House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report

SECOND REPORT

LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We commend the high level of commitment the Government has shown towards the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee in the past year. We recommend that the Government consider carefully how to ensure that the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee is effective in the long run, and continues to foster international co-operation and goodwill (paragraph 17).

We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government set out what further measures it will take to to encourage and assist governments, particularly in the Middle East and Gulf region, to stem the flow of terrorist financing (paragraph 22).

We conclude that, despite the emergence of significant differences of opinion between European Union leaders over the conduct of the war against terrorism, the EU has taken some constructive steps forward in co-operation against terrorist activities, both within Europe and in forging agreements with third countries (paragraph 33).

We conclude that Britain can work constructively with European Union partners on some areas of foreign policy—such as development, the ICC and Iran—while aligning itself more closely to the United States on policy towards Iraq. We recommend that, in the war against terrorism and elsewhere, the Government continue to judge each of its major partners' policies on their own merits: the experience of the past year has demonstrated the extent to which Britain can work with both the EU and the US, without damaging its relationship with either (paragraph 36).

We recommend that the Government set out, in its response to this report, how NATO's new military concept for defence against terrorism will now be implemented, and how its adoption at the Prague summit will affect NATO's future role in the war against terrorism (paragraph 43).

We fully support the Government's decision to align itself closely with the United States in the war against terrorism. We conclude that this policy has enhanced Britain's influence over current policy decisions, and has also helped to foster the 'special relationship' in the long run (paragraph 46).

We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government set out its policy on targeted killings, such as that carried out by the United States in Yemen on 3 November 2002 (paragraph 54).

We recommend that the Government inform us, and likewise the House, if it decides to change its own nuclear posture or learns that the United States is planning a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons (paragraph 62).

We conclude that, despite over a year of vigorous international efforts to disrupt the network, al Qaeda and associated organisations continue to pose a grave threat to the United Kingdom and its interests abroad (paragraph 76).

We conclude that, although the possibility that Saddam Hussein might employ terrorist methods must be taken seriously, there is no compelling evidence linking the Iraqi regime to al Qaeda. Neither the British nor the US Government has thus far provided any evidence that Iraq had any involvement in the attacks of 11 September 2001. Until any such evidence is provided, any military action against the Iraqi regime must therefore be justified on grounds other than its past or current involvement with the al Qaeda network (paragraph 86).

We conclude that evidence of Iraq's retention and continued development of weapons of mass destruction is compelling, and a cause for considerable concern. We commend the Government's decision to draw international attention to the scale of Iraq's illegal weapons of mass destruction programme, through the publication in September 2002 of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government (paragraph 96).

We conclude that, given Saddam Hussein's record of human rights abuses, he would not hesitate to use torture and weapons of mass destruction against foreign troops and civilians if he believed that this would benefit his regime (paragraph 100).

We conclude that failure to address the threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction could pose very high risks to the security of British interests in the Middle East and the Gulf region (paragraph 108).

We commend the Government's commitment always to work within international law, although we recognise that international law must evolve to meet new challenges such as the unprecedented terrorist threat. We further commend the Foreign Secretary's commitment to strengthen the credibility of multilateral institutions—and, in particular, the United Nations—in pursuit of international security (paragraph 109).

We urge the Government to ensure that its efforts to address the threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction do not detract in any way from those to eliminate al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups (paragraph 110).

We commend the Government's decision to work closely with the United States, to produce a strong and unanimous Security Council Resolution establishing an unconstrained weapons inspections regime and demanding Iraq's full disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction (paragraph 120).

We conclude that the difficulties faced by UN weapons inspectors are formidable. We urge the Government to offer every assistance to facilitate the inspectors' work, provided that such assistance does not compromise United Kingdom intelligence assets (paragraph 128).

We conclude that should the US, British and other governments seek to justify military action against Iraq for example, on an expanded doctrine of 'pre-emptive self-defence,' there is a serious risk that this will be taken as legitimising the aggressive use of force by other, less law-abiding states (paragraph 154).

We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government set out in detail the thinking behind its policy on the pre-emptive use of military force, and whether this policy has been reviewed following the publication of the United States National Security Strategy in September 2002 (paragraph 160).

We conclude that the notion of 'imminence' should be reconsidered in light of new threats to international peace and security—regardless of whether the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence is a distinctively new legal development. We recommend that the Government work to establish a clear international consensus on the circumstances in which military action may be taken by states on a pre-emptive basis (paragraph 161).

We commend the Government's decision, in its efforts to address the threat from the Iraqi regime, to focus on Iraq's persistent violation of UN Security Council Resolutions. We conclude that unless new evidence emerges that Iraq poses an imminent threat to the security of the United Kingdom, any military action against Iraq should be taken on the basis of Iraq's violation of successive Security Council Resolutions, culminating to date in UNSCR 1441 (paragraph 170).

We conclude that Iraq must not be permitted to continue to defy the authority of the United Nations. The unanimous adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1441 has made the obligation on the Iraqi regime to disarm absolutely clear, and has given the regime a final opportunity to comply with successive UN Security Council resolutions (paragraph 171).

We further conclude that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 would not provide unambiguous authorisation for military action, were Iraq to fail to comply with its provisions. We therefore recommend that, in the case of Iraq's violation of Resolution 1441, the Government do its utmost to ensure the adoption of a further Security Council resolution authorising the use of "all necessary means" to enforce Iraqi disarmament (paragraph 172).

We recommend that the Government clarify, in its response to this Report, whether it believes that a further United Nations Security Council Resolution is legally necessary before military action is taken against Iraq (paragraph 173).

We conclude that the establishment of the rule of law and functioning representative government in Iraq after a war would pose formidable challenges. We recommend that the Government examine carefully the possible models for post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq, including a United Nations transitional authority. We recommend that, in its considerations, the Government bear in mind the necessity for country-wide peacekeeping, civil policing, transitional justice, and representation of all groups in Iraqi society (paragraph 191).

We recommend that the Government treat seriously the possibility that a war with Iraq could trigger instability in the Arab and Islamic world, and could increase the pool of recruits for al Qaeda and associated terrorist organisations there and in Western Europe (paragraph 200).

We commend the Foreign Secretary's decision to examine carefully the Arab Human Development Report 2002. We conclude that addressing inter alia the problems highlighted by its authors is important for the medium and long term success of the war against terrorism (paragraph 209).

We recommend that, in its response to our own Report, the FCO set out its progress towards a comprehensive strategy for the Arab world, including an explanation of the extent to which it is working with the Department for International Development, the BBC World Service and the British Council on this strategy (paragraph 210).

We conclude that the Government is right to engage the leaders of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in an effort to revive the Middle East peace process. We are convinced that this policy must be pursued in parallel with international efforts to address threats from al Qaeda and from the Iraqi regime (paragraph 220).

A year after the collapse of the Taliban, the stabilisation of Afghanistan and its surrounding region continues to be a critical objective in the war against terrorism. We urge the Government to continue and, if necessary, to enhance its efforts to stabilise Afghanistan, and to ensure that the lives of ordinary Afghans continue to improve (paragraph 227).

While we understand that the US government has obtained valuable intelligence from prisoners detained at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, we are nonetheless concerned that the US government continues to detain many of these prisoners without trial. We recommend that the Government continue to press the US government to move rapidly towards the trial of these alleged terrorists, in accordance with international law (paragraph 238).

We recommend that the Government supply us with further information about the seven British citizens currently being held, including details about when and how they can expect to be tried, and whether, if found guilty, they will be liable to the death penalty (paragraph 239).

We recommend that, in its response to the Report, the Government set out in detail the Cabinet Office mechanisms for co-ordinating the "government-wide response" to the threat from international terrorism (paragraph 241).

We recommend that the Government publish and implement the results of its review of the travel advice system at the earliest opportunity (paragraph 248).

We recommend that, at the earliest possible date, the Government supply us with a full description of the process according to which travel advice is agreed among Government departments. Specifically, we seek details of the process of collating information in this area; of the relationship between the FCO and the Joint Intelligence Committee in deciding travel advice; and full details of the organisational structure and decision-making process within the Foreign Office, at both official and ministerial level, for the taking of travel advice decisions and issuing them to the public (paragraph 249).

We conclude that the Government must continue to address with the utmost seriousness its obligation to keep the British public informed of developments in the war against terrorism. This, we believe, is essential to ensure the widest possible public support for Government actions (paragraph 252).

We commend the Government's stated commitment to keep Parliament fully informed of developments in the war against terrorism, through statements to the House, through regular Ministerial meetings with Select Committees, and also through further meetings between the Prime Minister and Select Committees. We look forward to receiving the specific dates of these proposed meetings (paragraph 253).

We commend the Government for its firm and committed leadership in the war against terrorism. We conclude that Britain has contributed substantially to ensuring that the "international coalition" remains a reality, more than a year after the devastating terrorist attacks on the United States (paragraph 256).



© Parliamentary copyright 2002	Prepared 19 December 2002