Examination of Witnesses (Questions 146
- 159)
TUESDAY 4 MARCH 2003
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR PETER
RICKETTS CMG AND
MR ROB
MACAIRE
Chairman
146. Foreign Secretary, we welcome you with
your two colleagues, Mr Peter Ricketts, Director General, Political,
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Mr Rob Macaire, Head
of the Counter Terrorism Policy Department at the Office. Time
is short. Can I just indicate for everyone's convenience what
we aim to do? You, Foreign Secretary, will make a brief opening
statement and, obviously, Iraq is going to dominate proceedings
this afternoon. We will then have a public session until about
a twenty to four and we will then go into private session. I understand
you are due to meet your Russian counterpart very shortly after
that. So clearly we are entering a very difficult few weeks in
terms of the Iraq crisis. Let us start straight away with your
statement, Foreign Secretary.
(Mr Straw) Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. I will
make a brief opening statement on Iraq. When the Security Council
unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 1441 last month
it sent Iraq a simple message: co-operate immediately, unconditionally
and actively with the United Nations' inspectors or face serious
consequences. The language could not have been clearer. Nor, sadly,
could Saddam Hussein's tactics in response. They have been to
deny the existence of weapons of mass destruction and, if caught
out, to offer the smallest concession possible in order to work
for delay. These tactics have culminated in the destruction in
recent days of 16 Al Samoud missiles. We can expect more concessions
right up to the point at which Saddam Hussein concludes that the
international community has, once again, been lured into doing
exactly what he wants. Then the concessions will stop, and Saddam
Hussein will be left in possession of an arsenal of deadly weapons.
Saddam Hussein has still not explained or accounted for all the
chemical and biological weapons material left unaccounted for
and recorded in UNSCOM's[1]
final report in February 1999. These include 3,000 tonnes of precursor
chemicals, 3,000 tonnes unique to the production of VX nerve agent,
growth media for biological agent production, enough to produce
over 26,000 litres of anthrax, 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare
agent including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent, 6,500 chemical bombs
unaccounted for (although, Mr Chairman, you will recall that one
of these bombs was allegedly found last week), 1,000 litres of
chemical agent for these bombs and 30,000 missing munitions for
delivery of chemical and biological agents.
We are going to go into more detail in the closed
session but it may be helpful if I offer you an outline of our
current intelligence assessment which follows from what I have
just described. Our assessment is that Iraq has the capability
to produce the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin
and VX, and the biological agent anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin
and ricin. The Iraqi regime has put up an elaborate screen of
concealment based on intimidation and deception to cover this
capability. I want to share with the Committee some of the intelligence
on which we base these judgments. For example, we know that sensitive
materials and documents have been hidden in the homes of employees
and hidden too in hospitals, farms and in other sites. Intelligence
also suggests that WMD-related items may have been buried and
others are being kept on the move every twelve hours, using trucks
and trains. Throughout the period of inspection Iraq's security
and intelligence agencies have been monitoring UNMOVIC[2]
and the IAEA[3]
and plans are available to obstruct them if they come close to
WMD itself. Iraq's agents and agencies are continually adjusting
their tactics to counter any changes in the inspectors' modus
operandi. Iraq is particularly concerned about the requirements
laid down clearly in 1441 about interviews of scientists and others
because if they were carried out as mandated by 1441 they would
unquestionably expose the regime's deception and its stockpile
of weapons. The main planks, therefore, of avoiding free interviews
are intimidation and monitoring. In early December we know that
Saddam Hussein issued instructions that the scientists were to
be threatened with serious consequences for themselves and their
families if they revealed any sensitive information to UNMOVIC.
They were ordered not to agree to any interviews taking place
outside Iraq, and my understanding is that so far none have, more
than three months after the passing of 1441. The potential witnesses
have been coached in the answers they have to give. Some of them
have been removed from their homes and places of work and detained
to prevent them being interviewed.
In dealing with Saddam Hussein it is always
a risk to make projections about the future, but based on his
habits of the last 12 years and his approach to 1441 thus far
we can expect that Iraq will continue trickling out so-called
concessions, one at a time, at the last minute to split the Security
Council and to buy more time while continuing an active policy
of concealment; to start trickling out "newly-discovered"
documents as part of a co-ordinated plan to tie down UNMOVIC on
what the regime considers to be expendable parts of its WMD programme.
We can also expect Iraq soon to announce that interviews may take
place unaccompanied. In truth, these interviews, in our judgment,
will continue to be monitored either by a requirement that the
interviewees carry concealed microphones and tape-recorders and
transmitters on them, or by bugging the rooms in which the interviews
take place, or both. The interviewees will be well aware of this.
Mr Chairman, it is clear to us that Saddam Hussein believes he
can once again divide and outwit the international community through
a pretence of co-operation. We cannot afford to send him a clear
signal, or any signal, that he is close to success. This is what
we would do if, at this stage, we decided that 1441 did not, after
all, mean what it said. Full compliance for Saddam Hussein—what
he is looking for—is the least that he can get away with.
He is also hoping that the final opportunity, which was originally
afforded to him 12 years ago and then repeated by 1441, was not
final at all. The international community came together in the
weeks leading up to 1441 and then, when it was unanimously passed,
on 8 November. The words are very clear. They mean what they say
to us; they do now and they did when we signed up to them, and
I think it is very important that the international community
follows through the meaning of those words too. Thank you very
much.
147. Foreign Secretary, that is an important
statement. I anticipate that colleagues will be asking you about
the scientists, they will be asking you about the evidence for
the biological and chemical weapons and, indeed, about the response
to any supposed concessions which the regime makes. I would like
to start off on another tack, and that is the second Security
Council resolution. The Prime Minister has given this escape clause
on the possible second resolution that the Government would not
feel bound to await such a resolution or to abide by it if it
were to be vetoed unreasonably. Do you not think that this question
of reasonability is a rather dangerous test and highly subjective?
One can understand it in respect of Kosovo, for example, where
there was a looming and actual humanitarian crisis which arguably
might have occurred had there not been an intervention irrespective
of the position at the Security Council. How would you define
"unreasonably", save in a narrow, subjective way, on
the basis of what the Prime Minister has said?
(Mr Straw) Mr Chairman, with respect, I would rather
not get drawn into offering a definition of "reasonableness".
As you know, as an experienced lawyer, the words and phrase traditionally
defined offer extensive explanation about reasonable, and I would
defer to that expertise. I would also like to say this: of course,
when we argue by analogy, as we are bound to do, very few analogies
are ever completely—
148. Do you accept the danger of the subjective
test?
(Mr Straw) I want to explain our position. When you
argue by analogy there comes a point where they may break down.
The reason why we have drawn a parallel with Kosovo is for this
reason: that in respect of Kosovo it was not possible to get a
direct Security Council resolution and instead the Government
and those that participated in that action had to fall back on
previous Security Council resolutions and general international
law in order to justify the action that was taken. That, if you
like, is the parallel. We are satisfied that we have sufficient
legal authority in 1441 back to the originating resolution 660
and so on to justify military action against Iraq if they are
in further material breach.
149. You say "We have sufficient legal
authority". "We", in that definition, means presumably
the US, the UK and any other members of the coalition. Do you
not think it is rather dangerous to have one group within the
Security Council or the UN assuming to itself the enforcement
of a UN resolution?
(Mr Straw) If you allow me to finish. We think we
have sufficient legal authority there and that is clearly laid
down and it was anticipated when we put 1441 together. We would
much prefer, if military action proves necessary, for that to
be backed by a second resolution, and that is what we are actively
seeking. We have had to reserve our options if such a second resolution
does not prove possible, and that is what the Prime Minister spelt
out and what I have also spelt out. So far as your latter remarks
are concerned—
150. The enforcement by a group of members.
(Mr Straw) The enforcement of all United Nations resolutions
and actions has always fallen to individual countries, and whether
it is a UN-hatted coalition of the willing or a non-UN-hatted
coalition of the willing, it has to be a coalition of the willing
because the UN has no forces of its own; we do not have a world
government, we have an association or international organisation
of sovereign states.
151. But without express authority?
(Mr Straw) We believe there is express authority.
I am all too familiar with the negotiating history of 1441. There
was a debate before we got to 8 November—a very intense
debate—about whether the resolution that became 1441 should
explicitly say, in terms, that military action to enforce this
resolution could only be taken if there were a second resolution.
That was a proposition which was in discussion. It was not acceptable
to a majority of members of the Security Council, it was never
put before the Security Council. Instead you have got the scheme
laid out in the operative paragraphs of 1441 which set very clear
obligations on Iraq: the declaration set out in paragraph 3, the
compliance with the inspectors set out in paragraphs 5 through
to 8 and so on, and then a definition in paragraph 4 of what is
a further material breach. A false declaration, a part of the
further material breach which has already been satisfied or failed
to be satisfied by Iraq, and failure at any time to comply with,
and co-operate fully in, the implementation of this resolution,
which it is also palpably obvious has happened too. In those circumstances
where you have got a further material breach you then have the
Council meeting for an assessment of the situation in accordance
with paragraphs 11 and 12. But what the Council has to do under
12 is to consider the situation, not necessarily to pass a second
resolution.
152. There should be endorsement by the Security
Council before any country or group of countries takes it upon
itself.
(Mr Straw) We want a second resolution. That is what
we are actively seeking. So, to some extent, this is a hypothetical
discussion. We also believe that this provides sufficient legal
authority for military action.
153. Before calling Sir Patrick and Mr Mackinlay,
you will be meeting Mr Igor Ivanov, your Russian counterpart,
this afternoon. They have said in terms that they will veto or
at least not support a resolution. What is your reading of the
Russian position?
(Mr Straw) My reading of their public statements is
the same as yours, Mr Chairman. Let us wait and see so far as
the position of President Putin and Mr Ivanov is concerned. They
are less convinced about the necessity for a second resolution
than are we at the moment. That is a matter of public record.
We have good relations with the Russian Federation and its leading
figures and, as you say, I have yet to see Mr Ivanov so I would
rather leave it there.
Sir Patrick Cormack
154. Foreign Secretary, the clear inference
that I and I suppose most people would draw from your very robust
opening statement is that you believe that Iraq is in very substantial
material breach of its undertakings and you also believe that
1441 is itself sufficient to justify taking action of an enforcing
nature against Iraq. Am I right on that?
(Mr Straw) Yes to both. Iraq has been
in further material breach as a matter of fact for some weeks
now because they were told they had to co-operate immediately,
unconditionally and actively. That is the last line of paragraph
9.
155. If that is the case, Foreign Secretary—and
I, personally, applaud your robust stand—why seek a second
resolution?
(Mr Straw) Because, politically, it is a better way
of binding in the international community.
156. But not if it is repudiated by a majority
of the Security Council.
(Mr Straw) Let us wait and see on that. We tend not
to put forward resolutions with the idea that they will be repudiated,
and there are intensive discussions currently taking place.
157. When do you expect that that resolution
will be tabled?
(Mr Straw) That depends. We are waiting to see what
Dr Blix and Dr El Baradei say on Friday in their reports (although
I think, as colleagues here know, the main focus now is on the
biological and chemical weaponry) and then we will make a judgment
after that. It is already tabled but we will not put it in a position
where it is ready to be voted on.
158. There have been suggestions over the last
48 hours, in particular, that events in the Turkish parliament
mean that any onset of hostilities would be delayed, perhaps,
by a fortnight or so. Does this mean that you have more time to
convince your colleagues on the Security Council of the wisdom
of this second resolution?
(Mr Straw) Not necessarily is the answer. What we
are anxious to do is to gain a political consensus, if that can
be achieved, in the Security Council and in the world community
which recognises the state of Iraq's flagrant violation of its
obligations. As far as I am concerned and the British Government
is concerned, that is a matter of fact; the facts speak for themselves.
I think it is impossible to read 1441 without coming to that conclusion.
What we also believe because we want this crisis resolved peacefully
is that the only way you are going to get this active, immediate
and full co-operation by Saddam Hussein, even at this very late
stage, is if he realises fully what the alternative is. It is
to be said, for all the suggestions that it is diplomacy that
has brought about what co-operation there has been, including
the re-admission of inspectors, it has come about by the unanimous
passage of this resolution but, above all, by the fact that there
are now a large number of US and UK troops stationed on Saddam's
doorstep concentrating his mind.
159. I entirely accept that. If it appears during
the negotiations over the next week or ten days that this second
resolution is not going to get the support that it merits, would
you be inclined just to leave it on the table and seek to act
under the resolution that has been unanimously approved?
(Mr Straw) With respect, Sir Patrick, I would rather
not get into public speculation about the "what ifs"
here. What we are seeking to do is to gain an international consensus
around the resolution.
1 United Nations Special Commission. Back
2
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Back
3
International Atomic Energy Agency. Back
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