Select Committee on European Scrutiny Ninth Report


14. INVESTMENT SERVICES AND REGULATED MARKETS


(24025)

14796/02

COM(02) 625


Draft Directive on investment services and regulated markets, and amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC.

Legal base:Article 47(2) EC; co-decision; qualified majority voting
Department:HM Treasury
Basis of consideration:Minister's letter of 8 January 2003
Previous Committee Report:HC 63-v (2002-03), paragraph 5 (18 December 2002)
To be discussed in Council:Not known
Committee's assessment:Politically important
Committee's decision:Cleared


Background

  14.1  The 1993 Investment Services Directive (ISD), 93/22/EEC[35] sets the conditions for authorised investment firms and banks to provide investment services in other Member States on the basis of home state authorisation and supervision, and gives the right of direct or remote access to any authorised ISD firm to trade on regulated markets in other Member States. As part of the Financial Services Action Plan the Commission has proposed a revised ISD with the objective of providing for an integrated EU securities market and for the effective cross-border provision of investment services. Two main regulatory principles underlying the draft Directive are: the protection of investors and market integrity; and the promotion of fair, transparent, efficient and integrated financial markets.

  14.2  We considered the draft Directive last month[36] and left it uncleared whilst awaiting more information from the Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Ruth Kelly) about the views of the interested parties consulted by her department.

The Minister's letter

  14.3  The Minister has now written to us with a helpful account of the views of those consulted. She says it seems that the overall feeling of the industry is one of qualified support. The industry generally welcomes:

  • the move towards country of origin regulation, which is seen as a robust approach to creating a single market in investment services;

  • the abolition of the concentration rule (which effectively requires order execution only business[37] to take place on-exchange); and

  • the robust post-trade transparency regime and the limiting of it to equity transactions.

    These are the points that the Minister had earlier highlighted to us as being particularly welcome to the Government.[38]

  14.4  However the Minister also tells us that some market participants are very concerned and important reservations have been expressed. These include the following points, some of which the Minister had already highlighted to us in her Explanatory Memorandum of 9 December 2002 as government concerns:

  • the possible impact of the proposed conduct of business rules on execution-only business. There is a preference for retail customers to be able to continue trading on an execution-only basis where they do not want investment advice;

  • on the client order handling rules the general view is that, if there is a strong 'best execution rule'[39] to protect retail customers, there is no justification for either a 'default rule' or a 'limit order handling rule'.[40] The default rule is seen as inappropriately implying that on-exchange execution is best — and therefore effectively reintroduces the concentration rule;

  • the mandatory quote disclosure rule - requiring publication of price and volume details of off-exchange trades - is thought at best unnecessary and at worst totally unworkable. The rule risks reducing liquidity and market efficiency, leading to worse outcomes for investors. It could put EU markets at a competitive disadvantage compared to other major markets. The preferred option is for the rule to be removed in its entirety;

  • the restriction of access to regulated markets to eligible counterparties (authorised financial intermediaries) is seen as unjustified and potentially very damaging to EU markets as it would make it harder for them to gain more business. The ability of home state regulators, rather than the regulator where the business is being transacted, to determine whether or not a firm qualifies as an eligible counterparty is also seen as inappropriate;

  • on the definition of 'professional investor' it is thought that the threshold for large companies and other institutional investors to be defined as professionals (and so to be relieved of inappropriate investor protection measures) is too high;

  • the effect on market participants of the inclusion of commodity derivatives within the scope of the Directive, especially the potential application of disproportionate capital requirements; and

  • appropriate convergence of rules is generally seen as desirable and necessary for the creation of a single market in investment services. But there is concern that harmonisation at too detailed a level —through mandatory measures of the Commission and the European Securities Committee[41] — may well disadvantage investors by disrupting well-functioning markets. The preference is for more regulatory convergence through permissive, rather than mandatory, comitology provisions.[42]

Conclusion

  14.5  We thank the Minister for the further information about the attitudes of interested parties towards this document. We note that the Government's qualified welcome for the proposal is seconded by interested parties. We are content to clear the document, but urge the Minister to pursue vigorously the correction of the flaws in the draft Directive.


35   OJ L 141, 11.6.93, p.27. Back

36   See headnote to this paragraph. Back

37  That is fulfilling clients' orders without offering advice. Back

38   See headnote to this paragraph. Back

39   That is obliging terms of execution of orders most favourable to the client.  Back

40   A 'default rule' would require regular client authorisations and a 'limit order handling rule' making public an order with a price limit which cannot be implemented promptly.  Back

41   The second level of the Lamfalussy comitology process for financial regulation and composed of high level representatives of Member States and the Commission.  Back

42   The third level of the Lamfalussy process involving the advisory Committee of European Securities Regulators, composed of high level representatives of Member States. Back


 
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