US policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction
55. On 11 December 2002, the United States published
its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The
Strategy argues that 'Some states, including several that have
supported and continue to support terrorism, already possess WMD
and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion
and intimidation. For them, these are not weapons of last resort,
but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our
nation's advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from
responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions
of vital interest. In addition, terrorist groups are seeking to
acquire WMD with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of
our people and those of friends and allies—without compunction
and without warning.'[57]
56. The US National Strategy to Combat WMD expresses
the administration's intention to 'ensure that all needed capabilities
to combat WMD are fully integrated into the emerging defense transformation
plan'; calls for the enhancement of 'traditional measures—diplomacy,
arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance,
and export controls—that seek to dissuade or impede proliferant
states and terrorist networks'; and proposes the development and
maintenance of capabilities 'to reduce to the extent possible
the potentially horrific consequences of WMD attacks at home and
abroad.'[58]
57. The difficulty inherent in addressing the threat
from terrorist use of WMD is raised in the Strategy. Preventing
terrorists from acquiring and using WMD is 'one of the most difficult
challenges we face ... The current and potential future linkages
between terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism are particularly
dangerous and require priority attention.'[59]
58. Notably, the Strategy makes clear that the United
States 'reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including
through resort to all our options—to the use of WMD against
the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.'[60]
The United States believes that its nuclear weapons are a valid
deterrent against WMD use by its enemies.
59. In our Seventh Report, we noted that the Bush
administration was reassessing its nuclear posture, and would
consider their use "against targets able to withstand nuclear
attack; in retaliation for attack with nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons; or 'in the event of surprising military developments.'"[61]
We also noted numerous press reports indicating that the United
States is developing a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons
in response to the terrorist threat. In our view, this would have
significant implications for arms control policy.[62]
60. In its response to our Seventh Report, the Government
stated that its own nuclear posture had not changed since the
Strategic Defence Review was published in 1997. It also stated
that "the UK is neither developing nor planning to develop
any new nuclear weapons, nor is it modifying current systems to
lower their yield."[63]
An earlier memorandum from the FCO had also confirmed that all
activities at the Governments Atomic Weapons Establishment at
Aldermaston "are fully consistent with the UK's international
commitments, including the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."[64]
61. In response to questions about the United States'
alleged development of tactical nuclear weapons, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State, Mike O'Brien, wrote on 5 July that "The
US has emphasised ... that there is no such programme."[65]
Mr O'Brien quoted US Secretary of State Colin Powell, who said
on 10 March that "What we are looking at, and what we have
asked the Pentagon to do, is to see whether or not within our
lowered inventory levels we might want to modify or update or
change some of the weapons in our inventory to make them more
effective. But we are not developing brand new nuclear weapons,
and we are not planning to undergo any testing."[66]
62. We are reassured by the Government's current
maintenance of its existing nuclear posture, and by its assurance
that the United States is not developing a new generation of tactical
nuclear weapons. We recommend that the Government inform us,
and likewise the House, if it decides to change its own nuclear
posture or learns that the United States is planning a new generation
of tactical nuclear weapons.
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