APPENDIX 5
Memorandum from Mr C and Mrs M Sabel
1. Zimbabwe's decline needs little descriptive
elaboration. At every level, events unfold pointing inexorably
to a fundamental breakdown in society. It leaves little hope of
a natural evolution towards a resumption of the rule of law and
a minimum acceptable level of freedom of expression and from fear
of state apparatus.
2. In this context, HMG's response has been
reminiscent of our Government during the period 1964-75 in its
approach to Ian Smith's Rhodesian Government, viz., high octane
moral outrage and the bare minimum of effective pressure. This
is symbolised by the ineffective posturing over the World Cup
cricket games in Zimbabwe.
3. If the considered belief on the UK Government's
part is that there is no meaningful pressure which can be applied
to redress the dire situation there, either alone or in concert
with other governments, it would be more honest to say so! We
do not believe that this would be the right course to take however,
and are convinced that a practical and morally coherent strategy
can be adopted by HMG. For this to be successful however, we suggest
it requires recognition of the following factors.
3.1 The position may take decades to change
for the better. There is every possibility that the regime there
has been so far corrupted at every level, that it will not fall
like a house of cards if and when Mr Mugabe is no longer Head
of State. Our strategy should take a leaf from our work with the
ANC in pre-1994 South Africa and offer to help in training new
Zimbabwe cadres outside Zimbabwe who, at some point in the future
can return there to re-establish civic organs particularly in
the judiciary, police and armed forces.
3.2 We mush re-evaluate our posture viz-a"-viz
the Commonwealth. The issue of Commonwealth-wide values must be
central to the agenda of that body. Membership of the organisation
must involve a deep commitment to basic human rights (defined
broadly to encompass material rights to education, decent habitation,
etc, as well as those political norms which are more central in
the West). In order that this is not seen simply as a tool to
"get Mugabe" it would be reasonable to allow a significant
period for a full-scale monitoring exercise by the Commonwealth
Secretariat which, conceivably, may net other unsavory regimes
(Swaziland for example). If however at the end of the monitoring
period, little progress has been made, or, in the worst-case scenario
access has been denied to monitors, the issue must be brought
to a head.
3.3 In the short-term, this may involve
a painful split with some African Commonwealth members, who appear
to believe that they can pay lip service to core Commonwealth
values which conducting business as usual with the Zimbabwe Government.
The value of our own membership of the Commonwealth may, as a
last resort, need to be examined.
3.4 In the immediate future, we should continue
to make clear that our fundamental aim remains friendship with
all African countries in need of material development support
but this will not be at the price of silence or ambiguity regarding
dubious regimes such as Zimbabwe. Similarly, positive support
for "NEPAD" and regional organisations such as "SADEC"
should be withheld where there is no tangible evidence of serious
political and economic pressure being applied by members of those
bodies towards Zimbabwe.
3.5 Finally, faced with the outrage of selective
emergency food aid distribution in Zimbabwe to Zanu/PF and denying
it to MDC areas, we trust that our government will only release
funds in Zimbabwe where it is permitted to verify deliveries to
ensure even-handed distribution. Zimbabwe government assurances
per se are clearly worthless.
Clive Sabel and Maureen Sabel
January 2003
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