Memorandum from Dr A M Ansari
INTRODUCTION
Unlike many of its regional neighbours, Iran
possesses a dynamic political environment, and a sophisticated,
highly politically aware and literate public. The process of "democratisation"
which grew in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, and accelerated
dramatically with the election of President Mohammad Khatami in
1997, continues apace, although it has faced considerable difficulties
and resistance from a hardline establishment unenthusiastic about
the prospect of sharing, let alone relinquishing power. This continuing
contest, which has not been without some significant casualties,
has resulted in a polarisation of views, between the vast majority
of the Iranian public, who seek greater political and social liberalisation,
along with economic integration; and a decreasing clique of hardliners,
who seem equally determined to resist change, apparently at any
cost.
This almost irrational determination was most
recently seen with the decision by the hardline dominated Judiciary
to sentence the popular Professor of History (and war veteran),
Hashem Aghajari, to death, for reportedly having blasphemed against
Islam. The sentence was so harsh, and so obviously disproportional
to his alleged crime, that it enervated a somewhat exhausted and
demoralised reform movement. Although, of far more significance
was the reaction the sentence received from more moderate conservatives,
who openly voiced their concern at the wayward judgements issued
by certain elements in the Judiciary, and served notice that the
common distinction between "reformists" and "conservatives"
could not accurately describe the growing gulf in opinions between
a radical minority of zealots and the rest of society (whatever
their political leanings). This domestic political contest, which
has undoubtedly been influenced by regional and international
developments, though not dictated by it, has similarly influenced
Iran's position on these developments.
This brief memorandum will seek to highlight
the most recent trends and developments in Iran and should be
read in conjunction with the previous submission to the Foreign
Affairs Select Committee in 2001[1].
It will be divided into four main sections:
1. Domestic Developments;
3. International Developments;
4. Anglo-Iranian Relations.
1. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
Iran continues to possess a dynamic political
environment, in which political views are frequently aired if
not always respected. There is little doubt that since the election
of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, there have been marked improvements
in political and social freedoms, and some measure of stabilisation
in economic terms, although the economic development aspired to
has yet to be achieved. This in large part is a consequence of
the failures of political reform, in that while a more liberal
atmosphere pervades, notions of the rule of law, transparency,
accountability, and respect for individual human rights have yet
to be institutionalised. In sum therefore, it may be said, that
considerable progress has been made, but much has yet to be achieved.
In particular, since the triumph of Reformist
deputies in the elections to the 6th Majlis (Parliament) in February
2000, there has been a determined and often brutal attempt by
the hardline establishment to stifle reform, encourage apathy
and effectively de-politicise the public. This attempt has had
mixed results. Rather than extinguish the flame, hardline resistance
has tended to further polarise opinion, and to radicalise it away
from notions of Islamic democracy altogether. Indeed, arguably,
much as reformist politicians had warned, hardline resistance
has ensured the secularisation of the Iranian public.
It has also ensured that this public (which
is overwhelmingly young in composition), increasingly espouses
a radically nationalist ideology, which regards the hardline establishment,
epitomised by the head of the Judiciary, as distant from their
needs and alien to Iranian culture. While this process of polarisation
has undoubtedly created a dangerously wide gulf between "State"
and "Society", it is also important to point out that
the "State" in question is represented in the popular
mind, by a relatively small clique of hardline insiders, and bears
little relation to the organs of government we usually associate
with the "State". Indeed many ministry officials (including
those of Intelligence) are now very much considered to be outsiders,
and it is not without reason that President Khatami is characterised
as the "leader of the opposition". Such a situation,
is clearly neither socially nor politically desirable, nor tenable,
and challenges continue to emerge. Indeed many prominent agitators
against the current status quo come from the ranks of staunch
revolutionaries (such as Aghajari), and the recently released
Ayatollah Montazeri, who had previously been Imam Khomeini's heir
apparent.
2. REGIONAL RELATIONS
Iran's political situation and the social revolution
which it is witness, reflect upon its somewhat anomalous position
in the region. Put simply, not only is Iran distinguished by the
fact that it is a Shi'a island in an ocean of Sunni states; it
is in contrast to the sacralisation of social and political life
in many Arab countries, moving towards a more secular approach
to politics. (Arguably, while in many Arab states, the existence
of a "secular" state is witnessing a religious revival
within society, the reverse is true for Iran). This process has
yet to reach fruition, and while there is little possibility of
Iran adopting the French model of secularism, it is with no little
irony, increasingly clear that the model being aimed at is that
of the United States. In other words, the state should espouse
a secular attitude, so that society may, in the absence of state
strictures, remain religious. This secularism, and appreciation
of pluralism is being reflected in its regional relations, particularly
in its pursuit of stronger relations with India; its undisguised
sympathies for the US war against the Taleban in Afghanistan (a
group which many Iranians deride as having perverted Islam); and
its similar enthusiasm, must to the chagrin of Arab allies, for
the war against Saddam, though as will be noted in the next paragraph,
there are also many reservations.
3. INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS
The impending US led war against Iraq has raised
mixed emotions among Iranians. Put simply, many members of the
establishment view the onset of war with trepidation, and are
anxious about the possibility that Iran may be next on the US
hit list. Extremists nevertheless, see in any war an opportunity
to finally get to grips with the "Great Satan", and
indeed view any war as a useful pretext to declare martial law
and end any possibility of reform. These views are certainly in
a minority, and it is not clear how sustainable such a development
would be. The vast majority of society however, views the prospect
of war with some enthusiasm, insofar as there is no affection
for Saddam Hussein, and some Iranians harbour the view that change
in Iraq will in turn encourage change in Iran. It is certainly
probable that a successful US invasion (and occupation) will have
a catalytic effect on domestic politics. At the same time, it
is an indication of the political sophistication of the Iranian
public, that for all the desire for dialogue, few Iranians actually
trust the Americans in their war aims; few for example are convinced
that the US will attempt to develop some sort of democracy in
Iraq. For Iranians, the war remains an issue of oil, and US desires
to control the oil. Furthermore, while there is a tendency, even
among members of the more moderate establishment to provide assistance
to any allied invasion of Iraq, there are justifiable concerns
that the US will not appreciate such help, and much as in the
aftermath of Afghanistan, will then turn against the Islamic Republic.
The real fear among Iranians of all hues (and this is a reflection
of the growth in nationalism), is that the United States will
seek to dismember Iran, as part of any radical restructuring of
the Middle East. That said, despite these concerns, there exists
a curious reality, that most ordinary Iranians find the "moral
certainty" of the Bush administration attractive.
This is in stark contrast to their views on
Europe. The European Union has traditionally been seen as a strategic
ally, and a useful counter-weight to the United States. The trouble
is, that at this crucial time of domestic political tensions,
the multi-lateral European approach, is perceived as somewhat
ineffective. There is discomfort and irritation at the tendency
of European parliamentarians to associate themselves with Iranian
opposition groups (of course the US Congress does this too, but
to some extent the Iranians expect this), while at the same time
pursuing a somewhat ambiguous dialogue with the Iranian "state"
(however that is defined). This is obviously a gross simplification,
but it is a perception that is widespread. In simple terms, the
Europeans seem to Iranians, to lack consistency and certainty
in their approach to Iran, and ironically, are perceived are particularly
lax in their approach to human rights issues.
4. ANGLO-IRANIAN
RELATIONS
Anglo-Iranian relations continue to be comparatively
healthy, with the recent accreditation of a new ambassador, Richard
Dalton, and of significance, the opening of the British Council.
Anglophilia is relatively widespread though not always for the
right reasons (there is a widespread assumption that know how
to run things, and indeed do run things, so there is an admiration
even if it is grudging). The debacle over the nomination of David
Reddaway as ambassador last year, has largely subsided, though
it reminds us that relations, certainly at the state level, remain
fragile. There are also a number of points which need in addition
to be kept in mind, and which, to my mind would need addressing,
should there be a desire to expand Anglo-Iranian relations:
— Britain should avoid associating,
at whatever level, with opposition groups, in particular the Mujahedin-e
Khalq Organisation, who are resident in Iraq and largely discredited
in the eyes of the Iranian public. Neither should they be seen
to be cultivating links with the Pahlavi's, since this will only
enhance feelings of paranoia about Britain's true intentions.
— Britain should try and limit its
association, in the public mind at least, with the more conservative
elements in the clerical classes in Iran. Few Iranians will fail
to point out that Islamic centres abound in Britain, and that
many of the most hardline Ayatollahs seem to have little difficulty
in gaining access to Britain. Given their unpopularity in Iran,
Britain's "links" are injudicious.
— Britain should seek to distance itself
from the more hawkish attitudes in the United States, but at the
same time not appear to succumb to the ambiguity being identified
with the EU. While most Iranians cannot get excited about alleged
links with terrorists (they tend not to believe this in any case),
WMD (they don't see why they can't have them given the neighbourhood);
and the Peace Process (as far as they are concerned the Israelis
are doing a good job of demolishing the PP on their own); they
are frustrated by the lack of attention to human rights, and while
this has to be handled delicately, (insofar as no-one wants to
be seen to be interfering), there is a demand for a more robust
stand on human's rights issues. Iranians, even in government,
feel that the hardliners would not dare even attempt repression
if they felt there was a sufficient cost to pay in their (commercial)
relations with the EU.
Dr Ali Ansari
University of Durham
February 2003
1 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee; Iran:
Interim Report, Second Report of Session 2000-01 (HC 80), p 28. Back
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