Select Committee on European Scrutiny Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)

WEDNESDAY 16 JULY 2003

RT HON PETER HAIN, MS SARAH LYONS AND MR TOM DREW

  Q20  Angus Robertson: Yes.

  Peter Hain: What is the answer to that, Tom? Can I probe you a bit? What do you mean by that?

  Q21  Angus Robertson: From a legal perspective, do the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy have the same legal status?

  Peter Hain: I am trying to get at what is behind your supplementary question, so perhaps you could ask that, as it were, before I answer it and then I can give you a proper answer.

  Q22  Angus Robertson: The question obviously is if they have the same legal status, which most purists would agree, then why is it that both of those policies are treated differently when the competencies of the European Union are listed under Article 12 of the draft constitution?

  Peter Hain: I do not see really what the problem is here. It seems to me that what we have here is a situation in which the fisheries policy and the agricultural policy is determined by the European Union in the way we all know, and again—and I apologise if I am not getting to your point but I cannot see the key point you are making—

  Q23  Angus Robertson: It is pretty fundamental really because at the moment policies with regards to fisheries and policies with regards to agriculture are subject to the CAP and to the CFP, yet when one looks at the constitution both of those policies are treated differently. It is not just a tidying up exercise. One, namely fisheries, is to be an exclusive competence when dealing with the conservation and marine biological resources, but agriculture is not—it is to be a shared competence. It is fundamentally different. How is it that they are being treated differently if they are of the same legal status?

  Peter Hain: Well, they operate in a different way. The draft Treaty does not propose extending competence. It is not extending competence of fisheries—we can all agree that. If you are interested, as I think you are, in the conservation of marine biological resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, that has been exclusive to the European Community since 1979.

  Q24  Angus Robertson: With respect, that is not my question. I am asking why are these two policy areas which have the same legal status being treated differently?

  Peter Hain: Because they have been.

  Q25  Angus Robertson: Why?

  Peter Hain: I am not sure, to be perfectly frank, other than the obvious point which is that lots of different policies are treated in different ways in Part III of the constitution, and in different ways and so on. It seems to me to be a pretty obvious point. I am not sure what you are getting at.

  Q26  Miss McIntosh: My understanding is that these are two common policies so they should have exclusive competence and I think the thrust of Mr Robertson's question is that one is being treated—fisheries—as exclusive competence, whereas the CAP now, under the mid-term review, is going to be treated as shared competence. That is a fundamental change to the Treaty which appears to have been smuggled through. It is a very important point.

  Peter Hain: What matters is the impact and the outcome—that is what matters. The common foreign and security policy is common, but it is treated in a very different way.

  Q27  Miss McIntosh: If we follow that logic through then effectively exclusive competence means that fisheries policies will be applied the same across the European Union, whereas now you are going to have farming policy which is going to be applied disuniformly across the European Union. I think the question I would like to ask the government is, was this the intention behind the change of competence in this new constitution?

  Peter Hain: There has not been a change of competence.

  Q28  Miss McIntosh: Yes, there has. You just told us there has.

  Peter Hain: No, I have not. I have not said there has been a change of competence in the way the constitution—this is getting very anoraky, Mr Chairman, but unless I am wrongly advised, I do not think there has been any change of competence in this area in the draft constitutional Treaty compared with the previous one. Is that right?

  Mr Drew: Yes.

  Q29  Chairman: I have the advantage of having my legal adviser on my right hand side here, who tells me that it is a highly technical matter but it may be a bit better than it was previously under the new proposals. I am going to suggest it is something the Committee will want to look into in greater detail, and we will come back on this. It is a highly technical matter according to my legal advice, so I will move on, Minister.

  Peter Hain: Well, if I can help in the future on that, or if the Foreign Secretary or the Minister for Europe can respond to help you I am sure they would, but I do not believe any substantive change has been made in the way that has been suggested.

  Mr Connarty: I think we will look forward to that answer, Minister. It is not just an SNP point. If people representing fishing communities do not have a right to speak on it because it has been pledged solely to Europe and there is nothing for us to say at national level, I think that would be very worrying, and I think that is the inference of the question.

  Chairman: I did not call Mr Connarty to carry on this point. We look forward to the answer. [1]Do you have another question, Mr Connarty?

  Q30  Mr Connarty: I would like to turn to the institutions, Minister. I was surprised to hear Giscard d'Estaing say himself that the institutional reforms contained many uneasy compromises, and he said, "it contained mistakes made by the Praesidium at the express request of the Convention at large". Is the government happy with the Convention's compromise proposals on the reform of the EU institutions, or will it seek substantial changes at the IGC, and could we have an indication of where the government stands on the various proposals? Secondly, does it hold the view that was given in the contribution by you and others that you submitted that the Nice provisions should be retained after 2009?

  Peter Hain: Firstly, on the last point, I do not think anybody is suggesting that the Nice provisions say, for example, on the numbers of commissioners should be retained after 2009. It is accepted that there will be a change there. Secondly, on the institutions, we were broadly happy with the outcome: we got a key strategic objective achieved in making the European Council and therefore governments stronger by better co-ordination, better organisation, and a full time elected member to chair the Council on behalf of national governments. We were also happy that the European Commission had been strengthened and reformed to make it more efficient, and we were happy that the European Parliament, for example, got greater scrutiny rights, which I think is a good thing. The area which we remain doubtful about is this proposal for a so-called double hatting of the existing High Representative, Javier Solana, and the external relations commissioner, Chris Patten. The way that has been configured still leaves some room for doubt in a number of areas and we would still need to negotiate the detail of that to make absolutely crystal clear that this new foreign representative role is strictly under the control of governments and accountable to governments, despite the fact that he quite properly, or she, would have access to European resources through the Commission role in a way that is not possible now.

  Q31  Mr Connarty: Pressing you on this, some of the discussion has been that the Foreign Secretary of Europe, which is the title that has been bandied around, somehow would conflict with the role of the new elected President or chair of the Council, who is seen in the first instance to be the most important person in the joint government bodies. Is that the basis of this? That it would be a conflict of who speaks for Europe?

  Peter Hain: No, that is not what it is about. The point I was making was whether the Commission in effect got a back door into the common foreign and security policy in areas where it does not have a competence, and if you brought these two posts together, and we are not satisfied with the position as it currently stands, it is satisfactory to the extent that the person is appointed by the Council, in other words by governments and accountable to governments, but some of the detail leaves us uneasy. It is not a question of a conflict of role with the full-time Chairman of the Council or President. What each President of the Council would do is effectively operate for Europe at the level that the post operates now—for example, in international summits with Russia, China, the United States or India, representation at the G8 and so on. But it is very confusing for other presidents and Prime Ministers of other countries when the person changes every six months. They just start to build a relationship, then off they go and it is some other figure. So that is the advantage of that role at a foreign policy level—the foreign representative level will not deal with that any more than our own Foreign Secretary normally deals at the head of government level. He or she would be dealing with the foreign ministers of other nations and other groups of nations, so there is no conflict at all.

  Q32  Mr Connarty: To the same agenda set by the Council rather than by the Commission?

  Peter Hain: Indeed. To the same agenda set by the Council.

  Q33  Mr Marshall: Continuing on the institutional changes, one of the provisions in the draft Treaty is for a legislative council. Will the government seek to remove this provision and, if it fails to do so, do you think that the principle is workable?

  Peter Hain: Originally, there was a proposal for an entirely new Legislative Council which we saw as a Trojan Horse really for effectively separating legislation from executive policy making, whereby the Commission would be able to get its hands on executive policy making in a way that was not acceptable from our point of view. I think that was part of the agenda behind those who advocated it. There was a very persuasive advocacy in the sense that the Legislative Council would give the opportunity for a final, as it were, almost Third Reading on behalf of governments sitting together and whoever was representing governments on the Legislative Council. For example, it was argued that the Environment Council could adopt a position that was actually negative as far as the Agriculture Council was concerned or Industry was concerned, so you might want to have a chance of a final look at it—that was the argument put. Anyway, we knocked out the Legislative Council but then it was proposed to change it to the General Affairs and Legislative Council together, so you extended the existing General Affairs Council mandate. Now, effectively, you have in the existing GAC an agenda item at every meeting called Reports from other Council Formations, what these different councils have been doing, legislating and so on, so you could regard it as a kind of expanded version of that agenda item, and if that was the case then fine, normally it just goes through on the nod, but if there is an ambition to reincarnate a full-blown Legislative Council that is not something we would be prepared to go along with.

  Q34  Mr Tynan: Minister, Mr Connarty touched on the Foreign Affairs Minister in a kind of competition with the President, or the proposed Presidency. Obviously the fact that 25 countries are going to be part of the European Union and the smaller countries in particular enjoy their time in the sun is in strong opposition to the proposal that there be strong rules about the presidency. There is a feeling at the present time that the smaller countries have been successful in watering down the role of the new President. What would your view be on that?

  Peter Hain: There was an ambition on the smaller countries to do exactly that. First of all, some of the smaller countries like Sweden backed us all the way, Denmark supported us, and there were changes along the road through the process of the Convention, but when the smalls realised that it was something that was either going to happen or the Convention would be in deadlock they then changed to try to reconfigure the job description and strip away some of the role to do exactly that, and to confine it to just chairing the European Council meetings, whereas we wanted it to co-ordinate the whole work of governments in the European Union including Councils of Ministers, and we have achieved that to all intents and purposes, so I think we have exactly what we want which is a strong representative of governments at the top of the European Union, and I would have thought that would be welcomed by everybody who wants to see the European Union as a partnership of sovereign nation states, not a federal super state.

  Q35  Mr Tynan: So the view expressed that the Council President has been talked up to be considerably more important compared to the Commission and the Foreign Affairs Minister you would dispute?

  Peter Hain: I would strongly dispute it. The Council President has the same role as the job has now, pretty well, and I think once that person has been appointed, beds down and starts to operate, then it will become an increasingly formidable role just because of the nature of the way the world is changing, and governments and prime ministers and presidents, heads of other governments, are increasingly seeing the European Union for what it is—a very important, and growingly so, agency for achieving national interests. Having somebody who is there as a full-time person based in Brussels, able to negotiate with the Commission President and the European Parliament President on governments' behalf continuously rather than with prime Ministers or presidents who have to do the full job of heading up their own governments—it has become increasingly impossible to do both of those things.

  Q36  Mr Tynan: I understand there is no proposal for the President of the European Council to have their own cabinet: that no longer exists within the proposal that is on the table at present. Is that not a weakening of the position?

  Peter Hain: No. We did not want a rival bureaucracy set up, or a great big institutional apparatus to underpin the role of the President in the Council. We wanted pretty well the existing Council secretariat to do that job so no, there was no real, as it were, knock back on that position.

  Q37  Angus Robertson: Minister, can I move things on to the common foreign and security policy? As you will be aware, probably, the German foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, not long ago proposed the creation of a diplomatic service for the European Union and that it should be under the control of the new EU Foreign Affairs Minister. Can I ask you what the government's view is on the proposal to create such a foreign service for the European Union, and should such a service be under the control of the new Foreign Affairs Minister or, indeed, the Commission?

  Peter Hain: Well, the idea of, as it were, a fully fledged European diplomatic service was not taken forward by the Convention though it was, as you imply, advocated, and we argued against it. What we did argue for, however, was an end to the ridiculous situation where Javier Solana, the high representative, as he gave evidence to us demonstrated, could travel to Washington representing the Council and governments but not be able to use the European Union's Commission staff there. This is a ridiculous situation because he was representing the Council, not the Commission so we now have a situation where that artificial distinction is going to be broken down. Already, there is a sensible co-operation amongst European Member States: we represent some Member States in African countries, for example, and they do the same for us in areas where they have a traditional, historical relationship, and we do not have the resources to put in a proper mission. So I think that kind of co-operation will go. But arrival of a diplomatic service? No.

  Q38  Angus Robertson: In five years' time you do not imagine that there might be even only a small diplomatic service working for the Foreign Affairs Minister?

  Peter Hain: Yes. Perhaps I need to clarify what I said. There are proposals for a diplomatic service but not as a rival. I think some in the Convention saw that like they saw Europe taking our seat in the Security Council, they had that ambition—well, all of that was defeated within the Convention and we had a much more common sense approach.

  Q39  Mr Marshall: Could I just probe a little on the role and the position of the European Foreign Affairs Minister? From what you have said, Minister, it appears that the British government is in favour of that position: I wonder if you could make that clear? Secondly, even though the government may be in favour, do the government not see that they could well be in serious difficulties with the duality of the role of this person? You have mentioned one example of where Javier Solana, when he is at the United Nations, might be in a better position to negotiate if he could use the Commission's staff or whatever, but is not this the crux of the potential problem? That you cannot on the one hand be serving the Member States where the national interest is paramount—you have mentioned that in terms of the common foreign and security policy—but at the same time be a Vice President of the Commission, because in many cases their interests are different. The Commission has got this urge to extend qualified majority power all the time whereas presumably the European Council in charge of common and foreign security policy is opposed to that, and there is a potential danger if you put all of this responsibility in one person?

  Peter Hain: There is obviously a concern about that and I understand that, but the original proposal for this double-hatted figure, as it came to be known at the Convention, was for a takeover by the Commission through the back door of the common and foreign security policy, and there were still those who wished to see that—if you like the federalists' convention. We saw them all. But to give you another practical example—


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