Examination of Witness (Questions 140
- 145)
TUESDAY 11 FEBRUARY 2003
DR GARY
SAMORE
140. It seems to me that we must be presenting
a rather confusing picture to Iranians, that a few years ago under
Clinton American policy was clearly to have an engagement; Secretary
of State Albright talked about normalising relations. We now have
the current EU policy which is about a constrictive dialogue which
has been unkindly called, "Speak softly and carry a big carrot".
We are sending those messages out that we want constructive dialogue;
at the same time President Bush is sending a completely different
message. If I was a reformer in Iran I would be very confused
about the West's attitude. Our aim in the EU is to encourage reform
and democracy. I am sure that must be President Bush's aim as
well. They must be getting some very conflicting messages. Who
do you think is getting this right? Is it the EU or is it Bush?
(Dr Samore) There is confusion on both sides. We are
very confused about what their politics are as well. My sense
is that the big fear of the reformers now is that the United States
will make a deal with the hard-liners. What they are worried about
is that the US will deal with those political elements who actually
are responsible for providing support to Hezbollah and running
the various weapons of mass destruction programs. I think the
reformers are nervous that they will end up being basically abandoned
by the US in the interests of achieving more operational objectives:
end of terrorism, limits on weapons of mass destruction. I do
not think there is an easy answer as to who has it right. It is
so difficult to figure out how to influence Iran's behaviour.
But I do think it is important, to the extent that it is possible,
that Europe and the United States coordinate their positions.
It seems to me that that requires us to decide what our objectives
are and what incentives and disincentives we are prepared to use
in order to achieve those objectives. There may very well be disagreement
about what the relative merits of the different objectives are.
I personally would put human rights much lower on my list of things
I would like to try. I would put an end to support for terrorism
and an end to a nuclear weapons program at a much higher level.
Other people obviously have different priorities. But I do think
it is important. This is one of those areas where I think US-European
coordination really matters because I think the Europeans have
a much stronger role to play in terms of influencing Iranian perceptions
and behaviour than Europe does in the case of North Korea.
Mr Hamilton
141. I am glad you pointed out so many of the
confusions and contradictions. Clearly Ayatollah Khomeini gained
power on the back of fierce resentment and patriotic fervour on
behalf of Iranians who resented American interference. The policy
of the previous Shah was reversed. Likewise, the same with Israel.
I want to just concentrate on Israel in a second. Two thirds of
the population of Iran—if I am not mistaken—are under
25 and therefore do not really remember the 1979 revolution. It
seems there is more pro-American and pro-western sentiment in
Iran than any other Middle Eastern country, possibly because America
and the west have not really done very much in Iran or interfered
in the way they have in other Middle Eastern countries. Leaving
that aside, it is surely our duty here in Europe—and in
the United States—to encourage those elements that want
to push the Islamic element and the theocratic part of the republic
back into a box and establish a secular democracy. Surely it is
our duty, rather than calling Iran part of the axis of evil—both
the American government and Great Britain and the rest of Europe—to
encourage that overwhelming element within Iran that wants to
see secular democracy established and have the kind of freedom
of speech that we enjoy. What would your comments be on that?
(Dr Samore) I certainly agree with you
about the objective. The problem is how do you achieve that. Nobody
has been able to come up with a successful formula for encouraging
the development of secular democratic trends. The main impression
that I had from my years in the White House in the Clinton administration
is that by the end of the administration people had very much
decided that the reformers were feckless, powerless and pretty
much unable to deliver anything. The efforts by the Clinton administration
to engage Iran, to encourage those elements—the moderate
secular elements—utterly failed because there was nobody
at the other end who could deliver a deal.
142. In a fiercely proud nation like Iran surely
you create huge bitterness by saying that they are just part of
the axis of evil and lumping them all together.
(Dr Samore) My impression is that the result of that
was very complicated. It certainly did create resentment; it certainly
did strengthen some elements who argued that they had to defend
themselves against the American Satan, but I think there were
others who argued that they have to be careful about the way they
behave because they are behaving in a way that could arouse strong
American opposition and that could be damaging to their interests.
I agree with you that a policy toward Iran has to be sophisticated;
it has to have incentives and disincentives. But I do not think
that you want to have a policy that is all carrot and no stick.
It has to be both big carrot and big stick. That is what I am
trying to say.
143. My colleague, Greg Pope, mentioned support
for terrorism—Hezbollah and the other organisations—and
clearly one of the platforms of the current administration government
in Iran is to be fiercely anti-Israel. Basically they say that
Israel has no right to exist. Yet we understand—if we can
believe some of the information—that Iran has bought weapons—not
weapons of mass destruction but other weapons—from Israel.
What chance do you think there is in the near future that Iran's
official policy will change? I know you have partly answered this
with Sir Patrick's question, but, if the Palestinians are willing
to embrace a two state solution which the Saudi Arabians have
proposed and certain numbers of Israelis think it is a good idea,
what chance is there that Iran will do that? If they do that,
will the United States then be satisfied that the attitude has
changed sufficiently towards Israel in order to establish a closer
relationship?
(Dr Samore) That is a very good question and I think
it is very hard to answer. I think that there is such an ideological
cleavage in Iran over this whole question of Israel that it becomes
part of the broader battle between different elements. I would
not expect to see that kind of change in declaratory policy as
the first order of business. I think what is more likely is that
you might see a willingness by Iran to cut back on providing military
assistance to Hezbollah. Something that is not public, something
the regime could deny if they were questioned, but I think to
expect one to make a change in public declaratory policy is probably
really more than the traffic will bear at this point because it
is so closely tied to this broader struggle among different factions
over the future of the whole government.
Chairman
144. Between 1980 and 1988 these two regional
heavyweights, Iran and Iraq, fought themselves to a standstill
and rather like the bucket and the well principle when one power
is high the other is low. In a post-Saddam Hussein position with
the regime change in Iraq, clearly the successor government is
likely to be more constrained in its regional position, hence
Iran is likely to have an enhanced power position regionally.
Is that a good or a bad thing? What are the implications?
(Dr Samore) Actually most people in Iran
I think—at least some of them—are worried that the
post-Saddam Iraq will be much more powerful. Saddam, as much as
they did not like him, at least he was constrained by sanctions,
inspections and so forth. The new Iraq may be buying American
and British tanks and planes as part of it reconstruction program.
There are quite a few people in Iran who are worried that it will
end up being a much more dangerous adversary than Saddam was after
the Gulf War.
Mr Maples
145. But without weapons of mass destruction?
(Dr Samore) Yes, without weapons of mass
destruction.
Chairman: As always you have been extremely
stimulating and helpful. Thank you very much. The dialogue will
continue.
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