Select Committee on Foreign Affairs First Report

The Foreign Affairs Committee has agreed to the following Report:

THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS GREEN PAPER

1. In April 2002, the Government published a Green Paper, which focuses on the arms control pillar of the UK strategy to defend against the biological weapons threat and specifically on the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The BTWC "represents the legal centre piece of international co-operative efforts to counter BW and has been the focal point of recent international co-operative efforts".[1]

2. The Green Paper appears to have been prompted by the failure, in November 2001, of a group of states (the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties, or AHG) to agree consensus on the text of a Protocol to strengthen the BTWC. After seven years of negotiations among the AHG, this failure was deeply disappointing. Nonetheless, the Government "considers that efforts to strengthen the Convention must continue, and that a range of international and national measures can and should be taken, both to strengthen the Convention and to counter the threat from BW."[2] The Green Paper accordingly sets out options for strengthening the BTWC, and also outlines the "five specific areas for immediate action."[3] The Green Paper was published well in advance of the Resumed Fifth BTWC Review Conference, which commenced on 11 November 2002. The outcome of the Conference is summarised in an attached FCO memorandum.[4]

3. On 22 October 2002, we heard oral evidence from Mr Tim Dowse and Mr Patrick Lamb, respectively Head and Deputy Head of the Non-Proliferation Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We have also received written memoranda relating to the Green Paper, for which we are grateful. This Report summarises our own considerations on the threat from biological weapons, and international measures to control them.

The nature of the threat

4. Our predecessor Foreign Affairs Committee noted the "horrific potential" of bio-terrorism, highlighting, for example, the assessment of an unclassified FCO report issued on 4 February 1998 that "One hundred kilograms of anthrax released from the top of a tall building in a densely populated area could kill up to three million people."[5]

5. In 1999, the Government believed that "So far, very few terrorist groups have shown an interest in biological or chemical materials ¼The current threat to UK interests [from terrorist attack using biological and chemical agents] is low."[6] This assessment has been reconsidered in the light of the recent terrorist attacks. On 22 October, Mr Dowse told us that "The present assessment, and this is of course based partly on evidence that was discovered in Afghanistan ... is that there are certainly terrorist groups that are interested in acquiring chemical and biological weapons. There are terrorist groups, and al Qaeda was one, that have taken active steps to acquire such weapons. We have no evidence as of this moment that any have succeeded."[7]

6. As the Green Paper points out, the anthrax attacks which took place in the United States at the end of 2001 "demonstrated the inherent potential of such material to have massive psychological, political and economic/financial effects, as well as causing illness or death, for relatively little effort."[8] Although none of the mass casualty terrorist attacks of the recent past has involved biological weapons, and although the Government assesses that none of the terrorist groups threatening the United Kingdom has in fact succeeded in obtaining biological weapons, bio-terrorism remains a possibility which must be addressed with the utmost seriousness.

7. The threat from biological weapons arises from states as well as from terrorist groups. The Green Paper highlights the risk that 'dual-use' knowledge, facilities and technologies in Iraq and the former Soviet Union could be misused to develop Biological Weapons (BW), and also states that there remains a BW threat from "regions in which the UK is most likely to face challenges to our interests, particularly the Gulf, Near East and North Africa."[9] The Government clearly needs to continue to address the threat from these regimes.

8. The threat from states and from terrorists increases as biotechnology develops. J P Perry Robinson, Professorial Fellow for Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Sussex, described a "great upsurge" in biotechnological developments, which have "maleficent as well as beneficent potential."[10]

9. We conclude that the level of threat to the United Kingdom from biological weapons must not be underestimated. We commend the Government's commitment to dealing with the issue internationally, and its decision to launch a debate about how to tackle the threat through publication of a Green Paper.

The United States position

10. The main reason for the breakdown of earlier negotiations at the BTWC Fifth Review Conference was the United States' opposition to the BTWC draft protocol. At the Fifth Review Conference, US Under Secretary of State John Bolton stated that the "time for 'better than nothing' protocols is over ... We will not be protected by a 'Maginot treaty' approach to the BW threat."[11] The US opposed the draft protocol for three reasons: "first, it was based on a traditional arms control approach that will not work on biological weapons; second, it would have compromised national security and confidential business information; and third, it would have been used by proliferators to undermine other effective international export control regimes."[12]

11. Though President Bush has advocated the establishment of an "effective United Nations procedure for investigating suspicious outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use,"[13] John Bolton argues that "Unlike chemical or nuclear weapons, the components of biological warfare are found in nature, in the soil, in the air and even inside human beings ¼ Components of biological weapons are, by nature, dual use¼ Detecting [treaty] violations is nearly impossible; proving a violation is impossible." Bolton's conclusion is that "Traditional arms control measures are not effective against biology. Using them, we could prove neither non-compliance nor compliance. Traditional arms control measures, in fact, applied to biological activities yield no benefit and actually do great harm."[14]

12. The Green Paper acknowledges that the "dual use nature of virtually all the know-how, materials and equipment used in biology means that identifying and agreeing workable and acceptable verification and compliance measures for biological arms control is fraught with formidable intellectual, scientific and political problems."[15] We have seen no evidence which disputes this claim; indeed, the experience of the United National Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq, which was ready to declare the country clean of biological weapons until it received intelligence from a defector, is the most obvious example of the difficulty inherent in identifying BW programmes.[16]

13. The Iraq example illustrates Mr Dowse's point that "It is certainly correct ... that treaties, even underpinned by compliance measures ... are not the whole answer. We would not be so naive as to put our faith solely in those instruments as a guarantee. But if we take those measures combined with the other instruments at our disposal"—such as export controls, intelligence, and action with other countries or nationally to intercept shipments of concern—"the Government feels (and successive governments have felt since the work to establish compliance measures for the Biological Weapons Convention began in 1994) that it would add something."[17] The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is not "the sole answer to the problem", but "another tool in the toolbox. We have always felt the need to look at these tools across the board. We need where we can to strengthen them. It would be foolish simply to discard one of these tools as useless."[18] The European Union has also expressed strong support for a multilateral approach to preventing biological weapons proliferation.[19]

14. The Government's conclusions are supported by the findings of a group of experts convened by the Henry L Stimson Center to examine the United States government's alternative proposals to the draft BW Protocol. The experts concluded that, despite the problems associated with inspections regimes, the "let-each-government-do-as-it-pleases approach," which was proposed by the US as an alternative to the BW Protocol, would result in the "failure to articulate an international standard that governments would be expected to meet." The consequence would be that "Many governments will enact measures that fall far short of worthwhile standards... [This] would foster an uneven patchwork of domestic laws and practices that might have little near-term value and could prove difficult to harmonise in future."[20]

15. The United States has agreed to consider a number of international and institutional measures to combat the BW threat before 2006, according to the unanimous decision of States Parties at the Resumed Fifth Review Conference.[21] Throughout much of 2002, however, parts of the Administration have demonstrated considerable scepticism about multilateral agreements, arguing that the United States would prefer to work with "likeminded groups."[22] We conclude that the threat from biological weapons is a global problem, which—contrary to the view of parts of the US administration—cannot be addressed through national measures alone. We commend the Government's commitment to employ 'all the tools in the toolbox', despite their imperfections, to counter the threat of biological and toxin weapons.

National criminal legislation

16. Though we are convinced that the Government is right to persist in efforts to reach effective international agreements to control BW, measures at the national level are also necessary. States Parties to the BTWC agreed at the Resumed Fifth Review Conference to consider, next year, the adoption of national legislation to translate the prohibitions in the Convention into domestic law.[23] This is an important first step. There is, however, a danger that States Parties which pass weak laws under this proposal, or fail to implement them, might remain safe havens for terrorists.

17. Graham Pearson of the University of Bradford argues that "It will be important the States Parties ... provide information on the texts of specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to ensure domestic compliance." Dr Pearson notes that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has "carried out ... collation and analysis of the legislation enacted by States Parties to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention.[24] We note that the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the United Nations Security Council may also have some relevance here: the CTC has helped to co-ordinate international assistance to weak UN Member States, in their development and implementation of counter-terrorist legislation. We recommend that the Government consider the merits of establishing a co-ordinating mechanism, to assist weaker BTWC States Parties in the development and implementation of effective criminal legislation to translate the Convention's prohibitions into their own domestic laws.

The United Nations Secretary-General process for investigating alleged CBW use

18. In the early and mid-1980s, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was authorised by UN Member States to investigate suspicious disease outbreaks and allegations of CBW use. As we note above, in November 2001 President Bush stated his intention to enhance the effectiveness of the existing United Nations procedure.[25]

19. We heard from Mr Dowse that "One of the weaknesses of the current Secretary-General's mechanism is that he has no ready-made pool of experts to call on to make these investigations if an allegation of use is brought to him, so it takes time to gather the necessary expertise to send the mission." Mr Dowse explained that "One could establish a pool, a list of names could be held by the Secretary-General of people who could be called on at very short notice."[26]

20. We note the comments of Jayanatha Dhanapala, UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, that 'The lack of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the BWC provisions other than the possibility to review the convention at five year intervals, is a lacuna that today more than ever must be addressed.'[27] We further note that the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) proposes the establishment of a 'BWC Secretariat', which could 'be mandated to receive, translate and archive CBM declarations; maintain the CBM database and website; publish an annual summary of CBM declarations; maintain and constantly update lists of possible BW inspectors for use by the UN Secretary-General; undertake research into inspection and fact-finding protocols ... and act as a clearinghouse for open source information from governments.' VERTIC suggests that the United Kingdom 'could offer to host and provide facilities in London for such a Secretariat.'[28]

21. At the Resumed Fifth BTWC Review Conference, States Parties agreed to "promote ... effective action on ... enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease," and "strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants."[29] These measures had been identified as priorities by the Government in advance of the Review Conference.[30] They will be the focus of the States Parties' work programme for 2004.

22. We commend the Government's decision to focus on establishing an effective process for investigation into suspected non-compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention at the Resumed Fifth Review Conference.

23. We recommend that the Government consider measures to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system—including the World Health Organisation—for investigating suspicious outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use, in advance of negotiations on this matter between States Parties in 2004.

24. We recommend that the Government consider carefully the merits of proposing the establishment of a secretariat, with a mandate similar to that of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,[31] to enhance international monitoring of States Parties, compliance with the BTWC and to assist States Parties in ensuring compliance.

Control over dangerous pathogens

25. Investigations since 11 September 2001 have brought to light the extent to which terrorists, unnoticed by the relevant authorities, were pursuing training and preparations for their attacks in both Europe and in the United States. Biotechnological research is undertaken commercially, within the National Health Service, and in a number of universities and research establishments in Britain, and we asked the FCO to explain how the Government is currently regulating such research.

26. Mr Dowse described to us "a scheme that is run in conjunction with institutions of higher education ... known as the Voluntary Vetting Scheme, under which we have briefed these institutions on countries where we have certain concerns about proliferation and we also brief them on courses of study that would give us concern, that could be of benefit to a proliferator."[32] Mr Lamb described the academic institutions' desire—at least "at an earlier stage"—to maintain academic freedom, pointing out that "of course the whole basis on which research goes forward is freedom of information."[33] We were told that there are academic institutions which the Government considers to be of the highest concern, all of which participate in the Voluntary Vetting Scheme. However, only 70 per cent of academic institutions in the Government's "medium concern" category, and 85 per cent of those in the "low concern" category, currently participate.[34]

27. Mr Dowse also pointed out that "We do have on the statute book legislation which makes it a criminal offence to assist the development of a weapon of mass destruction, and indeed the transmission of intangible technology where WMD is concerned is also covered by our legislation. Some of this was introduced in the Anti-Terrorist Act last year, some of it was previously on the statute book. Others are covered by the new Export Control Act, so there are offences that can be targeted."[35] By Mr Lamb's own admission, however, Government control over such research is a "major problem",[36] and currently there is no central co-ordinating body for the control of dangerous pathogens in the United Kingdom.

28. Recent research carried out on behalf of the BBC Radio 4 programme, File on Four, also seems to suggest that the current system for controlling potentially dangerous research in this field in the United Kingdom is inadequate.[37] We also note that although a member of this Committee tabled in early November a series of Written Parliamentary Questions to the FCO on this topic, asking in detail which institutions had been invited to participate in the Voluntary Vetting Scheme and the extent of the 'take up', as of 3 December no substantive replies have appeared in the Official Report.

29. We do understand that there may be security implications if these questions were to be answered openly. We indicated to the Foreign Secretary that we would be pleased to receive some information on a confidential basis. Whilst we have received supplementary evidence,[38] this does not list those institutions that the Government deems should be included in the Voluntary Vetting Scheme and have been invited to participate in it or, more importantly, those institutions who have declined to participate. We would also like to receive information as to the frequency of submissions made under the scheme and be reassured of some consistency in the application and rigour of the vetting process.

30. We consider this to be wholly unsatisfactory. Quite apart from the security implications, it would appear very unfair, in such a competitive and income generating environment, to those institutions who do collaborate fully as against those who do not.

31. We are concerned that existing measures to regulate the use of biotechnology research in this country may be insufficient to prevent dangerous materials falling into the hands of terrorist groups. We are also concerned that the voluntary vetting procedure does not apply to the National Health Service, wholly commercial research laboratories or other institutions, but is confined to the higher education sector. Our anxiety is that a fully qualified research scientist, who unknown to the authorities was a supporter of a terrorist group, could be admitted to a postgraduate or other research institution within the United Kingdom to pursue an approved programme of research. Such a scientist could thus gain unhindered access to the dangerous materials or pathogens. The United Kingdom should be in a position to set an example to other States Parties in this respect. We recommend that, in the light of current threats to the security of the United Kingdom, the Government take steps to strengthen its control over biotechnological research in British universities and research institutions.

32. We further recommend that the Government consider the establishment of a central authority responsible for control of dangerous pathogens in the United Kingdom.

A NEW INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF DANGEROUS PATHOGENS

33. With respect to the national and international measures for the physical protection of sensitive materials which might be used for the development of biological weapons, Mr Dowse informed us that "There are regulations in place today that address the issue of safe storage of dangerous pathogens ... These regulations have been drawn up essentially with health and safety in mind rather than the terrorist issue in mind. It does seem a gap in the international network of agreements that there are no international standards in this area."[39]

34. We fully endorse the proposal outlined in the Green Paper for the development of a new convention on the physical protection of dangerous pathogens.[40]

35. We welcome the Government's decision to make the implementation by more countries of effective physical protection, containment measures and operating procedures for dangerous pathogens and toxins, and genetic modification one of its priorities at the BTWC Fifth Review Conference.[41]

36. We note that the BTWC Review Conference agreed to promote common understanding and effective action on "national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins,"[42] and we recommend that the Government do its utmost to assist States Parties to the BTWC in drawing up and implementing such national mechanisms.

37. We further note that States Parties present at the BTWC Review Conference agreed to promote common understanding on "the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists."[43] We are, however, concerned that the States Parties will not consider such action until 2005. We recommend that the Government take steps to promulgate an international code of conduct for scientists working with dangerous pathogens, even before the States Parties to the BTWC consider this matter in 2005.

Transparency between States Parties about dual-use capabilities

38. Of the Government's five priority areas to strengthen the BTWC, actions relating to four were agreed at the Resumed Fifth Review Conference. No specific action was, however, agreed to promote "greater transparency between States Parties about their legitimate activities whose dual-use capabilities might be in danger of being misconstrued or misused."[44]

39. We congratulate the Government on achieving many of its objectives at the Resumed Fifth Review Conference.

40. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government outline how it hopes to proceed towards achieving greater transparency between States Parties about legitimate dual-use capabilities which might be in danger of being misconstrued or misused.

Conclusion

41. We acknowledge the work of non-governmental organisations in bringing greater public awareness of the issue of biological weapons proliferation and in adding to pressure on governments to eschew the development and use of biological weapons. We note, in particular, the launch of the 'Biotechnology, weapons and humanity' project by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the BioWeapons Prevention Project.[45]

42. We welcome the Government's decision to publish the Green Paper on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and its commitment to promoting international action in this crucial area. We note that all of those who responded to the Green Paper "believe that efforts at an international level should continue", and that, among respondents, there is "widespread support and full endorsement of the multilateral and legally based approach outlined in the paper."[46] We, too, believe that this multilateral approach—outlined in the Green Paper, and evident in the Government's stance at the Resumed Fifth Review Conference—is likely to be the most effective way to tackle the grave and growing threat from biological and toxin weapons.

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1   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons, Cm 5484, April 2002, para 8. Back

2   Cm 5484, para 10. Back

3   Cm 5484, para 54. Back

4   Ev 15. Back

5   Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 1999-2000, Weapons of Mass Destruction, HC 407, paras 2 and 123. Back

6   Defending against the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence paper, July 1999, available at: http://www.mod.uk/issues/cbw/. Back

7   Q 25. Back

8   Cm 5484, para 15. Back

9   Ibid. Back

10   Ev 38, para 1. Back

11   Statement of the Hon. John R. Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security to the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention Geneva, Switzerland, November 19, 2001.

Available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/01111902.htm. Back

12   John Bolton, Remarks at Tokyo America Center, 27 August 2002. Back

13   Statement by the President: Strengthening the international regime against biological weapons, 1 November 2001. Available at hpp://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01110110.htm. Back

14   John Bolton, Remarks at Tokyo America Center, 27 August 2002. Back

15   Cm 5484, para 24. Back

16   Q 1. Back

17   Q 1. Back

18   Q 3. Back

19   "We highlight the importance of the multilateral strengthening of international legally binding and political instruments to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We are equally committed to the reinforcement of disarmament instruments in this field. We will continue to work together for the complete eradication of chemical and biological weapons. We underline the importance of strengthening the compliance with and the promotion of the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention as well as other international norms against the use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. We underline that it is our conviction the latter Convention is best enhanced by the adoption of a legally binding instrument to oversee the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of Biological and Toxic Weapons and their destruction. We continue to support the objective of attaining a regime that would enhance trust in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention in accordance with the mandate of the ad hoc group set up under the said convention." Statement on ''Common Values and Positions'' made at the EU & Latin America and the Caribbean Summit on 17th May 2002.  Back

20   Compliance through science: US pharmaceutical industry experts on a strengthened bioweapons nonproliferation regime, Henry L Simson Center, Washington DC, August 2002.  Back

21   Steve Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, stated at the Resumed Fifth Review Conference that "We believe the decision today at this Review Conference represents a realistic judgement about what can successfully be achieved in this forum over the next several years." United States Statement at the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, 14 November 2002. Available at: http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/15151.htm. Back

22   John Bolton, Remarks at Tokyo America Center, 27 August 2002. Back

23   Ev 35. Back

24   Graham Pearson recommends a "small secretariat" to collate information about States' Parties' measures to ensure domestic compliance with the BTWC. See Graham S Pearson, Review Conference Paper no. 7, Return to Geneva: A comprehensive list of measures, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, August 2002.  Back

25   Statement by the President: Strengthening the international regime against biological weapons, 1 November 2001. Available at hpp://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01110110.htm. Back

26   Q 73. Back

27   J Dhanapala, opening statement for the BioWeapons Project Launch, Geneva, 11 November 2002, available at:

hppt://disarmament.un.org/speech/11Nov2002.htm.  Back

28   Ev 42, para 10. Back

29   Ev 36, Draft Decision of the Fifth Review Conference, para i, iii and iv. Back

30   The Green Paper (Cm 5484) states (para. 54) that the Government would seek the "establishment of an effective and legally binding process for investigation into suspected non-compliance with the Convention [and] greater efforts to tackle the threat posed by natural infectious diseases" at the Resumed Fifth Review Conference.  Back

31   The Secretariat staff of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons "propose policies for the implementation of the Convention to the Member States of the OPCW and develop and deliver programmes with and for them. These programmes have four broad aims: to ensure a credible, transparent regime to verify the destruction of chemical weapons and prevent their re-emergence in any Member State, while also protecting legitimate national security and proprietary interests; to provide protection and assistance against chemical weapons; to encourage international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry; and to bring about universal membership of the OPCW by facilitating international cooperation and national capacity building." See Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons website: http://www.opcw.org/html/glance/index.html. Back

32   Q 26. Back

33   Q 31. Back

34   Ev 24. Back

35   Q 33. Back

36   Q 32. Back

37   "BBC Press Office", Iraqi scientists infiltrated British research centres, reveals File on 4, 17 November 2002, available at: www.bbc.co.uk/print/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories.../fileon4_iraqi_scientists.shtm.  Back

38   Ev 24, para 3. Back

39   Q 35. Back

40   Cm 5484, para 47(f). Back

41   Cm 5484, para 54. Back

42   Ev 36, Draft Decision of the Fifth Review Conference, para 1, ii. Back

43   Ev 36, Draft Decision of the Fifth Review Conference, para 1, v. Back

44   Cm 5484, para 54. Back

45   Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, stated at its launch that the BioWeapons Prevention Project "could make a significant contribution" towards achieving the objectives of the BTWC. See http://disarmament.un.org/speech/11Nov2002.htm.  Back

46   Ev 17, para 1. Back

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Prepared 11 December 2002