House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report

THE THREAT FROM IRAQ

77. In our Seventh Report, we noted—despite the Foreign Secretary's reluctance to speculate about further military action in the "war against terrorism"—that since December 2001 "Iraq has been identified as the state most likely to be targeted" after the military operation in Afghanistan.[85] During our visit to Washington DC in March 2002, we had observed that "huge resources were being devoted to the development of plans to act against the Iraqi regime."[86]

78. Between June and September 2002, speculation about the scale and nature of the threat from the Iraqi regime intensified, on both sides of the Atlantic. The debate focused on two questions. The first concerned the extent of links between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda. The second concerned the Iraqi regime's development of weapons of mass destruction, and whether the threat from such weapons would justify military action to enforce disarmament.

Is the Iraqi regime linked to al Qaeda?

79. The United States administration has asserted that quite substantial links exist between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda. The Secretary of State for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, has stated that the link between al Qaeda terrorists and Iraq is "accurate and not debatable,"[87] and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice has said that "We clearly know that there were in the past and have been contacts between senior Iraqi officials and members of al Qaeda going back quite a long time... Iraq provided some training to al Qaeda in chemical weapons development."[88] In his Cincinnati speech on 7 October, President Bush stated that "We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases."[89]

80. It is notable that the CIA document Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction contains no reference to Iraq's links with terrorist organisations, although the Iraqi regime could use terrorists as a 'delivery mechanism' for weapons of mass destruction. On 7 October 2002, however, the US Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, wrote to Senator Bob Graham, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: "Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability... We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda going back a decade. Credible information indicates that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression... we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad."

81. George Tenet also asserted that the Central Intelligence Agency possessed "credible reporting that al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs. Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al Qaeda, suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent US military action."[90]

82. Two of our witnesses were highly sceptical about alleged links between Iraq and al Qaeda. Lord Wright told us that "I think it is unlikely, that Saddam Hussein would want to enter into a collaboration with Islamic extremists over whom he has no control. Perhaps the greatest internal threat to Saddam Hussein is precisely from that sort of Islamic extremist. I think it is very unlikely ... that Saddam Hussein is willing to enter into collaboration with al Qaeda."[91] Sir Harold Walker agreed, arguing that "Saddam is seen by al Qaeda and the Muslim world as a totally bogus Muslim ... one needs to be a bit careful about associating Saddam's regime with this particular bunch of terrorists, although there is plenty of historical evidence of links with [other] terrorists."[92]

83. On this matter, the British Government also takes an apparently different view from that of the US administration. On 5 December 2001, the Foreign Secretary told us that "I have seen no evidence to link the Iraqi regime with Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda or the Taliban."[93] The Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee that "As far as I am aware there is no evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the actual attack on 11 September." The Prime Minister continued: "There are various rough linkages [between al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime] but the issue [with the Iraqi regime] is weapons of mass destruction. It is not what happened on 11 September or the al Qaeda terrorist network."[94] The Government has not subsequently produced evidence to counter these assertions. Its dossier on Iraq, published in September this year, makes no mention of links between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda.[95]

84. A possible explanation for this divergence of views is that the 11 September attacks clearly heightened awareness of the potential of linkages between 'rogue states' and terrorist organisations. As Vice President Dick Cheney told the US war veterans' convention in August, the attacks "awakened this nation to danger, to the true ambitions of the global terror network, and to the reality that weapons of mass destruction are being sought by determined enemies who would not hesitate to use them against us."[96] In Washington, we heard from a number of people that even if Saddam Hussein was not directly involved in the 11 September attacks, those events might now be copied by the Iraqi regime. Saddam Hussein has used terrorism before—he tried to assassinate the first President George Bush, during his visit to Kuwait in 1993—and al Qaeda has now demonstrated how effectively terrorism can be used against the United States.

85. The potential, if not the actuality, of links between al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime has been recognised by the Government. On 25 September 2002, the Foreign Secretary explained that, while "no one has ever suggested that Saddam Hussein is directly behind the al-Qaeda organisation ... given the fact that Saddam Hussein's regime has unquestionably been supportive of terrorist organisations in the Middle East, which it has, and given his hatred for the United States, which is visceral, it is reasonable to see that he has some sympathy with the al-Qaeda regime and, therefore, for us to look for evidence." For this reason, the Government is "investigating all reports of links [between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda] and there may be some evidence which we are still investigating about whether there were [such links] post-September 11."[97] [98] This low-key response suggests at least a degree of scepticism on the part of the United Kingdom Government about the extent of current links between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda.

86. We do not dismiss the possibility that Saddam Hussein has links with some Islamist terrorist organisations, and that he tolerates their presence in Iraq. However, we conclude that, although the possibility that Saddam Hussein might employ terrorist methods must be taken seriously, there is no compelling evidence linking the Iraqi regime to al Qaeda. Neither the British nor the US Government has thus far provided any evidence that Iraq had any involvement in the attacks of 11 September 2001. Until any such evidence is provided, any military action against the Iraqi regime must therefore be justified on grounds other than its past or current involvement with the al Qaeda network.

The extent of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme

87. The preceding section of this Report highlights the difficulties inherent in linking the Iraqi regime to al Qaeda. Intelligence relating to its engagement in another illegal activity—the development of weapons of mass destruction—is far less ambiguous. Since the publication of our last report, extensive details of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes have been published in three major reports. The first of these, the International Institute of Strategic Studies' Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Net Assessment, was published on 9 September. On 24 September, the British Government published its long-awaited dossier, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. The United States Central Intelligence Agency also published a document detailing its own assessment, in October 2002.

88. There is little divergence between the substantive judgements detailed in the three reports. Dr Chipman of IISS told us that differences between his Institute's assessments and those of the Government and the CIA were "within the normal bounds of areas of judgment."[99] The documents are based on information available in the public domain and (in the case of the Government and CIA assessments) on more recent intelligence. Though Dr Chipman told us that "there was inevitably a degree of speculation in some of our assessments, and I would dare say there was a degree of speculation also in the information provided by the governments,"[100] all three documents provide compelling evidence of Iraq's programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities, and the means to deliver them.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

89. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) states that, of the three weapons types, "nuclear weapons seem the furthest from Iraq's grasp [though] there is a nuclear wild card. If, somehow, Iraq were able to acquire sufficient nuclear material from foreign sources, it could probably produce nuclear weapons on short order, perhaps in a matter of months ... While Iraqi acquisition of fissile material is not a high probability, it has to be seen as a real risk that could dramatically and quickly shift the balance of power."[101] The CIA's assessment is that "Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to procure weapons-grade fissile material abroad"; if left unchecked, Iraq "will probably have a nuclear weapon during this decade."[102] The Government argues that "if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources the timeline for production of a nuclear weapon would be shortened and Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years."[103]

90. We asked Dr Samore about delivery of a possible Iraqi nuclear device. In his judgement, the nuclear device on which the Iraqis were working in 1991 "would have been far too large and heavy to deliver on the missiles that were available to them." Dr Samore felt that "it is unlikely that [Iraq] could make [a nuclear weapon] small enough and light enough to be deliverable by the existing missile we know they have, which is the al-Hussein missile, a modified scud [with a range of] 650 km. That requires quite a small size, which would be difficult for them to achieve with the basic design they are working on."[104]

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

91. In the IISS assessment, "Iraq's current CW capability probably comprises hundreds of tonnes of agent (presumably a mixture of mustard and nerve agent, most likely sarin and cyclosarin and perhaps VX) and perhaps a few thousand munitions." In the Government's assessment, Iraq has retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War, which would "enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve gas within months."[105] Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent, production facilities associated with Iraq's chemical warfare programme have been rebuilt, and other dual-use facilities have been rebuilt or re-equipped.[106] The CIA argue that "Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX."[107]

92. All three documents detail potential means for delivery of Iraq's chemical weapons. IISS states that Iraq's "ability to deliver chemical warheads on its rocket and artillery pieces, as well as aerial bombs, would pose operational complications for opposing forces."[108] The threat of CW use against military logistical or civilian targets is, in IISS view, "questionable." Their document states that "Unless Iraq has advanced beyond the impact fusing and warhead design of its 1991-era special warheads, its ability to disseminate efficiently CW agent with missile warheads is extremely limited and unlikely to cause large casualties ... Iraq could also seek to deliver CW agent by air, but its remaining air force capabilities are very weak." The Government states, however, that—according to its intelligence—Iraq has "attempted to modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which is potentially capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area."[109] The CIA analysts believe that this UAV "probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents."[110]

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

93. The threat from Iraq's biological weapons is perhaps most alarming. In the CIA's view, all "key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponisation—of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were during the Gulf War."[111] The British Government states that "Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents", and describes a number of facilities of concern. The Government's dossier also argues, on the basis of evidence from Iraqi defectors, that the Iraqi regime has continued to develop mobile biological agent production facilities. These would be extremely difficult for inspectors to detect.[112]

94. IISS argue that "As of 1998, Iraq possessed sufficient civilian facilities, equipment, and materials to produce bulk BW agent within weeks following a political decision to resume production. It is not known for certain whether Iraq has resumed production of fresh BW agents, but it seems a safe bet that it has, or will, in the face of impending attack ... In theory, Iraq could have preserved or produced enough BW capability to cause mass casualties, which, from Baghdad's perspective, presents Iraq's closest approximation to nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterrence or terror."

95. IISS believe that "Unless Iraq has substantially improved its delivery capabilities, its current threat against well-equipped and well-defended forces would not be decisive." The existing BW capabilities might well be used against civilians, however: "Assuming Iraq has retained a small force of 650km-range al-Hussein missiles,[113] it could deliver BW warheads to cities in Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran from relatively protected launch points within Iraq ... casualties in an unprotected population could run in the hundreds or even thousands. Delivery by airborne spray devices would likely be more deadly."[114]

96. We conclude that evidence of Iraq's retention and continued development of weapons of mass destruction is compelling, and a cause for considerable concern. We commend the Government's decision to draw international attention to the scale of Iraq's illegal weapons of mass destruction programme, through the publication in September 2002 of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government.

Iraq and human rights

97. On 2 December the Government published a further document entitled Saddam Hussein: crimes and human rights abuses, which describes the "human cost of Saddam's policies."[115] The document quotes the April 2002 resolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights, which drew attention to "the systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror."

98. The Government document describes the Iraqi regime's systematic use of torture, abuses against women, inhumane treatment of prisoners, harassment of exiled opposition leaders, and persecution of Kurdish and Shia communities—including the use of chemical weapons against Kurds in Halabja in 1988. It also cites evidence of the Iraqi regime's use of torture during its occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91.

99. Although the document on these Iraqi abuses cites evidence collected by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International accused the Government of being "opportunistic and selective" in its publication of this material in December. Human Rights Watch also said that when it had collected evidence of Iraqi human rights abuses in the past, this evidence had been ignored by the British Government.[116]

100. We accept that the Iraqi regime is not unique in its abuse of human rights and of civil and political freedoms.[117] In the context of this Report, the regime's human rights abuses are most relevant because they indicate the ruthlessness of Saddam Hussein and other senior figures in the Iraqi government. We conclude that, given Saddam Hussein's record of human rights abuses, he would not hesitate to use torture and weapons of mass destruction against foreign troops and civilians if he believed that this would benefit his regime.

Does Iraq constitute an immediate threat to British security and interests?

101. Saddam Hussein has defied the United Nations for eleven years. As the Prime Minister pointed out in his speech to the House on 24 September 2002, "occasionally debate on [the question of Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction] seems to treat it almost as if it had suddenly arisen, coming out of nowhere on a whim in the last few months of 2002. It is actually an 11-year history: a history of UN will flouted, of lies told by Saddam about the existence of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes, and of obstruction, defiance and denial."[118]

102. Failure to take action throughout this period is no reason to further postpone enforcement of Security Council Resolutions; but is the threat from Iraq sufficient to justify robust action, including the use of military force? Arguably, other international security problems are equally pressing: North Korea, for example, already has missile and nuclear technology which—as recent events have demonstrated—it is willing to export;[119] and nuclear-armed Pakistan is highly unstable.[120] Iraq does not currently pose a military threat to the United Kingdom: the Government's view on 11 June 2002 was that "We assess that there is no immediate threat of military attack by Iraq, although Iraq threatens RAF aircraft patrolling the Iraqi no-fly zones."[121]

103. Furthermore, Lord Wright suggested to us that Saddam Hussein, living in a dangerous region, might arm himself with weapons of mass destruction as a deterrent.[122] He pointed out that "Iraq has had certain weapons of mass destruction for a long time, as we all know, and we do need to ask ourselves why, if they have not used them yet, should they use them unless they are provoked by an attack from the United States?"[123] Sir Harold Walker argued that deterrence had prevented Saddam Hussein from using chemical weapons in the Gulf War. The same strategy had "worked in a different context with the Soviet Union, which was a much bigger enemy, and worked in the Gulf War, really ought to be able to work with Iraq now."[124]

104. One reason the Government presents for addressing the threat from Iraq now is that the Iraqi regime, "if it ever saw opportunities to develop other terrorist networks on which it could rely it would do that and it would then be used against the West."[125] As we indicated in paragraph 85 above, the Government takes seriously the possibility that Iraq may be forging alliances with terrorist organisations, even if such links are not demonstrable now. The 11 September attacks have undoubtedly highlighted the horrifying potential of mass casualty terrorism, which could be even more devastating if terrorists were to obtain weapons of mass destruction.[126]

105. A second reason to arrest the Iraqi regime's development of weapons of mass destruction with some haste derives from awareness of the extent of WMD development combined with an understanding of the history of Saddam Hussein's regime. As the Government points out in its dossier, "the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we have described. It arises also because of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. His record of internal repression and external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses."[127] The Prime Minister, reinforcing this message, told the House on 24 September that Saddam Hussein "has used these weapons [of mass destruction] in Iraq itself—thousands dying in those chemical weapons attacks—and in the Iran-Iraq war, started by him, in which 1 million people died; and his is a regime with no moderate elements to appeal to."[128] A nuclear armed Iraq would alter profoundly the balance of power in the Middle East and the Gulf region: deterring Iraqi aggression in the region would become extremely difficult. In the event of another Iraqi attack on Kuwait, for example, Iraq could defy the international community to respond if it possessed strategically sited nuclear weapons. Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction also encourages such proliferation among its regional neighbours.

106. The Government presents a third reason for addressing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction urgently. The Foreign Secretary argues that both the Government's pursuit of the 'war against terrorism,' and its policies towards Iraq, are designed to strengthen the international rule of law and the credibility of multilateral institutions, notably the United Nations. In Iraq, the Government's objective is "to see Saddam Hussein disarmed of his weapons of mass destruction ... both because of the threat which [Iraq's weapons of mass destruction] pose to his own people, to the region and to the wider international community and also because [Saddam Hussein] is in flagrant defiance of the international community. We have made the world relatively safer over the last 60 years because of the relative success of our international institutions based on the United Nations, and if we want to have a safer world still in the future that system has to be upheld and enforced."[129] In addressing the threat from al Qaeda, the Government is also "dealing with an equally flagrant breach of international law ... by terrorist organisations". Both the war against al Qaeda terrorism and the Government's approach to the Iraqi regime "are part of a total comprehensive approach to ensuring that we live by international law."[130]

107. For these reasons, the Foreign Secretary does not see "the War Against Terrorism and a war against rogue states like Iraq as alternatives, I see them as part of an overall strategy to remove or reduce threats that are posed."[131]

108. We conclude that failure to address the threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction could pose very high risks to the security of British interests in the Middle East and the Gulf region.

109. We commend the Government's commitment always to work within international law,[132] although we recognise that international law must evolve to meet new challenges such as the unprecedented terrorist threat. We further commend the Foreign Secretary's commitment to strengthen the credibility of multilateral institutions—and, in particular, the United Nations—in pursuit of international security.

110. We note with concern the words of Senator Bob Graham, chairman of the US Senate Intelligence Committee, that the US administration is "so focused on Iraq that they are not paying adequate attention to the war on terror."[133] We urge the Government to ensure that its efforts to address the threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction do not detract in any way from those to eliminate al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups.

85 HC (2001-02) 384, para 202. Back

86 HC (2001-02) 384, para 203. Back

87 US Department of Defense News, 27 September 2002, available at: http://www.defenselinek.mil/news/Sep2002. Back

88 Newshour, PBS News, 25 September 2002, available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour. Back

89 Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002. Back

90 Letter from George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to Senator Bob Graham, Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, 7 October 2002. Back

91 Q 108. Back

92 Q 108. Back

93 Q 52. Back

94 House of Commons Liaison Committee, Session 2001-02, evidence presented by the Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, Prime Minister, HC 1095, Qq 96-98. Back

95 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, available at www.fco.gov.uk/files. Back

96 Cheney argued that "containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States." 'Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103^rd National Convention, 26 August 2002; available at: