Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 1

Memorandum from MEDACT and the Oxford Research Group

RESPONSE TO THE UK GOVERNMENT GREEN PAPER OF APRIL 2002; "STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION"

  1.  We broadly welcome the initiative of the UK Government which is expressed in the Green Paper of April 2002 "Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention". In particular, we support the stated need to re-convene the Fifth Review Conference, and not to follow the proposal of the Government of the United States of America to wind up the Ad Hoc Group, so that the work of the Conference can resume on 11 November 2002.

  2.  Although it may be difficult to implement a Verification Protocol under the current American Administration, we feel it essential to encourage and maintain continued active participation from the US Government in order to extend the international co-operative measures, and we remain convinced that the ultimate objective must be the establishment of a Verification Protocol as an integral part of the BTWC and, as such, a recognised component of International Humanitarian Law. An enforceable verification protocol for the BTWC is particularly essential to counteract the tendency towards even greater secrecy in work on dangerous pathogens. In particular, it is now possible that new techniques in biotechnology could be used to make existing pathogens more dangerous, for example, by making them more resistant to antibiotics or even by creating new pathogens from currently non-pathogenic organisms.

  3.  The possible measures outlined in paragraph 47 are promising, and we welcome the reference to President Bush's statement of 1 November 2001 which supports the strengthening of the international regime against Biological Weapons by encouraging acceptance of an effective UN procedure.

  4.  One area which we feel needs further clarification is the approach to the "Third Pillar"—deterring use. Although paragraph 47g clearly supports the criminalisation of violators of the BTWC and CWC, which would presumably extend to any clandestine activities within the UK, it is not clear how deterrence would actually be applied to external agencies or nations. We would not approve, for example, the military use of nuclear or even conventional Weapons of Mass Destruction. In order to strengthen effective national legislation on the export of agents, equipment and materials potentially useful for offensive BW programmes etc (paragraph 48) we would rather advocate, for instance, the effective use of targeted trade sanctions, as well as the strict enforcement of legal liability for any state or trans-national commercial enterprise trading with and supplying potential or actual weapons grade materials to any state sponsoring the development of Chemical or Biological Weapons.

  5.  We understand the difficulties resulting from "dual use". Any ambiguities in international trade of materials capable of supporting research for offensive, defensive or purely medical programmes should be subject to effective international regulatory authorities, with powers to prosecute offenders, as well as effective and stringent application by each exporting nation of a system of export licensing.

  6.  We see these as part of the programme for building up the Confidence Building Measures referred to in paragraph 47e. Although it is necessary to address the concerns of the US Administration regarding the draft protocol from the AHG, we feel that it is essential to maintain as much of those proposals as possible without compromising them in the interests of the US concerns. In particular, the fundamental reasons for these concerns need to be ascertained and clarified. All parties should participate actively in the CBMs described in paragraph 47e. Indeed, we see the advancements of CBMs as an important element in strengthening international compliance with the BTWC.

  7.  We also understand and support the efforts of governments to ensure the protection of their own citizens by programmes, for example, of prophylactic vaccination. We are aware that some nations—particularly the former USSR—continued quite cynically to maintain stocks of living smallpox virus; and that such stocks may have been passed undeclared to other nations. We would, however, urge extreme caution in the implementation of any programmes of mass vaccination, particularly when live vaccines are used. This is because of the inevitable adverse side effects, particularly for immuno-compromised persons, and also because of the implied message for the public which could create unjustified panic. We are aware that the UK Department of Health is re-organising the Public Health Laboratory Services, and emphasise the need to use that re-organisation to take the opportunity to strengthen the system of surveillance of infectious disease at the newly created National Infection Control and Health Protection Agency.

MEDACT

The Oxford Research Group

21 October 2002



 
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