APPENDIX 7
Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office
FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF THE WAR AGAINST
TERRORISM
Thank you for your letter of 8 October. Ministers
have agreed the following replies to your questions.
COUNTER-TERRORISM
COMMITTEE
1. "The Committee wishes to receive
a progress report on the work of the CTC. The progress report
should cover, inter alia, the following points: initial
findings of the review of the second set of country reports; which
countries have now ratified the 12 conventions and which have
legislation and `effective executive machinery' in place; which
countries other than UK are acting as `donors', and which countries
are they assisting; how the UK's £1 million assistance package
is being spent; whether HMG remains entirely satisfied that the
UN has the necessary resources to enable the CTC to function effectively."
Progress report and initial findings of the review
of second set of country reports:
One year on from its creation by UN Security
Council Resolution 1373 (2001), the Counter-Terrorism Committee
(CTC) has received reports from 174 UN member states and five
others. It has completed the review of 170 of these and is working
hard to review the remainder of the reports received. The CTC's
hallmark is openness, transparency and even-handedness. Its procedures
adhere to these principles wherever possible; for example, all
the reports submitted by States are published on the CTC's website.
But the CTC maintains confidentiality in the sensitive parts of
its work, such as the content of its exchanges with States.
On 8 October the Security Council approved the
CTC's work programme for the period from 28 September to 31 December
2002. This programme includes:
(i) improving the structure of its online
directory of information on best practice, model laws and available
assistance programmes on counter-terrorism issues;
(ii) complete the review of the second-round
letters from Member States;
(iii) ensure that the CTC's experts meet
representatives of all states requesting assistance to comply
with UNSCR 1373 (2001); and
(iv) collate information received from international,
regional and sub-regional organisations on their activities in
the area of counter-terrorism.
The Security Council also confirmed Sir Jeremy
Greenstock as chairman until 4 April 2003. The CTC continues to
have the unanimous support of Security Council members.
As States respond to the CTC's comments and
concerns by submitting further reports, the CTC is taking a second
look at implementation in each State. 92 second round reports
have been received to date. In reviewing the second round of reports
the CTC will focus on two key priority areas: (i) whether legislation
is in place covering all aspects of 1373, including the ratification
of the 12 international conventions; and (ii) whether each State
has effective government machinery for preventing and suppressing
terrorist financing. Further exchanges between the CTC and States
will follow in 2003.
17 Member States have not yet submitted a first
report to the CTC. Of these, six have not made any contact and
the CTC is actively following up, with a view to offering advice
on preparing a report.
Which countries have ratified all 12 conventions
and have effective executive machinery in place?
Ratifications of the 12 counter-terrorism conventions
have increased significantly since July 2001 (the last point before
the adoption of resolution 1373 at which the UN published consolidated
figures on ratifications) when only Botswana and the UK had ratified
all 12 conventions. Since then 22 more States have done so. These
are: Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Denmark,
Finland, Grenada, Iceland, Japan, Mali, Netherlands, Norway, Panama,
Peru, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, USA and Uzbekistan.
The analysis of second reports from Member States should provide
the CTC with a useful guide to which States have effective executive
machinery in place.
List of donor countries (other than UK) and who
they are helping:
The CTC continues to coordinate and facilitate
the provision of technical assistance. It has invited all States
in a position to do so, to contribute to the compilation of a
comprehensive directory of sources of advice and expertise in
the areas of legislative and administrative practice. 13 donors
have now done so; the CTC is continuing to encourage others to
follow suit in order to make the Directory as comprehensive, and
therefore operationally useful, as possible. The Directory of
Information and Sources of Assistance is available to member states
on the CTC's website (http://www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/1373/).
How is the UK's £1 million assistance package
being spent?
In keeping with the current priorities of the
CTC, three programmes have been developed within the UK's £1
million assistance package, focusing on Counter Terrorism Legislation
and Administrative Measures, Charity Regulatory Measures and Law
Enforcement Training on Terrorist Financing.
The assistance will be delivered, in the first
two cases in the form of regional seminars, to countries selected
according to various criteria, including needs expressed in the
reports submitted to the CTC and in line with the findings of
the CTC itself. Precise details of recipient countries have yet
to be confirmed.
Is HMG satisfied that the U N has the necessary
resources to enable satisfactory CTC functioning?
The Fifth (administrative and budgetary) Committee
of the UN General Assembly in May 2002 authorised the UN secretariat
to provide funds and sufficient resources to support for the work
of the CRC. There are no outstanding resource problems at this
time.
AFGHANISTAN
2. "The Committee wishes to receive
a note on the work of the FCO's Afghanistan Unit."
The Afghanistan Unit was established as a separate
department of the FCO in January 2002 as a successor to the FCO's
Emergency Unit, set up in the immediate aftermath of the World
Trade Centre attacks on 11 September 2001. The Unit's mission
statement is "to help Afghanistan achieve stability, security
and prosperity, to the benefit of the Afghan people, the United
Kingdom and the world community".
The work of the Afghanistan Unit has focussed
on three main areas:
(i) Political. The Unit formulates policy
recommendations and briefings to Ministers on a wide variety of
issues—political/economic developments, human rights, anti-narcotics,
bilateral contacts etc, acting as a central Whitehall co-ordination
point for HMG policy on Afghanistan. Working with the UK Special
Representative for Afghanistan, the Unit drives policy on relations
with international partners on Afghanistan, focussing in particular
on building continued international support for the Bonn Process
and ensuring HMG objectives are met. The Unit arranges numerous
inward and outward visits (including Chairman Karzai and many
members of the Interim Administration, and the Prime Minister
and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), and produces all
briefing for these visits. The Unit pursues a public diplomacy
strategy, discussing and exchanging views on events in Afghanistan
with NGOs, academics, media, companies and foreign governments;
it co-ordinates a Chevening Scholarship programme for Afghans
to study in the UK; organises conferences and other meetings on
Afghanistan; and funds a variety of democracy/human rights related
projects. A significant proportion of resources were devoted earlier
in the year to responding to letters from members of the public
and to advising Ministers on responses to MPs' letters.
(ii) Political/Military. In the first half
of 2002, with the UK lead of the International Security Assistance
Force and significant UK involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) activities in Afghanistan, work in this area focussed on
international coalition building—including for continued
support for ISAF once the UK lead had been handed over—and
on maintaining a conductive political environment for action by
UK forces within OEF. Work has also focussed on ways to improve
security outside Kabul, and on coordination of security sector
reform efforts in Afghanistan with other Whitehall Departments
and international and Afghan partners. In particular, this has
involved developing projects with DFID and MoD funded under the
joint Global Conflict Prevention Pool (see separate below on "Spreading
the ISAF Effect").
(iii) HMG's presence in Afghanistan. Following
the lengthy closure of the British Embassy in Kabul, considerable
work has been required to re-establish HMG's physical presence
in Afghanistan. This has ranged from arranging procurement and
transportation of equipment, to advising on the recruitment of
Embassy staff. Many members of the Unit have filled positions
in the Embassy on a temporary basis to cover leave, sickness etc.
This area of work is now declining as facilities for the international
community in Afghanistan, and the staffing of HMG's own operations,
become more established.
3. "The Committee also wishes to
receive a progress report on work to `spread the ISAF effect outside
Kabul' and on the development of Afghanistan's own security structures."
SPREADING THE
ISAF EFFECT
ISAF under Turkish leadership continues to provide
security in Kabul, although violent incidents persist. The Germans
and Dutch have provisionally agreed to take over the ISAF lead
from the Turks, using their help NATO High Readiness Force HQ
with some NATO force generation/planning support.
In the regions, however, the security situation
remains uncertain. Local confrontations between rival factions
persist, albeit at a low level; the absence of effective law and
order forces means that little is being done to combat criminal
activity; and Al-Qaida/Taliban remnants continue to stir up trouble
in some areas. This continues to have an adverse effect on the
welfare of the population, is hampering the delivery of humanitarian
aid and obstructing efforts to deliver reconstruction benefits
on the ground. It also provides fertile ground for opium production/trafficking.
We have continued to work closely with international
partners, including the Americans as lead nation for the development
of an Afghan National Army, to explore a range of options for
"expending the ISAF effect". Ultimately, the solution
must lie in building up indigenous security and law and order
forces capable of addressing the sources of instability and allowing
the central government to project its authority in the regions.
The challenge in the short-term is to find a way of delivering
the necessary security in the regions to combat the narcotics
threat and allow reconstruction to go ahead. There is no appetite
amongst current contributing nations to commit large numbers of
additional troops. Nor is there any guarantee that what has worked
in Kabul would work in the country as a whole.
We are pressing for an urgent decision on regional
security plans which, to be successful, will require full US involvement.
We have also suggested that it makes sense to use the newly-trained
ANA battalions for security tasks in the countryside.
Development of Afghanistan's security structures
We are working closely with Afghan and international
partners, in particular the Americans, to help establish an effective
and democratically accountable national army, and with the Germans
to create a national police force. To date five battalions of
ANA troops have been trained, one by ISAF when under UK leadership,
three by the US and one by the French. Further battalions are
under training. The UK is supporting by funding radios for all
newly trained ANA battalions and funding the refurbishment of
barracks. As agreed at the Emergency Loya Jirga in June, the Afghan
Transitional Administration has established a Defence Commission
which has drawn up a plan for the further development of the Afghan
National Army. However there are still some fundamental issues
that remain to be addressed, including a more precise definition
of the size and structure of the Army, and the mechanisms for
democratic control by the Afghan security institutions.
The UK is also contributing to the German-led
national police force reform programme, which is training over
1,500 recruits in the newly rebuilt Kabul Police Academy. Progress
with judicial reform (an Italian lead) has been less encouraging
and we are exploring the possibility of seconding a UK legal expert
to help move the process forward. We have also launched a £5.7
million project to build capacity in the office of the National
Security Adviser, using Global Conflict Prevention Pool funds.
This is a key project that should significantly enhance the co-ordination
and delivery of security sector reform on the ground.
The UK is co-ordinating international counter-narcotics
assistance to Afghanistan. In consultation with the Afghan Government,
other donors and international (including UN) agencies, we have
developed a strategy for the elimination of drugs from Afghanistan.
It identifies four key areas where the international community
should focus its support: providing alternative livelihoods for
opium poppy farmers; improving Afghan drug law enforcement capacity;
building up the capacity of Afghan drug control institutions;
and reducing drug demand in Afghanistan. Work is continuing to
identify the necessary British and international resources to
implement the strategy.
GUANTANAMO BAY
4. "The Committee wishes to receive
a progress report on the position of detainees held at Guantanamo
Bay, with particular reference to the British detainees."
There are seven UK detainees in Guantanamo Bay.
The Government is conscious of the importance
of safeguarding the welfare of the British detainees in Guantanamo
Bay and of the need to resolve their position. The Foreign Secretary
has raised the circumstances in which British nationals are being
held with the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, on a number
of occasions. Senior UK Government lawyers and officials have
regularly asked their counterparts in the US Administration in
Washington and London for progress on the issues concerned. The
US has given us assurances that the detainees are being treated
humanely and consistently with the principles of the Geneva Convention.
UK officials have paid three visits to the British
detainees in Guantanamo Bay. The UK was the first state to visit
its nationals there. The purpose of the visits has been to confirm
the identity and nationality of the detainees, check on their
welfare as well as to ask questions about national security.
The detainees appeared generally to be in satisfactory
physical health, although various ailments, and in one case, injuries
sustained in Afghanistan, are being treated by the US authorities.
UK officials have seen no visible sign of mistreatment. The detainees
can exchange letters with their families though the US authorities
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC
has a presence on Guantanamo Bay. It has access on demand to the
detainees.
All detainees are housed in indoor accommodation
including individual sleeping, toilet and washing facilities and
air-ventilation. A field hospital and clinic are on site. The
detainees are able to exercise and to practise their religion.
Calls to prayer are broadcast throughout the Camp. The detainees
have access to reading and writing material.
We have made clear our view that the detainees,
if prosecuted, should receive a fair trial. The US is well aware
of the UK's opposition to the death penalty under all circumstances.
The FCO's and Home Office's handling of the
case of one of the UK detainees, Feroz Abbasi, is the subject
of judicial review proceedings. The hearing took place in the
Court of Appeal on 10-12 September. We await the Court's decision.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
5. "The Committee wishes to be
brought up to date on any bilateral and EU moves to reach an understanding
with the US on the jurisdiction of the ICC."
EU Foreign Ministers agreed on 30 September,
"Conclusions and Guiding Principles" on how to respond
to US requests for bilateral (non-surrender) Agreements under
Article 98.2 of the ICC Statute without undermining the Statute.
In the meantime, US officials have visited Italy, Austria, Spain
and the UK for exploratory discussions, and interpretation of
the "Guiding Principles" in relation to their draft
Agreement which had been circulated in July. On 17 October in
London, and in line with the Principles, discussion centred on:
(i) The scope of existing Agreements (eg
Status of Forces Agreements) in addressing US concerns.
(ii) No impunity—the US have declared
their willingness to prosecute ICC crimes, but it is not clear
that all such crimes are covered in their law.
(iii) Non-surrender of nationals of States
Parties—the US is concerned about the many non-US nationals
serving with its armed forces.
(iv) The scope of "persons sent"
by the US government—a particularly difficult issue since
the US draft agreement goes beyond what is envisaged in the Statute.
The US side will take time to reflect on these
discussions before seeking further dialogue. No new draft Agreement
has emerged to date. The UK team made clear that, although we
do not share the US concerns, we will wish to be helpful to them,
provided that we do not undermine the Court or compromise the
Statute.
MIDDLE EAST
6. "The Committee wishes to receive
a progress report on the latest moves to bring about peace in
the Middle East."
The Government has long recognised the importance
of a negotiated settlement to the disputes between Israel and
the Palestinians and between Israel and neighbouring states. We
have consistently sought to reach a settlement based on UN Security
Council Resolutions which would realise legitimate Palestinian
aspirations and deliver peace and security within recognised borders
for all the peoples involved. The 11 September attacks underlined
the critical importance of such efforts. Tackling the Middle East
conflict is necessary on its own merits, but would also help maintain
the consensus for action against international terrorism.
Since August 2002, when the Government provided
its Command Paper Response to the Committee's Report on the War
against Terrorism, we have continued to work with the parties,
the US, EU partners and regional and other Governments to revitalise
the peace process. Israelis and Palestinians have continued to
suffer the consequences of the cycle of violence and retribution.
We have lobbied the parties to refrain from, and prevent, actions
likely to escalate the violence and undermine efforts to resume
negotiations. We have condemned suicide bombings and other callous
terrorist acts, and urged the parties to respect international
humanitarian law. We have raised our concerns with Israel at the
impact of military operations, restrictions imposed by the Israel
Defence Forces on the movement of Palestinian people and goods,
and the demolition of infrastructure, property and agricultural
land on the Palestinian economy and on the provision of basic
services. We have made clear our view on continuing illegal settlement
activity, which threatens the basis for a two-State solution and
consequently prospects for peace. The Foreign Secretary has been
in frequent contact with the parties, the US and EU colleagues,
and visited Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Iran from 7 to 10 October.
The Government has continued to provide UK personnel to monitor
the Palestinian detention of six prisoners in Jericho as part
of the agreement reached in May to end the siege of Ramallah.
The UK played a key role in the adoption of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1435 on 24 September
which expressed alarm at the reoccupation of Palestinian cities.
It demanded an end to all acts of violence and repeated the need
for respect in all circumstances of international humanitarian
law. It demanded an immediate end to Israeli measures in and around
Ramallah, and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian cities.
It called on the Palestinian Authority to meet its commitment
to ensure that those responsible for terrorist acts are brought
to justice.
The Prime Minister is personally committed to
a new conference on the Middle East Peace Process based on the
twin principles of a secure Israel and a viable Palestinian State,
and to reviving final status negotiations between the parties
urgently. We have long held that an international conference addressing
political, security and economic issues could provide impetus
behind a renewed political process.
The immediate focus of international activity
is on work by the Quartet (US, EU, UN and Russia) to draw up a
three-phase roadmap that could achieve a final settlement within
three years. We expect the plan to be comprehensive, including
the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, and to address the political,
economic, humanitarian, institutional and security dimensions.
It would spell out reciprocal steps to be taken by the parties
in each of its phases. Progress would be based on the parties'
performance against specific benchmarks such as comprehensive
Palestinian security reform and Israeli withdrawal to pre-intifada
positions by mid-2003 as the security situation improves. These
benchmarks would be monitored and assessed by the Quartet. US
Assistant Secretary of State Bill Burns travelled to the region
in late October to consult key regional partners on the roadmap.
We recognise the dire humanitarian situation
in the Occupied Territories. Overall we plan to spend £32
million in 2002-03 through our bilateral programme in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip and our contribution to the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). We also fund 20 per cent of the
European Commission's Palestine Programme, and contribute a 5
per cent share of the World Bank's Trust Fund for the West Bank
and Gaza. We have provided over £12 million to UNRWA, the
World Food Programme, the World Bank as well as local and international
NGOs in response to emergency initiatives resulting from the intifada.
Reform of the Palestinian Authority is an important
element of efforts to implement the call made by President Bush
in June for a final settlement within three years, and to prepare
for Palestinian statehood. We have supported international donor
co-ordination to assist reform through the Task Force on Reform,
and have called for the early appointment of a new Palestinian
Cabinet capable of delivering credible reforms. We have provided
advisers to assist the reform process.
7. "The Committee wishes to be
provided with more detail on HMG's work to address the factors
which have led to the growth of Islamic extremism in the Middle
East."
We are consulting with partners in the UK and
overseas on strategies for responding to a growth in violence
and anti-western hostility that claims to have a religious motivation.
Within the FCO we are also working on a comprehensive strategy
towards the Arab world, including policies to address the causes
of extremism and violence.
The FCO has allocated funds for promoting women's
rights in Muslim countries. Posts in the Middle East and North
Africa are supporting economic and political reform as a priority,
in some cases through projects, eg:
— Morocco: booklet promoting electoral
awareness among rural population.
— Yemen: projects to encourage women
to participate in next year's election.
— Kuwait: sponsored visit by Kuwaiti
women's organisations as part of promoting the political process.
— Iran: seminar with Iranian academics,
government and religious officials within the framework of the
Dialogue among Civilisations.
— Saudi Arabia: continued support for
reform efforts (and help for funding with youth exchanges).
— Algeria/Tunisia: with EU partners
use the mechanisms of the EU Association Agreements to press for
reform.
The FCO has given full support and assistance
to the interfaith initiative on the Middle East Peace Process,
whose most recent meeting was at Lambeth Palace this month.
Research Analysts have been involved in a number
of projects, seminars and engagements with the Muslim community
eg a seminar on radical Islam in November 2001. The FCO is also
planning to organise a seminar with moderate Islamists. Research
trips have also had a strong Islamic focus and have helped forge
relationships and contacts with the Muslim community in countries
across the Middle East, South and South East Asia. The group has
well established links with the Muslim community and continues
to build and sustain good contacts both with the Muslim community
in Britain and abroad.
The FCO Arabic spokesman gives several interviews
a week to pan-Arab broadcast media, and participates in discussion
programmes.
"Connecting Futures" is a five year
British Council initiative which aims to build better understanding,
learning and respect between young people from different cultural
backgrounds, by working in new ways and with extended communities
in the UK and overseas. Post 11 September 2001, due to the recognised
need to address the gulf of understanding between communities
in the UK and in the Arab and Muslim world, we are focusing initially
but not exclusively on activities in Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia,
Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UK. From 2003-04 financial year,
we shall include the other countries in the Middle East and North
Africa, including Israel; Central Asia; Crimea/Ukraine; and South
East Europe. Our work in Afghanistan is also relevant. Our target
audience is aged 15-25 years and we aim to reach three million
young people per annum.
THE THREAT
FROM WEAPONS
OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
8. "The Committee requests a fuller
statement of how the FCO discharges its lead responsibility for
responding to threats to UK interests overseas."
The FCO response to the pervasive threat from
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is essentially a pro-active
one, seeking wherever possible to prevent their further development
or proliferation by means of a variety of tools—multilateral
arms control agreements; export control regimes; action to assist
in the destruction or disposal of existing weapons stock and materials.
Where there is a direct and immediate threat
to UK interests overseas, the FCO would have lead responsibility,
albeit as part of an integrated Whitehall-wide response that would
draw upon a wide range of other departments and agencies, co-ordinated
through Cabinet Office mechanisms. This structure applies whatever
the nature of the threat, although of course the serious nature
of a situation involving the possible use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
would affect the level and urgency of government activity.
A primary objective for the FCO is to prevent
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons materials falling into
the hands of terrorists and those who support them. To this end
the UK continues to take every opportunity to urge the international
community to co-operate further in preventing the further proliferation
of such weapons and materials. More specifically the FCO takes
the lead in seeking to extend the global spread of the major international
Treaties which prohibit the proliferation of WMD—the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In the course of
2002 we have taken action, both nationally and in concert with
our EU partners, to promote their universality.
Since the events of 11 September last year,
each of the multilateral export control regimes has been examining
how it can contribute to the prevention of WMD falling into the
hands of terrorists. The Australia Group has introduced formal
guidelines which refer explicitly to the possibility of terrorist
use of chemical and biological weapons, and is refining its lists
of controlled goods to catch more items of use for small-scale
production of chemical and biological agents. The Nuclear Suppliers
Group and Missile Technology Control Regime are considering how
they can make explicit their commitment to prevent technology
falling into the hands of terrorists, for instance by amending
their guidelines.
The Prime Minister announced to Parliament in
July this year a commitment of up to $750 million over 10 years
to the G8 "Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction". Our contribution to this
co-operative effort will include work in areas such as Plutonium
Disposition in Russia; the destruction of Russian Chemical Weapons
stocks; nuclear materials accountancy at nuclear facilities across
the former Soviet Union (FSU); and the physical protection of
nuclear materials across the FSU. We will continue to play a leading
role in developing this Partnership at G8 level and beyond. The
UK has also provided an initial voluntary contribution of £250,000
to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Prevention Against
Nuclear Terrorism' fund, and will continue to urge others to follow
suit.
THE LEGAL
BASIS FOR
MILITARY ACTION
9. "The Committee will wish to
have a note on the latest position with regard to UN Security
Council Resolutions on Iraq and on the legal basis under which
military action might be taken against Iraq: (a) to remove weapons
of mass destruction, or (b) to bring about a change of regime."
After several weeks of bilateral and collective
discussions with the other Permanent Members of the Security Council,
the US and UK presented a draft text to the full Security Council
on 23 October. Negotiations are continuing.
The Committee will appreciate that these Security
Council discussions are confidential. So we are not at this stage
able to share the draft text. In broad terms, however, the draft
declares Iraq to be in violation of previous resolutions, and
sets out new procedures for the conduct of inspections together
with the consequences of Iraqi non-cooperation.
Our view of the legal position on military action
remains as cited by the Committee in its 20 June 2002 report on
the Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism. The objective
of any military action would depend on all the circumstances,
including the terms of any relevant Security Council resolutions.
THE INTERNATIONAL
COALITION
10. "The Committee wishes to know
whether the Government is prepared to act militarily against Iraq
together with the United States as a coalition of two in the event
that no other country is willing to take such action."
A decision to launch military action against
Iraq has not been taken and is not inevitable. Our efforts are
focused on disarming Iraq of its WMD through the establishment
of an effective inspection regime. What we would do in the event
that these efforts failed would depend on the circumstances at
the time.
Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
28 October 2002
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