APPENDIX 1
Memorandum from MEDACT and the Oxford
Research Group
RESPONSE TO
THE UK GOVERNMENT
GREEN PAPER
OF APRIL
2002; "STRENGTHENING THE
BIOLOGICAL AND
TOXIN WEAPONS
CONVENTION"
1. We broadly welcome the initiative of
the UK Government which is expressed in the Green Paper of April
2002 "Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention".
In particular, we support the stated need to re-convene the Fifth
Review Conference, and not to follow the proposal of the Government
of the United States of America to wind up the Ad Hoc Group, so
that the work of the Conference can resume on 11 November 2002.
2. Although it may be difficult to implement
a Verification Protocol under the current American Administration,
we feel it essential to encourage and maintain continued active
participation from the US Government in order to extend the international
co-operative measures, and we remain convinced that the ultimate
objective must be the establishment of a Verification Protocol
as an integral part of the BTWC and, as such, a recognised component
of International Humanitarian Law. An enforceable verification
protocol for the BTWC is particularly essential to counteract
the tendency towards even greater secrecy in work on dangerous
pathogens. In particular, it is now possible that new techniques
in biotechnology could be used to make existing pathogens more
dangerous, for example, by making them more resistant to antibiotics
or even by creating new pathogens from currently non-pathogenic
organisms.
3. The possible measures outlined in paragraph
47 are promising, and we welcome the reference to President Bush's
statement of 1 November 2001 which supports the strengthening
of the international regime against Biological Weapons by encouraging
acceptance of an effective UN procedure.
4. One area which we feel needs further
clarification is the approach to the "Third Pillar"—deterring
use. Although paragraph 47g clearly supports the criminalisation
of violators of the BTWC and CWC, which would presumably extend
to any clandestine activities within the UK, it is not clear how
deterrence would actually be applied to external agencies or nations.
We would not approve, for example, the military use of nuclear
or even conventional Weapons of Mass Destruction. In order to
strengthen effective national legislation on the export of agents,
equipment and materials potentially useful for offensive BW programmes
etc (paragraph 48) we would rather advocate, for instance, the
effective use of targeted trade sanctions, as well as the strict
enforcement of legal liability for any state or trans-national
commercial enterprise trading with and supplying potential or
actual weapons grade materials to any state sponsoring the development
of Chemical or Biological Weapons.
5. We understand the difficulties resulting
from "dual use". Any ambiguities in international trade
of materials capable of supporting research for offensive, defensive
or purely medical programmes should be subject to effective international
regulatory authorities, with powers to prosecute offenders, as
well as effective and stringent application by each exporting
nation of a system of export licensing.
6. We see these as part of the programme
for building up the Confidence Building Measures referred to in
paragraph 47e. Although it is necessary to address the concerns
of the US Administration regarding the draft protocol from the
AHG, we feel that it is essential to maintain as much of those
proposals as possible without compromising them in the interests
of the US concerns. In particular, the fundamental reasons for
these concerns need to be ascertained and clarified. All parties
should participate actively in the CBMs described in paragraph
47e. Indeed, we see the advancements of CBMs as an important element
in strengthening international compliance with the BTWC.
7. We also understand and support the efforts
of governments to ensure the protection of their own citizens
by programmes, for example, of prophylactic vaccination. We are
aware that some nations—particularly the former USSR—continued
quite cynically to maintain stocks of living smallpox virus; and
that such stocks may have been passed undeclared to other nations.
We would, however, urge extreme caution in the implementation
of any programmes of mass vaccination, particularly when live
vaccines are used. This is because of the inevitable adverse side
effects, particularly for immuno-compromised persons, and also
because of the implied message for the public which could create
unjustified panic. We are aware that the UK Department of Health
is re-organising the Public Health Laboratory Services, and emphasise
the need to use that re-organisation to take the opportunity to
strengthen the system of surveillance of infectious disease at
the newly created National Infection Control and Health Protection
Agency.
MEDACT
The Oxford Research Group
21 October 2002
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