Examination of Witness (Questions 20-37)
MR PETER
LONGWORTH CMG
TUESDAY 21 JANUARY 2003
20. Do you think there is any argument to extend
the sanctions any further. New Zealand have targeted some 140-odd
individuals; I think we have taken action against—or banned—79.
Is there an argument to extend the sanctions against supporters
of Zimbabwe? Commercial organisations, such as that, but without,
as you say, affecting the population of Zimbabwe economically?
(Mr Longworth) I do not really think it is a numbers
game, frankly. I have been out of the debate for some time. I
am sure that as people qualify for sanctions, the sanctions should
be applied to them. I would not really want to comment on it.
Mr Hamilton
21. As you know, on 19 March last year Zimbabwe
was suspended from the Commonwealth. Do you think that was the
right decision?
(Mr Longworth) Yes, but I think to be precise it was
not suspended from the Commonwealth; Zimbabwe was suspended from
the councils of the Commonwealth. It is still actually a Commonwealth
member; it is just that member of the Zimbabwean Government cannot
participate in official Commonwealth events.
22. Does that suspension from the councils reduce
the leverage that the Commonwealth has on the Mugabe regime?
(Mr Longworth) I think it certainly hurt the President
that the Commonwealth had taken that action. I think it hurt that
he had not been able to prevent his African colleagues from going
that far. I think it was something which was upsetting and something
which was telling. We have only recently had a meeting of Commonwealth
Ministers of Finance in London; Zimbabwe was not represented.
That hurts. I think the degree to which the Zimbabwe Government
seeks to participate in international meetings in countries where
individuals would otherwise be banned is an indication of how
much this kind of exclusion hurts.
23. Should they therefore be expelled from the
Commonwealth completely? Does Mr Mugabe care at all? You indicated
that it hurts.
(Mr Longworth) I do not know. I do not believe that
expelling anybody from the Commonwealth is a good idea. I think
the Commonwealth is a unique organisation which, as we know, spans
every kind of country from LLDC to members of the G8. At this
particular time I think it is important that it is an organisation
which incorporates so many creeds and beliefs. I think it is an
organisation which does exert influence and I think the importance
with which the Commonwealth electoral observer body was accorded
is something which showed that the Commonwealth does matter.
24. Is that an argument, then, for continued
suspension after March?
(Mr Longworth) I am sorry. I think you said expelled.
25. I said expelled earlier, but I am wondering
whether—from what you say—suspension might be the
best option. That hurts them but it does not kick them out completely.
(Mr Longworth) I think the Commonwealth has every
right to feel aggrieved at Zimbabwe, particularly after the complete
disregard that was paid to the Abuja Agreement18.7
Mr Chidgey
26. Mr Longworth, I would like to raise a few
issues with you on regional developments. We have the humanitarian
crisis which obviously is far worse since you were in post. Nevertheless,
I am sure you have kept up to speed with developments. For example,
the South African Minister of Labour visited three farms in Zimbabwe
on 10 January, it is reported. After his visit he said that South
Africa had a lot to learn from Zimbabwe about land reform. Interestingly
enough, in the counter-part to that, earlier last year, Fergal
Keane gave evidence to this Committee[1].
He said that the United Kingdom should be pressing President Mbeki
of South Africa to do more and that, in fact, he was a critical
partner to resolving the problems in Zimbabwe with Mr Mugabe.
He said when we put real pressure on Thabo Mbeki it has an effect.
The questions coming from that to us is to what extent do senior
members of the African National Congress feel some sort of solidarity
with the Mugabe regime? What influence do they have, if any? And
what influence, if any, do we have as a Government do exert on
the ANC to exert pressure on Zimbabwe?
(Mr Longworth) Of course I have views
on everything you said except that I was High Commissioner to
Zimbabwe and not South Africa.
27. But you were in Johannesburg at some stage?
(Mr Longworth) Yes, I was in Johannesburg. I think
that it is important for the United Kingdom and for the countries
of the developed world that South Africa and the other African
states are kept in play on the issue of Zimbabwe and that they
should be reminded on a regular basis that it is just not good
enough to fall back on arguments which derive from the liberation
struggle. I can appreciate that the ANC leadership and President
Mbeki do have difficulties in coming out and condemning President
Mugabe and I see there are a number of reasons. They are, in many
respects, partners from the struggle. I think President Mbeki
remains an African nationalist. I think he has taken a great deal
of persuading that much of what President Mugabe has said about
the UK's involvement in destabilising Zimbabwe is not true. I
think probably he does believe that. I think there is also something
else which is likely to become more of a factor in Africa, which
is what really worried the ANC was the emergence of the MDC as
a popular African party, multi-racial—something which had
nothing whatever to do with the struggle - suddenly being in a
position almost to overthrow one the great liberation movements.
I think that has struck a number of serious alarm bells in various
parts of the continent.
28. That is very interesting. I think from what
you are saying, Mr Longworth, is that pressure from South Africa
and other southern African countries might not be the best prospect
of peace in Zimbabwe, primarily because they do not perceive it
to be in their interests.
(Mr Longworth) I think it is difficult to lump Africa
into a whole. The interests in South Africa and the management
of the politics and the economy in South Africa are much more
complex than, for example, in Botswana. One would expect that
there is a lot of fudging which needs to take place in the upper
leadership of the ANC on issues which are so emotive and so strongly
relating to what in South Africa is a very recent struggle. ZANU-PF
came in 20 years ago, but memories in South Africa of white domination
are extremely recent.
29. Folk history. In that case, if the southern
African countries, because of these very strong and diverse links
in all sorts of factors, are in some way inhibited and therefore
cannot be persuaded to act, what about other African countries
with great influence? What about Nigeria? Do you see a role for
countries such as Nigeria in having some influence?
(Mr Longworth) Nigeria and South African became engaged
at quite an early stage. Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki have both
had joint missions and individual missions to discuss this thing
through with the Zimbabwean authorities and also with the UK Government.
President Obasanjo initiated a meeting between Robin Cook and
Mugabe in Cairo, at one particular stage of the meeting of the
OAEU. These countries have been engaged. I think that it is maybe
naive for us to think that their priority is our priority. Their
priority is the stability of their own country. There are important
political factors that a leader of South Africa has to take into
consideration.
Chairman
30. They also have a priority in terms of the
image of the continent, in terms of inward investment and the
deal they reached with the G8 over NePAD.
(Mr Longworth) I do agree, Chairman. I was going to
come to this. The problem for South Africa and the others is that
in trying to manage the political difficulties which they find
themselves in with Mugabe—on the basis that the African
search for consensus and respect for elders and so on—they
are in great danger of losing the confidence of the international
investor community.
Mr Chidgey
31. One final point on the regional aspects
before we get into humanitarian. Do you think that the recent
peaceful transfer of power in Kenya and the election of Mr Kibaki,
might be another source of influence on Mugabe or would this be
totally irrelevant so far as he is concerned?
(Mr Longworth) As I said earlier, we get into quite
easy mistakes if we try to lump the continent together. We have
seen a lot of very progressive things happening in African over
the past five or six years. We have seen a market economy developing
in Mozambique; we have seen good governments in Botswana; we have
seen good things happening in Ghana and even good developments
taking place in Tanzania which was once really thought to be at
the bottom of the heap. It is not all a one-way street in Africa.
I think that the Kenyan experience is something which should help
people who wish to pursue fair elections in the rest of the country.
That is not to say that the succession of power in Kenya is actually
gone entirely into the hands of an opposing group. Quite a number
of the members of the new administration were once members of
the old one, but I think the lesson drawn from Kenya is that it
is possible that in an Africa country an unpopular leader can
be removed by a popular vote without too much violence associated
with the election.
32. Moving on to the humanitarian crisis much
of which I suppose has taken place since you left Zimbabwe I imagine.
We are briefed that recent events have led to a situation now
where I think it is some eight million people are facing starvation.
Perhaps more seriously, we are informed and advised, that food
aid which is being provided for Zimbabweans is being channelled
and directed solely at those Zimbabweans who carry membership
cards of ZANU-PF. It is reported that the reaction from Mr Mugabe's
ministers is that they do not see any point in feeding members
of the opposition because they are merely weeds. That leads us
to ask you, Mr Longworth, whether you believe that the escalating
food crisis in Zimbabwe is likely to affect the political situation
in the coming months.
(Mr Longworth) Yes, I think it is. If it were to go
anywhere it could be rather tragic. There is no question of what
one might call a civil war, for example, in a country where only
one party is armed and has control of the security services. But
I do think there could be a rapid deterioration of society in
Zimbabwe as a result of this starvation. I think, to be clear,
it is something that we saw coming . We knew the famine was coming
despite denials. There were a number of signals which we received
quite a long time ago—two and a half years ago—that
the ruling party would find it very hard to tolerate the management
of food distribution to outsiders. This has been a traditional
source of patronage. This is something that they would have been
very unwilling to lose.
33. Given that it was clear that Britain, the
EU and also the United Nations has been manipulated for political
purposes in terms of how the aid is arriving in Zimbabwe, it is
a key suggestion that the international community should take
direct action to intervene in Zimbabwe. I said the international
community, not the United Kingdom. May I preface this question
with the fact that even now it is being debated in Parliament
as to how one defines genocide. You will remember, of course,
the Matebeleland massacres that took place in the 80's. You will
know that we have intervened with the United Nations in Kosova,
for example, for genocide. We are contemplating going into Iraq,
one of the reasons being, we are told, is genocide. Do we not
also have to bite the bullet and classify what is happening—or
is likely to happen—in Zimbabwe as a deliberate attempt
to kill large sections of the population who happen to be of a
particular ethnic group and should we not be calling to the United
Nations to pass resolutions in the security counsel calling for
action under humanitarian rights, as we do elsewhere in the world?
(Mr Longworth) I am not an expert on how genocide
is defined and I think in the case of Zimbabwe it is irrelevant
because the actual aggression is directed towards members of political
parties, people who do not support the government. You do not
necessarily have to be Ndebele to be opposed to ZANU-PF nor to
have voted against them in an election. I would not want to go
down a track of saying that there is a genocidal thing taking
place based on the difference between the Shona and the Ndebele
tribes. It is based on support, or non support for the ruling
party. This does not make it any better. I am not sure how you
would define it. I do not think it is directed specifically towards
one tribe. I think the United Nations does need to be brought
into the debate. I think that we have tried; our European partners
have been persuaded to join us in joint action. I think we have
worked very hard with our African partners and within the Commonwealth
and that process has been less than helpful, or less that totally
helpful. I think that the United Nations should be involved. My
view of human rights appreciations by governments is that there
seems to be some inverse relationship between one's intention
to pursue a human rights cause and the geographical, political
significance of the particular country involved. I think actually
to start doing what the Americans suggest is penetrative action
in Zimbabwe will require a very, very big political will. It will
require a huge amount of persuasion of the neighbours and the
region. It is difficult to see how any kind of action could be
taken without the support of the African neighbours. I think we
are stuck with resolutions.
Mr Chidgey: Back to the UN. Thank you.
Andrew Mackinlay
34. I saw Peter Oborne's piece on television
recently. I put down a parliamentary question following it[2].
DFID really do not have up-to-date information as to the scale
of the famine or potential famine on a regional basis. I do not
know if you can comment on that, but it seemed to me that it also
raised the question of resources in the British High
Commission. Have we got enough there? Could we do more in terms
of knowing the scale of the crisis?
(Mr Longworth) I think I am going to
ask to be excused the question. I do not know the size of the
High Commission. I know that there has been a restructuring, for
example, and the commercial section is now very much depleted
because there is very little commerce. I honestly would not want
to be drawn into a debate on resources.
35. Throughout the past months I have been looking,
when I read the press reports, for the mischief which apparently
the British Government are apparently guilty of. I look for mischief
in the British Government, but on this I cannot fault them. It
does seem to me that there are protestations that somehow the
British Government can and should be doing things but they are
not doing them. From your observations is there anything more
that HMG should be doing which they are not doing?
(Mr Longworth) It is very difficult to influence someone
who really does not care about the suffering of people or the
views of the international community. If you accept that you are
not able to use force against Zimbabwe to bring down a government—which
most people would accept—then it is very difficult to see
how you can influence the course of events. Believe me, not a
day goes by without my wondering if we could have done something
during my tenure in Zimbabwe to have stopped this happening. I
do not think we could. I think the moment that President Mugabe
found that he had lost the referendum on the new constitution
and that his power base was vulnerable, then I do not think anything
was going to stop this happening.
Chairman
36. One final matter to help the Committee,
you know South Africa, you know Zimbabwe, what are the levers
which South Africa could use if it were so minded to influence
Zimbabwe? One, presumably, is the electricity supply Eskom, there
are debts. Can you just give a series of headings of the degree
of dependence of Zimbabwe on South Africa?
(Mr Longworth) I would say that a while ago there
were more opportunities for South Africa to take action than there
are now because the economy in Zimbabwe has now been reduced to
almost subsistence level. You get to a stage where identified
sanctions are not necessarily as effective as they might have
been. Everybody quotes electricity because it is said that that
was the threat that was used against Ian Smith and which brought
Rhodesia to the negotiating table.
37. Are there debts which could be called in?
(Mr Longworth) I am out of date, Mr Chairman, but
there were very large debts to the South African Electricity Utility.
There are debts elsewhere.
Chairman: That is very helpful. Mr Longworth,
you have been of great assistance to the Committee. Thank you
very much.
1 Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report of Session
2001-02, Zimbabwe, HC 813, Ev1-10. Back
2
HC Deb, 13 January 2003, col 458w [Commons written answer]. Back
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