Memorandum from Dr Gary Samore, International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
1. I would like to discuss Iran's nuclear
weapons program and what options we have for stopping it, especially
after Iraq is dealt with.
2. For years, government experts like myself
have warned that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability,
but we were constrained by classification restrictions from publicly
presenting any details to back up our warnings.
3. Now, thanks to an Iranian opposition
group called the National Council of Resistance of Iran, Iran's
nuclear cover has been blown. Last August, the group held a press
conference in which it revealed the existence of two previously
secret nuclear facilities in Iran, along with details about the
organization structure and the front companies Iran has established
to procure materials and equipment for these facilities. In December,
an American think tank called the Institute for Science and International
Security published further details and commercial satellite pictures
of the two facilities. More recently, the Iranian government has
itself begun to acknowledge the existence of the facilities, in
anticipation of a scheduled visit by the head of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohammed El Baradei to the facilities
later this month.
4. What are these two facilities? One facility,
located near the town of Arak in central Iran about 150 miles
south of Tehran, is a plant for the production of heavy water.
Heavy water is natural water enriched in the deuterium, which
is used as a critical ingredient (called a moderator) in a type
of natural uranium fueled reactors that are ideal for the production
of weapons grade plutonium. For example, the Dimona reactor in
Israel and the Cirus reactor in India are heavy water moderated
reactors of this type used to produce plutonium for the nuclear
weapons programs in these countries.
5. The second facility, located near the
town of Natanz about 25 miles southeast of the city of Kashan,
appears to be a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant under
construction. A gas centrifuge enrichment facility can produce
highly enriched, weapons grade uranium for the production of nuclear
weapons. Gas centrifuge technology is the basis for Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program, and is currently being pursued by both
Iraq and North Korea for their nuclear weapons program.
6. In theory, both heavy water and gas centrifuge
can also support peaceful nuclear energy. For example, some types
of nuclear power plants, such as the Canadian-designed Candu reactor,
use heavy water as a moderator, and gas centrifuge technology
can produce low enriched uranium as fuel for light water power
reactors. For example, the British-Dutch-German consortium URENCO
uses gas centrifuges to produce low enriched uranium fuel for
nuclear power facilities in Western Europe.
7. Because these technologies are dual use—with
both civilian and military applications—Iran will attempt
to justify these fuel cycle facilities as part of its civilian
nuclear power program. Tehran claims, for example, that it has
long term plans to generate 6,000 MW of electricity from nuclear
power plants and it needs fuel cycle capability to produce fresh
fuel and dispose of spent fuel.
8. In Iran's case, however, this justification
makes no technical sense whatsoever. Iran's only nuclear power
plant is the 1,000 MW light water Bushehr nuclear power plant
under construction by Russia, which uses low enriched uranium
for fuel. Moscow has contracted to provide a lifetime supply of
fuel for this facility so Iran hardly needs to produce its own
enriched uranium. Moreover, Russia has agreed to take back the
spent fuel from Bushehr for storage and processing, so Iran does
not need a reprocessing facility to manage nuclear waste. Equally
clear, Iran has no plausible need for a heavy water production
facility because the Bushehr plant does not require heavy water
and Iran's existing research reactors do not use heavy water or
too little heavy water to justify a heavy water production facility.
9. The best explanation is that Iran is
pursuing a nuclear weapons break out capability under cover of
the NPT and IAEA safeguards. In some respects, Iran's strategy
represents a more difficult challenge than NPT parties such as
Iraq and North Korea who have tried to violate their NPT commitments
by building secret nuclear facilities not declared and inspected
by the IAEA. Legally, under the NPT, Iran can build and operate
fuel cycle facilities under IAEA safeguards, while preserving
the option to withdraw from NPT under three months notice if it
decides to exercise a nuclear weapons option. Alternatively, Iran
could try to divert material from these facilities or even build
parallel covert facilities not declared to the IAEA.
10. What can be done about Iran's program
to develop a nuclear weapons capability? Certainly, it would be
helpful if the enrichment plant is placed under IAEA safeguards
as soon as possible. Under its current safeguards agreement with
the IAEA, Iran is not required to allow IAEA inspections of the
facility until 180 days before nuclear material is introduced
into the facility. However, the public exposure of the plant has
put pressure on Iran to allow IAEA access to the plant much sooner.
Since the plant appears to be several years from completion, the
IAEA may be able to insist on design and configuration details
that would make more difficult for Iran to produce high-enriched
uranium or divert the material without detection. In addition,
it would be extremely helpful if Iran signs an enhanced safeguards
protocol with the IAEA. Under the protocol, Iran would be required
to declare nuclear facilities to the Agency 180 days before construction
begins and allow environmental sampling that could help detect
undeclared facilities.
11. Safeguards are good, but I believe they
are not good enough. If Iran proceeds under its current course,
it will eventually develop a nuclear weapons breakout capability
under IAEA safeguards. With three months notice, it can withdraw
from the NPT and convert civilian fuel cycle facilities to produce
materials for nuclear weapons within a relatively short period
of time. Moreover, Iran could set a precedent for other NPT parties
in the region who might want to develop a similar breakout capability.
Once one country left the treaty, others could follow suit and
the Middle East could become nuclearized in a relatively short
period.
12. So, the key policy issue for me is whether
Iran can be persuaded not to proceed with its current plans to
develop fuel cycle facilities under IAEA safeguards. It won't
be easy, but there may be new opportunities to influence Teheran's
calculations after Iraq's nuclear threat has been dealt with,
either through inspections or (more likely) an invasion to replace
Saddam with a government prepared to comply with Iraq's treaty
commitments. There appears to be some internal debate within Teheran
about how far to proceed with a nuclear weapons programs. Some
in Iran see real or potential enemies—Iraq, Israel, and
the United States—that support the need for acquiring nuclear
weapons. Others in Iran see the danger of proceeding with programs
that would attract widespread international pressure and even
military attack.
13. Arguably, a successful outcome in Iraq
could help tip the balance in favor of those in Teheran arguing
for restraint. In principle, elimination of the Iraqi threat could
reduce Iranian motivations for acquiring nuclear and set an example
for avoiding actions that would make Iran a target of international
pressure. At the same time, if Tehran feared that the U.S. was
intent on forcing regime change in Iran, it might strengthen those
arguing that only nuclear weapons and long range missiles could
deter American pressure.
14. In practice, whether Tehran is prepared
to limit its nuclear weapons program will depend largely on the
outcome of Iran's complex internal political struggle, over which
outside actors have only limited influence. However, to the extent
that we can influence Iran's calculations and perceptions, it
will be essential for the U.S. and Europe to coordinate their
positions. If Iran persists in pursuing fuel cycle facilities
under IAEA safeguards (that have no reasonable peaceful uses),
what kind of political, economic, or even military actions are
the U.S. and Europe prepared to support? If Iran agreed not to
pursue its present course, what kind of measures are the U.S.
and Europe prepared to take to address Iran's political, economic,
security, and energy needs?
15. Once the current transatlantic differences
over Iraq are behind us, we will need to work together to answer
these questions and develop a coordinated approach to deal with
the Iranian nuclear threat.
Dr Gary Samore
International Institute of Strategic Studies
11 February 2003
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