Examination of Witness (Questions 120
- 139)
TUESDAY 11 FEBRUARY 2003
DR GARY
SAMORE
120. The Koreans are, I understand, developing
a much longer range missile than a fifteen hundred kilometre range.
They are looking at an inter-continental range ballistic missile.
That technology might, presumably, become relatively easily available
to Iran.
(Dr Samore) It is certainly plausible to me that if
the North Koreans were paid they would have provided that kind
of technology to Iran. I think that Iran's missile program is
very much focussed in the first instance on being able to reverse
engineering and produce their own version of the No Dong. I think
they are pretty far along in having that capability and I would
expect within a relatively short period of time—a few years
perhaps—they would be able to do that. In the meantime they
will continue to buy bits and pieces from the North Koreans and
assemble their own Shahab 3 partly from imported parts and partly
from parts they can manufacture themselves. I do not think they
put a very high emphasis myself on building much longer range
systems, inter-continental range systems that could reach Europe
or the United States. Certainly they have plans on the drawing
board. Given enough time it is the kind of thing they will eventually
be able to achieve, but I do not see it as being as an important
a program or something that they put as much resources into as
the North Koreans have.
121. They want to be the regional super power,
do you think?
(Dr Samore) Or they want to defend themselves against
what they see as regional threats.
Sir John Stanley
122. We have been informed that the Iranian
Foreign Minister, Mr Kharrazi, has said on the official Iranian
state media, "Iran has no plan to produce nuclear weapons
and all efforts in this field are intended for peaceful means".
Are you saying to the Committee that in your judgment that is
a lie?
(Dr Samore) I think it is patently false.
If you look at the facilities that Iran is building, the heavy
water plant and the gas centrifuge enrichment plant, they cannot
be plausibly justified as part of a civil nuclear power program.
Iran has one nuclear power plant under construction by Russia
at Busher which operates on light water so there is no need for
large quantities of heavy water. The plant is being fuelled by
fuel from Russia; Russia has agreed to provide a life time supply
of fuel for the facility so there is no earthly reason for the
Iranians to need to manufacture their own fuel. The technology
in question, heavy water and gas centrifuge, does have peaceful
applications and around the world you can find examples where
that technology is used for peaceful applications. You can find
other examples in the world where it is used for military applications.
In the particular case of Iran there is no plausible civil need
for those capabilities and I think the purpose of it is to build
what I would call a nuclear breakout capability under the NPT
so that Iran could, under the Treaty, give three months notice
if they decided they needed to acquire nuclear weapons. They could
leave the Treaty and those facilities could be converted to produce
material for nuclear weapons.
123. So are you saying to the Committee that
in your judgment the Iranian government is lying?
(Dr Samore) Yes.
124. Deliberately.
(Dr Samore) Yes.
125. In the quotation that I have just read
from the Foreign Minister.
(Dr Samore) Yes.
126. And in doing so, in order to be able to
forward its nuclear weapons program to the point at which it can
make a rapid breakout and presumably will then follow in the same
route as the North Koreans. When it becomes unarguable they will
be obliged to make a public confession—as the North Koreans
have done—that they have been lying all along and they have
a nuclear weapons program.
(Dr Samore) I do not say that the Iranians have made
the decision now that they will leave the Treaty once they have
these facilities operating. What I am arguing is that they are
creating the option for themselves of leaving the Treaty by building
these facilities under cover of the NPT and IAEA safeguards. Whether
they decide in the future—five years from now—to leave
the Treaty or not, I think that will depend upon their calculations
about the pros and cons—the risks and benefits—of
leaving the Treaty.
127. Leaving aside whether they leave the Treaty
or not, as I understand it—tell me if this is not correct
as it is a very, very important point—you are saying to
us that the Iranian government have made a decision to procure
nuclear weapons, are currently refusing to admit this and, indeed,
are denying they have such a program when one is in existence;
they have taken a policy decision to have a nuclear weapons program.
(Dr Samore) I think that they have made a policy decision
to create a nuclear weapons option for themselves.
128. In terms of the future—and this must
rest on a hypothesis—if there is a war against Iraq, if
that war results in the removal of Saddam Hussein, regime change
and obviously the removal of weapons of mass destruction that
he has, do you judge that there will be significant popular pressure
on the Iranian government to go public in order to satisfy their
own people, that they are taking all possible defensive measures
against the possibility—which may or may not have any reality
at all—that the Americans may wish to proceed from Iraq
to either North Korea or Iran—or conceivably both—to
achieve some degree of regime change in both of those countries?
(Dr Samore) I think that is a very good question and
my guess is that the answer—as usual with most things with
Iran—is very complex. I think on one hand to the extent
that some in Iran argue against the pursuit of the nuclear weapons
programs because of the dangers that that might create, including
provoking an attack from the United States, they will argue for
greater caution, for greater restraint. They will also argue that
with the Iraqi threat essentially removed there is less need for
Iran to develop an option to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other
hand those who debate in Iran the need for Iran to have a nuclear
weapons capability will argue that the presence of a very large
number of American and British troops next door make it more important
than ever that Iran have a nuclear weapon capability in order
to deter an attack from the US. How that exactly plays out within
the very complicated domestic internal scene in Iran I think is
very hard to anticipate. I think at least in the short term the
Iranian government is going to be trying very, very hard to avoid
doing things that could provoke Washington's hostility. I think
they are very nervous about being next on the hit list after Bagdad.
They appreciate that their position is extremely vulnerable if
only from a military standpoint. I think Iran will be looking
for ways to try to appease the United States. At the same time
they may also be looking for ways to try to covertly build up
their capabilities, but I think the face they will put to the
world will be one of trying to reassure, trying to moderate their
behaviour in a way that will avoid provoking hostility from Washington.
129. In determining the course of that internal
debate in Iran between, if you like, doves and hawks, do you think
that debate will be influenced by the fact that within a matter
of months of North Korea opening up to its possession of nuclear
weapons the US government has taken a public position, which it
has repeated many times now, that there is no military option
available to the United States in relation to North Korea.
(Dr Samore) That depends on whether Iran thinks there
is a military option with respect to itself. As Iran looks at
the world it sees right next door a very good example where a
government is very likely to be destroyed because of its pursuit
of weapons of mass destruction. It looks across the globe at the
far east and sees a situation where the United States is powerless
to take military action. What the calculation will be in Iran
I do not know, but my guess is that they are more likely to see
themselves as vulnerable to a military attack—as in the
case of Iraq—than invulnerable as in the case of North Korea.
The Iranians are still years away from having nuclear weapons
so the risk for them is that if they try to produce nuclear weapons
they run the risk of being caught; they run the risk of provoking
the United States and they are still so far away from having it
that they may calculated that it is just too dangerous to pursue.
Mr Chidgey
130. Dr Samore, you may recall on a previous
time you were before us[5]
we talked about this very issue of North Korea and Iraq. I am
sure it was you that told us that if Iraq had had nuclear weapons
there would be no Gulf War and the fact that Saddam Hussein had
recognised his mistake in attacking Kuwait because he did not
wait until he had nuclear weapons. My point is, is there not a
case to be made that from Iran's perspective it is a race against
time to acquire a deterrent to protect itself from invasion by
the world's super power? How strong does that play in the debates
that take place in Tehran?
(Dr Samore) If somehow Tehran could acquire
a nuclear weapon tomorrow then they would do so. They have every
motivation in the world to have a nuclear weapon. Their problem
is that they cannot; they are years away and the pursuit of the
capability subjects them to political pressure or even military
attack. They have to calculate, is it worth the risk?
131. No case of a willing seller from North
Korea and a willing buyer in Iran?
(Dr Samore) Not that we know of yet.
I think that is a reasonable concern, but so far that person has
not appeared on the doorstep.
Chairman
132. Russia has a particular role here. Russia
is exporting nuclear technology to Iran, yet there has been a
very considerable warming of Russian-US relations, strategic nuclear
missiles and so on. To what extent you think the US has been able
to moderate the policy of Russia in respect of such matters?
(Dr Samore) This was one of the most
frustrating issues that I worked on when I was in the White House
because we badgered the Russians for years—from President
Clinton on down—about their very poor control over missile
and nuclear technology flowing to Iran. We threatened sanctions
and we offered enticements and we used political pressure; we
used just about every means we had available. I think we made
some progress. Certainly on paper the Russians have a very impressive
export control system, the problem is it is only on paper and
when it comes to actual implementation it often proves to be quite
inadequate. But I think there has been some progress over the
many years we have worked on this issue and I think the Bush administration
has a tremendous opportunity—given the better overall political
relations between Washington and Moscow—to make more progress.
I think perhaps the issue has not received as much attention as
I would like because the administration, in its relations with
Russia, has been focussing on other matters, including Iraq. I
know that work has been going on to try to persuade the Russians
to limit their nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran. I think
it is very important that that continue. I suspect that much of
the basic equipment and material for the two plants I mentioned
in Iran is probably of Russian origin.
Sir Patrick Cormack
133. You have been very insistent on the fact
that there is a desire to have this nuclear capability and also
on the fact that it is some years away. You touched on the chemical,
the biological, but did not amplify. I want to ask you about terrorism.
Could you just say what is the extent, in your view, of the biological
and chemical arsenal at their disposal, and is it something that
could be used immediately?
(Dr Samore) I am a little more constrained
unfortunately because the cover has not been blown off the chemical
and biological weapons program yet the way it has on the nuclear
program. I would say that it is certainly a reasonable conclusion
that the chemical and the biological weapons programs are much
more advanced than the nuclear weapons program. We know that Iran
manufactured and used chemical weapons against Iraq in the 1980/1988
wars, so we know they have some capability. I would say that it
is a reasonable assumption that they do have some existing chemical
and biological capability that could be used now.
134. Do you have any suspicion that any of this
material has been supplied to terrorists?
(Dr Samore) No.
135. That leads me on to the terrorism point.
Many people have alleged—with very convincing anecdotal
evidence—that Iran has given assistance to Hamas, Hezbollah
and Islamic-Jehad. How do you see this?
(Dr Samore) It is certainly true that they have a
long relationship with Hezbollah. In part, of course, that is
based on a common religious fraternity and in part it is based
on a desire to try to do what they can against Israel. I found
in talking to experts on Iran one of the most difficult issues
is policy towards Israel because that is one of the issues that
divides the moderates and the hard-liners. For the hard-liners
it is a religious duty to try to destroy Israel and supporting
Hezbollah is part of that. The moderates see support for Hezbollah
as one of the important obstacles in trying to fix and improve
relations with the West. Again, it is another one of these issues
that divides the Iranian government. Where you have different
pieces of the government running off pursuing their own policies—for
example the Karine A episode, which I am sure you are familiar
with—it is pretty clear that some elements in the Iranian
government were very heavily engaged in selling a lot of arms
to the Palestinian authority. Other parts of the Iranian government
I think knew nothing about it and were quite unhappy about it.
136. Do you think there are any significant
elements of the Iranian government who would be content to see
a two state solution of both Israel and Palestine properly recognised?
(Dr Samore) I think that there are elements of the
Iranian government that would be willing to support any agreement
the Palestinians were willing to support.
137. Looking at terrorism from the other point
of view, they often claim that they are victims of terrorism.
I would like to know what you think western countries should be
doing, if anything, to curb activities, the MKO[6]
and so on. We have had evidence this afternoon—which I do
not think you heard—saying that the British government ought
to proscribe certain organisations. How do you see this?
(Dr Samore) It is a very good question,
but I just do not think I am qualified to answer because I am
not exactly sure about what the activities are of the MKO. My
impression from talking to people is that to the extent there
are opportunities in the wake of a war against Iraq, pressure
in Tehran to limit or cut off support for Hezbollah is probably
one of the more achievable near-term objectives. The feeling is
that the Iranians are more willing to sacrifice their links to
Hezbollah than they would be willing to sacrifice their nuclear
program or take other steps that would be seen as more directly
threatening their security. To the extent that we are trying to
figure out exactly how to use our leverage in the aftermath of
a war, it strikes me that Hezbollah is probably an area where
one might be successful in the short-term.
138. And the proscribing of certain organisations
here in Britain and the West might assist to that end?
(Dr Samore) I certainly know that the Iranians complain
about the activities of the MKO, yes. I think we are looking for
face-saving package and that presumably could be part of it.
Mr Pope
139. It seems that we are getting a clear picture
about Iran. This is a country which is repressing many of its
own citizens, it is exporting terrorism, partly financing Hezbollah,
Hamas, Islamic-Jehad . It is developing weapons of mass destruction.
So this is no Sweden. But do you think Bush was right in the axis
of evil to lump it in with North Korea and Iraq. It seemed to
me that whilst not a great friend of the West it is of a different
kind of a state to the other two and it was probably a strategic
error on Bush's part to put Iran in with Iraq and North Korea.
What do you think?
(Dr Samore) From an analytical stand
point it is a very different type of problem. In the case of North
Korea and Iraq you are dealing with fundamentally dictatorial
states, one man rule. In the case of Iran it is much more complicated
and that makes it both better and worse in some respects. It is
better in the sense that one can hope to strengthen the moderate
elements and produce an improvement in behaviour that way. It
is worse in the sense that I find it very, very difficult to figure
out how any action one takes will actually reverberate within
the endless and very complicated and murky warfare that goes on
in Tehran. Some people who are not particular fans of President
Bush think that including Iran in the axis of evil was actually
a very good thing because it strengthened the hands of the moderates
who are able to say to other elements, "Your behaviour is
putting us on a very dangerous list. The last thing we want to
do is antagonise the United States." I think how our behaviour
affects what is going on in Iran is very, very difficult to figure
out. We may do things that actually have a beneficial effect even
if, at first blush, they do not look too smart.
5 HC(2002-03)196, pp Ev 11-17. Back
6
Mujahedin-e Khalq organisation. Back
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