9 Burma/Myanmar
(24437)
| Common Position on Burma/Myanmar. |
Legal base | Article 15 EU; unanimity
|
Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 31 March and EM of 15 April 2003
|
Previous Committee Report | None
|
To be discussed in Council | 14 April 2003 GAERC
|
Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
Committee's decision | Cleared, but agreed text requested
|
Background
In a letter dated 31 March[15],
the Minister for Europe (Mr Denis MacShane), said that the Government
had been following events in Burma with increasing concern over
the past six months. The military regime had refused to enter
into substantive discussions with the leader of the National League
for Democracy, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, had made further politically
motivated arrests and had not taken credible action to end serious
violations of human rights. He believed that the regime needed
to be sent a firm message that the deteriorating situation was
not acceptable to the international community
The Common Position on Burma is due to expire on
29 April. The Minister said that the Government proposed that
it should be amended and strengthened, in order to ensure that
pressure is maintained on the regime. No official text was available
as negotiations between Member States, which had been tough, were
not complete. He expected the existing Common Position to be
extended for a year to allow time for the amendments to be agreed.
However, we understand that the Council subsequently decided
that the amendments were so extensive that a new Common Position
should be adopted.
The current text
In his Explanatory Memorandum, based on an unofficial
text of 10 April, the Minister says that he expected the main
provisions of the existing Common Position[16]
to remain in place. These include the embargo on the sale of
weapons, the ban on the sale of items that could be used for repression
or torture, the ban on high-level visits above the level of Political
Director, the travel ban, the assets freeze, the ban on defence
links and the suspension of non-humanitarian assistance programmes.
However, the Minister says:
"in line with stated EU policy of responding
proportionately to developments in Burma, be they positive or
negative, the Council will also amend and strengthen the provisions
of the Common Position to reflect the deteriorating political
situation in Burma. The amendments are:
· A
broadening and strengthening of the EU travel ban and asset freeze
to target more members of the regime, their economic interests,
those who benefit from the regime's misrule and those who hinder
Burma's transition to democracy.
· A further
strengthening of the provisions ensuring that weapons, training
or assistance cannot be provided to Burma.
· A commitment
for the Council to consider further targeted economic measures;
e.g. a ban on export credits.
· The
introduction of an exemption in the ban on high-level visits to
allow for possible visits at more senior levels that are deemed
to be contributing to national reconciliation in Burma.
· Introduction
of a humanitarian exemption in the weapons embargo which would
allow the export of certain military listed items for humanitarian
use by the United Nations or non-governmental organisations.
· Amendments
to the implementation of the travel ban to bring it into line
with more recent common positions and allow the EU to honour its
international commitments when implementing the travel ban".
He adds:
"These amendments would significantly strengthen
the scope of the EU Common Position. In an attempt to use this
pressure creatively to encourage political progress, the first
three amendments listed above will be announced on April 15, but
their implementation will be suspended until no later than 29
October 2003, unless the Burmese regime made substantive political
progress during this time on the key issues of dialogue with the
democratic opposition, the release of political prisoners and
improvements in human rights adherence. As part of explaining
the EU's stance and pressing firmly for political progress, it
is planned that an EU Troika at political level will visit Burma
before October 2003, when the new coercive measures will be implemented.
"The Council will also issue Council Conclusions.
These set out the EU's balanced approach of continuing pressure
on the military regime and those who frustrate the transition
to democracy and a commitment to helping the Burmese people who
suffer under the misrule of the authorities. The Council Conclusions
also set out the reversibility of EU policy if substantive political
progress is made, while underlining that further action will be
taken against the regime unless such progress is made".
We understand that the text was finally agreed at
the April General Affairs and External Relations Council without
debate. The Council Conclusion was also agreed without debate.
[17]
The Government's view
The Minister says that the new Common Position and
Council Conclusion are consistent with established UK and EU policy.
They are a careful balance of further targeted pressure, support
for ordinary Burmese people and careful encouragement to allow
political, economic and humanitarian change in Burma. He comments:
"The release from house arrest of Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi in May 2002 has not led to a substantive political
breakthrough in Burma. The Burmese authorities have proved unwilling
to move their discussions with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on to substantive
issues. Other than a failure of political will on behalf of the
Burmese regime, there is no credible explanation for this failure.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD)
have consistently made clear their wish to peacefully work with
the authorities in any genuine process of national reconciliation,
respect for human rights an democracy. HMG policy towards Burma
is mindful that the will of the people of Burma was freely expressed
in the result of the 1990 election in Burma, which resulted in
an overwhelming majority for the NLD.
"The refusal of the Burmese regime to pursue
change, combined with renewed political arrests, some restrictions
on the movement of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the failure of the
regime to address the worsening economic, humanitarian and human
rights situation has forced the EU to once again make clear its
concern. The Burmese regime can no longer avoid these difficult
issues if their stated ambition of national reconciliation, respect
for human rights and a transition to civilian rule is to remain
credible. It is therefore important that the EU takes action
to make clear to the regime, those who benefit most from its misrule
and those who frustrate a transition to democracy that their personal
interests will be affected if they refuse to make good the assurances
to pursue political reform and a transition to civilian rule".
Conclusion
The Government has kept us fully informed on the progress
of this Common Position. We are pleased to note that it was agreed
at the April General Affairs and External Relations Council, as
a new and improved text, as advocated by the UK.
We now clear the document, but ask
the Minister to provide us with the agreed text, under cover of
an official letter unless he wishes to draw our attention to any
changes of substance to the text he described in his Explanatory
Memorandum.
15 Not reported. Back
16
(23845) - ; see HC 152-xxxviii (2001-02),
paragraph 37 (16 October 2002). Back
17 General Affairs and External
Relations Council Conclusions: External Relations 14 April 2003:
8220/03 (Presse). Back
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