4 Security at European Council meetings
and comparable events
| (a)
(24705)
10965/03
——
(b)
(24938)
10965/2/03
——
(c)
(24959)
10965/3/03
——
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Draft Council Resolution on security at European Council meetings and other comparable events.
Draft Council Resolution on security at European Council meetings and other comparable events.
Draft Council Resolution on security at European Council meetings and other comparable events.
|
| Legal base | (a) Article 30(1)(a) and (b) EU; unanimity
(b)— ; unanimity
(c) — ; unanimity
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| Document originated | (b)30 September 2003
(c) 13 October 2003
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| Deposited in Parliament | (b)9 October 2003
(c) 21 October 2003
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| Department | Home Office |
| Basis of consideration | (a)EM of 18 July 2003
(b) and (c)EM of 30 October 2003
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| Previous Committee Report | (a) HC 63-xxxii (2002-03), paragraph 18 (17 September 2003)
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| To be discussed in Council | 6 November 2003
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| Committee's assessment | Legally and politically important
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| Committee's decision | (a) and (b) Cleared; (c) For debate in European Standing Committee B
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Background
4.1 These three documents are successive drafts of a non-binding
Council Resolution stemming from concern about public order disturbances
at European Council meetings and comparable events. Article 2(2)
of the Schengen Convention enables Member States to apply border
checks to travellers for reason of public policy or national security.
The aim of this proposal is to make the application of Article
2(2) more effective and reduce disruption at European Council
meetings and comparable international events.
The document
4.2 The most recent draft of the Resolution (document (c)) supersedes
the two previous drafts (documents (a) and (b)). The first Recital
to document (c) says:
"Member States' authorities responsible for security and
public order at European Council meetings and other comparable
international events have to ensure that the right of free expression
of opinion and the right of peaceful assembly are upheld, while
as far as possible preventing interference by those whose aims
or actions constitute an offence or involve the use of violence".
4.3 The main provisions of document (c) are :
Member States are invited to supply the Member State which is
hosting a European Council meeting or comparable event with information
about people who, on substantial grounds, are suspected of intending
to enter the Member State with the aim of disrupting public order
at the meeting or event. The information may also be given to
Member States through which the people are expected to travel
.
Member States, when applying border controls for
the protection of the relevant meetings or events, may limit as
far as possible the inconvenience caused by checks on travellers.
Precedence should be given, therefore, to "intelligence-led
checks" on people suspected of wanting to disrupt public
order.
The host Member States may use the information it
receives for the purposes of border checks, the prevention of
offences or the maintenance of public order at the event.
The mere existence of a criminal conviction will
not automatically justify measures against the person with the
conviction.
The exchange of personal information for the purpose
of the Resolution must comply with national and international
legislation on data protection.
The personal information must be used and kept only
until the end of the event, save with the agreement of the country
which supplied it.
4.4 The greatest difference between the first draft
of the Resolution and the two subsequent drafts is that the first
one imposed duties on Member States whereas the other two are
largely permissive.
4.5 On 17 September, when we considered the first
draft[17], it was not
clear to us that the UK, which is not a party to Article 2(2)
of the Schengen Convention, would be able to receive information
about people who were suspected of intending to enter the country
to disrupt international events to be held here. We also thought
it likely that definitions would be required of the references
in the draft to "targeted close checks" and "other
comparable international events". We asked the Government
to comment on these points and kept the document under scrutiny.
The Government's view
4.6 The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at
the Home Office (Caroline Flint) has now commented on our questions
and on the revised texts of the draft Resolution. She tells us
that the most recent revised text (document (c)) takes account
of the fact that the UK and the accession states are not parties
to Article 2(2) of the Schengen Convention and ensures that the
UK could exchange information about people who may be a threat
to public order in the UK or in another Member State. Moreover,
the expression "targeted close checks" has been replaced
by "intelligence-led checks". She regards this as clearer
and a reflection of current UK practice. The revised text still
contains no definition of "other comparable international
events". The Minister expects, however, that this would cover
other EU Council meetings and comparable high-level political
summits.
4.7 More generally, the Minister comments that this
is a proposal for a non-binding Resolution. It imposes no legal
obligations on the countries involved and no UK legislation would
be required to implement it. The Government supports the sharing
of information on known trouble-makers to minimise the potential
for public disorder by the violent minority, while safeguarding
the right of all to peaceful assembly and protest within the law.
The Government believes that each Member State should decide what
information to provide and that Member States are best placed
to ensure that data protection and human rights issues are taken
into account.
4.8 The Minister also tells us that, "as an
atypical legal act", the proposed Resolution has no formal
legal base in the Treaties.
Conclusion
4.9 We are grateful for the Minister's response
to our questions. Her answers and the third draft of the Resolution
assuage our concerns on two of the points (about Article 2(2)
of the Schengen Convention and "targeted close checks").
It remains our view, however, that it is unsatisfactory that the
latest draft omits a definition of the other international events
to which the Resolution would apply.
4.10 Provision for the exchange of information
between Member States about individuals is, in our view, clearly
a matter of political importance, even if the provision is contained
in a non-binding Resolution. On a matter of this importance, we
believe that a firm legal base in the Treaties is required (and,
indeed, Article 30(1)(a) and (b) of the Treaty on European Union
was cited as the legal base for the first draft of the Resolution
though not for the latest one). The point is of legal importance
and has arisen only with the revision of the draft.
4.11 We are concerned, in addition, by a more
fundamental question. We can see the justification for the exchange
of information about individuals or groups where there are substantial
grounds to believe that they intend to travel to a European Council
meeting or comparable event to commit a crime. But the draft Resolution
is not confined to the prevention of criminal acts. It refers
to "disrupting public order or security" at the event
as well as committing offences. Peaceful protest and lawful assembly
may disrupt public order. While the first Recital says that Member
States have to ensure that the right of free speech and peaceful
assembly are upheld, this is nowhere to be found in the text of
the Resolution itself. In our view, therefore, the present text
raises the important question whether the draft Resolution currently
provides sufficient protection for legitimate public protest and
peaceful assembly. It is true that the measure would not be binding
but, unless it is to be meaningless, the Resolution will affect
the actions of Member States and their law enforcement authorities.
We consider, therefore, that the question is of sufficient importance
to call for debate in Standing Committee B.
4.12 Documents (a) and (b) have been superseded
by the latest draft of the Resolution and so we clear them from
scrutiny. But we recommend that document (c) should be debated
in Standing Committee B.
17 See headnote. Back
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