Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160
- 179)
TUESDAY 4 MARCH 2003
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR PETER
RICKETTS CMG AND
MR ROB
MACAIRE
160. I wish you success.
(Mr Straw) Thank you very much.
Andrew Mackinlay
161. I know you do not want to go into "what
ifs", so let me put my question to you this way: does the
formulation of words "unreasonable exercise of veto"
also extend to if there is a failure actually to get a resolution
passed?
(Mr Straw) I understand what you mean.
162. Do you see what I mean? I understand permanent
members have to say "I exercise a veto", but you have
got to get nine votes. If you did not get nine votes for this
resolution you would have failed, would you not?
(Mr Straw) If we fail to get nine votes we have failed
to get nine votes. That is true.
163. You have not got a Security Council resolution?
(Mr Straw) You need nine votes and no veto in order
to pass a Security Council resolution.
164. What I want to press you on is that I understand
the point you make that "we think we have mandates anyway
under the existing council resolutions". The scenario which
is a very real one, which I want you to address, is that if you
go for a Security Council resolution, a further one, and are denied
it, does not that shift, if you like, the legal balance because
you have actually been denied a mandate? You went asking for it
and been denied it. What happens then?
(Mr Straw) I understand the point you are making.
It does not undermine the legal base which was there before. It
cannot do. But to re-make the point I have been making, we would
prefer there to be a second resolution, and we are working very
hard to achieve that, as a precursor to any military action. We
also believe that the best way of avoiding military action is
by passing a clear, tough second resolution, which at that point
is likely—if anything is—to bring Saddam to his senses
and to force him to stop the prevarication and deceit which he
has practised over the last 12 years. On your point, Mr Mackinlay,
again I do not want to speculate about the "what ifs"
here. We are seeking a second resolution, we are working hard
to secure that second resolution and I talk daily to a range of
foreign ministers whose countries are members of the Security
Council. We hope we get there. As you say, as a matter of the
rules of the UN Security Council you need nine votes and no veto.
165. I do not know if it has occurred to you,
but there has been, if the historians are right, a seismic shift
in the British Constitution recently, and not just from last week's
vote; that whilst the prerogative powers exist, in reality one
would need a mandate from the British House of Commons, and I
think it is agreed ground that if possible you would get it beforehand,
or it has to be done pretty swiftly retrospectively after conflict
has started. That is the reality. Surely, it has occurred to you
and the Prime Minister that there are many of us who robustly
support the British Government but do so on the basis that we
deem it necessary for there to be a second Security Council resolution.
So it is not that Her Majesty's Government thinks we do not necessarily
need a second Security Council resolution; many of the legislators
who will have to vote consider it to be essential.
(Mr Straw) Yes, I am aware of that.
166. Good. What I want to ask you is this: if
Mr Blix reports "Good news. There has been now a sustained
move to compliance", being very mindful of all you have said
and the track record (from which I do not demur at all), is there
a mechanism whereby you can agree with the United States and agree
with Mr Blix what is compliance? It is not unreasonable to postulate
there could be a scenario where Saddam, rather grudgingly, he
does not really want to—from pride or arrogance—indicates
that he is fully complying but he may well comply, and Mr Blix
thinks we are on a roll, and perhaps even Her Majesty's Government
might have a view which differs from the White House. How are
we going to have a proper conscious decision-making as to where
there is compliance? Will it hold? I am just anxious there could
be a difference between us and the United States on compliance.
(Mr Straw) Mr Mackinlay, we make our judgment on the
basis of best evidence. I have to say it was on the basis of best
evidence that the international community made its judgment on
8 November. They had hundreds of pages of reports. For example,
the last report of UNSCOM[4],
in February 1999, which I think extends to over 200 pages, set
out in forensic detail what Saddam had failed to account for[5].
I have summarised it very briefly. With some minor exceptions,
Saddam has still not accounted for this. I cannot say what Dr
Blix is going to put in his report on Friday because that is a
matter for him, but what I read in the newspapers—speculation—is
that he may well be making available to the Security Council his
own assessment for the further work that Saddam needs to do, which
he has failed to do for 12 years, since 8 November. Let us wait
and see. No one would be happier than me if it turned out that
there had been immediate, unconditional and active compliance
with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Iraq would then be a very much safer
place and we could close this file. Can I just make this point,
Mr Chairman, about the Royal Prerogative?
Chairman
167. Please.
(Mr Straw) I think one can get too excited
about this. The Royal Prerogative is a shorthand way of talking
about the powers of government which existed before the glorious
revolution in 1689 and were then on the statute book. It happens
that amongst those powers are the powers to declare war or to
take military action. However, in practice, and certainly for
100 years, no government has been able to take its military to
war unless there has been the consent of the House of Commons
for that, and absolutely right. I, however, have been pleased
to have been an active party to what I may think is becoming a
new and better convention; that rather than doing that under motions
for the adjournment we do it on substantive resolutions, which
I think is very much clearer to everybody.
Andrew Mackinlay
168. Dr Blix, on 28 February, said that: "UNMOVIC
is presently finalising an internal document of some importance,
namely, a list of the disarmament issues which it considers currently
unresolved, and of the measures which Iraq could take to resolve
them." What has happened to that? The other side of the coin
is I understand that Blix asked member states—I guess the
United States (the big players), the United Kingdom and France—for
further support and assistance, notably in the field of information.
That was as recently as 28 February.
(Mr Straw) The first was what I was referring
to myself; that it appears from Dr Blix' public statements that
he is putting together some report about uncompleted tasks by
the Iraqi regime. However, I have not seen it. Let us wait and
see what he produces, I think, on this Friday. Your second point
was?
169. He actually asked for further support from
member states.
(Mr Straw) We continue to give as much support as
possible.
170. Why would he say that? Reading that, we
see there is a degree of frustration on his part.
(Mr Straw) You would have to ask him that. All I can
say is that certainly in private he has been—and so has
Dr El Baradei—complimentary about the co-operation and information.
Chairman
171. So that is not directed against us?
(Mr Straw) No.
Mr Maples
172. Foreign Secretary, we have seen quite a
lot of strains within the Western alliance over the last few weeks,
I suppose in particular led by France and Germany but, obviously,
with other European countries, and we have seen those spill over
into NATO over putting their defence systems into Turkey. We are
seeing it now spilling over into the Security Council, which I
imagine you spend a lot of your time dealing with. It would be
a heavy price, I think, to pay for dealing with Iraq if there
to be permanent damage to the Western alliance. I wonder if you
could tell us how seriously you think the prospects of that are
and what the Government is doing to try to make sure that these
are short-term problems and do not spill over into being long-term
damage to NATO?
(Mr Straw) Mr Maples, if I may, I think
there are strains in the Western alliances, NATO and the EU but
there are also strains imposed by this on the UN system as a whole,
which includes obviously the five key members of the Security
Council. How do we deal with that? By working as hard as we can
to secure a consensus where we believe that one exists. The irony
about these strains is that they are strains which are based on
a very powerful consensus. It is a very paradoxical situation,
because we managed to gain unanimity in the international community
by 8 November. I have to say, as one of the active participants
of the negotiating process, it did not feel like that for a long
time in the run-up to it, but we finally got there. We all thought
the words meant what they say, others have a slightly different
interpretation of this, so some further strains have appeared.
How we deal with it is by having a care for the medium and long-term
futures of these institutions which have been of such profound
importance to relative peace and security in the western world—the
whole world—since the end of the last war. I agree with
you that it would be very unacceptable if we were to place these
institutions at risk. At the same time, I do not believe that
simply sitting on our hands in the face of defiance by Iraq is
a way of securing the future of these institutions because if
we were to do nothing about Saddam's defiance—and, more
than his defiance, the threat that he poses, the basis of which
I have just read out—then the world would be a much more
dangerous place and these institutions would have been rendered
less effective by default. We deal with it by care, I think.
173. I am particularly concerned with the institutions
of the Western alliance: the European Union and, to a greater
extent, NATO. Let us focus on where the problem is: the difference
of view between us, on the one hand, and France and Germany on
the other. Those are the important states in this issue. Maybe
you think France and Germany have a different point of view on
this, and if so perhaps there is a three-way split on this rather
than two. Do you think the position that France is taking is one
of almost fundamental difference in approach, or do you think
it is—posturing (I would like to find a less pejorative
word for that)? Do you think it is trying to extract maximum advantage
from the situation where, in the end, as usually, they come along
with it? If that is the case it seems to me that relatively little
damage will be done. However, if this is a fundamental difference
of approach about being prepared to accept, essentially, the military
leadership of the United States where we decide that a problem
needs a military solution which none of the rest of us are capable
of doing very much about, if we are prepared to accept that and
France and Germany are not, then it seems to me we have a more
serious problem. As I say, it may be a different response in respect
of the two countries. Or are we looking at something really fairly
superficial that will disappear?
(Mr Straw) I hope it is the latter. I think it will
be for historians to judge exactly what the categories are. I
am not going to speculate on what is in the minds of people in
the leadership of the French Republic. It is a known fact that
France has been in the past more relaxed about the non-compliance
by Iraq of its obligations. That is a historical fact. For example,
in respect of 1284, which was the base resolution providing the
establishment of UNMOVIC which was passed, I think, in December
1999, France was a reluctant participant in the negotiating process
and then did not veto but did not vote for the resolution. That
is based on their perspective; I do not happen to share it. I
was very pleased that notwithstanding their, as I say, reluctance
about 1284 they did sign up fully to 1441. We are now involved
in discussions not least with our French colleagues about the
importance of the international community's commitment, as a whole,
to 1441 being translated into action. On your point about the
United States, one of the points I make to all our European Union
colleagues is this: that you are right it is the United States
which has the military power to act as the world's policeman,
and only in the United States. We live in a uni-polar world; the
United States has a quarter of the world's wealth, the world's
GDP, and it has stronger armed forces than the next 27 countries
put together. So its predominance is huge. That is a fact. No
one can gainsay it; no one can change it in the short or medium
term. The choice we have to make in the international community
is whether, in a uni-polar world, we want the only super-power
to act unilaterally and we force them to act unilaterally or whether
we work in such a way that they act within the multilateral institutions.
What I say to France and Germany and all my other European Union
colleagues is take care, because just as America helps to define
and influence our politics so what we do in Europe helps to define
and influence American politics. We will reap a whirlwind if we
push the Americans into a unilateralist position in which they
are at the centre of this uni-polar world.
174. If that is what you are saying to your
European counterparts it seems to me you have answered my question,
by saying that, because you are saying something very strong and
powerful to them. What it has got down to now is that the French
and German proposal involves giving the inspectors I think it
is some four months, which will take us to midsummer, whereas
we and the United States seem to want to be able to move more
quickly. I quite follow the argument that giving the inspectors
more time does not solve the problem; if Iraq is not going to
comply within the last three months why should it comply in the
next three? On the other hand, other things being equal, it is
not worth tearing the Western alliance apart over a few weeks
here or there. I wonder if behind the pressure on time are military
considerations which it is very difficult to get around. In other
words, even going halfway to the four months would actually rule
out military options or force the West into fighting in the summer
in the desert or something like that. Are there fundamental military
planning considerations involved in this timetable?
(Mr Straw) The fundamental military point which cannot
be avoided by anybody is that we have only got this degree of
compliance because there are—I know you accept this, Mr
Maples, but some do not; some think it is somehow—
Andrew Mackinlay
175. It is self-evident truth to most people.
(Mr Straw) Yes, that by simply passing
the fine prose of 1441, Saddam has readmitted the inspectors having
said he would not and to the extent he has complied he has complied.
That, of course, is not the case. So there is a military reality
behind whatever has been achieved by the diplomacy of 1441. However,
I have seen nothing at all which says that we have to take action
immediately because of military planning necessities. The point
we are making to our colleagues is that the reason we want immediate
compliance is because that is what the Security Council said.
As I said in the House of Commons last Wednesday, it seems to
me that 110 days since we said that is stretching the meaning
of the word "immediate" to breaking point. Of course
you can argue about a week here and there, and that is exactly
what is going on at the moment. The issue of active, immediate
and unconditional compliance is not a matter of time, it is about
the state of mind of the Iraqi regime, and they have changed their
state of mind like that, if they choose to. Indeed, that is exactly
what Saddam does. It did not take him 120 days to change his mind
between 10 September and the 14th. On 10 September he said he
was never, ever going to readmit weapons inspectors and on the
14th he said after all "We are". At the beginning of
last week he said "We are never, ever going to destroy the
Al Samoud missiles"—hey presto, four days later, he
said after all "We are". So when it suits him he can
take decisions very swiftly indeed. That is what we are looking
for.
176. You have got on to Saddam Hussein's timetable,
I was more interested in our timetable. I understood you to say
pretty clearly that you were not aware of any overwhelming military
considerations which said that we had to move in the next two
or three weeks as opposed to the next six or eight weeks. So maybe
we are going to come down to the question of whether or not the
French and the Germans are using this four months as a way of
trying to drag this out and make the action meaningless or try
to dissipate the international will to do it, or whether it is
something that they are just posturing about.
(Mr Straw) I do not challenge the good faith of our
French and German colleagues; they have got their position. It
happens they are in the same place at the moment, but the whole
background of Germany and France is a very different one. There
are people in Germany, for reasons that I certainly understand
and respect, who take a pacifist view. I am not suggesting that
that is the view, for a moment, of Chancellor Schröeder or
Vice-Chancellor Joschka Fischer, but that is part of the background,
given their terrible, bloody history. France, of course, has a
very different historical background. They take the view that
it is possible by continuous diplomacy to secure Saddam Hussein's
compliance. We take a different view. I think the facts and history
are with us.
(Mr Ricketts) May I add one point on the 120 days,
which the Foreign Secretary mentioned? As I understand it, the
120 days proposal in the German memorandum is not an ultimatum
but it is a request for another report in 120 days. So it is not
clear that they would regard that as the end point but, maybe,
another weigh point.
Mr Chidgey
177. Foreign Secretary, I would like to ask
you for some more information, if I may, in regard to the relationships
and role of UNMOVIC in the context of your Government's view and
the United States' and the Security Council. In your opening remarks
you repeated to us a fairly well-known list now of quite a chilling
arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, and I take that as
read. Can I just ask you: is that the list that came from previous
Security Council resolutions that I can refer you to? If that
is the case, is that the list that Hans Blix is working to? The
question at the heart of my concern is, is UNMOVIC saying, or
do you expect them to say, that with those weapons not produced
by Saddam Hussein it is therefore clear that he, as we have talked
about, is in material breach in their report to the Security Council?
It seems to me that UNMOVIC may well turn round and say, in a
week's time, that Saddam Hussein has failed to comply entirely
in any great respect to the Security Council resolution. It may
be their recommendation therefore that there is no point in continuing
with the inspections and verification regime. On the other hand,
would you take note and respect the view of Hans Blix if he were
to report back to the Security Council that "Yes, I can,
with my team, secure the complete verification and destruction
of these weapons in a programme extending for, perhaps, another
two to four weeks"?
(Mr Straw) Mr Chidgey, first of all,
the list that I read out is a synopsis of the outstanding unaccounted-for
weapons of material capabilities contained in UNSCOM's—that
is the previous weapons inspectors—final report. I think
you will find it is dated February 1999. It is a great thick report.
178. Is that the list that Mr Blix is working
to?
(Mr Straw) That is part of what he calls the baseline,
yes, because it is where the previous inspectors left off at the
end of 1998 when they were, effectively, kicked out. What then
happened was that the United Kingdom led the way to negotiate
a new inspection regime and other, in fact, improvements in the
sanctions regime which found their way finally into Resolution
1284, (and I included that in this White Paper which I published
last Tuesday) which is a resolution setting out, as I say, the
establishment of UNMOVIC and various other things. The Iraqi regime
refuse to comply with that at all, they have said, except for
the things that were beneficial to them and not for the inspection
regime. That is the baseline. In addition, UNMOVIC have tried
to re-base their inspections using other information available
to them as well, but that was the starting point for their inspections.
IAEA are doing a similar job although, because it is much more
difficult to conceal nuclear capabilities than it is to conceal
chemical and biological weapon capabilities, their job is a more
straightforward one. On material breach, the way that 1441 is
structured is that the question of material breach is at large;
the facts speak for themselves, and it is for the Security Council
to confirm whether there has been a material breach, but not for
the inspectors. You will never find an inspectors' report, even
if there had been the most flagrant violation, saying "They
are now in material breach" because that is not for them
to say. What they will say is "We tried to do X but we ran
up against a brick wall". So they will report the facts on
which the inferences and conclusions will be drawn.
179. If one of these facts were a recommendation
that they should be given another two or four weeks to complete
the verification and destruction—
(Mr Straw) Of course we take very careful account
of what Drs Blix and El Baradei say, and their predecessors—just
to make my point again. If UNSCOM had said in February 1999 "Despite
the fact that we have been kicked out we give Iraq a clean bill
of health" we would not now be sitting here.
4 United Nations Special Commission. Back
5
S/1999/94 Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring, UNSCOM
29.01.99. Back
|
