Examination of Witnesses (Questions 107-119)
LORD WRIGHT
OF RICHMOND
AND SIR
HAROLD WALKER
THURSDAY 24 OCTOBER 2002
Chairman
107. Welcome, gentlemen. We have just had an
interesting difference of views between the expansionist and the
more restrictive view of international law as it applies to the
problem of Iraq. Whether there will be any wafer-thin difference
between two distinguished diplomats in this area I do not know
but we look forward to that with anticipation. Can I welcome you
both, Lord Wright, a former Permanent Under Secretary and Sir
Harold Walker, a very distinguished diplomat still very involved
in the Middle East. Lord Wright you said on 21 August, "that
implications of an attack against Iraq would be absolutely devastating,
and I do not personally believe that the case has yet been made."
Since when an amendment has been moved in that we have both the
IISS dossier, we have had the Foreign Office dossier, do you believe
that is sufficient to change your own view?
(Lord Wright of Richmond) Chairman, first
of all, thank you very much for inviting me to appear. It is 11
years since I last appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee
and it is very nice to be here again. If I can take your second
point first. I do not actually yet believe that the case has been
made for a military invasion of Iraq. Mr Mackinlay said in the
previous session that we were no longer talking about regime change
but, with respect, a lot of people are still talking about regime
change. The first point I would like to make is that, to me at
least, the objectives of the United States administration are
still very unclear. I hope it is right to say that their first
objective is disarming Iraq of dangerous weapons. I personally
believe that that should be the absolute priority. There are still
a lot of noises coming out of Washington, not necessarily from
the President himself, but suggesting that there are people still
in the administration who think that the aim should be to remove
Saddam Hussein. I think a very clear case has to be made if the
Americans and their allies, including the British government,
are going down that route and I do not actually believe that case
has yet been made.
108. What would be necessary to convince you.
(Lord Wright of Richmond) I would regard any evidence
of an attack, imminent or otherwise, against Britain or the United
States or our allies, our western allies, as a good case for it.
The dossier produced by the British Government gave me no evidence
whatsoever that there was such likelihood of an attack. I think
I am right in saying the dossier showed no evidence at all of
links between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda. I know there has been
talk, and this was mentioned in the IISS interview, there has
been talk from the United States of various activities by Al-Qaeda
in Iraq; interestingly in the north of Iraq, an area over which
Saddam Hussein has no control and contacts with people for whom
Saddam Hussein has very little sympathy. I think it is unlikely,
it is possible but I think it is unlikely, that Saddam Hussein
would want to enter into a collaboration with Islamic extremists
over whom he has no control. Perhaps the greatest internal threat
to Saddam Hussein is precisely from that sort of Islamic extremist.
I think it is very unlikely—Sir Harold Walker is a former
Ambassador to Baghdad and I would defer to his views—that
Saddam Hussein is willing to enter into collaboration with Al-Qaeda.
I also think that the dossier did not produce any evidence that
Saddam Hussein has collaborated with or supported, let alone armed,
extremist Palestinian groups. I notice that the Foreign Secretary
made a slightly different point in his last evidence to you; but
the dossier itself, I think, produces no evidence that Saddam
Hussein has supported "terrorists" in Palestine.
109. Bounties to suicide bombers is not support?
(Lord Wright of Richmond) I do not think it is. Of
course it is offensive that he should behave like that. But there
is a very widely felt feeling in the Arab world that the Palestinians
are being severely discriminated against and ill-treated. Perhaps
you may not approve of it, but it is an entirely understandable
public relations exercise on Saddam Hussein's part.
(Sir Harold Walker) I agree with all of that. I think
it is worth stressing that it seemed to me at the time extremely
unlikely that the Iraqi regime would be behind 9/11 because at
the time the Iraqis were doing rather well by their lights in
seeing sanctions crumble, in getting on better terms with regional
people, including the Syrians, so why on earth should Saddam risk
everything by being caught out in an operation like that. As Lord
Wright said, Saddam is seen by Al-Qaeda and the Muslim world as
a totally bogus Muslim, if I may say so. He has led a secular
regime in a secular way and he raises the Islamic flag purely
for PR reasons. I do not like to say things that could be interpreted
as in favour of this regime, which is a really wicked regime,
but I do think the claim that there are significant contacts between
Al-Qaeda and the regime in Iraq is a very murky area. The Ansar
Islam, or whoever they are, as I think Lord Wright said, are in
northen Iraq, they are not under Baghdad's control, and senior
Iraqi spokesmen have twice claimed—and I do not know whether
anybody has disputed it—that the Iraqi regime have actually
helped the Kurds defeat the incursions of Ansar Islam. Despite
what Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld has said, one needs to
be a bit careful about associating Saddam's regime with this particular
bunch of terrorists, although there is plenty of historical evidence
of links with terrorists.
Mr Olner
110. That is extremely enlightening from someone
who has lived and been in Baghdad under Saddam. If what you just
said is right, why is all this pressure now being put on Saddam
Hussein to disarm when for five years he has been dormant?
(Sir Harold Walker) My position is really rather a
simple one, that the record of the Iraqi regime in actually developing
weapons of mass destruction, in actually using them and actually
going on developing them (using incredible devices to deceive
the inspectors and so on) demonstrates that in the long term,
as the IISS witnesses indicated, Saddam regards developing weapons
of mass destruction as an integral part of his regime, for prestige
and for imposing his will on the area as he would like. President
Bush has said that we are "faced with a grave and growing
danger"—I think those were the words. I entirely agree
it is growing but I do not agree it is grave at this moment. I
think it is a medium-term problem, not an immediate problem, but
one can readily see why the world, the American world in particular,
faced with 9/11, should suddenly realise that there are new threats
out there, and one of the good things, surely, that the American
response has done is to force the Security Council to face up
to responsibilities it ought to have addressed five or more years
ago.
111. That is given the UN come behind the resolution
and there is the backbone to do something. The corollary is if
the UN do not do anything this time then they themselves will
be extremely discredited in the future. Do you think Saddam will
ever comply with UN resolutions?
(Lord Wright of Richmond) Can I answer a slightly
different question first because, going back to the Security Council
resolutions, I also heard that very interesting exchange with
the lawyers? But leaving aside the legal arguments, perhaps I
do not need to remind the Committee that today is United Nations
Day. I do think it is very important, whatever the legal arguments
and justifications, that there is a Security Council resolution
which explicitly authorises military action against Iraq, if that
is what the United States and her allies decide to do ultimately.
Although there clearly are some lawyers who argue that the existing
Security Council resolutions are enough, I do not believe that
politically or in terms of public credibility that is adequate.
Chairman
112. Would you like to comment more directly
on the question, Sir Harold?
(Sir Harold Walker) I might add to that—it is
no doubt something that you will come on to, Chairman—that
a firm Security Council backing for any action could have a significant
effect on the reactions in the region, amongst governments perhaps,
not amongst people. I think that is another important realpolitik
reason why we should have another Security Council resolution,
regardless of the law.
Sir John Stanley
113. As we all know, the business of going to
war is surrounded with monumental uncertainty. Predictions in
advance of hostilities commencing, as to their length and as to
the loss of life that will ensue subsequently, are notoriously
difficult to make and historically have been the subject of massive
miscalculation, that is to say massive miscalculation in both
directions. If one looks back at some of the comment before the
Kosovan war and the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
most of the comment was that the loss of life and the difficulties
would be very much greater than was actually shown, but of course
when we come to the 1914-18 War the miscalculation was massive
the other way. It would not be reasonable with your background
to ask you to make a judgment to the Committee as to the ease
and likely cost in life of this particular military operation,
but what we would be very interested to hear from you is your
judgment if military operations do take place (and they must take
place if they do, presumably, with a view to removing the Saddam
Hussein regime and thereby going into Baghdad) as to what you
think would be the repercussions for Britain and its allies—obviously
we focus particularly on Britain—in terms of its own relations
with other countries in the Middle East and in the wider world?
(Lord Wright of Richmond) The first point I would
like to make is that this very much depends on the public perception,
and the perception in the Middle East and in the Islamic world,
of what the objective of military action is. With great respect
to Mr Mackinlay, I do not believe that is yet clear. It is certainly
not clear to me what the Americans expect to follow military action.
There has been rather wild talk about General Tommy Franks becoming
Governor of Iraq. One can dismiss that perhaps, but it is very
unclear to me how the Americans expect to settle Iraq, as they
say, as a democratic country as a result of a military operation.
I think the perception in the Middle East of what the Americans,
and with Security Council authority what the Americans and the
rest of us are going to do, depends very much on what the objective
is and how clearly that objective is set out.
Chairman
114. How do you distinguish Afghanistan; was
that a successful regime change?
(Lord Wright of Richmond) I think it is very different.
There was widespread opposition to the Taliban, it was authorised
by a Security Council resolution, and it had wide international
support. Whatever other Arab states may feel privately about Saddam
Hussein, they have all expressed openly opposition to military
action. If I could go to Sir John's second point on what are the
implications of this. I think that if military action takes place
(and I should have said in parenthesis that I believe that the
immediate objective and the sole objective at this moment is to
get the weapons inspectors back into Iraq and I think that should
be the overriding aim of any Security Council resolution, as indeed
we have seen in the press today in the text of the resolution
tabled yesterday) the response in the region will depend very
much on the "success" of any operation to remove weapons
of mass destruction from Iraq or to neutralise them and it will
depend most particularly on the speed, because I think that if
it is a quick, clean action—and I have no idea how that
can be achieved—then I believe that the regional response
can probably be held under control; but I think there is a serious
danger of real problems on the streets of the Middle East and
perhaps more widely. You may have seen Mahathir Mohammed of Malaysia
quoted as saying that war against Iraq would lengthen the anti-terrorist
campaign and that it would cause anger in the Muslim world where
there would be more willing recruits to the terrorist ranks. I
think that is a danger and I think it is a danger that the United
States need to take very carefully into account before any launch
of military action. Can I just make a few points about this? We
need to remind ourselves that there is a widespread view in the
Arab world that the first priority should be to tackle the Arab/Israel
problem. When I say the Arab/Israel problem, I am not just talking
about the Palestinian problem, I am talking about the occupied
Golan and Syria and Southern Lebanon. There is an almost universal
feeling in the Arab world, both on the streets and among Arab
governments, that the priority is wrong. They are really asking
the question you asked Mr Olner, "Why are the Americans focusing
on Iraq when in the view of the Arab world, and I am bound to
say the view of the British Government, much more priority ought
to be put on trying to solve the Arab-Israel problem?" I
must say I very much welcomed the passage in the Prime Minister's
speech in the House of Commons on the day of the emergency debate
and what he said about Arab/Israel; compared with that, I am afraid
I found the few lines in President Bush's speech in the General
Assembly rather inadequate. I would like to see the United States
putting much more effort at a high level into the Arab/Israel
problem. Secondly, I think there are fears in the Arab world and
among Arab governments about this talk of "democratising"
the region. It may be an admirable aim; but I am blowed if I know
how the United States is going to achieve that by occupying Iraq.
I am sorry, Mr Mackinlay, I am probably going into fantasies which
I believe you think do not exist, but I actually believe that
in the Arab world they are paying attention to these various speculations
in Washington about what the purpose of military action would
be.
Sir John Stanley
115. Could Sir Harold just respond as well.
(Sir Harold Walker) Of course, you are not going to
find a cigarette paper between us, Chairman!
Chairman
116. We are waiting for it!
(Sir Harold Walker) It seemed to me that Sir John
put his finger on a most significant point, which is that he said
he could not expect us to tell you what is going to happen because
there are multiple uncertainties in the contemplation of military
action against Iraq—the level of resistance in Iraq, the
level of casualties we will have to take, the form of a new regime,
how do you introduce a new regime, what will be the effect on
oil, what will be the economic cost, what will be the effect on
the world economy, on which we all have views—but I think
we should be honest and say that we do not know and anything we
say should be regarded with an equal degree of scepticism according
to our experience. It is important because you are contemplating
sending young men and young women to die and it is not right that
they should go if the situation is very uncertain. I noted down
what Donald Rumsfeld said in an article in the Daily Telegraph
on 25 February: "If . . . you are going to put people's lives
at risk, you had better have a darned good reason." All these
uncertainties are not an ultimate reason for putting war out of
the window, but they are a reason for saying it should be a last
resort and not a first resort. In amplification of what Lord Wright
said about reaction in the Arab world, I think that there are
a great many variables and if action were taken with a Security
Council resolution the chances are that the Arab world, the governments,
would actually breathe a huge sigh of relief (they would not say
so but they would breathe a huge sigh of relief). I do not think
that the people of the Arab world will like it whether it is with
a Security Council resolution or not. They will see it, wrongly,
as one of a series of American assaults on Muslim people, forgetting
that the Americans have helped Muslim people in, for example,
Kosovo. However, that is the way they see it. The big unknown
is: so what will the famous Arab in the street do? Will he rise
up and overthrow his government? He has not done anything about
Afghanistan, he has not done anything about the current oppression
of the Palestinians, so why should he rise up about this further
assault on an Arab country, or would it be the straw that broke
the camel's back? We do not know but we have to note that Arab
leaders have used pretty powerful language in forecasting disaster.
I noted that President Mubarak of Egypt on 27 August said: "If
you strike Iraq . . . while Palestinians are being killed by Israel
. . . not one Arab leader will be able to control the angry outburst
of the masses." The Omani foreign minister talked of plunging
the world into chaos. In public at least some responsible Arab
leaders see a very bad situation. Many commentators think, and
I think I am one of them, that the Arab man in the street in this
context is a busted flush—that is not the right expression—and
will not do anything significant. We can go into great detail
about why. The only place I would really worry about would be
Jordan, depending on what the King was perceived to have done
in helping an American assault. If he just said search and rescue,
fine, but if he was caught out, as it were, allowing his territory
to be used for American and British Special Forces there could
be serious trouble in the streets. As I say, this is one man's
view.
(Lord Wright of Richmond) Sir John Stanley very kindly
said that he would not expect us to talk about military operations.
Can I talk about military operations for a moment? I am not a
military expert, but I have very strong doubts whether the Americans
are likely to find an invasion of Iraq as smooth as the ejection
of Iraqis from Kuwait was. Whatever their real feelings about
Saddam even the Shia Iraqis would be defending their own homeland.
None of us needs to be reminded of the difference between people
defending their own homeland, however badly they think it is governed,
and taking part in an operation to occupy their neighbour. Many
of us have memories of the appalling brutality of the Iraqi Revolution
of 1958. I think there is a real danger of street fighting in
Iraqi cities and the likelihood of heavy casualties and presumably
the risk of Saddam at last being provoked to use the weapons of
mass destruction that he is believed to possess. On that point
can I just remind you, I think the IISS were asked to look into
the mind of Saddam Hussein as to why he has these weapons of mass
destruction? One aspect which was not mentioned was deterrence.
Remember that his main enemy Israel has all of the weapons of
mass destruction that he is believed to possess or is developing
and I think many Arabs would argue that it is reasonable for Saddam
Hussein to supply himself with a deterrent.
Andrew Mackinlay
117. I want to ask two questions. In a sense
I am a little disappointed, I did not explain myself adequately.
I think it is bonkers to suggest that you can go and create a
democracy like that. I thought the whole thrust of what I was
saying, I am really not disagreeing with you, is I think the United
States are so intoxicated with power they miss the thing they
should keep their eye on, compliance. Even you, Lord Wright, fall
into the chasm of talking about disarmament. If you were advising
the British government now both legally and from the point of
view of spin you should be emphasising, and us politicians as
well now want compliance with that armistice. It is a matter of
rule of law. That is really what I was trying to say to the lawyers,
and I think you agree with me.
(Lord Wright of Richmond) Absolutely.
118. It is good presentation but good in law
and morality. The other thing I did want to ask both of you about,
this is something new this afternoon, I have mentioned it in other
meetings we have had, what frightens me is that Saddam may not
actually understand the gravity of the situation in this sense.
If you look at the 20th century tragically so often our adversaries
have not understood we really mean to go down the road. I wonder
if you think there is a danger, indeed ought there not to be some
high level interlocutor, perhaps in a very private way going over
there. You mentioned the Cuba crisis, a lot of things were not
in the public domain but were done. One, spell it out to Saddam
that this is going to happen. Also, and I return to this point,
you are not going to have regime change. Lord Wright, whilst I
think they have been saying all these things, Rumsfeld has been
saying these things, there has been a major shift in the past
four weeks in attitude by the United States. They are not going
to go to war on regime changes. I want you to advise us on this,
ought there to be people going to Saddam and saying, they do mean
this, it is going to happen but you can survive. If you comply
in a real sense we are not going to go for regime change.
(Lord Wright of Richmond) In talking about the absolute
priority to be given to disarmament and compliance, I nevertheless
think that it is right to back that up with credible threats.
Whether Saddam Hussein believes those credible threats is a very
difficult question to answer; Sir Harold is much better placed
to do that than I am. As he reminded me earlier today, Saddam
Hussein has very little understanding of the great outside world.
He has hardly travelled abroad at all, if at all, in his life.
As diplomats you would expect us to sympathise with your suggestion
that it is a pity that there is not diplomatic contact with Saddam
Hussein if only to get messages across directly.
Chairman: Sir John Stanley will now take over
to ensure that everyone has a good say.
In the absence of the Chairman, Sir John
Stanley was called to the Chair
(Sir Harold Walker) It is a very good point raised
by Mr Mackinlay. We all know that Saddam Hussein is not a travelled
man and he is surrounded by sycophants. It is extremely difficult
to know how he makes decisions. It does point to an important
point about diplomacy, you need to get people he regards as in
some sense friends to warn him. I think it is more important that
the French, Russians and the Chinese speak to him and say you
had better do this or else than it is to get a message over the
airwaves from the Americans or the British. That is the stuff
of diplomacy, you think how best to get your message across. If
I can again add one man's view on the war, I think personally
that the regular armed force of Iraq will crumble when they are
invaded. But there are somewhere between 500,000 and one million
people very dependent on Saddam for their standard of living in
the security forces, in the republican guard and in the umpteen
security services and I think that a considerable number of those
people would see that they hang together or separately and there
would be people who would fight with Saddam out of severe self-interest
on top of the unknowable business of people rallying round a leader
when your country is invaded. It should not be thought that the
military victory will be a walkover, although undoubtedly it can
be won.
(Lord Wright of Richmond) That still leaves the question
of "what afterwards"?
(Sir Harold Walker) One more point I think is worth
making for a Committee with this wide scope. IISS witnesses quite
rightly said that Saddam has his weapons of mass destruction for
prestige and for securing his regional ambitions and Lord Wright
added that he lives in a dangerous world. It should be noted that
in recent decades in modern history it is not possible to construct
a security system in the Gulf area using solely local ingredients
because you have a powerful Arab country, Iraq, always at loggerheads
with a powerful Iranian country and underneath countries with
strong social societies with lots of money but they are weak militarily
and in terms of population. So you have needed an outside power,
which since 1971 has really been the US or the US using the Shah
as a policeman, to construct some kind of balance of power, and
I do not see how in the long run you are going to have a security
situation other than a regional one. In the long, long run you
are going to have to have a regional security situation in which
these powerful people are taken care of, otherwise you are always
going to have to have intervention from, as it is now, a superpower.
Mr Maples
119. We have had a very interesting conversation
with you and with the two previous witnesses. Whether or not the
United States' policy is correct or indeed whether or not it is
legal, the fact is that these decisions will be made by them and
not us. What I am really interested in is if we were collectively
advising the British Prime Minister in circumstances without a
United Nations Security Council resolution which explicitly mandated
the use of force that perhaps a new resolution might imply, and
the United States chose to take action, do we really have any
alternative but to support them? Surely by not supporting them
the damage we would do to our alliance with them and the extent
we rely on them would far outweigh any damage it might do to us
in supporting them? Secondly, if you look at the position that
Chancellor Schroeder has got himself into, I doubt Bush is ever
going to speak to him again. Relations between the United States
and Germany might be repaired but I think Schroeder is just out
of the game. France is playing its usual quite dangerous game
and I would have thought if it pushes the United States too far
it is likely to put itself in the same position.
(Lord Wright of Richmond) I would not contest what
you say at all about the effect on the relationship if we were
to draw back. But the logic of what I have described and others
have described as the absolutely essential point—that any
operation is done through the United Nations and on the basis
of a Security Council resolution—is a point which I would
hope the Prime Minister has stressed again and again to President
Bush. I would hope that President Bush has drawn the conclusion
that without that—
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