STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN
WEAPONS CONVENTION: COUNTERING THE THREAT FROM BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
1. VERTIC welcomes the Green Paper of April
2002 on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention:
countering the threat from biological weapons. The UK has
been a driving force behind efforts to strengthen the treaty and
it is commendable that the government is consulting a broad range
of stakeholders on the best way forward. VERTIC especially welcomes
the suggestion of annual meetings on the BW issue involving experts
from the UK government and non-governmental communities.
2. The Green Paper is timely. The failure
of the Ad Hoc Group of states parties in August 2001 to agree
on a verification protocol and the inability of the Fifth Review
Conference in December 2001 to agree on a Final Document have
highlighted the need for urgent action to safeguard and strengthen
the BWC.
3. While VERTIC considered that the draft
BW protocol tabled by the Ad Hoc Group Chairman in April 2001
was in significant respects too weak, we share the analysis of
the Green Paper that the so-called Composite Text was "a
substantive improvement on the status quo represented by
the Convention" and was worthy of adoption by states parties.
4. VERTIC remains convinced that an integrated,
legally-binding multilateral verification regime implemented by
a dedicated international organisation along the lines envisaged
in the draft protocol (ideally with stronger transparency and
compliance provisions) is indispensable to dealing with the threat
of biological weapons. Such a regime should remain the vision
that guides efforts to strengthen the treaty and should not be
relegated to the dustbin of history just because a particular
US administration opposes it and because other states with their
own self-serving motives hide behind the US position.
5. The central weakness of the Green Paper,
in VERTIC's view, is its failure to strongly reiterate previous
UK support for a comprehensive, legally-binding multilateral verification
regime. The close resemblance of the Green Paper's list of proposed
measures to the US "alternative" proposals gives the
impression that the UK shares the US view of the future of the
BW protocol. This would be a radical departure from previous UK
policy: the UK should, in our view, strongly reiterate that policy.
6. Recognising the difficulties that stand
in the way of further progress on the protocol at this stage,
the Green Paper rightly proposes making progress on partial measures
where possible. VERTIC supports all of them. We note, however,
that without the framework of a global verification regime they
are likely to be disconnected and, as a result, have less impact.
Moreover, as the Green Paper itself recognises, the acceptability
of many of the measures may hinge on the linkages and trade-offs
that emerged during 10 years of talks in VEREX and the Ad Hoc
Group.
THE GREEN
PAPER'S
PROPOSED MEASURES
7. VERTIC's views on some of the proposals
in the paper are as follows:
— Investigations into suspected
non-compliance with the Convention (alleged use of BW, misuse
of facilities and suspicious outbreaks of disease). It is
commendable that the UK has extended the US proposal to include
facility investigations. In the absence of viable alternatives,
the existing mechanism which permits the UN Secretary-General
to conduct investigations or fact-finding missions into the use
of chemical and/or biological weapons should be strengthened,
as the Green Paper suggests. A strengthened mechanism should unambiguously
affirm that the Secretary-General may either conduct such investigations
at the request of the General Assembly, the Security Council or
a UN member state, or under his own authority under the UN Charter
(as increasingly reinforced by custom). The mechanism should also
be provided with the resources to maintain it in readiness. This
should include keeping up to date and improving the roster of
experts available for investigations and establishing codes of
conduct and protocols for carrying such missions out. Ultimately,
a professional inspectorate should be established. These tasks
could be taken over by a BWC Secretariat if and when established
(see below).
— A convention on the physical protection
of dangerous pathogens. Such a convention should include mechanisms
for establishing the veracity of information declared under its
provisions and for quality control in implementing the standards
that it establishes.
— Revising the existing BWC Confidence-Building
Measures. Given the poor track record of compliance with the
existing CBMs it is unlikely that simply expanding the declaration
requirements will be sufficient to improve their quality, quantity
or timeliness. Instead, the CBMs should be made legally-binding
and expanded. The declarations should be translated into all official
UN languages and compiled into a publicly accessible database.
— Voluntary visits to facilities.
Visits to facilities declared under the CBMs or to other facilities
could help increase transparency. In order to evaluate the usefulness
of non-challenge on-site activities under a future verification
regime such visits could follow the procedures envisaged in the
Composite Text.
THE WAY
FORWARD
8. Given the current hostility of the US
to multilateral negotiations on a BW protocol and the apparent
unwillingness of proponents of a protocol to proceed without the
US, the outcome of the resumed session of the Review Conference
in December 2002 is critical to the future of the BWC.
9. Although the collapse of the protocol
negotiations was a major disappointment, and US behaviour in bringing
it about is to be deplored, the logjam over the preservation of
the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group should no longer be allowed to
stand in the way of progress in strengthening the convention.
This is especially because for many states parties including Russia,
China, Iraq, Iran, India and Pakistan the current lack of progress
suits their purposes in avoiding transparency, monitoring and
verification. Moreover, the Ad Hoc Group, although it had major
achievements to its credit, in the end produced a flawed draft
that, at US behest, fell far short of what might be considered
best practice in multilateral verification.
10. VERTIC's view is that if agreement on
continuing or renewing the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group cannot
be reached at the Review Conference, the Group should be wound
up but ONLY if there is agreement on a package of measures that
keeps state parties focused on the political, scientific and technological
challenges facing the convention. Such a package should explicitly
envisage the negotiation of partial, but legally-binding instruments
(including those mentioned in the Green Paper) to meet such challenges.
The package should, at a minimum, include:
— Annual meetings of states parties.
Given the dynamic nature of political, scientific and technological
challenges to the BWC, the international community cannot wait
until the next Review Conference in 2006 to discuss measures to
strengthen the treaty.
— Inter-sessional expert groups.
These would make recommendations to annual meetings of states
parties on key issues, including: new monitoring techniques and
technologies for BWC verification; multilateral cooperation on
transparent research for effective defences against biological
weapons; assistance for victims of BW attacks; and synergies between
national, regional and multilateral efforts to prevent BW proliferation.
— A standing Scientific Advisory
Panel. This should meet at least twice a year, to keep watch
on the implications for the BWC of the exponential growth in scientific
knowledge and its applications. As its first activity, the panel
should be directed to oversee a scientific (double-blinded) study
of the effectiveness of all types of on-site visits and inspections
(including challenge) relevant to the BWC. Such a study should
aim to address the controversy over the credibility of the respective
UK and US studies in this area. (A model that the panel could
emulate is the series of scientific studies on climate change
by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) conducted
for the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change).
— A BWC Secretariat. Such a
body would give institutional embodiment to the treaty. It could
be mandated to receive, translate and archive CBM declarations;
maintain the CBM database and website; publish an annual summary
of CBM declarations; maintain and constantly update lists of possible
BW inspectors for use by the UN Secretary-General; undertake research
into inspection and fact-finding protocols; organise intersessional,
annual and review meetings; and act as a clearinghouse for open
source information from governments, industry and non-governmental
organisations. The UK, as one of the BWC depositaries, could offer
to host and provide facilities in London for such a Secretariat.
11. Both at the final meeting of the AHG
and at the first session of the Review Conference the UK and its
EU partners appear to have been caught flat-footed by US initiatives
and manoeuvres, at least some of which were predictable. An active
and coordinated role by the UK, the EU and other like-minded countries
in the run-up to the resumed Review Conference and at the conference
itself is essential. This should include the adoption of a new
EU Common Position, the planning of strategies for likely alternative
outcomes and pre-conference démarches to key countries.
12. Unanimity of all BWC state parties is
not necessary for progress on the issues outlined above. Experience
in the AHG and the Review Conference has shown that the attempt
to reach consensus, including an effort to keep the US involved
at all costs, can scupper agreement altogether. It also helps
countries hiding behind the US position to avoid revealing their
true preferences. Should the resumed session be faced with repeated
US intransigence, it may be preferable to seek agreement without
them. Given the current impasse, it is important to find alternative
ways to strengthen the convention, while not closing the door
on a resumption of future negotiations on a comprehensive verification
regime.
VERTIC
3 September 2002
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