Conclusions and Recommendations
1. We conclude that Mugabe's regime may indeed be
in its last throes, although we do not underestimate its determination
to cling to power. We recommend that the Government ensure that
it is in a position swiftly to restore good working relations
with any incoming administration which demonstrates a real commitment
to restoring the rights, welfare and dignity of the people of
Zimbabwe. (Paragraph 7)
2. We recommend that the Government ensure that the
policy which it supports, of refusing to operate through Zimbabwean
governmental organisations or other official channels, is not
subverted by inappropriate relationships with organisations closely
associated with ZANU-PF. (Paragraph 14)
3. We recommend that the Government prepare and publish
a detailed dossier on human rights in Zimbabwe. (Paragraph 18)
4. we recommend that in its response to this Report
the Government bring the Committee up to date on progress towards
publication by the EU of a document on human rights in Zimbabwe.
(Paragraph 19)
5. We recommend that the Government take a positive
decision to provide technical and financial assistance to the
independent media in Zimbabwe, in consultation with representatives
of those media. (Paragraph 21)
6. We recommend that the FCO—on it own, with
other relevant Government Departments, or through the European
Union—consider carefully the case for offering appropriate
support to independent broadcasters operating from outside Zimbabwe.
(Paragraph 22)
7. We recommend that the Government take steps to
strip Robert Mugabe of all honours, decorations and privileges
bestowed on him by the United Kingdom. (Paragraph 25)
8. We recommend that the Government explain in its
response to this Report exactly how Interpol came to honour Chihuri,
and how it now proposes to persuade Interpol to remove the honour.
(Paragraph 26)
9. We conclude that the French government's decision
to invite Mugabe to attend a conference in Paris just one day
after sanctions were due to elapse was a deeply regrettable and
offensive act, which ran wholly counter to the convention that
EU partners respect each other's interests in such cases, and
which lent unwarranted credibility to the ZANU-PF regime. (Paragraph
30)
10. We recommend that in its response to this Report
the Government set out in full the objections raised by other
EU member states to a strengthening of sanctions against Zimbabwe,
state by state. (Paragraph 31)
11. Because of their likely adverse impact on the
Zimbabwean people as a whole, we would not yet advocate the introduction
of trade sanctions against Zimbabwe, other than the arms embargo
which is already in place, but we recommend that, in its response
to this Report, the Government set out its policy on the imposition
of bilateral, non-trade sanctions against ZANU-PF, in addition
to those imposed by the European Union. (Paragraph 32)
12. We conclude that for Zimbabwe to be readmitted
to the Councils of the Commonwealth without a very substantial
and verifiable improvement in its human rights record and major
steps to re-establish democracy would be a travesty of the Harare
principles and a betrayal of all that the Commonwealth stands
for. We recommend that the Government continue to seek a consensus
in the period leading up to the December heads of government meeting,
but that it resist any compromise which does not require full
compliance by Zimbabwe with the 2002 Marlborough House Statement.
(Paragraph 36)
13. We recommend that the Government consult informally
with other members of the Security Council and with African countries
with a view to raising in the Council ZANU-PF's persecution of
its political opponents, its use of torture, beatings, rape and
starvation against its own people, and the threat which it poses
to the prosperity and stability of southern Africa, as a matter
of grave concern to the region and to the international community.
(Paragraph 42)
14. We recommend that in its response to this Report
the Government set out its policy on the use of an international
force to supervise the distribution of aid and, in the longer
term, to assist Zimbabwe's transition from dictatorship to democracy.
(Paragraph 43)
15. We conclude that if Zimbabwe's neighbours were
fully to assume their responsibilities—for example, by imposing
targeted non-trade sanctions similar to those already imposed
by the EU, by some Commonwealth countries and by the United States—Mugabe's
regime would be further isolated, his opponents would be encouraged
and his days would be numbered. We further conclude that the Government
would be entirely right to accept such a step, if it is taken,
as evidence of the intention of the countries concerned to adhere
to the principles to which they have committed themselves under
NePAD and other international agreements, qualifying them to receive
the benefits of those programmes. We recommend that Ministers
take every opportunity to make this point clear to their counterparts
in southern Africa. (Paragraph 48)
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