Was there a deal with France?
28. With the sanctions regime due to expire on 18
February, France called a summit with African countries for 19-21
February. Mugabe was included among the heads of government invited
to the summit. Because the dates of the summit fell after the
expiry of the sanctions, there was nothing the United Kingdom
could do unilaterally to prevent Mugabe's attendance. While the
Minister assured us that representations were made to the French
"at the highest levels", she told us that "we could
not stop Mugabe going to Paris. The French wanted Mugabe to go
to Paris, and on that basis they were prepared to invite him and
have him there."
29. The United Kingdom's priority was to ensure the
renewal of sanctions. Renewal required unanimity on the part of
EU member states, including of course the French. While the United
Kingdom could not prevent Mugabe's trip to Paris, France could
prevent the renewal of sanctions. Ministers therefore needed to
balance the need to make it very clear to the government of France
that its invitation to Mugabe was unwelcome with the requirement
for a positive French vote in favour of the renewal of sanctions.
Baroness Amos referred to "discussions" which took place
between the two governments, causing us to ask whether a deal
had been struck. She strongly denied that there was a deal. However,
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was some linkage.
30. The facts are that the sanctions were renewed;
that Mugabe was nonetheless permitted to travel to Paris for the
France/Africa summit; and that the planned EU/Africa Summit (scheduled
for April) was postponed indefinitely. We are disposed to accept
the Minister's assurances that there was no 'deal' behind this
series of events, although we stand by our conclusion in our recent
Report on Human Rights that the Government should have taken a
more robust line with the French. We conclude that the French
government's decision to invite Mugabe to attend a conference
in Paris just one day after sanctions were due to elapse was a
deeply regrettable and offensive act, which ran wholly counter
to the convention that EU partners respect each other's interests
in such cases, and which lent unwarranted credibility to the ZANU-PF
regime.
Should there be a stronger sanctions regime?
31. We asked Baroness Amos whether she felt that
the sanctions should be extended, as we suggested in our Report
of March this year on Human Rights. She replied that "this
is something which has been the subject of discussion" and
that "the EU will come back to this issue", but she
could not guarantee that sanctions would be strengthened. The
Minister implied that this was the price of achieving unanimity
among EU partners. It is unfortunate that some of this country's
European partners are apparently reluctant to increase the pressure
on ZANU-PF. We recommend that in its response to this Report
the Government set out in full the objections raised by other
EU member states to a strengthening of sanctions against Zimbabwe,
state by state.
32. However, some additional sanctions—such
as barring the dependants of those on the list from visiting the
United Kingdom, or freezing their assets—could be applied
without reference to the EU. There is a range of measures which
could be taken against the regime, without adopting trade sanctions
which might worsen the plight of ordinary Zimbabweans still further.
Such measures have been called for by, among others, the political
journalist Peter Oborne. Because of their likely adverse impact
on the Zimbabwean people as a whole, we would not yet advocate
the introduction of trade sanctions against Zimbabwe, other than
the arms embargo which is already in place, but we recommend that,
in its response to this Report, the Government set out its policy
on the imposition of bilateral, non-trade sanctions against ZANU-PF,
in addition to those imposed by the European Union.
