Examination of Witnesses (Questions 137-139)
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR TIM
DOWSE AND
MR PETER
RICKETTS CMG
MONDAY 28 OCTOBER 2002
Chairman
137. Foreign Secretary, may I on behalf of the
Committee welcome you and your two colleagues to the continuation
of our study into foreign policy aspects of the war against terrorism.
You have with you Mr Peter Ricketts, Political Director, whom
we have certainly met before, and of course Mr Tim Dowse, Head
of the Non-Proliferation Department, who returns again. We met
him last Thursday. Perhaps he should be permanently encamped here
with the Committee. Foreign Secretary, I would like to begin with
an update on the current position in New York at the Security
Council. I well understand the constraints which lie on you because
of the continuing negotiations, but can you at least begin by
telling us this? It is said that the United States is losing patience
with the lack of movement at the Security Council and if there
is no agreed resolution by, say, the end of the week do you think
there is a real danger that the US will indeed lose patience to
the extent of seeking to go ahead on its own and dispense with
the Security Council resolution?
(Mr Straw) The United States Government
has to answer for itself, point one. Point two is that these discussions
about any Security Council resolution have been in the air since
the speech made by President Bush on September 12, which must
now be six and a half weeks ago, although it is also true that
discussions amongst the P5 as a whole did not begin until about
two weeks ago. It is now important that the Security Council reaches
a conclusion. I am not going to put a deadline of the end of this
week or the beginning of next on it because this does not work
that way. In my view what is as important as, if not slightly
more important than, reaching a timely conclusion is the nature
of that conclusion and if it takes an extra day or an extra two
days in order to bolt down some other aspect of the resolution
and by doing so we then gain a wider measure of agreement, so
much the better. Of course, all the parties, particularly those
in the P5, recognise that we are towards the end of the negotiations
and, speaking for the British Government, I hope very much that
we are able to secure the resolution which is currently agreed
by the widest number of people in the Security Council.
138. So far as the key sticking points are concerned,
would you confirm that one of them is the automaticity that the
French are particularly concerned about, that there would be a
danger of in one resolution going ahead without a reference back
to the Security Council if there were to be non-compliance?
(Mr Straw) It has been called automaticity. I do not
think it is a very helpful description because none of the relevant
drafts put forward at any stage has had within it any automatic
trigger which moves from the resolution being agreed to military
action without cause. If I can put the difficulty in a more complete
way, Mr Chairman, it is this. On the one hand there are those,
France and Russia particularly, who are concerned that the Security
Council having in one resolution laid down the terms of the weapons
inspections and what would amount to a failure by Iraq, and they
are concerned that that resolution might be used in certain circumstances
to justify military action. On the other side there are the United
States and the United Kingdom with, if you like, the opposite
concern, which is that we could end up with a situation where
the future integrity of the whole of the international system
of law is at stake: military action is necessary and palpably
obvious and yet one or other member of the Security Council decides
to veto it. It is how you square this circle which has been the
matter in discussion. It is well known that it has been our position
that we would have preferred a single resolution where everything
was up front from the current failures by Iraq through to prescriptions
related to the inspectors through to what would happen if those
inspectors were not able to do their job properly all with one
resolution. But we have also made it clear that we are ready,
whilst that is a preference, to discuss a two-phase process and
these discussions are now in hand.
139. And the two-phase process would be a return
to the Security Council before any question of military action
is considered?
(Mr Straw) Not before any question of military action
can be considered because we do not know the full circumstances
of what may happen once the inspectors go back and then the circumstances
envisaged in which the whole international community believed
that military action was fully justified without a necessity to
return to the Security Council. In practice, however, let us be
clear about this, that no single member—no two members—of
the Security Council can control the agenda of the Security Council,
so to a degree there has been some tilting at windmills here.
However, by way of reassurance, we are happy for it to be said
that matters should be able in all the circumstances to go back
to the Security Council. Any member of the Security Council can
have items put on the agenda of the Security Council and move
resolutions. As I say, there has been this implication that somehow
the US or the UK would control the agenda. It is not the case.
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