Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report


MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ

174. President Bush has argued that the United States must remove the Iraqi regime, because "The situation could hardly get worse, for world security and for the people of Iraq."[227] Vice President Cheney has asserted that "The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action."[228] We have some sympathy with these views: as we conclude above,[229] failure to address the threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction could pose very high risks to the security of British interests in the Middle East and the Gulf region.

175. The threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime must, however, must be weighed carefully against substantial evidence suggesting that a war against Iraq could damage international efforts to counter terrorism, and could severely destabilise the Middle East and the Gulf region. Sir Harold Walker spelled out the uncertainties: "the level of resistance in Iraq, the level of casualties we will have to take, the form of a new regime, how do you introduce a new regime, what will be the effect on oil, what will be the economic cost, what will be the effect on the world economy." Sir Harold Walker also emphasised the importance of considering these factors, because "you are contemplating sending young men and young women to die and it is not right that they should go if the situation is very uncertain... All these uncertainties are not an ultimate reason for putting war out of the window, but they are a reason for saying it should be a last resort and not a first resort."[230] Despite the United States' massive military capabilities, "It should not be thought that the military victory will be a walkover, although undoubtedly it can be won."[231]

176. Clearly there are many risks and uncertainties in military action, particularly against a regime as unpredictable and ruthless as that of Saddam Hussein. If the case has been made, however, these uncertainties should not be an excuse for refusing to take military action as a last resort.

The conduct and possible consequences of war against Iraq

URBAN WARFARE

177. We were warned of a "real danger of street fighting in Iraqi cities and the likelihood of heavy casualties"[232] in the event of war with Iraq. As speculation intensified during August and September about possible US military action to remove Saddam Hussein, US intelligence services reportedly received evidence that the Iraqi regime was planning to concentrate troops in urban centres.[233] Iraq would have no chance of overcoming superior US air power, and its battle tanks would be vulnerable to US air strikes. However, it has more than 400,000 active troops, and perhaps a similar number in reserve. By concentrating troops in the cities, Iraq could force the US and its allies to attack major centres of population. Such a tactic could significantly increase the risk of both civilian and US (or allied) military casualties.

178. There are doubts about the loyalty of the army to the regime. There are fewer doubts about the loyalty of the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard. Significantly, only two out of the seven divisions of the Republican Guard were committed in the Gulf War.[234]

IRAQ'S USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

179. Lord Wright estimates that a "war with Iraq could substantially increase "the risk of Saddam at last being provoked to use the weapons of mass destruction that he is believed to possess."[235] Dr Chipman voiced similar concerns, arguing that "if the United States with some allies were intent on overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime, it would really be imprudent to rule out the possible use of some weapons of mass destruction. Forces operating in theatre would need to operate on the presumption that some biological or chemical weapons might be used, and that, equally, neighbouring states would need to be prepared for the possible launch of a ballistic missile on their territory."[236] The consequences of a chemical or biological attack on civilian populations in the area could be devastating.

180. Israel, the United States' major ally in the region, is perhaps the country most likely to be subjected to Iraqi attack—although, as the Foreign Secretary pointed out, "Iraq has not only attacked Israel in the past but it has used missiles against four other of its neighbours. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and Turkey have all had missile attacks... in the last two decades."[237] The Foreign Secretary also told us that Iraqi missiles are also able to reach British Sovereign Bases on Cyprus.[238]

181. Dr Chipman told us that there are "obviously contingency preparations for a possible use of a ballistic missile conventionally armed, or perhaps tipped with chemical or biological weapons" against Israel.[239] Such plans include mass inoculations of Israeli civilians,[240] and Israel's development of a missile defence system, 'Arrow.' Another protective strategy mentioned to us in Washington was the United States' public warning that any Iraqi official responsible for releasing weapons of mass destruction would be prosecuted for war crimes.[241] Dr Chipman felt that this would have some impact:"it is not necessarily the case that an order given by Saddam Hussein to launch chemical or biological weapons would be followed by commanders in the field if those same commanders felt that there would be reprisals personally against them by the inevitably victorious power once the military operation is ended. One can imagine a dialogue whereby Saddam Hussein instructs a field commander to use weapons of mass destruction and the field commander radios back after thirty minutes, saying, 'I fear I am having some technical difficulties'."[242] However, Dr Chipman "would find it strange if all risk of using WMD could be eliminated" in this way.[243]

182. A missile attack by Iraq on its regional neighbours could result in dangerous escalation of the conflict in the region, as well as civilian casualties. In 1991, during the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein fired thirty nine Scud missiles into Israel. Then, the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Shamir, refused to retaliate. According to press reports, the current Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, has made it clear that should Israel be attacked again during another war against Iraq, he would strike back against Iraq.[244] If Iraqi missiles did not hit major population centres, the Israeli response might be less robust than if an Iraqi attack were to result in major civilian or military casualties.

183. We asked the Foreign Secretary whether he had discussed this possibility with his Israeli counterpart. He replied that personally he had not; but "of course" the Government was "looking at possible consequences of military action in the region."[245] Though he was reluctant to speculate about the appropriate Israeli response to such an attack, he reminded us that "Every country has a right to act in self-defence under Article Fifty One of the United Nations Charter."[246]

Iraq after Saddam Hussein

184. The US administration is optimistic about the prospects for the Middle East and Gulf region following the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. Vice President Dick Cheney has asserted that "Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace ... Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of Jihad. Moderates throughout the region would take heart. And our ability to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be enhanced, just as it was following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991."[247]

185. Governing post-conflict situations is fraught with difficulties, however. The establishment of the rule of law—let alone the creation of democratic governance structures—presents major challenges.[248] Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Secretary of State for Defense, pointed out recently that "No one should be under the illusions that you can create the kind of peacekeeping force for Afghanistan that has worked I would say remarkably well in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Those are very small places where once the fighting was over the remaining law and order problems were relatively minor."[249] The chances of the country fragmenting are, in the views of those with whom we met in Washington, quite small. Nonetheless, keeping the peace in Iraq is unlikely to be very much easier than it is in Afghanistan. A transitional authority to govern post-conflict Iraq would almost certainly require substantial international involvement for some years, to keep the peace, establish the rule of law, assist in the development of representative political structures and create the conditions under which the Iraqi people could benefit from the country's economic recovery.

186. Our witnesses were not optimistic about the effects of a war in Iraq on the country itself, nor did they appear to believe that it would benefit the wider region. Dr Charles Tripp of the School of Oriental and African Studies raised a number of concerns: "The idea that the current regime in Baghdad can only be overthrown by a US-led military invasion is a testimony to the weakness of those Iraqi forces opposed to the current regime," and, presumably, an indication of how difficult it might be to establish a cohesive government after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In Dr Tripp's view, bringing new values into Iraqi public life would be difficult, because of the "absence of Iraqi allies with sufficient clout and determination to carry such a project through. None of the present Iraqi opposition forces is suited to this role."[250] Dr Tripp contends that "virtually all" of Iraq's major political players adhere to the rules of a "distinctively Iraqi political game ... hostility of those threatened by the abandonment of the old rules could lead to formidable resistance... transparency, accountability and the idea of truly public service would carry the threat that accumulated privileges would be stripped from them and their patrons."[251]

187. The consequences of the prevailing political climate might be that "the occupying power may find itself with allies in Baghdad who are no more than clients. Ironically, the occupying power would have been manoeuvred into playing a role which would be functionally not far removed from that of the present regime in Iraq. It would be the patron, armed with overwhelming coercive force and financial resources, which would be relying on its subordinates to deliver social order in Iraq."[252] We note that a successor regime would, however, be able to build prosperity in the country on the basis of the oil resources and finance that would consequently be made available.

188. Lord Wright shares Dr Tripp's apparent scepticism about Iraq developing into a 'beacon for democracy' in the Arab world. "It may be an admirable aim; but I am blowed if I know how the United States is going to achieve that by occupying Iraq."[253] In Lord Wright's view, the United States has not explained how they "expect to settle Iraq, as they say, as a democratic country as a result of a military operation. I think the perception in the Middle East of what the Americans, and with Security Council authority what the Americans and the rest of us are going to do, depends very much on what the objective is and how clearly that objective is set out."[254]

189. The Government has had some limited contact with Iraqi opposition groups. The Foreign Secretary told us, however, that "To say we are working with exiled groups would give a wrong impression. There have I think been talks at official level with the Iraqi opposition groups which are based here, which received information about their views, but to suggest that we are working with them would be over-egging the situation."[255] The FCO had no involvement in the meeting of Iraqi opposition that was held on 14-15 December in London and which, according to press reports, was preceded by "squabbling" between Iraqi groups about whom should attend.[256]

190. The Foreign Secretary has also discussed with Iraq's regional neighbours the possibility of Iraq's fragmentation. He reassured us that "There is a wide measure of agreement by most of Saddam's neighbours about what needs to be done, including, post-disarmament of Iraq, for Iraq's territorial integrity to be maintained ... I think that there is such a common interest among the states bordering Iraq that first of all it is improbable that any of Iraq's neighbours would take any action to destabilise and fragment Iraq and, secondly, that it has developed in the last 80 years as a single entity, albeit with these three distinct groups, the Kurds, the Shi-ites and the Sunnis, that with proper support to a successor regime its territorial integrity would be enhanced."[257]

191. We are reassured by the Foreign Secretary's comments. Nonetheless, we conclude that the establishment of the rule of law and functioning representative government in Iraq after a war would pose formidable challenges. We recommend that the Government examine carefully the possible models for post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq, including a United Nations transitional authority. We recommend that, in its considerations, the Government bear in mind the necessity for country-wide peacekeeping, civil policing, transitional justice, and representation of all groups in Iraqi society.

Instability in the Arab and broader Islamic world

192. In our Seventh Report, we argued that "For the war against terrorism to succeed in the long run, many of the new allies must address internal problems affecting their economies and societies." We cited evidence suggesting that a dangerously high level of popular discontentment in many Arab countries contributed to the growth of anti-Western groups such as al Qaeda. According to Dr Rosemary Hollis, the relative quiet of the "Arab street" in the war against terrorism was a sign of political repression: "all forms of assembly in almost every Arab country are forbidden, so to assemble and demonstrate ... is very difficult to do."[258] As a consequence of the absence of political liberties, dissent is focused in the mosque or through the Internet. Dr Hollis argued that al Qaeda activism and terrorism should be interpreted as "an expression that ultimately emanates from the Arab street."[259]

193. A US-led war with Iraq could have a substantial impact on already tense and unstable societies in the Arab and Islamic world. Sir Harold Walker told us that "Arab leaders have used pretty powerful language in forecasting disaster" in the event of a war. Sir Harold had noted Egyptian President Mubarak's comment of 27 August that "If you strike Iraq ... while Palestinians are being killed by Israel ... not one Arab leader will be able to control the angry outburst of the masses." He also reminded us that "The Omani foreign minister talked of plunging the world into chaos. In public at least some responsible Arab leaders see a very bad situation."[260] In Sir Harold's own view, the "only place I would really worry about would be Jordan, depending on what the King was perceived to have done in helping an American assault."[261]

194. Lord Wright felt that public reactions to a war with Iraq would depend substantially on the length of the campaign: "if it is a quick, clean action—and I have no idea how that can be achieved—then I believe that the regional response can probably be held under control." However, a longer campaign could give rise to "a serious danger of real problems on the streets of the Middle East and perhaps more widely"[262] including, we add, Western Europe.

195. War in Iraq would make the battle against al Qaeda even more difficult. Steven Simon, who is a former Senior Director for Transnational Threats in the US National Security Council, wrote to us that any war with Iraq would "be seen by many Muslims, especially militants, as evidence of the systematic conquest of the Muslim world that al-Qaeda theoreticians—and many others—allege is taking place."[263] Sir Harold Walker agreed that people in the Arab world would likely see a US-led war against Iraq as "wrongly, as one of a series of American assaults on Muslim people, forgetting that the Americans have helped Muslim people in, for example, Kosovo."[264]

196. War could increase the likelihood of al Qaeda attacks in the short run, and might also increase the pool of al Qaeda recruits. Mr Simon judges that war with Iraq would "spur a surge in attacks against US, UK and French assets" in the Middle East and Gulf region, "as well as opportunistic attacks against Westerners elsewhere. British diplomatic missions abroad will be at risk as well as areas or sites frequented by British tourists, who are perceived by the militants as defying local mores and tempting local Muslims to transgress religious laws. Businesses that are believed to be British may also become targets of spontaneous violence as well as terrorist attack. British military personnel will also be subject to risks on par with the one they faced at the height of violence in Northern Ireland."[265]

197. If the war were prolonged, Steven Simon estimates that—as a consequence of the perception that the United States is attacking the Islamic world—the pool of al Qaeda recruits would increase, "not only in remote areas, but within the UK and Europe." Mr Simon points out that recruitment by al Qaeda has been quite vigorous in the 1990s. A "war against Iraq will generate an increase in conversions from either moderate to more radical Islam practice, or from Christianity to Islam in local mosques and within HM prisons."[266] This could lead to an increase in the threat of terrorism inside Britain.

198. The Foreign Secretary seems surprisingly unconcerned by the potential threats discussed above. He accepts that "there will be international terrorist organisations, particularly Islamic terrorist organisations who claim Islam to themselves which seek to exploit any situation where military action is taken against an Islamic country ... they sought to exploit ... military action being taken against the Taliban in Afghanistan in order to free a Muslim country, as they did military action taken to free another Muslim country, Kuwait, in 1991 and to free Muslims in Kosovo in 1998." However, Mr Straw is confident that "If [military action] is justified, we will be able to justify it"[267] to critics in the Islamic world.

199. To substantiate this level of confidence, Mr Straw explained that he has a "very, very large Muslim population myself in my own constituency. I remember the anxieties of people over Kosovo and even more so in respect of Afghanistan ... What I also say to my Muslim friends is look at the record of Saddam Hussein."[268] Mr Straw also told us about initiatives such as the FCO Islamic Media Unit, and the high level of Arabist expertise in the FCO, both of which should, in his view, help to ensure that the Government's message in the Islamic world is communicated effectively.

200. We do not share Mr Straw's confidence that, in the event of military action against Iraq, the United States and the United Kingdom would be able to justify such action to the satisfaction of the 'Arab street.' The Foreign Secretary has presented a case for robust action to enforce Iraqi disarmament which seems reasonable enough to many British citizens, but which will likely appear less so to disaffected young people in Egypt, Yemen or Saudi Arabia—especially if, as is likely, images of Iraqi civilian casualties are broadcast by the al Jazeera television station and other pan-Arab news services. We recommend that the Government treat seriously the possibility that a war with Iraq could trigger instability in the Arab and Islamic world, and could increase the pool of recruits for al Qaeda and associated terrorist organisations there and in Western Europe.


227   Remarks by the President on Iraq, Cincinnati Museum Center, Ohio, 7 October 2002. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002. Back

228   Vice President Dick Cheney addresses Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, 26 August 2002, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08. Back

229   See para 108 above. Back

230   Q 116. Back

231   Q 118. Back

232   Q 116. Back

233   See, for example, 'Iraq plans urban warfare to thwart US', The Guardian, 9 August 2002, available at:

http://www.guardian.co.uk. Back

234   See, for example 'US planners see a weaker Iraqi leader', Boston Globe, 31 July 2002; 'The Iraqi Forces: large, but troubled',Center for Defense Information, 26 April 2002, available at: http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/iraqi-forces-pr.cfm. Back

235   Q 116 [Lord Wright of Richmond]. Back

236   Q 58. Back

237   Q 34. Back

238   Q 33. Back

239   Q 58. Back

240   In August 2002, the Israeli government issued smallpox vaccinations to 15,000 health and security officials, expanding an inoculation programme in case of Iraqi biological attack. See 'Israel widens smallpox vaccinations', Associated Press report, 21 August 2002.  Back

241   Pierre Richard Prosper, US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes, has said that Saddam Hussein would be "suspect number one brought before a court, any court." A US State Department group is developing plans for a system of transitional justice, including criminal prosecution of members of the current Iraqi regime. See 'US would seek to try Hussein for war crimes,' Washington Post,30 October 2002.  Back

242   Q 58. Back

243   Q 58. Back

244   "Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has informed the Bush administration that he plans to strike back if Iraq attacks Israel, according to Israeli and Western officials. Mr. Sharon's statements, made privately to senior American officials in recent weeks, represent a major shift in Israeli thinking since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, when 39 Iraqi Scud missiles struck without any Israeli response." New York Times, 22 September 2002.  Back

245   Q 172. Back

246   Q 172. Back

247   Vice President Dick Cheney addresses Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, 26 August 2002, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002. Back

248   A number of multilateral peace operations were established during the past decade with the purpose of restoring political and economic stability and establishing democratic structures of governance in war-affected societies. While elections were held under international supervision from Cambodia and Haiti to Bosnia and Kosovo, few of these places can yet be considered genuinely democratic. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the High Representative retains-and continues to use-significant powers over elected Bosnian authorities, although over six years have passed since the first elections were held since the Dayton Accords. In Kosovo, thousands of international staff from organisations such as the UN, the EU and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe continue to wield significant power over the administration of this small province of two million people. The resolution of issues such as property ownership and criminal justice remain deeply problematic throughout the former Yugoslavia, and international involvement in matters such as these looks likely to persist for years to come.  Back

249   Paul Wolfowitz, interview with Associated Press, 10 September 2002. Back

250   Ev 98, para 9. Back

251   Ev 98, para 10. Back

252   Ev 99, para 14. Back

253   Q 114. Back

254   Q 113. Back

255   Q 173. Back

256   See, for example, 'Iraqi opposition row puts London meeting in doubt', Reuters, 20 November 2002, available at:

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk. Back

257   Q 174. Back

258   HC (2001-02) 384, Q 150[Rosemary Hollis]. Back

259   HC (2001-02) 384, paras 163-166. Back

260   Q 116. Back

261   Q 116. Back

262   Q 114. Back

263   Ev 10, para 5b. Back

264   Q 116. Back

265   Ev 11, para 5b. Back

266   Ev 10, para 5b. Back

267   Q 179. Back

268   Q 179. Back


 
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