FIRST REPORT
LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
(a) We conclude that the level of threat to
the United Kingdom from biological weapons must not be underestimated.
We commend the Government's commitment to dealing with the issue
internationally, and its decision to launch a debate about how
to tackle the threat through publication of a Green Paper (paragraph
9).
(b) We conclude that the threat from biological
weapons is a global problem, which—contrary to the view
of parts of the US administration—cannot be addressed through
national measures alone. We commend the Government's commitment
to employ 'all the tools in the toolbox', despite their imperfections,
to counter the threat of biological and toxin weapons (paragraph
15).
(c) We recommend that the Government consider
the merits of establishing a co-ordinating mechanism, to assist
weaker BTWC States Parties in the development and implementation
of effective criminal legislation to translate the Convention's
prohibitions into their own domestic laws (paragraph 17).
(d) We commend the Government's decision to
focus on establishing an effective process for investigation into
suspected non-compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention at the Resumed Fifth Review Conference. (Paragraph
22).
(e) We recommend that the Government consider
measures to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system—including
the World Health Organisation—for investigating suspicious
outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use, in advance
of negotiations on this matter between States Parties in 2004
(paragraph 23).
(f) We recommend that the Government consider
carefully the merits of proposing the establishment of a secretariat,
with a mandate similar to that of the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons, to enhance international monitoring of States
Parties, compliance with the BTWC and to assist States Parties
in ensuring compliance (paragraph 24).
(g) We recommend that, in the light of current
threats to the security of the United Kingdom, the Government
take steps to strengthen its control over biotechnological research
in British universities and research institutions (paragraph 31).
(h) We further recommend that the Government
consider the establishment of a central authority responsible
for control of dangerous pathogens in the United Kingdom (paragraph
32).
(i) We fully endorse the proposal outlined
in the Green Paper for the development of a new convention on
the physical protection of dangerous pathogens (paragraph 34).
(j) We welcome the Government's decision to
make the implementation by more countries of effective physical
protection, containment measures and operating procedures for
dangerous pathogens and toxins, and genetic modification one of
its priorities at the BTWC Fifth Review Conference (paragraph
35).
(k) We note that the BTWC Review Conference
agreed to promote common understanding and effective action on
"national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security
and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins," and
we recommend that the Government do its utmost to assist States
Parties to the BTWC in drawing up and implementing such national
mechanisms (paragraph 36).
(l) We recommend that the Government take
steps to promulgate an international code of conduct for scientists
working with dangerous pathogens, even before the States Parties
to the BTWC consider this matter in 2005 (paragraph 37).
(m) We congratulate the Government on achieving
many of its objectives at the Resumed Fifth Review Conference
(paragraph 39).
(n) We recommend that, in its response to
this Report, the Government outline how it hopes to proceed towards
achieving greater transparency between States Parties about legitimate
dual-use capabilities which might be in danger of being misconstrued
or misused (paragraph 40).
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