House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report

TAKING FORWARD THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

201. In our Seventh Report, we recommended that the Government "consider carefully how to help allies in the Islamic world to address the social, economic and political conditions that have led to the growth of Islamic extremism among their populations."[269] These conditions have been detailed recently by the authors of the United Nations Development Programme Arab Human Development Report, which was published earlier this year. The Report, which was written by prominent Arab intellectuals, is clearly being examined carefully on both sides of the Atlantic: it was recommended to us by both the Foreign Secretary and senior officials in the US administration.[270] It was also discussed by US Secretary of State Colin Powell in his speech launching the US-Middle East Partnership Initiative—the US Government's new effort to support peoples and governments in the Middle East to meet "challenging and pressing human needs."[271]

202. The Arab Human Development Report focuses substantially on the need for good governance and economic development in the Arab world. It highlights a number of alarming trends in the region, which inhibit both these goods: ten million children between the age of 6 and 15 years are currently out of school; and "if current trends persist, this number will increase by 40 per cent by 2015."[272] There is a serious and growing "under-supply of knowledgeable people, a problem exacerbated by the low quality of education together with the lack of mechanisms to intellectual capital development and use."[273] Arab countries access to and use of technology—especially communications technology—is detailed in the Report: only 0.6 per cent of the population uses the Internet and personal computers. Investment in research and development in the region is very low.

203. The region's economic problems are very evident: at around 15 per cent, average unemployment in Arab countries is among the highest in the developing world.[274] People lack both the skills and the capital to enhance their economic and development opportunities. While the state sector is downsizing, formal credit is often available only to those who are better off.

204. Demographic trends in the Arab world suggest that this unemployment rate may well grow, as the region's young people reach working age. Currently the age structure of the population is significantly younger than the global average, with 38 per cent of the population under the age of fifteen.[275] Although fertility rates have declined recently in many Arab countries, they are still high by international standards. The populations of Mauritania, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Yemen are all growing at a rate of 3 per cent or more per annum.[276] As the rent from oil is shared among more people, living standards are likely to continue to decline unless new sources of income and wealth are found.[277]

205. The Arab Human Development Report's authors argue that, although income poverty is low in Arab countries compared with other parts of the developing world, inequality of capabilities and opportunities is high. They advocate action to secure universal, high-quality education; strengthening tertiary education; and eliminating illiteracy at one end of the education spectrum while providing opportunities for 'lifetime learning' to enable the better educated to take advantage of new economic opportunities. They also call for measures to ensure greater access to capital, because "millions of people lack the opportunity to participate in the economy by combining their innovation, skill and hard work with capital."[278]

206. Weak political participation—manifested by lack of representative government and restrictions on liberties—is also highlighted as a critical problem. "The mismatch between aspirations and their fulfilment has in some cases led to alienation and its offspring—apathy and discontent." It is this discontent, combined with the lack of opportunities described above, that foster Islamic extremism in these countries.

207. We note with interest the views of Richard Haass, director of policy planning in the US State Department. Haass argues that "No-one should confuse promoting democracy with holding parliamentary elections the next day—in which, yes, the Islamists would do well, because they're the only ones who are currently allowed to organise. Parliamentary elections are not the first step." Instead, Haass recommends a number of reforms, some of them similar to those recommended in the Arab Human Development Report, which should precede elections: educational reform, especially for girls; establishment of the rule of law; strengthening civil society; establishment of freedom of assembly and freedom of the press. "Then, against that backdrop, introduce elections—gradually. Locally first. Or nationally, but for a body with limited powers."[279] The US administration aims to help peoples and governments in the Middle East to address development and governance issues through its new US$29 million US-Middle East Partnership Initiative.[280]

208. We welcome the FCO's support of women's rights projects in the Middle East and North Africa, its assistance to the interfaith initiative on the Middle East Peace Process, and its decision to develop a "comprehensive strategy towards the Arab world, including policies to address the causes of extremism and violence."[281]

209. We commend the Foreign Secretary's decision to examine carefully the Arab Human Development Report 2002. We conclude that addressing inter alia the problems highlighted by its authors is important for the medium and long term success of the war against terrorism.

210. We recommend that, in its response to our own Report, the FCO set out its progress towards a comprehensive strategy for the Arab world, including an explanation of the extent to which it is working with the Department for International Development, the BBC World Service and the British Council on this strategy.

The Importance of Addressing the Arab-Israel Problem

211. In our Seventh Report, we concluded that "a linkage between the conflict in the Middle East and the war against terrorism is widely perceived among populations and governments in the region. Both the US and British governments appear to accept that the conflict is a factor which severely complicates their conduct of the war, although it does not weaken their resolve. While the conflict in the Middle East requires swift and fair resolution on its own merits, this perceived linkage lends added urgency to the search for peace."[282]

212. Since we made that Report, violence in Israel and the Palestinian territories has remained at a high level. Prospects for the resumption of a peace process look bleak, despite the drafting of a three-stage 'road map' by the Quartet (the EU-UN-US-Russia working group on the Middle East) in September 2002. Meanwhile, the issue of Iraq has come to dominate the international agenda to a far greater extent than it did in the first six months of the 'war against terrorism.'

213. In Lord Wright's view, this focus on Iraq has created resentment in the region: he perceives "an almost universal feeling in the Arab world, both on the streets and among Arab governments, that the priority is wrong. They are really asking the question... 'Why are the Americans focusing on Iraq when in the view of the Arab world, and I am bound to say the view of the British Government, much more priority ought to be put on trying to solve the Arab-Israel problem?'"[283]

214. To its credit, the Government appears deeply aware of the importance of tackling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in parallel with its efforts to address the problem of Iraq. The Prime Minister told the House that, on the basis of his discussions with "the leaders of the Arab world," none holds "any brief for Saddam Hussein but [they] feel that we should pursue with equal vigour a just resolution in the middle east. As I point out to them, that just resolution must involve security for Israel as well as a viable Palestinian state."[284]

215. Towards this end, the Prime Minister has called for "urgent action to build a security infrastructure that gives both Israelis and Palestinians confidence and stops the next suicide bomb closing down the prospects of progress. We need political reform for the Palestinian Authority, and we need a new conference on the middle east peace process, based on the twin principles of a secure Israel and a viable Palestinian state." He promised that "we in Britain will play our part in that in any way we can."[285] The Government is "working with the Americans and others to try to put together a proper conference on the issue to get the peace process restarted."[286] At the Labour Party Conference, the Prime Minister announced that "By this year's end, we must have revived final status negotiations."[287]

216. In addition to its push for revived peace negotiations, the Government has provided substantial humanitarian assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in response to the "dire humanitarian situation." In 2002-03, the United Kingdom will spend £32 million through its bilateral programme, and through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. The United Kingdom also supplies 20 per cent of funds for the European Commission's Palestine Programme, and contributes 5 per cent of the World Bank's Trust Fund for the West Bank and Gaza. The Government has also provided advisers and supported international donor co-ordination to assist reform of the Palestinian authority, which, it believes, is necessary "to prepare for Palestinian statehood."[288]

217. Since we last reported on this subject, the Bush administration has made it clear that the Palestinian Authority leadership is 'against us' in the war on terror. On 24 June, President Bush called upon the Palestinian people "to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror" and stated that "when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and new security arrangements with their neighbours, the United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East."[289]

218. The Foreign Secretary welcomed President Bush's speech as "very positive."[290] He stated, however, that although "Many people are disappointed with President Arafat's record, and those disappointments are shared by this Government," the British Government would continue to "deal with the elected leadership of the Palestinian Authority. I have put my view on the record. I welcome the elections and have expressed the hope that they are free and fair; otherwise they will not be legitimate. However, we shall deal with whoever is elected, as we have in the past."[291]

219. We are deeply concerned at the continuing high level of violence in Israel and the Palestinian territories, and that little progress appears to have been made towards reviving peace negotiations in the region. We note with interest that both Palestinian and Israeli elections are scheduled to take place in January 2003. We hope that both elections will be free and fair, and that the resulting authorities will take forward negotiations towards a final settlement of the conflict. These elections should not, however, be used by the parties to the Quartet as an excuse for inaction in the interim period. It is unlikely that new and more moderate governments will emerge on either side of the conflict. The urgency of this issue demands greater action by the Quartet in the coming weeks and months.

220. We conclude that the Government is right to engage the leaders of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in an effort to revive the Middle East peace process. We are convinced that this policy must be pursued in parallel with international efforts to address threats from al Qaeda and from the Iraqi regime.

Afghanistan

221. In our Seventh Report, we recommended that "the Government consider carefully, with the United States and other coalition partners, the options for maintaining and increasing security in Afghanistan, both during and for a significant period after the June 2002 Loya Jirga. This should include consideration of the extension of ISAF [the International Security Assistance Force] beyond Kabul and its immediate area."[292] The Loya Jirga to decide on the future of the country was carried out in a "generally peaceful environment" in June. If the new administration in Afghanistan were to secure substantially improved human rights and living standards for the majority of Afghans in the near future, Afghanistan could become an example of the possible benefits of 'regime change'. However, as the Government acknowledged in its August response, the murder of Vice President Haji Kadir in July 2002 "indicates how fragile the situation remains."[293] On 5 September, an attempt was made on President Karzai's life. This attack, and a disastrous "errant" US bombing raid on a wedding party in rural Afghanistan which killed 54 civilians, illustrate the level of violence that continues to pervade Afghanistan and the fragility of the current political settlement.

222. British armed forces handed leadership of ISAF to Turkey on 20 June, though Britain continued to support ISAF with 400 troops in Kabul. The Germans and Dutch have agreed to take over the ISAF lead from the Turks, with some NATO force generation and planning support.[294]

223. Britain has also been involved in reform of Afghanistan's security sector, for example through training the First Battalion of the Afghan National Guard. The United Kingdom has also taken the lead internationally on tackling drugs trafficking from Afghanistan, has provided substantial humanitarian assistance, and is prioritising capacity building within the Transitional Administration in the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank.[295]

224. Despite some progress, the Government stresses that "Many vulnerable people remain reliant on food aid. Remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban are still active and can still threaten the reconstruction of Afghanistan... There is an urgent requirement for the Transitional Administration to deliver a reconstruction dividend that is visible on the ground."[296] The United States has cited as its"biggest single concern" donor states' failure to deliver the economic aid pledged at the Tokyo conference. US Deputy Secretary of State for Defense Paul Wolfowitz complained in September that " some of the donors are not giving their fair share. In fact, only a little more than 30 percent of the $1.8 billion pledged for the first year has been delivered so far. Most of that money was needed for humanitarian assistance projects, with many Afghans still waiting for real reconstruction to begin."[297]

225. Our own call for the extension of ISAF[298] has been repeated throughout the year: for example, Pakistan's representative to the UN called on 4 October for deployment of additional forces to consolidate peace and security in Afghanistan and warned that failure to take timely action there "could prove to be very costly in the future.[299]" The Government, in its August 2002 response to our Seventh Report, stated that "ISAF contributors and coalition partners have discussed the expansion of ISAF's mandate at some length and the consensus is that ISAF expansion outside Kabul is not feasible at the moment," though "the UK is working with others to spread the 'ISAF effect' outside Kabul."[300]

226. We note with interest that in September, the US was "considering the possibility that ISAF could play some useful roles beyond Kabul if ISAF could be enlarged... there are some benefits that could possibly come from using ISAF in ways outside the capital." However, the US was not offering additional resources for this purpose, although, as Paul Wolfowitz explained "We welcome and support these developments and encourage the international community to provide the leadership and resources necessary to make it happen."[301] As the Government states, however, "There is no appetite amongst current troop contributing nations to commit large numbers of additional troops."[302] In late November, the US also announced a major restructuring of its forces in Afghanistan. Under the plan, US troops would move to population centres such as Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat, to enhance security outside Kabul and to establish bases for US aid projects. This apparently indicates a shift in US activities in Afghanistan, away from 'hard' military activities and towards civil affairs and reconstruction work.[303]

227. Though progress has undoubtedly been made in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, not least in the status of women, we are concerned by the continuing level of instability in the country and about reports that much of the reconstruction assistance pledged at Tokyo has not arrived. A year after the collapse of the Taliban, the stabilisation of Afghanistan and its surrounding region continues to be a critical objective in the war against terrorism. We urge the Government to continue and, if necessary, to enhance its efforts to stabilise Afghanistan, and to ensure that the lives of ordinary Afghans continue to improve.

Prisoners Detained at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba

228. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the subsequent military operations in Afghanistan, over six hundred individuals, including seven British nationals, have been detained by the United States government in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and classified as "unlawful combatants". We discussed the treatment and status of these detainees in our Seventh Report.

229. Before agreeing the Seventh Report, we asked the United States government to clarify how it intended to deal with the detainees. The US response was that the relevant authorities have made "no decisions... on the disposition of the detainees currently being held. The fate of the detainees will be determined on a case-by-case basis."[304] In March 2002, when we visited Washington, we were reassured to hear that if, after review, the US decides that a detainee does not pose a significant security threat, he will be repatriated.

230. We questioned in the Seventh Report for how long the US intended to detain the prisoners it holds at Guantánamo Bay.[305] The US Secretary of State for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, had stated that the US claims "every right" to detain certain individuals "for the duration of the conflict," even if they are acquitted of specific crimes.[306] This poses the question of whether the 'war against terrorism', unlike a conventional conflict, can ever have an end. The only detainees released from Guantánamo so far are a mentally ill inmate who was returned to Afghanistan on May 1, 2002, and four detainees (two of whom were over 80 years old) who were returned to Afghanistan and Pakistan on October 28, 2002.[307]

231. The President of the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights, Michael Ratner, wrote to us that the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay "have not been charged, tried or given access to lawyers."[308] Citing US Department of Defense press transcripts, Mr Ratner, reminds us that "The United States has itself acknowledged that at least 'some [of the detainees] were 'victims of circumstance' and probably innocent.'" Nonetheless, "Since gaining control of the detainees, the United States military has held them virtually incommunicado. They have been or will be interrogated repeatedly by agents of the United States Departments of Defense and Justice, though they have not been charged with an offense, nor have they been notified of any pending or contemplated charges. They have made no appearance before either a military or civilian tribunal of any sort, nor have they been provided with counsel or the means to contact counsel."[309]

232. In a Written Statement on 11 December 2002, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Mike O'Brien, wrote: "British officials paid a fourth visit to Guantánamo Bay between 11-15 November... The official passed to the camp authorities some personal letters for some of the detainees and was able to give oral messages to others. We have passed on to the families oral messages which were received and have briefed them on details of the detainees' circumstances. For reasons of privacy these details are not disclosed in this statement. Detainees continue to be able to send and receive letters through the camp authorities and through the ICRC, although there is some concern about delays."[310]

233. Citing the cases of Messrs. Rasul and Iqbal, two of the British citizens detained at Guantánamo, Mr Ratner informs us that the detainees' "ability to contact their families has been severely restricted ... Attempts by their Members of Parliament to secure greater access to them by their families have failed." [311] The Center for Constitutional Rights, having examined the cases, has concluded that: "(i) the detentions are unlawful, arbitrary and indefinite contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and customary international law, specifically Articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 18, 25 and 26 of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man[312]; and (ii) that the detainees' rights as persons seized in times of armed conflict, as established under, inter alia, the regulations of the United States Military, Articles 4 and 5 of Geneva Convention III, Geneva Convention IV, and customary international law have been violated. We also believe that the ancient writ of habeas corpus should be available to the detainees to challenge their detention."[313]

234. We further note with interest the Abbasi case, which was "an attempt by judicial review proceedings to pressure the Foreign Secretary to intervene more forcefully on behalf of [Mr Abbasi, A British citizen held at Guantánamo Bay] and the other detainees ... on the basis that the Foreign Office was not reacting appropriately to the fact that [a British citizen was] being arbitrarily detained in violation of his fundamental human rights."[314]

235. In the Abbasi case, the Court of Appeal "made a clear finding that '¼in apparent contradiction of fundamental principles recognised by both jurisdictions and by international law, Mr Abbasi is at present detained in a 'legal black hole'¼.and [w]hat appears to us to be objectionable is that Mr Abbasi should be subject to indefinite detention in territory over which the United States has exclusive control with no opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of his detention before any court or tribunal'. This was a matter of "deep concern" to the Court, which it appeared to hope would be conveyed to the appellate courts of the United States.[315] However, the Court felt it could not order the Foreign Secretary to do more than consider Mr Abbasi representations for assistance, which had been done."[316]

236. The US government maintains that the detainees at Guantánamo Bay are being treated humanely. Delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have visited the detainees, at the invitation of the US Government. The American Red Cross explains that the US government issued this invitation to the ICRC, because "Along with 188 other nations across the globe, the United States is committed to meeting the standards of humanitarian treatment described in the Geneva Conventions."[317] During our visits to Washington in March and October this year, US officials have also made it clear to us that some of the Guantánamo detainees have provided the administration with valuable intelligence, which may help to prevent further civilian casualties in the 'war against terrorism.'

237. In the Seventh Report, we concluded that "in relation to the detention of Taliban and al Qaeda suspects, as we do in relation to other matters, that the Government must strive to uphold standards of international law, and, to the greatest extent possible, to ensure that prisoners are tried in full accordance with internationally accepted norms of justice."[318] In August, the Government replied to this conclusion that "It is for the US, as the detaining power, to decide whether, and if so how, they will prosecute the detainees. However, we have made our view clear to the US, and will continue to do so, that if any of the detainees are prosecuted they should receive a fair trial in accordance with international law."[319] We are pleased that the Foreign Secretary was able to raise the cases with the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, at the Prague NATO summit on 20 November 2002.[320]

238. While we understand that the US government has obtained valuable intelligence from prisoners detained at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, we are nonetheless concerned that the US government continues to detain many of these prisoners without trial. We recommend that the Government continue to press the US government to move rapidly towards the trial of these alleged terrorists, in accordance with international law.

239. We recommend that the Government supply us with further information about the seven British citizens currently being held, including details about when and how they can expect to be tried, and whether, if found guilty, they will be liable to the death penalty.

Challenges to the United Kingdom Government

240. The scope of this Report reflects the complexity of issues that the Government must address in parallel, in fighting the war against terrorism. It is not a conventional war; indeed the very use of the word 'war' can lead to profound misunderstanding. Conventional military and diplomatic tools in this campaign are therefore complemented by resources from other government departments and services. We note that in its reply to our Seventh Report, the FCO refers to the "government-wide response" to the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom, which is led by the Home Office and "co-ordinated through the Cabinet Office mechanisms (relevant Ministerial and official committees, and in the case of a serious incident, the Cabinet Office Briefing Room facility)." The FCO has lead responsibility where the threat is to United Kingdom interests overseas, "again, as part of an integrated Whitehall-wide response."[321]

241. The co-ordination of this multidimensional approach poses significant challenges to the Government. We recommend that, in its response to the Report, the Government set out in detail the Cabinet Office mechanisms for co-ordinating the "government-wide response" to the threat from international terrorism.

242. The terrorist attacks in Bali and Kenya have raised serious questions about the Government's Travel Advice system. No specific warning was issued by the FCO in advance of the Bali attack, nor were British citizens warned of a potential attack in Kenya—despite the fact that the German and Australian governments issued public warnings in mid-November that militants were planning to attack Western targets specifically in Mombasa.[322] On 5 December, A few days after the attacks in Mombasa, the British High Commission in Nairobi was closed for four days in response to a "specific threat" to the High Commission.[323] On 9 December, the FCO advised that "Kenya is one of a number of countries in East Africa where there may be an increased terrorist threat. UK nationals in Kenya should be vigilant, particularly in public places frequented by foreigners such as hotels, restaurants and shopping malls. In particular there is a potential threat against Western interests in Nairobi."[324] Nonetheless, British citizens have not been advised to cancel trips to Kenya.

243. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mike O'Brien, pointed out on 31 October that the Government's "First and foremost ... priority is to protect the United Kingdom, its overseas territories and its citizens overseas"[325]: providing accurate and timely travel advice is central to the FCO's responsibility in this area.

244. The FCO has already supplied, at our request, an updated memorandum on the FCO's travel advice system.[326] The memorandum describes the FCO's Travel Advice Unit, which is based in the Consular Division of the FCO and which updates travel advice in response to requests from Posts overseas and Departments in London. The FCO memorandum claims that travel advice has recently improved significantly, and "is now considerably more comprehensive" than in was in 1999.[327] Mr O'Brien nonetheless felt, in light of the Bali experience, that "there are lessons to be learned" in this important area.[328]

245. On 21 October, in his statement to the House on the Bali attacks, the Foreign Secretary 'asked the intelligence co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office to ensure that all intelligence [relating to the Bali attacks] was made available to [the Intelligence and Security] Committee. The ISC will of course consider that [intelligence] and then reach its own conclusions on it.'[329]

246. On 11 December 2002, the Intelligence and Security Committee made its Report to the House on Intelligence, Assessments and Advice prior to the Terrorist Bombings on Bali 12 October 2002.[330] The ISC Report discusses in some detail the FCO Travel Advice system in relation to the Bali terrorist attack, and concludes that 'the FCO Travel Advice did not accurately reflect the threat or recent developments, although it was proportional to the then current Security Service assessment.' The ISC also argue that 'the FCO Travel Advice is not well formatted and consequently it does not highlight the key points, particularly risks—they get lost in the complexity of the document. Routine language is recycled from edition to edition and contains elements of reassurance that produce a confused effect. The terrorist threat to British citizens is not clearly identified, nor are the sensible precautions that could be taken by them clearly described.'[331] The ISC conclude that the 'whole issue of FCO Travel Advice, its purpose, target audience and presentation needs to be examined by the FCO as a matter of urgency.'[332]

247. The Foreign Secretary informed the House on 11 December that 'In the wake of the Bali bombing, I have put in hand a comprehensive review of the way in which our travel advice is both prepared and presented. We have already made some improvements, but we will be making further changes, drawing on the Committee's helpful recommendations.'[333]

248. We welcome the Foreign Secretary's announcement of a comprehensive review of the FCO's travel advice system. We will certainly wish to consider the results of this review once it is complete, and will hold hearings in the New Year on the travel advice system. We recommend that the Government publish and implement the results of its review of the travel advice system at the earliest opportunity.

249. We recommend that, at the earliest possible date, the Government supply us with a full description of the process according to which travel advice is agreed among Government departments. Specifically, we seek details of the process of collating information in this area; of the relationship between the FCO and the Joint Intelligence Committee in deciding travel advice; and full details of the organisational structure and decision-making process within the Foreign Office, at both official and ministerial level, for the taking of travel advice decisions and issuing them to the public.

The Parliamentary Dimension

250. In our Seventh Report, we argued that "While nothing should be published which might compromise sources or methods of intelligence, the Government must try to secure the widest possible support in Parliament and among the British people if it is proposing to risk the lives of British servicemen and women as part of a further phase of the war against terrorism."[334] Further military deployments in the war against terrorism appear likely: on 20 November, the United States asked the Government formally for assistance in any forthcoming military operation it might undertake to disarm Iraq. Understandably, public concern about the next phase of the war is very high.

251. The Government recalled Parliament on 24 September, to debate the threat from Iraq and its assessment of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Government also decided to hold a debate on UN Security Council 1441 on 25 November 2002.

252. We conclude that the Government must continue to address with the utmost seriousness its obligation to keep the British public informed of developments in the war against terrorism. This, we believe, is essential to ensure the widest possible public support for Government actions.

253. We commend the Government's stated commitment[335] to keep Parliament fully informed of developments in the war against terrorism, through statements to the House, through regular Ministerial meetings with Select Committees, and also through further meetings between the Prime Minister and Select Committees. We look forward to receiving the specific dates of these proposed meetings.

Conclusion

254. The Government will face hard decisions in the coming months. Intelligence suggests that the threat from al Qaeda remains acute, both within Britain and to British interests overseas. Current assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes, detailed in this Report, indicate that the threat from Saddam Hussein's regime must also be addressed with determination and some urgency.

255. The international community's approach to both these challenges will have implications for Britain's security in years to come. As Stephen Pullinger argues, "If and when we achieve a world in which the possession of all weapons of mass destruction is banned, ensuring strict compliance with that international norm will be paramount. Intrusive inspections and UN Security resolutions backed, if necessary, by force will become vital components of a world free from the scourge of WMD. How we deal with Iraq today may signal how likely we are to reach such a world."[336]

256. We commend the Government for its firm and committed leadership in the war against terrorism. We conclude that Britain has contributed substantially to ensuring that the "international coalition" remains a reality, more than a year after the devastating terrorist attacks on the United States.

269 HC (2001-02) 384, para 167. Back

270 Q 180. Back

271 'The US-Middle East Partnership Initiative: Building Hope for the Years Ahead', Secretary of State Colin Powell, The Heritage Foundation, 12 December 2002, available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/15920pf.htm. Back

272 Arab Human Development Report 2002, United Nations Development Programme, p 3. Available at

www.un.org/publications. Back

273 Ibid. Back

274 Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC estimates that disguised and open unemployment affects about 45 per cent of the labour force in Iran and Iraq and just under 40 per cent in Saudi Arabia. See Martin Wolf, 'The building pressures that threaten the world's oil well', Financial Times, 4 December 2002. Back

275 Arab Human Development Report 2002, p 36. Back

276 Ibid, pp 36-37. Back

277 Martin Wolf, 'The building pressures that threaten the world's oil well', Financial Times, 4 December 2002. Back

278 Arab Human Development Report 2002, p 11. Back

279 Richard Haass, cited by Nicholas Lemann, The New Yorker, 18 November 2002. Back