 must
provide a basis for licensing removal operations in circumstances
where badgers are shown to be causing significant problems for
the agricultural industry. Given the results of Professor Harries'
study into badger numbers, many farmers are questioning the extent
to which the badger population will be allowed to grow before
any control measures are sanctioned. Questions also arise over
the impact of TB on the badger population and the long term consequences
for the species of TB infection.
13. During early 2002, the FUW, recognising
that the Krebs conclusions would not be available until at least
2005, put forward a number of suggestions to stem the spiralling
incidence of TB during the interim period:
— that the EU recommendation on inconclusive
animals be adopted, with cattle testing as inconclusive on the
second skin test removed, with full compensation payable to the
producer;
— that in hot-spot areas, farmers should
be able to request the removal of inconclusive reactors following
the first test with full compensation payable;
— that in hot-spot areas, the Gamma
Interferon Test should be used as an adjunct to the TB skin test.
In recommending this course of action, the Union
accepted that resources were a limiting factor and suggested that
this strategy should be used in parishes where there had been
annual testing for a minimum of three years.
— that those parishes selected should
follow a regime whereby all reactors and inconclusives where removed
following the first skin test. All cattle testing negative following
a skin test would then be subject to a Gamma Interferon test some
thirteen to thirty days later. Following the removal of any positives,
the herd, following a short interval, would be subject to a second
skin test. This approach is in line with the framework outlined
in the pilot study report, TB F62, and would provide a means of
addressing the unacceptably long restriction periods which apply
on farms suffering TB breakdowns.
— in situations where the likely source
of an outbreak was from wildlife, the FUW also recommended that
provision should be made for the wildlife species to be tested
for TB.
14. Whilst the FUW welcomed the Government's
acceptance that in order to control the spread of TB, additional
measures should be put in place, the detail contained within this
package, together with the speed of implementation, have proved
disappointing. The FUW believes that the case for using the Gamma
Interferon blood test has been made and the experience of other
countries eliminates the need for a scientific protocol to demonstrate
whether the use of GIFN clears infection from herds more quickly
than the use of the normal skin interpretation.
15. The Union is also concerned that the
positive measure which allows the movement of animals to other
farms under certain circumstances should not be regarded as a
long term solution to the current problems. The FUW is determined
that control measures should be designed to ensure a healthy badger
population and a healthy cattle population, and that greater account
needs to be taken of past controls strategies in order to combat
the spiralling incidence of the disease. The experience of the
past five years has shown that to do nothing is not an option,
and the FUW does not wish to see a series of measures being put
in place which merely allow farmers to live as best they can with
an ever deteriorating disease situation.
16. The significant increase in TB breakdowns
has also lead insurance companies to review their TB insurance
cover. These companies are now very reluctant to take on any new
business and are also wary of all requests for an increase in
the sum insured on an existing risk. Farmers who have obtained
TB insurance in the past now find that the rates are increasing
substantially and are subject to a minimum premium level.
17. There have been suggestions that the
increased number of TB cases is due to the concentration of cattle
into larger herds. This is a national phenomenon and is certainly
not limited to those areas which are subject to the greatest increase
in TB breakdowns. Furthermore, despite the Draconian movement
restrictions which existed during 2001 and 2002, the statistic
show that TB incidence has continued to increase unabated.
18. The FUW is also concerned that there
should be no confusion over the valuation procedure for TB reactors.
The value of the animals is determined by two professional valuers—one
appointed directly by DEFRA and the other (representing the farmer)
appointed from a list which has been subject to prior approval
by DEFRA.
CONCLUSION
There has been a dramatic increase in TB incidence
since the Government chose to discontinue the Dunnet control strategy,
and the FUW welcomes the opportunity this inquiry gives to present
evidence on the impact of TB on the farming community. Whilst
the headline statistics are testament to the deterioration there
has been in disease control since the mid nineties, the very real
hardship endured by producers is masked by the fact that statistics
on the periods for which farms remain under restriction are not
readily available in tabular form. Such restrictions have a devastating
impact on farm businesses and place huge emotional and financial
pressures on the individuals involved.
31 January 2003
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