12. EU military operation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo
| (a)
(24578)
—
—
(b)
(24583)
—
—
(c)
(24605)
—
—
|
Council Decision on the launching of the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Draft Council Secretariat strategic planning document setting out the Framework for EU action on crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Draft Council Decision on the launching of the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
|
| Legal base | (a) Article 14 EU; unanimity
(b) and (c) Articles 14 and 17 EU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration | EMs and Minister's letters of 5 and 10 June 2003
|
| Previous Committee Report | None
|
| Discussed in Council | (a) Adopted at 5 June 2003Transport Council
(b) Agreed at the Political and Security Committee
(c) Adopted at 12 June 2003 Agriculture and Fisheries Council
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared
|
Background
12.1 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution
1484 (2003) on 30 May 2003. This authorised the deployment until
1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in
Bunia, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to assist the
UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC). The UNSCR stresses
that the force would be deployed on a temporary basis and asks
the Secretary-General to send reinforcements to MONUC in Bunia
by mid-August 2003. It condemns the deliberate killing of unarmed
MONUC personnel and the staff of humanitarian organisations in
Ituri province.
The draft Joint Action
12.2 The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Mr Bill Rammell) says in his Explanatory Memorandum of 5 June
that the DRC is moving slowly towards peace, but there is a particular
problem in Ituri province, notably in Bunia, where large numbers
of people are being killed or displaced. The UN is in the process
of deploying more peacekeepers to the region. Their mandate may
be strengthened, but it will be three months before a full deployment
is achieved. The Minister says that when the EU agreed to lead
the multinational force, France, the Member State which offered
to lead the operation, proposed that it should be a European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission. He comments that the advantage
of an EU operation would be
"to give impetus through the concerted use of EU instruments
to support continuing EU and UN efforts to keep on track the overall
peace process in the DRC and the Great Lakes. It would also respond
to the vision of the UK and France in launching the ESDP [in]
that it would allow European nations to underpin the EU's CFSP
[Common Foreign and Security Policy] with the military means to
carry out humanitarian, peace-keeping and other crisis management
tasks."
12.3 This Joint Action, which authorises the EU to conduct the
EU Military Operation, [29]
sets out the political and procedural context. The Council Decision
to launch it is document (c).
The Minister's letters of 5 June
12.4 The Minister recalls that the Minister for Europe, Mr Denis
MacShane, warned us in his letter of 5 February on arrangements
for scrutiny of ESDP that there would inevitably be occasions
when the Government would need to take part in EU decisions before
scrutiny was completed. This was the case with the Joint Action
on the ESDP operation in Macedonia. With this planned operation
in the DRC, the Government is again faced with pressing political
and operational reasons to endorse a Joint Action before scrutiny
clearance. Given the urgent humanitarian need for the rapid establishment
of a stabilisation force in the Ituri region, he hopes that we
will understand that he does not propose to delay Council agreement
to the proposal.
The Council Secretariat Framework Paper
12.5 In his Explanatory Memorandum and letter on this document,
the Minister for Europe (Mr Denis MacShane) recalls that in his
letter of 5 February he set out the arrangements for scrutiny
of ESDP in its operational phase. This Council Secretariat paper
is classified, but he has agreement to provide us with an unclassified
summary.
12.6 The Minister says that the paper provides a "conceptual
framework" which describes the approach the EU proposes to
adopt to the management of the crisis in Bunia. It sets out to
ensure "coherence and comprehensiveness" of the EU's
actions, that is, that the actions complement each other in an
orderly fashion and that they fully cover what needs to be done.
Given that the situation on the ground requires immediate action,
the paper groups together key elements of a Crisis Management
Concept (CMC) and those of a Military Strategic Options paper,
and will be used for the operation.
12.7 The paper takes account of the range and scale of different
instruments available to the EU and advocates a strong and coherent
political and diplomatic effort to accompany and support the military
operation. It sets out the background to the conflict, external
involvement in it, the current situation in Bunia and Ituri, and
regional attitudes to multinational intervention. The withdrawal
of Ugandan troops from the DRC under the Lusaka Agreement was
followed by instability and violence between the Hema and Lendu
people in the main town of Bunia and in the Ituri region. Both
Uganda and Rwanda have confirmed to the UN their support for the
deployment of a multinational force in Bunia, although it is believed
they continue to be allied to some armed groups in the DRC. The
situation in Bunia has now reached a critical point and the humanitarian
situation remains dire. It could deteriorate further.
12.8 The Minister says that the political objective is to give
impetus to the efforts of the EU and UN to keep the overall peace
process in the DRC and the Great Lakes on track. The EU's Political
Military Objective is to deploy the interim emergency force under
the mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1484.
The Council Decision
12.9 This Decision authorises the Operation Commander to deploy
the forces and start the mission. It approves the Military Operation
Plan and the Rules of Engagement Authorisation. Both documents
deal with operational issues and are classified.
12.10 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 10 June on this document,
the Minister for Europe says that the UK has agreed to contribute
to this EU-led force because it considers it right to support
the UN and the DRC peace process. It also fits into the wider
efforts of the UK and the EU in the region. He says that discussions
are continuing on the exact nature of the UK contribution. It
will have to contribute to the common costs of the operation according
to the agreed EU GNP key (approximately 18% in 2003), in addition
to the costs of sending troops. An initial estimate of the UK's
share of common costs is approximately €1.25 million, but
this may vary in the light of third country contributions and
developments on the ground. The Minister notes that, unlike Operation
Concordia in Macedonia, the common costs of this operation do
not include barracks, lodgings and transport.
Conclusion
12.11 We thank both Ministers for providing us with as much
information as possible on this operation. As agreed with the
Minister for Europe earlier in the year, we do not expect to receive
militarily sensitive information. The information provided in
the letters and Explanatory Memoranda on these three documents
is sufficient for our purposes. However, we note the need for
further discussion with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about
how the difficulties over the timing of the provision of information
to us should be dealt with.
12.12 We understand that the agreement that common costs for
this operation will not include barracks, lodgings and transport
suits the UK's interests, and that its contribution may take the
form of a few HQ staff and a squadron of engineers, but that,
as of 18 June, a final decision was yet to be taken.
12.13 We now clear the documents.
29 Codenamed Operation Artemis. Back
| 
