| The Report follows up some of the proposals made in our Report on Democracy and accountability in the EU and the role of national parliaments in June 2002, and also highlights the more significant proposals in the draft treaty articles produced by the Convention's Praesidium.
The role of national parliaments
National parliaments do not want a new institution to represent them, or to obstruct or delay the EU's legislative process, but do need information and the time to express views before decisions are made. They require these, above all, in order to make their own governments accountable.
One of the most important requirements is that the Council of Ministers should meet in public when legislating; otherwise the role of individual Ministers cannot be reliably ascertained and they cannot therefore be held to account. We strongly support the provision in the draft Articles that the Council shall meet in public when legislating.
There should be a full transcript of Council debates held in public, and preferably also audio and video recordings. The principle of an official, public record of Council debates held in public is so important it should be provided for in the constitutional treaty.
Where a legislative proposal is placed on a Council agenda for decision, the agenda should indicate whether any national parliament scrutiny reserves are outstanding, and the Council should publish its reasons if it nevertheless proceeds.
Unless the Council adopts a Commission legislative proposal without amendment, ten clear days should elapse between consideration of the item by COREPER and the Council adopting a common position, except in cases of urgency. Rejecting this for the sake of the 'efficiency' of the legislative process would indicate that scrutiny by national parliaments is of such little importance that a pause of even a few days is unacceptable; the needs of national parliaments need to be built into the EU's legislative system rather than recognised only when wholly convenient.
We urge that Council meetings in public when legislating be only the start of creating a more orderly and transparent legislative process.
We are disappointed that the Convention seems likely to recommend an extension of the co-decision procedure without any consideration of how the process could be made more transparent.
Two weeks' notice should be given of new provisions and exceptions to be proposed in Conciliation Committees, unless these meet certain conditions.
The Commission should have a duty to respond promptly to requests for information and questions from national parliaments or their committees about its proposals.
The Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality is important in giving national parliaments for the first time a formal role in the EU's legislative process, but is inadequate because national parliaments' objections could simply be overridden. We would strengthen the relevant Protocol in four ways. The early-warning mechanism should cover proportionality as well as subsidiarity. The Commission should be required to give detailed reasons, related to the national parliaments' objections, for proceeding regardless. There should be provision for objections to be made following the convening of a Conciliation Committee. The Commission should be required to withdraw its proposal if two-thirds of national parliaments or their chambers object.
Greater inter-parliamentary co-operation, especially meetings bringing together sectoral or departmental committees, could be achieved informally, without treaty articles. Meetings involving national parliamentarians and MEPs should be jointly organised; the national parliament input to this could best be provided through COSAC.
There should be regular meetings of members of the defence, foreign affairs and European affairs committees of national parliaments to scrutinise the European Security and Defence Policy.
If the Commission President is to be elected, national parliamentarians as well as MEPs should have voting rights.
There should be a statement in the Protocol on the role of national parliaments acknowledging the importance of the involvement of national parliaments in the EU's activities.
The Convention's proposals
The draft Articles must be taken seriously, but will go through many more stages before any are finally agreed.
Articles to which the House should pay particular attention, because of problems with them or because of their significance, include those relating to the EU exercising its competences 'in the Community way', the EU's legal personality, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU competences, the 'flexibility clause', decision-making in the European Council, the Presidency of the European Council and Council formations, qualified majority voting, co-decision, the area of 'freedom, security and justice', the EU's external action, own resources, co-operation among countries which have adopted the euro, and ratification of treaty changes.
The Convention
The Convention has been extremely valuable as a way of preparing for the Inter-Governmental Conference openly, and involving parliamentarians fully in that preparation. However, the Convention is not a representative body; making decisions without voting has given too much power to the Praesidium; and the Convention has not fully responded to the Laeken Declaration's emphasis on democracy and transparency. Its work will be an extremely important contribution to the IGC, but its recommendations will need to be carefully considered by national parliaments, as well as governments, well before the IGC.
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