APPENDIX 3
Memorandum from Verification Research,
Training and Information Centre (VERTIC)
The Verification Research, Training and Information
Centre (VERTIC), an independent non-governmental organisation,
responded to the government's Green Paper on Strengthening the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention on 3 September 2002. I
attach a copy of that submission for your information. Since that
time, however, the United States' opposition to new verification
and compliance measures for the Convention has hardened further.
Having brought about the collapse of the negotiations on a verification
protocol in August 2001 and stymied the adoption of a final document
by the November 2001 Review Conference, the US is clearly no longer
even interested in pursuing the modest measures to replace the
protocol proposed by President Bush (a number of which were replicated
in the Green Paper). Moreover, it is clear from US talking points
for a Western Group meeting in Geneva on 2 September that the
US is now preparing to sabotage the resumed session of the Review
Conference in November by seeking an immediate closure of the
meeting. This would mean no further multilateral meetings on the
BWC until the next scheduled Review Conference in 2006. Given
the near global consensus that biological weapons are a serious,
and probably growing, threat to international security, this situation
is intolerable.
The UK delegation apparently intends to try
to achieve a quick consensus at the resumed session on a future
work programme on various BW issues. At the same time it apparently
will join the US in attempting to head off a general debate, ostensibly
out of fear that the Cubans and Iraqis will try to "politicise"
the meeting by making accusations against the US. Conveniently,
this would also avoid the UK having to take sides in a debate
in which most states will criticize the US for its attempt to
wreck the protocol and the review conference. It is impossible
to imagine how both these two UK aims will be achieved, especially
as the US has now made clear it will oppose any BW work between
review conferences. The danger is that the UK will fall in line
with the US push for closure by default. Yet the US cannot unilaterally
impose its will on the conference, whether to abolish the Ad Hoc
Group, end the review conference early or avoid a final document.
Failing the achievement of consensus or a procedural trick by
the chairman (such as gavelling closure through), a vote is the
only way out of the likely deadlock. Although a vote would be
unfortunate, it is likely to be less damaging to the BWC regime
than a five year hiatus in multilateral discussions. If a vote
is requested, the UK should support that call. If a vote is actually
taken, the UK should vote against the ending of the Ad Hoc Group
mandate and/or early closure of the conference and vote in favour
of a final document that keeps the process alive with substantive
discussions and preferably negotiations (with or without the US).
Having been one of the most active proponents of a new BW verification
regime, and being a treaty depositary with special responsibilities,
the UK should resist US attempts to sabotage the multilateral
track and not connive in them, whether deliberately or by default.
Trevor Findlay,
Executive Director
Verification Research
29 October 2002
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