Examination of Witnesses(Questions 20-39)
WEDNESDAY 18 DECEMBER 2002
MR DENIS
MACSHANE
MP, MR PAUL
JOHNSTON AND
MR ALEX
ELLIS
20. Did Mr Denktash refuse to put his initials
on it because he was ill or because he disagreed with it?
(Mr MacShane) I am not Mr Denktash, so I cannot answer.
I think it would be fair to say that he has had the opportunity
since his return to Cyprus and to Turkey to say yes, and so far
he has not done so.
21. What do you know about his objection?
(Mr MacShane) His objections are what have traditionally
been the objections he has made to any attempt to resolve the
Cypriot crisis. Basically, he wants, as I understand it—and
I must be cautious in what I say because I do not want to speak
entirely for another person—recognition for a wholly independent
Turkish Cypriot entity.
22. That would be a disagreement in principle,
not a disagreement about the details of the plan.
(Mr MacShane) It undoubtedly would. Mr Denktash is
going to have to decide whether he seeks to make the Kofi Annan
plan unachievable, or whether he seeks to help his own people
and the Island of Cyprus.
Jim Dobbin
23. Minister, how much pressure do you think
the Turkish Government itself can exert, in the short time available,
to have an impact?
(Mr MacShane) I very much hope, and certainly officials
have been saying and the Foreign Secretary has been making clear,
that it has to be in the interests of Turkey to support the Annan
proposals. I have looked at them in some detail. I know Cyprus,
I care for Cyprus, and I think that they take everybody significantly
forward. There is no solution that will please everybody in all
aspects, but the prize of a single Cyprus entering the European
Union in 2004 with its international representation so structured
that Turkey, as it were, will find someone to talk Turkish to
in its discussions on the European Union, I would have thought,
from the point of view of our Turkish friends in Ankara, would
be a prize they should seize with both hands.
24. This Committee has recently been to Cyprus
and we did see the stark reality of the differences between the
north and south. If a divided Cyprus becomes a member in 2004,
do you think the Greek Cypriots would oppose Turkish membership?
(Mr MacShane) I genuinely cannot answer that question.
We are at this stage of the timetable on Turkey. As you know,
the Prime Minister succeeded in pulling the date for the first
examination of whether Turkey had complied with the Copenhagen
criteria back to 2004, and the commitment that, if the answer
then in December 2004 is yes, accession negotiations could start
without delay. However, nobody is looking at anything other than
a fairly long, hard period of negotiations and it is now on the
record that the 25 Member States of the European Union (the 15
existing and 10 that are coming in) have signed an agreement saying
"We also welcome the important decisions that have been taken
today concerning the next stage of Turkey's candidature for membership
of the European Union." So the Cypriot representatives—they
are principally Greek representatives, for obvious reasons—are
fully signed up to that Declaration, and we expect them to honour
it.
Mr Davis
25. Were the Turks asking for negotiations to
start at once?
(Mr MacShane) I think that the Turks would have been
happy to see the earliest possible start to negotiations, but
they have been told very clearly by this Government's representatives,
let alone by others, that a 2002/2003 start was, frankly, not
realistic.
26. What was the earliest realistic date?
(Mr MacShane) When I began this job there were major
European states who would have been very happy with 2007/2008.
Mr Schroeder, whose party, along with the other partner in the
governing coalition in Germany, has always been committed to Turkish
admission, wanted an earlier date, and France, which to judge
certainly from its press reporting of the issue was much more
reluctant, would have been happier with the later date, but they
agreed 2005. If I may reveal a secret—and I do not think
it is much of a secret—from the dinner of European Ministers
prior to the discussion of the Turkish issue last Thursday night,
all of my European colleagues were quite happy to leave it until
2005 and some were not entirely sure that it could not be put
off for a wee bit longer. I, therefore, was delighted, as a strong
supporter of serious consideration of Turkey's admission to the
EU, that—thanks, again, I think, to good work by the Prime
Minister, but supported by other countries, Greece in particular—we
got 2004 into the headline start date for consideration of possible
negotiations.
27. Does the start of negotiations depend on
a solution to the Cyprus problem or improvement in terms of human
rights?
(Mr MacShane) The Copenhagen criteria—rule of
law, democracy and human rights—are the key issues. Undoubtedly,
a decision to accept the Annan proposals and the solution in those
being accepted in Cyprus and Turkey, I think, would be a very
positive and welcome statement of goodwill and, if you like, finding
a European answer that the Turks could achieve, in my judgment,
would considerably help their status as a potential candidate.
28. Yes, but is it essential or just welcome?
(Mr MacShane) It is not essential. What we said—at
the European Council in Edinburgh, in fact, nine years ago—is
that we want candidate countries to achieve stability over institutions,
guaranteed democracy and rule of law, human rights' respect and
protection of minorities, a functioning market economy and a candidate's
ability to take on the obligations of membership of political,
economic and monetary union. So quite clearly it would be wrong
suddenly to pitchfork into that a new condition in respect of
obligations towards a third country and a specific foreign policy
obligation. Nobody is in any doubt—and I certainly reinforce
that message and so will the Foreign Secretary, publicly and privately—that
Turkey's facilitating solution to the Cypriot problem has to stand
greatly to their credit for their wider ambitions to be in the
European Union.
Mr Connarty
29. Moving specifically to Turkey's pre-conditions,
and the concept of human rights, I just wonder how we could allow
the Copenhagen criteria not to include a reduction in the electoral
barrier for the representation of parties, given the structure
of the population and the percentage of people who are Kurdish.
They are unlikely ever to get beyond the 10% barrier and, therefore,
will never—unless it is changed to the standard 5%—have
representation in their own right in the Turkish Parliament. That
seems to me to be something that is not mentioned. Was it mentioned
in the discussions? Secondly, the fact that Turkey is the conduit
for almost 300 tonnes of pure heroin into Europe from Afghanistan,
and it is an industry, is not mentioned at a high enough level
because, surely, we must choke off this trail of death and destruction
that is coming into our country through Turkey.
(Mr MacShane) I very much agree with you, which is
why if it is decided to open full negotiations for accession with
Turkey, top, I would have thought, of the agenda must be the need
to combat organised crime and the fact that Turkey, as you rightly
say, is a conduit for people smuggling, drug smuggling and the
rest of it. On the question of insisting that Brussels should
decide how people conduct their elections, I would be rather nervous
about that. However, if representations are made they will be
considered. On the whole, I would be very, very reluctant for
(and I use Brussels as a shorthand) any of us to start telling
countries what the cut-off point should be for seats in parliament,
whether parties should be considered supporters of terrorist organisations
or not and whether funding should be given to parties who are
felt not to behave in a fully democratic manner. That really is,
I think, a question for national governments to decide.
30. Can I come back, because that is a fudge.
Turkey have put a 10% barrier for any party to get a seat in the
Turkish parliament. It is quite clear that the Kurdish people
can never reach that 10%, even if all of those who can, vote for
one party. It is clearly a deliberate barrier to democratic representation
of a minority in their population. I worry. I have read the reports
that people do not want to discuss this issue. Surely it is all
about the fact that human rights must also allow people to be
empowered and if we are just saying we are ignoring the plight
of the Kurdish people democratically because we do not want to
interfere internally, we are abrogating our responsibility to
civilised society.
(Mr MacShane) Quite sincerely, Mr Connarty, it was
not a fudge. I am not myself in favour of having elections based
on simply representation of people according to national or ethnic
interests. That is, maybe, because I come from a background that
thinks values and ideology are what should govern your affiliation
rather than petty nationalism or ethnicity. The Turkish Government
have agreed—
31. We seem to be willing to go to war over
the Kurds in Iraq.
(Mr MacShane) I am not really here to answer questions
on Iraq. My judgment is that it is to do with weapons of mass
destruction rather than Kurds or Sunnis or Shi'as. Mr Connarty,
your argument is a good one in the sense that everybody can have
a debate in every EU Member State on cut-off points. Mr Cash referred
to the fact that the Poles in their constitution say that to pass
a referendum you have to have 50% of people voting. Some of us
might think that that was setting the barrier too high, but, again,
it really is not, I think, for me here as a Minister, to tell
other countries what their voting system should be.
Chairman
32. That is a very good lead into my question,
Minister. How important was the role played by the United States,
and what arguments, inducements or threats did the US Government
make in the debate on whether Turkey should start accession negotiations?
(Mr MacShane) I can honestly say that since I have
been Minister for Europe my 'phone rings a hundred times a day
but I have yet to hear an American accent at the other end. As
I set out in an article published in The Observer and also
published in Liberation in France and El Pais in
Spain, my support for Turkish membership is purely on European
lines. We have got this fantastic prize of having a Muslim democracy
operating under the values, which are very much secular values,
and rules of the European Union within the European Union, in
due course, if everything works out. We also need to show particularly
to the 15 million Muslim citizens of Europe that the European
Union is not just a white Christian club. There are obvious, enormous
geo-strategic advantages in having secular Muslim democracy inside
the European Union. I notice many reports about America's interventions
here and there. Well, the United States is a partner and ally
of all of us in Europe and it is perfectly proper for it to make
its views known, just as we regularly—this Government, the
French Government, the German Government, other governments and
Brussels institutions themselves—make their views known
very vigorously across a range of issues to Washington, and do
so sometimes in a very public way.
33. Was it a coincidence that the Americans'
view was supported by the British Government during those discussions?
(Mr MacShane) I can truthfully say that in all the
discussions I have had on Turkey, and those preceded my nomination
to this post, that it is taken on its merits. It is good for Europe,
it is good for Turkey and it is good for the Mediterranean if
Turkey turns west to the European Union. Those, for me, are the
clinching arguments, not the points of view of any other state
in the world.
Mr Cash
34. Mr MacShane, there was an agreement described
in the Presidency conclusions, paragraph 27, as between NATO and
the European Union in respect of access to NATO assets. I am bound
to say that, although there was a rather self-congratulatory note
adopted there, the emphasis is on full conformity with the principles
that have already been arrived at in a series of previous meetings
which I have taken a certain amount of interest in. In particular,
Annex 2 to the Declaration states that these arrangements "
. . . shall not affect the rights and obligations of EU States
in their capacity as EU Members." That is, obviously, a reaffirmation
of the degree of single autonomous arrangements which I raised
with the Prime Minister at Faro and subsequently in the debates
on Nice and so forth. The question is partly one of commitment.
We hear about the so-called—and I am using a paraphrase—Pentagon
arrangements which are now being proposed with respect to a European
defence arrangement, but there is a simple problem here, and that
is that without a full commitment by the United States and that
arm of NATO, the European Defence Policy is rather a feeble operation.
Secondly, where is the money going to come from? The Greeks have
already got a commitment of 5% (4.9%) expenditure but, on the
other hand, they are proposing to reduce it over the next decade
to 3.5; the average in Europe is running at round about 1.4 and
the Germans are reducing their defence commitment. Where is the
money going to come from unless there is a universal tax policy
in Europe, which is certainly being advocated by several of the
Member States, in order to pay for this? You look very surprised,
but I would like you to answer a simple question: where is the
money going to come from for these high-flown proposals which
ultimately depend, in the last resort, on American commitment?
(Mr MacShane) Mr Chairman, Mr Cash, I looked surprised
because to my knowledge I have not seen concrete proposals for
a European-wide tax to pay for defence. That, genuinely, is new
to me. However, if Mr Cash can furnish me with better and more
detailed particulars I would be grateful to see the source for
that rather dramatic new proposal. What has happened is, of course,
that at the Copenhagen summit the conclusion, to which Mr Cash
has referred, was taken down to NATO in Brussels and it is there
that they lifted the objections from Member States to what is
called, in the shorthand, Berlin Plus. Berlin Plus is very much
what our allies and partners in NATO wanted and principally, of
course, the strongest ally and partner in NATO which the EU now
has, thanks to Copenhagen and NATO last weekend, assured access
to NATO's planning and shape, and this is effective immediately,
so you do not have to create endless parallel structures. Assuming
we have now got access to NATO's assets, we will be going ahead
with a joint exercise to test these procedures and we have got
great contacts between the EU and NATO staff. Mr Cash says "Where
is the money going to come from to pay for all of this?"
The fundamental problem with European defence is two-fold: we
have twice as many men under arms as the United States (I am talking
about the European Union in its totality) but the capacity to
actually put men into the field in an operational way is, frankly,
very, very limited. We will be able to take over from NATO now
its obligations in Macedonia and, possibly, Bosnia, which I think
would be very welcome to our American partners, as it can relieve
them of some of their tasks down there. We will continue to co-operate
jointly with NATO. This exactly reinforces what has been a constant
British Government position, under this Government, which is that
we do not want a divide between Europe and the United States in
matters of defence. The European Union's work in ESDP is complementary
not rival to NATO and NATO now has agreed to place its assets
and support at the service of the European tasks. I think that
is a win-win for everybody, except those, of course, who want
to divide Europe from America. I agree with you on the point of
budgets, Mr Cash. I am happy to place on record that I think we
should be spending more in Europe on our defence obligations,
especially with the new tasks in terms of security against terrorism.
I would wish—I go back to my point about closing the $2.5
trillion wealth gap between Europe and the United States—we
generally had more money generated by the European economy which
would allow, in the very tough budget decisions that national
governments have to take actually, more support for defence. I
will continue to take that message—and I think it represents,
broadly, the view of the House—forward in my discussions
in Europe.
35. Can I just follow that up by posing another
question, which is that it is, to say the least, an object of
hope that you expressed, which is that there would be less anti-Americanism
in the context of the defence question, because after all it is—
(Mr MacShane) And anti-Europeanism, if I may say so,
Mr Cash.
36. Well, not at all. I would say if you want
a secure and stable Europe and you want to be quite sure you have
full American commitment, let me put it the other way round, that
this degree of enthusiasm on your part and, indeed, on the part
of the government for a proper relationship with the United States
is laudable but unfortunately is not matched by some of the really
serious political differences that exist in some of the other
European countries. So I would simply say that if you are proposing
that we should have a better relationship with the United States,
would it not be far better for the United Kingdom to be more emphatic
with its other European partners in getting them to understand
that a good and sensible relationship with the United States is
to the benefit of everybody and to the security of not only Europe
but also the whole world?
(Mr MacShane) Yes.
Mr Hendrick
37. Minister, if press reports are accurate,
the Turks were placed under a great deal of pressure by the French
and Germans. Can I ask why this was necessary and was it due to
Turkey's concerns that NATO assets could possibly be used against
Northern Cyprus?
(Mr MacShane) Turkey has had its objections to the
SDP and NATO coming to full agreement under Berlin Plus but, yes,
I think it is fair to say that our partners in the United States
support the SDP and they made that position clear to the Turks.
Angus Robertson
38. Minister, the French government had been
insisting on EU commanders replacing NATO staff who might be of
US or of non-EU nationality in any EU-led operation. What was
the outcome of this issue?
(Mr MacShane) Would you mind if I referred to Mr Johnson
because that is quite a technical question and I think he is more
expert on it than me.
(Mr Johnston) The position is now that there is overall
agreement on the Berlin Plus arrangements that, as the Minister
says, the EU has the automatic right to have operational planning
done by Shape for EU operations which will be conducted with recourse
to NATO assets and capabilities, and NATO has agreed that there
is a strong presumption, should the EU ask for individual aspects
of NATO assets including the command structures, that it will
be provided. It will be for decisions on a case-by-case basis
by NATO exactly how those would be released and that would include
questions of personnel. This obviously happens in parallel now
with the transformation of the NATO command structure agreed at
the Prague Summit which we very much welcome because we see it
as an immediate response force which would enable NATO troops
to respond very quickly to emergencies. It has been agreed that
a large element of that NATO response force would be provided
by European allies, which we welcome because we think it will
be complementary to the rapid response capability we are trying
to develop in the ESDP.
39. Thank you very much. On a complementary
tack to that, four of the 14 members of the European Union are
neutral or non-aligned states and my understanding is that the
UK government's policy is fully supportive and understanding of
Ireland's, Sweden's, Finland's and Austria's position as being
neutral or non-aligned and this was made clear at the time of
the Nice Treaty ratification. Could you put on record the UK's
position with regard to the neutral and non-aligned states with
regards to the SDP. My understanding is that the UK government
fully appreciates and supports their perspective and values them
as partners within the ESDP and the United Nations?
(Mr MacShane) Absolutely.
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