Select Committee on European Scrutiny Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness(Questions 20-39)

RT HON PETER HAIN, MR NICK BAIRD AND MS SARAH LYONS

WEDNESDAY 20 NOVEMBER 2002

Tony Cunningham

  20. Would you not agree that one of the, perhaps, best examples of that was given by a senior police officer not too long ago who said that of the top one hundred criminals who were involved in trafficking drugs and all sorts of things in this country not a single one of them actually lives in the UK? How on earth do you deal with a problem like that when these people are living in Spain and Portugal and so on unless you deal with it at a European level?
  (Peter Hain) I think you make the case perfectly for why we share sovereignty to fight international crime, and why it is in our national interest to do so. I am sure your constituents would thank you for having achieved that, just as my constituents will. I guess the honourable Member for Stone's constituents would thank him too, even if he may not thank himself.

Mr Tynan

  21. The idea of a Congress of the Peoples of Europe has been floated. Could you give the Government's view on that proposal? Secondly, what role you see for that Congress?
  (Peter Hain) The idea was first put forward by the President of the Convention, Giscard d'Estaing, and it is not an idea we had encountered before. His proposal, and there is some support for it in the Convention (though considerable opposition as well), is for national parliamentarians and European parliamentarians to come together in a Congress, meeting perhaps once every five years or once a year—the detail is distinctly unclear. As to what we feel about this, until we know really what this animal is it is difficult to form a view upon it. If it is a way of involving national parliamentarians in determining and discussing a kind of policy agenda for Europe on a periodic basis then there may be considerable merit in it, which even your Committee, Chairman, might want to look at, and I would be interested in your views. If it is an entirely new institution (and, by definition, I guess it would be a new institution) to change the nature of decision-making in the European Union and to, in a sense, bypass Member States' vital strategic role in that decision-making, then I would be very concerned about it.

  22. At the present time your view is that there is not enough information or discussion taking place in order to give a Government view on it?
  (Peter Hain) We are adopting an attitude, as I have on the Convention, of always being open to a good idea, if it is a good idea. What does it mean? What role could it perform? I have been asking these questions and the answers have still to be given. We are not ruling out support; it may be it could play a role in annual consideration of the European Union's work programme. That may be valuable. It may be a way of tying national parliamentarians more into it. It is quite interesting that, again, an additional role is being considered for national parliamentarians—another sign of Europe changing more towards the kind of future where we want it to be.

  23. Obviously, the whole purpose of the Convention was to make sure that people understood what was happening here and felt closer to Europe on the decision-making. If you are in a position where you create another body, is there not a danger that it will further divorce the ordinary people from participation in Europe.
  (Peter Hain) I think there is a real issue here, which is one of the purposes of the Convention. Indeed, one of the remits given to it by the Laeken Council in December of last year was to simplify and clarify the tangled web of decision-making and treaties that make it very difficult for the average citizen really clearly to understand what is going on. On the creation, or setting up, of another body, I think the jury is out on whether it will do that or not. That test has to be applied very rigorously before we take a view on it.

Angus Robertson

  24. Moving on to another question, may I ask you about the obstacles to opening up more of the legislative proceedings of the Council of Ministers to the public? Is this something you are pressing for in the Convention?
  (Peter Hain) Yes, it is. We are advocates of full transparency of the decision-making. Not of negotiation because if you put the cameras in when the Council of Ministers is in negotiating formation it would not happen; it would happen, as it does in the Security Council, in a side room or it would happen in the corridors or various smoke-filled rooms (I do not think you can have smoke-filled rooms in the European Union). At any rate, if you leave that negotiating role of the Council aside, then I think the cameras should be in all the time, when speeches are being made, when positions are being argued and when votes—where they happen—take place. For me that is a crucial part of the chain of accountability being established so that the public know what their elected minister is doing on their behalf, and so that parliaments know. The advantage, too, is that very often governments become parties to a decision willingly in the context of the Council but then deny it afterwards and say "Oh, no, it was the rest of the mob that forced this on us." We have got some advance on that, as you know, from the changes in Seville, the European Council there, which brought the cameras in to some extent, but I think we need to go much further.

Mr David

  25. Minister, one of the things that has happened over the last few years is that through a number of treaty changes we have seen the European Parliament gain more and more legislative powers—something which I welcome—but it has meant that in dialogue with the Council of Ministers the European Parliament has, nevertheless, embarked upon a process which is very convoluted, very complicated and very difficult for anybody outside of the Council and the European Parliament to understand. I was wondering if there are proposals from yourself or the Government so that the process could be made more open and transparent.
  (Peter Hain) It is a very interesting point, because when you get into conciliation and co-decision all of that becomes a bit of a fog. I know that several former MEPs on your Committee would confirm that, Chairman. We have not really had the opportunity to go into this matter in the Convention, but if the Committee has any ideas I would gladly have a look at them and take them on. We have still to discuss institutional matters, of which this might be one area. The role of the European Parliament, I think, is due to come up in the January period of the Convention's deliberations. If you have any thoughts before then, formal or informal, I would be glad to receive them.

Tony Cunningham

  26. Following on from those last two questions, we would all support the idea of more openness and more transparency as far as the Council is concerned and as far as the conciliation process is concerned. However, there is a genuine dislocation between the European institutions and European citizens. What discussions have gone on within the Convention? What can be done? It is difficult enough even for our own Parliament to actually bring the citizens of Europe closer to those institutions.

  (Peter Hain) It is a huge challenge. There are, broadly, two models, I think, in the Convention. One is that you achieve greater connection by electing through the European Parliament the Commission President, who on one model would be elected by the people of Europe and, on another, by the European Parliament. So you would have either indirect democracy, as it were, through elected European parliamentarians, or you have direct democracy on this model through the voters of Europe. I believe—and it is the Government's view—that that is actually a false model for the Commission President; the Commission President should not be the big political leader of Europe, The Commission President should be the person responsible for making sure the European Union works well, that it works effectively and that it is delivering for the citizens of Europe the matters which are proper to it. The other model, which is one we favour, is that you have a much clearer chain of accountability, with the European Council reconfigured and reformed (I think we have discussed this before, but I am happy to go into the detail) in such a way that you have an elected president of the European Council who is a full-time figure rather than rotating every six months, as is the present situation, who is elected by elected heads of government, those heads of government themselves elected and answerable to their national parliaments and thereby to voters. That is a chain of accountability much more readily understood by the average citizen. If you then introduce greater transparency into the Council's decisions then I think you get a much clearer picture for the average citizen and a better connection to what is going on in Europe.

Chairman

  27. Moving on to the Charter on Human Rights, Secretary of State, you welcomed the report of the working group on the Charter as a "building block" for the creation of a constitutional treaty and added that, provided an appropriate way of integrating the Charter into the Treaty was found, the UK Government would be "ready to work towards incorporation." What has led the Government to change its mind on the Charter?
  (Peter Hain) You know, our views on the Charter have not changed; we have all along said that it contains a set of admirable principles but we said, at least, that it was unsuitable for legal incorporation—indeed, the Nice European Council agreed with us—because it risked creating a legal uncertainty for the citizens and for Member States. We could not have agreed and still could not agree to giving the Charter full legal status and incorporation into the Treaties unless that problem of legal uncertainty and the role of the Member States was resolved. So in the working group, where Baroness Scotland represented the Government, we fought very hard and began, I think, to win the battle for ensuring that the Charter could not be legally enforceable through our domestic courts. So the working group unanimously came up with a proposition which was, essentially, British ideas to strengthen the horizontal articles in the Charter that, effectively, in simple terms, stopped it reaching down into our domestic courts and changing our domestic law. That position was endorsed almost unanimously in the plenary. So I do not think that can be unpicked. We still have to see exactly how that might, as it were, come out on the night in terms of its full incorporation into the new constitution, which would have to be the case. We would need to be absolutely clear that, for example, you could not change our strike laws, you could not change our employment laws and you could not enable an individual citizen who felt they were not getting the housing opportunity they wanted from their local authority to take that local council to court and, ultimately, to the European Court of Justice under the Charter because that is not a role for Europe, that is a matter for national decision-making and, ultimately, for local authorities. We could have had a situation, if the Charter had simply been incorporated wholesale and unamended into the treaties, which would have been a matter of national veto for us. We are still very far from being certain that our concerns in that respect have been fully accommodated, but we have got a major part of the way and a significant change of stance by other European countries and their parliamentarians. So we are in a much more encouraging position than we were.

  28. You may have covered part of this question. What practical difference would it make if the Charter was incorporated as a protocol to the Treaty, as you want, rather than being part of the Treaty itself?
  (Peter Hain) I think you raise an issue that if it were to be incorporated and if all that necessary protection were built in and, in effect, a fire-break created through these horizontal articles, stopping the impact of the Charter coming down and changing our domestic law—because, remember, the Charter was about citizens of Europe's rights against the institutions, to stop the institutions behaving in a way contrary to those principles of civil rights and so on, not to change domestic laws—then the issue arises should it just be incorporated wholesale into the Treaty with those necessary horizontal clauses, or should there be an article in the new Treaty that cross-references to a protocol, which is what you refer to? We favour the latter, with, also, a full explanatory text associated. That has been the decision of the Convention so far. So it would not be possible to unpick this or to change it in a way that threatened the interests of British citizens—indeed European citizens—as a whole. What was very notable as we made these arguments was that we got more and more Member States and national parliamentarians from other countries supporting us. However the jury is still out for us on whether we can support this or not. We will have to see exactly what the final wording looks like, and there will probably still be some negotiation.

Mr Cash

  29. From what you have just said, we have moved substantially from the statement that was made by one of your predecessors in your previous incarnation that this Charter of Fundamental Rights would not add up to much more than The Beano. Having said that, we are now taking it more seriously. The second point I would make is that of course we took evidence in relation to the proposals for the Fundamental Charter as they were being put forward at the Nice Treaty and Richard Plender QC made it abundantly clear (and you can check this evidence for yourself) that however you juggle with this, the reality—and I am certain this is true—is that the courts will use whatever is contained in that Fundamental Charter however you try to go about trying to write horizontal clauses or anything else. So the question, basically, is this: I hear what you say about your confidence that things are moving in the right direction, but there is going to come a bottom line when the full constitution is considered, and I would like you to give us a guarantee that you would not allow this Fundamental Charter to become legally binding. My second question to you would simply be this: how do you see the Fundamental Charter interacting with the European Convention on Human Rights as incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998? Is it not going to be massively confusing to have two parallel operations which have, also, the intrinsic likelihood of interacting with one another and creating massive confusion?
  (Peter Hain) Can I first of all say that I am a much more grey and boring minister than anyone who could have produced a quote like that.

  30. You are The New Statesman?
  (Peter Hain) No, I am just more grey and boring. You said "the courts will use". This is precisely the area which we have been very concerned about, which is why we opposed full-scale incorporation at Nice. Until and if (and we are not there) that changed so that effectively the courts would not be able to pray the Charter in-aid for decision-making then we could not even consider going down this road. We are not there yet, but you will understand that to have achieved a situation where there was virtually unanimous support elsewhere in the European Union for full incorporation of the Charter, with Britain standing with a few others outside, to have emerged from that position to one where we have changed thinking fundamentally so that now there is unanimous support for strengthening the horizontal articles, is a major step forward, which I am sure you would concede. It is not a big enough step forward for us yet to consider incorporation because we want to be absolutely one hundred per cent certain that we have built in the necessary protective layer. There is an issue, and this was another factor, as to whether the European Convention on Human Rights came into the picture. This was one of the issues to be resolved, but the idea is for the European Union, to accede to the European Convention on Human rights and to do so in a way (which I think is a good thing) that does not contain a contradictory set of routes, for example, to which court do you go, Strasbourg or Luxembourg, in order to assert a right. So there are issues here still to be resolved.

  31. Very big issues indeed, Mr Hain.
  (Peter Hain) Which is why we are treating them with very great caution and great prudence, to borrow a word.

Angus Robertson

  32. Secretary of State, moving on to areas of foreign policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), what proposals does the Government have which could make the Common Foreign and Security Policy more effective without countries like the UK or others losing their room for manoeuvre in foreign affairs?
  (Peter Hain) First of all, I hope the Committee would agree that we want Europe to play a stronger role in the world stage. I think the world is evolving into a multi-polar world. Yes, we will still have one dominant super power for the foreseeable future and it is very important that Europe, as Britain does, works as a whole in partnership with the United States of America. I think the world will evolve beyond the present situation, with China becoming much more significant on the diplomatic stage, not just economically; with Russia wanting a partnership with the European Union and being a significant player, and other countries as well—India, I think, cannot be written out of the picture in terms of it influencing in future decades this century. Where does Europe stand? We are the biggest, richest part of the world and have the biggest single market in the modern world, after enlargement. After enlargement of the European Union the European economy will be bigger than the two biggest economies in the world, Japan and America, combined, and we are the biggest provider of overseas aid and development assistance in the world, providing more than half as the European Union. The question is do we take our global responsibility seriously on the diplomatic stage? I think we should. I think we should have a stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy and it is in Britain's interests for that to be the case, so that, for example, we can intervene as the European Union more effectively in resolving matters in our own back yards, such as the Balkans.

Mr Cash

  33. Or Iraq?
  (Peter Hain) I will come back to Iraq if you wish to press me on that point. Your question was—and I am sorry to set the stage but I think context is quite important—how could this be done? First of all, we need a much more effective European Council instead of the leadership changing every six months and instead of the agenda being a matter of an individual Presidency's fads on a rotating six-monthly basis—there being a strategic agenda. So I think that is one part of the picture. That links straight back into the nation states, as the Council is run by Member States such as ourselves, and the veto would have to exist as far as all the big questions on foreign policy and security policy are concerned. As far as implementation is concerned, that is done by qualified majority voting at the present time. So reform of the Council is part of that. Linked to that is the position of the High Representative, Javier Solana, currently doing an excellent job, giving the European Union a voice in the Middle East negotiations, in the Balkans and so on, and being seen as a credible figure in Washington, which the European Union has never had before. So we want to see that position strengthened, given more resources and so on. There is then a question as to how you link it into the Chris Patten figure, the External Relations Commissioner of the Commission, who has all the money and has the important responsibilities for aid and development and association agreements with other countries, and so on. So it is a question of how you co-ordinate those two roles. We are not in favour of a straight merging or a Commission takeover because that would effectively communitise foreign policy. So getting a much more effective CFSP for the European Union will involve strengthening that figure, strengthening the European Council, but it remaining essentially an intergovernmental matter but doing it in a way so that—because foreign policy is a continuum between the hard end, being the military dimension, and the soft end, being the aid and development dimension, as we have seen in Afghanistan, for example, only recently—there is a continuum and a continuous linkage between the different roles, but it being a matter ultimately for Member States to decide.

Angus Robertson

  34. I agree wholeheartedly with what you said, although there has been one omission, which is—
  (Peter Hain) The role of Scotland?

  35. Well, yes. If I say more in general "parliaments wherever". That is, to use your words, how important it is to be in favour of full transparency and to have a chain of accountability. This Committee recently received its first documents with regard to the CFSP which, in large, were not shared in full with Committee Members because of their sensitivity. I would be interested in how you foresee parliamentary oversight in this particular policy area being as open and transparent as it should be, because up until now Members of this Committee have not been able to share and have insight into the full documentation. I am unaware of other committees of this House having sight, whether that is Defence or Foreign Affairs. Many Members would see that as being particularly important.
  (Peter Hain) I understand that and you have got a reasonable point to make here. I am sorry that you have not got an answer on the question as to why documents relating to an ESDP operation could not be provided to the Committee. It is actually proving to be a much more complicated subject than we thought at first sight when we were considering this in the Foreign Office. What we are trying to do is marry together the way we consult Parliament during NATO operations and the way in which we provide European Union documents to parliaments, which is proving all the more complicated by the fact that some European Union documents to an ESDP operation may originate elsewhere. I think the Minister of State for the Armed Forces has been in touch with the Committee and this is now not a matter for me but a matter for the Minister for Europe and for the Foreign Secretary, but there are discussions going on with the MoD to try and clarify these issues in order for your own wishes to be satisfied.

  Angus Robertson: Thank you.

Mr Hendrick

  36. Coming back to the CFSP, Minister, you did mention there is, if you like, a hard end, in terms of military action, and a soft end where you get things like international development. Clearly, in terms of the European Union having one voice on foreign policy, what effectively you get—and I think you said it yourself—is an expression of whatever the intergovernmental or Council view is. Now, at the softer end I think, in many cases, that is a much easier affair, in that you can get a genuine consensus view that will be put forward. At the harder end it becomes that much more difficult. Given, for example, the circumstances in which we find ourselves, at the moment, where there is a potential for conflict with Iraq, would you think it is much more important that there is a single spokesperson for foreign policy for the European Union, given the fact that we may wish to differ with other European Union Member States' views on, let us say, potential action in Iraq, or are you happy with things as they are? In addition, certainly in my time in the European Parliament, there was a view that perhaps the European Union should have a seat as a permanent member of the United Nations, for example. Do you not see possibly a danger or a risk—or perhaps you might say it was a desirable thing—that Britain and France's place at the table as permanent members of the Security Council may be taken away and the European Union would have a seat as a permanent member?
  (Peter Hain) Dealing with that point first, the constitution of the United Nations does not provide for regional groups in the world to be represented on the Security Council. So that is not really an issue. It perhaps is in a theoretical sense. Even that minority of voices in the Convention that want foreign policy communitised, basically because they are small players on the world stage, to be perfectly brutal about it, have not argued a case for France's seat or Britain's seat to be given up, and we would not agree to that. That is just out of the picture, full-stop, end of the story, as far as we are concerned, and that goes for France. It is not a serious proposition. On your more interesting point—or even more interesting point—about the soft end and the hard end, if you look at what we have done—and this is a very practical issue—we have agreed, for example, to share sovereignty on trade negotiations, which comes into foreign policy. So a European Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, very brilliantly represented us, Britain, our national parliament, through the European Union at the Dohare talks and was able, because we are a strong block, to strike a deal with his opposite number the American negotiator to get a much more progressive position on opening up world trade and trying to create the basis for world trade and open up trade to poorer countries in the world, for instance. Now it is all part of foreign policy, you could argue, so that is a communitised soft end of external relations which we are happy to have agreed to. I do not think anybody would challenge that seriously. The same goes for development aid and assistance, it is an advantage that Europe has got a big programme but that does not stop us having our own programme or any other Member States. These things can run in together. The red line for us is we could not agree to a decision in Brussels committing British soldiers into a conflict zone where their lives may be at risk, that is a matter for this Parliament and our Government which is accountable to this Parliament. That deals with the Iraq issue, for example. What we are trying to establish is a Common Foreign and Security Policy which is a serious policy because you have this schizophrenia in the Convention, if I can be frank about it, that the most strident voices for a completely overwhelming foreign policy for the European Union are the ones who do not really want a serious foreign policy, they want to just issue resolutions and make statements and think that the world changes by that. We all want the conflict in the Middle East to end and for an independent Palestinian state to be established and the security of Israel to be guaranteed. The way some other Europeans operate, ministers included, which I have seen first hand is they just think you can rush out and issue a statement to the nearest television camera and then everything changes, of course it does not as we have seen with the expert work done by the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister on Iraq. This is painstaking negotiation and diplomacy and to get the European Union into that position requires big changes and a complete change of attitude as well on the part of a lot of Member States, and particularly the part of European parliamentarians.

Mr Cash

  37. I would like now to turn to the question of the European constitution and the alternative proposal that it could be a constitutional treaty. First of all, do you agree that this is a distinction without difference because the legal effect will be the same in either event? Secondly, you may not agree with this but I put it to you that the Government has sold the United Kingdom down the river already by conceding the principle of a European constitution for reasons that I am sure you understand. The reality is that once you get to the point in the context of the shift towards more governmental functions within the framework of this constitutional framework then of course you are conceding that you are moving towards a single European state which is endorsed by the notion of the single legal personality for the European Union which goes to the question of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the rest. Would you be good enough to comment on the question of which parts of the Giscard d'Estaing proposals you do not agree with? Would you disagree, for example, with the idea of the arrangements for the representation of the Union in international relations and the definition of the role and future rank of the high representative, touching on the matters you have referred to in relation to CFSP? Would you agree, for example, that the European Commission should be given an exclusive monopoly in relation to the initiation of legislation? Could you give us some idea as to what it is? It is a new monopoly in case Mr Baird is suggesting otherwise, it is not a minor matter. The question is to what extent would you be in disagreement with the Giscard proposals? Do you reject my general proposition that at the bottom line by giving way to the principle of a European constitution you are selling Britain down the river effectively? Just to refer to Mr Straw's article again, he makes three comparisons. Golf clubs, which is absurd, of course. Then he mentions the United Nations, of course the United Nations is not a country. Then he mentions the US constitution in aid of his agreement with the idea of a constitution but, of course, that concedes the point because the US constitution is the constitution for a country. What are your comments on those points?
  (Peter Hain) Well, there are a lot of them.

  38. There are indeed, and there are more to come, Mr Hain. We ought to go back to Papua New Guinea and discuss this.
  (Peter Hain) That would be very pleasant. First of all, can I say, Chairman, good friend though he is, I think anything that any British Government does, including those of Mrs Thatcher and John Major, in the Hon. Member's eyes would be selling Britain down the river in the European Union. It is just an article of faith for him as far as the European Union is concerned, even if it is in the British national interest. Let me just make that point, in a sense. To deal with his specific matters. First of all, the European Commission has large rights of initiative at the present time, excluding Common Foreign and Security Policy and some aspects of justice and home affairs. I do not think anybody is envisaging that changes, that it is either reduced or increased. It leads to the point about a single legal personality as well. At the moment you have the European Community and you have the European Union which is pretty confusing for most citizens and also confusing for third countries. If you are negotiating an association agreement say with a North African country in the Mediterranean area, effectively you have a whole series of agreements, some of which are with the European Union, some of which are with the European Community, some of which have to be negotiated by the Commission, others of which have to be negotiated with the Council and this is a very confusing way to go about life. Provided that a single legal personality—which meant effectively that in legal international terms there was no distinction between the European Union, it was one body effectively in international legal terms—for example, Common Foreign and Security Policy was not communitised, provided that did not mean that aspects of justice and home affairs were communitised, provided that did not mean that the EU became some federal super state then I think we should approach this in a very practical way, let us see what it means not just react in a kind of knee jerk fashion to it. The same goes for the principle of the constitution. To all intents and purposes the treaties of the European Union, running as they do to hundreds of thousands of words and hundreds of pages, amount to a kind of constitution for the European Union. The issue is do you bring these together in a simple straight forward clear test which the Foreign Secretary has called the European constitution or not? Now I think your constituents and mine would think there is quite a lot of merit in doing that provided—and this is the important proviso which relates to your question as well—that it is a constitution on the foundations of Member States, not some Brussels super state. I do not think there is any prospect of the Convention agreeing a federal super state model for the European Union. The support does not exist, not only Britain would oppose that, France would oppose it, Spain would oppose it, Italy would oppose it, Sweden would oppose it, Denmark would oppose it, most of the candidate countries would oppose it because they have only in the last decade or so emerged from under the shadow of being run from Moscow and they are not about to be run from Brussels so I do not think that is a serious runner. I am sure you would all want to look constructively at what is in a constitution rather than simply rejecting it wholesale.

Miss McIntosh

  39. Secretary of State, there is a little confusion at the moment because there was another draft constitutional treaty tabled, also, by Professor Alan Dashwood and other leading legal academics prior to the publication of Giscard d'Estaing's. I understand that was funded by the Foreign Office. Does the Foreign Office support this? Is it Government policy? Would you like to see either the whole of that draft treaty or only part of it effectively as part of the constitution?
  (Peter Hain) First of all, I omitted to answer one of the Hon. Member for Stone's questions, if you would forgive me and allow me just to do so briefly. There are aspects of the Giscard draft that we do not agree with, for example renaming the European Union. He suggested it could be called the United States of Europe, that was one option, well forget that frankly. Another idea was United Europe or Europe United which sounds like a football team to me to be frank. I think most Members of the Convention attacked the renaming the European Union and said "Look, we have got a name, let us stick to it". Then there was a rather odd proposal for dual citizenship and it was not clear what that meant. On the contribution from Professor Dashwood, what is known as the Cambridge text—because he is a professor at Cambridge University—it is not Government policy. We commissioned Professor Dashwood and his team at Cambridge to produce a text and we gave him Jack Straw's speeches and said we would like to see what his best shot at a European constitution could look like on the principle of a Union of Nation States rather than a federal super state. He came out with his own version. He retained complete editorial control. It contains some very good ideas such as clear dividing lines between the European Union and Member State roles, which is not defined often as clearly as it is in his text in the existing treaties but it differs from government policy in a number of areas too. I am sure you do not want me to give a running commentary on Dashwood but we thought it was a valuable contribution to the debate, not least because there was a text produced by the European University Institute at Florence which was a text we did not like and which was in a sense going the super state way. We wanted to put another contribution into the debate. In practice what will happen is we will negotiate from January onwards and, indeed, the presidium of the Convention secretariat is hard at work already trying to do some drafting around fleshing out the Giscard skeleton. We will negotiate around that and bring into play some of Professor Dashwood's ideas where these things seem appropriate.


 
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