Examination of Witness (Questions 1-19)
MR PETER
LONGWORTH CMG
TUESDAY 21 JANUARY 2003
Chairman
1. Mr Longworth, may I welcome you on behalf
of the Committee. You were the British High Commissioner in Harare
from 1998 to 2001. Before that you were Consul General in Johannesburg.
Clearly you know the area well and have a continuing business
interest, as I understand it, in the region.
(Mr Longworth) That is correct.
2. We are confident that you will be able to
assist the Committee in our consideration of the position in Zimbabwe.
First, it would be extremely helpful to have your appreciation
of the current political situation. Clearly we know that on 13
January Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic
Change, told the BBC that he had been offered—when he met
two leading members of ZANU-PF—an offer of talks and that
they had wanted to discuss the possibility of forming a power
sharing government pending the holding of fresh elections. The
ZANU-PF spokesman characterised that as wishful thinking and President
Mugabe himself has been quoted by Baroness Amos as saying "I
am not retiring. I will never, never go into exile." It would
be helpful for the Committee initially, from your knowledge of
the dramatis personae, of your knowledge of the region,
if you could say how you read those several matters.
(Mr Longworth) Thank you Mr Chairman. I am very glad
to help the Committee insofar as I can. I think I would just like
to preface my remarks by pointing out that I did, in fact, leave
my post in Zimbabwe at the end of June 2001 and so my personal
engagement with that country ended just over 18 months ago. I
retired from the Foreign Service rather soon after that. I am
not really in receipt of privileged reporting and I have not been
involved in any kind of official discussions.
3. You keep in touch with the region.
(Mr Longworth) I keep in touch with the region and,
as you rightly said, I am engaged in work now which gives me contact
with people in the region, particularly in the business community,
but I would not want to mislead the Committee into thinking that
I had any great insights as to what has happened on the ground
in Zimbabwe over the last 18 months. I was interested in the story
as it broke. I was also interested, in fact, that it was Morgan
Tsvangirai who actually broke it because he would obviously have
found himself in an extremely difficult situation if he had allowed
contact of that nature to proceed without it becoming generally
known. I think he is a man under considerable threat and one of
those would be a perceived risk of entrapment in the event that
he were seen to be engaged in the affairs of people who were talking
about the retirement or otherwise of Robert Mugabe. I can only
speculate—and it can only be my theory—that a moment
has now come within the upper echelons of the ruling ZANU-PF party
where the President's continued tenure is seen as a liability
to the future of the party and also to the ability of the party
to stay cohesive. I think that there will be a number of threats
which face them even though they do hold all the levers of security.
The ZANU-PF ruling party is not without its factions and there
have been, for many years, stories of one faction or another seeking
to gain ascendency. The two personalities mentioned by Mr Tsvangirai—
4. That is the speaker and the head of the armed
forces.
(Mr Longworth) The speaker and the head of the armed
forces between them represent a formidable combination. It is
known, of course, that the speaker has a history as a head of
the intelligence services and was largely responsible for events
in Matebeleland in the mid-80's. He is a very powerful party figure
and he is also a party figure who has become extremely prosperous,
I think. There is no doubt that personally he is a very rich person
and is involved in a number of business activities which have
been characterised by a relationship between the ruling party
and a number of business organisations, established really to
provide the party and individuals with funds. However, he is a
very powerful person and the fact that, having lost his parliamentary
constituency in the general election, he was then immediately
made speaker, shows there was a requirement by the President to
keep him in the forefront of events, in the public eye and a visible
political figure. The leader of the army, General Zvinavashe,
is obviously a key person in the event that there should be changes
in the leadership of ZANU-PF which might be contested since the
army does dominate in the country and despite many, many stories
that the army has split or there is the possibility of a coup,
there has never been any evidence of that kind. They are suggestions
that—certainly during my term—I always rejected as
did my defence advisor. I think there is a possibility that the
President may now regard his due time as past and that it might
come as a relief for him to leave, but only if the transition
could be managed in a satisfactory way. That transition would
involve power passing to people in whom he had confidence and
also in whom he had some confidence that the structures that had
been established in ZANU-PF would be maintained after the President
were to leave. I believe that Mr Mnangagwa and General Zvinavashe
are not universally popular within the leadership ranks of the
party and there have been stories of other attempts to form groups
which might contest what has been seen as the inevitability of
Mnangagwa's success into the President.
5. But this would not be just an initiative
of the two men because presumably it would make them highly vulnerable
and, indeed, would lead to expulsion from ZANU-PF if it were just
them acting on their own.
(Mr Longworth) No, they would not be acting on their
own. I think there has been a great deal of discussion on the
leadership of the party. There has been discussion amongst the
various clans and the various factions and the time may have come
for Mnangagwa and Zvinavashe to break cover. Even if they did
not make a decision to break cover themselves I think Tsvangirai
has revealed what could well be the tip of the iceberg in terms
of transition—
6. Would this have been approved by the central
committee, this initiative?
(Mr Longworth) I would not think so. If it had been
approved by the President then it would have been a matter for
the President and his close advisors. I do not think the whole
of the central committee would approve the forward move by Mnangagwa
and Zvinavashe.
7. Has this made them vulnerable?
(Mr Longworth) I think you are looking, as I said,
at two quite formidable persons. One is a formidable political
leader in the party; the other is the leader of the armed forces.
I think they might well be vulnerable but I do not think they
would be vulnerable for too long.
Mr Olner
8. I was just wondering, Mr Longworth, whether
you would categorise these people as moderates and whether they
would be willing to share their power with the opposition?
(Mr Longworth) I do not think I would apply the word
moderate, no. I think they have been very close to the President
over the years and one can associate them with the policies which
he has adopted. I would, perhaps, speculate that they could be
pragmatic in that they might not wish to be seen as the continuing
leaders of a rogue state or a bankrupt country.
9. So you think this pragmatism is driven by
self-preservation?
(Mr Longworth) I think it is driven by ambition. When
you get that close to the top of power you would wish to achieve
presidency if you were in Mnangagwa's place. I think, also, that
Mnangagwa would feel much safer if he were president than if he
were not president after Mugabe had left.
10. Do you think they would depose Mugabe or
would they use persuasion to get him to stand down?
(Mr Longworth) I think deposing the President would
be very dangerous and quite risky. I think that there would be
a persuasion process.
11. I want to turn to the performance in advances
since the September elections. I was wondering whether the Movement
for Democratic Change is a credible government in waiting.
(Mr Longworth) I have to claim that I have not really
had any detailed discussions with anybody in the MDC since June
2001. I would not want to given an opinion on that. I certainly
would not want to prejudice their chances in any way by saying
that I did not think that they were a credible opposition. It
is important to bear in mind that the MDC, as its name suggests,
is a movement; it is the Movement for Democratic Change. It is
a group which combines a number of elements whose one common point,
if you like, is opposition to President Mugabe and the way the
country is being managed. In many respects these people are strange
bedfellows. You have white commercial farmers, you have trade
unionists, you have very radical academics; then you have a broad
range of people from the urban poor to the urban bourgeoisie.
I think they are all people who, as the election process has shown,
are capable of mounting a campaign and capable of harnessing the
mood of the people, but it is not for me to say how easy they
would find it to stay together.
12. Is there anything specifically the British
Government should be doing to strengthen the opposition forces
in Zimbabwe?
(Mr Longworth) No, I think that it would be very unwise
for the British Government to interfere in any way in the domestics
policies of Zimbabwe. I think that on the one hand it is a country
that needs to resolve its own politics; we need to make it clear
that the framework within which we are prepared to work with the
next government is set by human rights rules, good economic management
rules and all that, but I think for us to give direct support
to a party would be wrong on our part and certainly would do no
great help to the cause of the party. I think one of the great
difficulties the MDC has had has been the allegations which have
been spread by the government media and government spokesmen that
in fact the MDC was some kind of front for white farmers and the
British government. Having been High Commissioner at that stage
I can now say quite categorically that the British government
had nothing to do with the formation of the MDC and that any suggestion
that that is the case is either a deliberate falsehood or a mistake.
Certainly if we were to become engaged in assisting the MDC in
their electoral ambitions then it would be interpreted as proof
of that lie.
Sir John Stanley
13. Mr Longworth, you said that you do not think
the British Government should get involved in the internal politics
of Zimbabwe. What policies do you think the British Government
should be following towards Zimbabwe?
(Mr Longworth) I am a retired person; they do not
pay me any more so I am not standing here as something who is
party preaching. I think there has to be a general acceptance
of the fact that we can only become engaged in Zimbabwe through
persuasion. We can only explain what the requirements are in London,
in the country, for continuing assistance to Zimbabwe, for continuing
support if those conditions are not met to withhold it. I think
to try to intervene in politics would be counter-productive. I
do not think that would lead to any kind of stability after the
present situation has passed because there would always be the
suggestion that somehow or another the Brits have made an attempt
to repeat their imperial role.
14. Are you suggesting, therefore, that the
British Government should be wholly passive in relation to Zimbabwe,
that we should be doing nothing whatever to try to relieve the
humanitarian disaster in Zimbabwe? That we should be doing nothing
in the international community and in the European Union with
African States?
(Mr Longworth) I think the British Government has
been very active in all the areas which you mentioned.
15. What policies would you like to see being
followed?
(Mr Longworth) Let me first state that as a bilateral
partner of Zimbabwe our influence there is limited to that of
any other country. We are perceived in Zimbabwe—or were
perceived when I was there—as having some kind of special
role to play as the former imperial power. It was quite clear
that the interests of the opposition to the government would best
be served if it were made clear that the United Kingdom was not
trying to pursue its former role. What we did wish to do, though,
was to ensure that the broader international community became
aware—as we had been—of the problems that the people
of Zimbabwe were facing. We have to speak now about a time in,
say, 1998-99 when the situation was not as desperate or as apparent
as it is now. But we had a great deal of difficulty in persuading
members of the European Community to take on board the likely
course of events and to persuade them that there should be a broad
approach based on sanctions and that we should also become engaged
through the Cotonou Agreement and the other instruments available
to the EU. I think that was a difficult diplomatic process and
it can be characterised as a success. I think it is also extremely
important to stay engaged with African countries—particularly
the neighbouring African countries—and to maintain the dialogue
first of all to gain their confidence in the British position;
there is still very strong Africanist feeling that in some way
we are continuing to pursue an imperial role and we first of all
need to make it clear that that is not the case. We also need
to make it clear that if it is a question of African solutions
for African problems, then those solutions should be devised by
Zimbabwe's neighbours with us being prepared to help as best we
can.
16. Do you think the British Government was
right to try to persuade the English cricketers not to play in
Zimbabwe?
(Mr Longworth) That is a matter for the British Government.
My personal view, I think, is not relevant to that debate. I happen
to believe that it should be all out or none out. I think that
the work should be done with the International Cricket Council
and perhaps our own cricket board should be working towards that
effect. I think it would be mistaken if the entire series took
place in Zimbabwe without the British cricket team because at
that stage it would be taken to reinforce the President's allegations
that this is a racial issue in Zimbabwe. You have South Africans
going; you have Kenyans going; you have Indians going; you have
Pakistanis going; but you do not have any Brits. I think that
would not actually help our position. It would, of course, help
everybody's position if the whole thing were called off.
Mr Illsley
17. Could I just follow on from that. I understand
what you are saying and it is quite an interesting point actually.
Do you think that if the cricket tournament does go ahead is there
a likelihood that the Zimbabwe leadership would use that as an
expression to the rest of the world, that because the cricket
matches can take place—and are taking place—that perhaps
the situation in Zimbabwe is not as bad as some countries—namely
perhaps us, the United States, the European Union—are painting
it?
(Mr Longworth) I am sure that the leadership would
attempt to use the leg of the tournament which takes place in
Zimbabwe to their advantage. I am sure that is the case. I am
sure it would be taken and demonstrated that there is acceptance
of Zimbabwe in the world. But I think here we have to take account
of the fact that very few people now believe what the Zimbabwean
Government say, and certainly not in Zimbabwe. As I say, I think
that the cricketers are in an extremely difficult position. I
do not want in any way, through saying something in this Committee,
to make it worse. I do believe that by seeing Britain isolated
from the rest of the cricketing world in this way is going to
create as many problems as it solves.
Mr Olner
18. We did it in South Africa.
(Mr Longworth) We did it in South Africa under different
circumstances.
Mr Illsley
19. Do you believe that the Government and the
European Union have come up with the right sort of sanctions given
the problems that Zimbabwe has economically, the travel bans,
the freezing individual assets? Do you think those are the right
sanctions?
(Mr Longworth) You cannot actually go to Zimbabwe
without realising that there really does need to be economic activity
in that country at whatever level to provide something for people
to subsist on. These sanctions were being muted at about the time
I was High Commissioner and we looked very carefully at what kind
of sanctions would be appropriate. The view was taken that we
could not get into sanctions which impacted directly on Zimbabwean
people. Unfortunately, by not taking those sanctions, economic
activity has taken place which has been of benefit to the leadership.
I think that is inevitable. I think that by targeting the leadership
first of all we have actually identified the people we think are
mainly responsible for the situation in Zimbabwe. Secondly, it
is having an effect on them rather than on the people who might
not be to blame.
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