Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200
- 219)
TUESDAY 4 MARCH 2003
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR PETER
RICKETTS CMG AND
MR ROB
MACAIRE
200. Finally, concerning the nature of the evidence
going to be presented to the Security Council, we discussed earlier
Colin Powell's evidence which did not seem to convince Dr Blix
about the sites at Taji, and I wondered if you could say something
about whether or not there will be extra evidence presented by
the US and the United Kingdom to the Security Council. In particular,
is there extra evidence linking Iraq with al Qaeda? I note that
our Prime Minister said that we do not rest our case against Saddam
on the basis of links with al Qaeda: however, it would also be
wrong to say that there is no evidence of any links with al Qaeda,
and I wondered if you could tell this Committee whether or not
it is our intention to be able to present any more evidence to
the Security Council about links between Saddam and al Qaeda?
(Mr Straw) We in the United Kingdom have got no current
plans to present evidence to the Security Council; indeed, we
have not done so at any stage. I was present for Secretary Powell's
presentation on 5 February and I thought it was very impressive.
There was one point raised by Dr Blix about these overheads; the
United States Secretary of State suggested Iraq had prepared for
inspection by cleaning up sites of evidence of the proscribed
weapons programme, and Dr Blix makes some comment on that. He
finishes by saying: "Our reservation on this point does not
detract from our appreciation of the briefing". The briefing
was really very important and I thought very compelling. Of course,
if people do not want to hear what the evidence is you are not
going to be able to convince them, but the transcript of the intercept
of one officer saying to another, "Don't ever use the word
`nerve agent'"—I think it was "nerve agent"—in
itself was rather chilling testimony about what they have. Why
would they be talking about that? It really was powerful stuff
so far as I am concerned. I am not aware of any current plans,
however, by Secretary Powell for a further such evidence session.
You asked me about what we know about relationships between al
Qaeda and the Iraqi regime: to repeat, Mr Chairman—
Chairman
201. Briefly, if you would.
(Mr Straw)—neither the Prime Minister
nor I have seen any evidence which links the Iraqi regime with
the events of September 11 before September 11. There has been
some evidence of Iraq creating a more benign environment in which
al Qaeda operatives may be able to operate but, as the Prime Minister
has said, that is not the burden of the case against Iraq so far
as its weapons of mass destruction are concerned.
202. But, Secretary, you must have been very
embarrassed by the so-called "dodgy dossier"; the way
of, without specific attribution, lifting elements from a PhD
thesis; the lifting of sentences and making them more extreme.
You must have felt like sacking somebody as a result of the damage
which was done to the credibility of the government's regime.
How many ministers saw that document before publication? Who authorised
it?
(Mr Straw) My embarrassment threshold is very much
higher than that, Mr Chairman; it would take a huge amount to
embarrass me! The important thing about this dossier is that it
is accurate. Its provenance should have been made clearer, and
I have made that clear in itself. On the issue of which ministers
approved it, it was approved by the Prime Minister.
203. Did you see it yourself?
(Mr Straw) No, it was not an issue. It was partly
drafted in the Foreign Office and partly—
Andrew Mackinlay
204. Who commissioned it?
(Mr Straw) The Prime Minister's Office.
205. The operative word is "Office",
is it?
(Mr Straw) Well, I cannot say for certain.
206. The point is this was damned irritating
to your friends in Parliament as well, frankly, was it not?
(Mr Straw) And I count you as one of them, Mr Mackinlay!
207. Absolutely, and there are these people
at No 10 Downing Street who are unelected, unknown to people,
acting freelance reading between the lines, and basically this
is what happened. One of these bright sparks, who plainly do not
know, commissioned it; the poor Prime Minister does not know what
is put before him, and it is signed off. Let's be candid and frank—that
is what happened, is it not?
(Mr Straw) I do not think so, and there are plenty
of people whose identity is not particularly well known in the
Foreign Office; I am responsible for what happens in the Foreign
Office and the Prime Minister is responsible for what happens
in the Prime Minister's Office. The crucial thing about it is
it is accurate. No one has been able to deny its accuracy.
Andrew Mackinlay: That is not the point, is
it?
Chairman: Can I move on? We hope to cover a
little on Palestine, Israel and North Korea, but first I am going
to appeal to colleagues to be crisp on this. Sir Patrick?
Sir Patrick Cormack
208. Two crisp questions, certainly—and
doubtless the answers will be even crisper. What would the Foreign
Secretary say to those who are alleging that the increase in air
strikes is the softening up, the beginning, of the war, and that
has been alleged even by colleagues in the House of Commons?
(Mr Straw) I refer you to what the Defence
Secretary said which is that it is not the case, and he made a
pretty full statement about it yesterday in Questions.
209. That not being the case, and I totally
accept that—and I am one of those who does not think that
there is massive public opinion against the Government; I think
there is a degree of unease—but at the time of the first
Gulf War I was one of those who advocated giving Saddam a 72 hour
ultimatum to get out, otherwise press on to Baghdad, and that
was an argument squashed at the time by those who thought they
knew much better. Would the Foreign Secretary consider giving
Saddam an ultimatum before beginning hostilities in earnest? I
think if that were the course that were adopted it might have
quite an effect on public opinion. Would the Foreign Secretary
like to comment?
(Mr Straw) First of all on your preliminary point,
it is worth bearing in mind—not for you but for critics
of the United States—that the reason the United States did
not continue on to Baghdad was because the United States and the
other coalition allies felt they did not have a legal mandate
for this; the legal mandate they had was to free Kuwait and then
to deal with WMD, not to take over the state of Iraq. They showed
very commendable respect for international law which they continue
to do. On the idea of some kind of ultimatum to Saddam to leave
Iraq, that is a suggestion which has come from some Arab states.
I have said, and I think Secretary Rumsfeld also has said for
the United States, that we consider that the provision of some
exile for Saddam Hussein would be a small price to pay for a peaceful
resolution to this, albeit quite bluntly that we all have to hold
our noses that we were not going to have this man arraigned before
an international criminal court, but that remains our view.
Mr Chidgey
210. Foreign Secretary, have you received assurances
from Turkish Government that, in the event of military action
against Iraq, Turkey would not seek to secure parts of Iraqi Kurdistan?
(Mr Straw) I have not directly received
those assurances; I can write to the Committee[6],
Mr Chairman. What is the case is that Turkey, as a member of the
United Nations, has to respect 1441 and its predecessors which
make very clear the commitment of the United Nations to the territorial
integrity of Iraq, and that is spelt out in one of the preliminary
paragraphs of 1441 on page 44 of this White Paper.
211. I am being very crisp, Chairman, and I
will not go on any further on that. According to the US administration's
official testimony before the United States' Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the US is planning for a two-year military occupation
of Iraq, the military and civilian administrators of which would
report to US General Tommy Franks. What plans is the government
making for post-war Iraq? Do you not feel that a multinational
peace-keeping mission supported by a UN administered transitional
authority would be less likely than a US military occupation to
exacerbate suspicions in the Arab world that the United States
has imperial ambitions to pursue in that region?
(Mr Straw) There are discussions taking
place at different levels at the moment about the administration,
humanitarian relief, reconstruction of post-conflict Iraq, if
there is a conflict, and no final decisions have been made. We
want to see the United Nations fully involved in any post-conflict
Iraq and we are sure that is the appropriate route.
212. Do you share the views expressed by President
Bush last Wednesday about the prospects for transition to democracy
in post-conflict Iraq?
(Mr Straw) I have not got the exact text of President
Bush but I think he was talking about the fact that any government
whom one can think of in Iraq would be a lot better and more representative
than the existing regime, and I think I also recall that he said
that it is offensive to imply that that one fifth of the world's
population which is Muslim is incapable of having democratic governments,
and I share that view.
213. If I can help you slightly because I do
not want to delay matters one of the things he said was: "The
United States has no intention of determining the precise form
of Iraq's new government".
(Mr Straw) Exactly. Do I think that it would be a
better government and more representative and over time become
democratic? Yes. I remember people saying the most appallingly
condescending things about Afghanistan—that the Taleban
were all they deserved, which is not true—and although it
has been a difficult transition it is far better in Afghanistan
than ever it was before, and that is my profound belief as far
as Iraq is concerned.
Mr Pope
214. One of the things the Government has argued
is that terrorists could get weapons of mass destruction from
Iraq. Can I put it to you that Iraq obviously is not the only
possible source of those weapons of mass destruction for terrorist
organisations, and that there is a real concern that the former
Soviet countries could be a source of weapons of mass destruction?
I understand that the G8 fund to safeguard nuclear facilities
in the former Soviet Union is $6 billion short. Could you briefly
tell us what steps the government has been taking to safeguard
that position?
(Mr Straw) I have not got the figures
in my head. To a degree I think the fund is short but there is
also an issue of the spending of the money and I do know, so far
as the Russian Federation is concerned, that the problem in terms
of the money Britain has put in has not been the amount but getting
it spent, and so it is a problem of capacity by the Russian Federation.
Yes, of course it is possible for weapons of mass destruction
and associated material to come from a variety of sources which
is why we sought to strengthen international non proliferation
regime. It is also why it has been so important through the European
Union and the OSCE[7]
to build up representative democratic governments because, other
things being equal, such governments are far less likely to spend
their money on such kit and possibly to use it.
(Mr Ricketts) The programme adopted at
the G8 summit last summer, the so-called global partnership, was
to have $10 billion in the US and $10 billion from other members
of the G8 to which the British government pledged $750 million.
We are still waiting to finalise the details with the Russians
of the legal arrangements to get that programme going but there
is a great deal of money ready to be spent as soon as we can sort
out the framework.
215. So there are issues about the shortfall?
(Mr Ricketts) No. The issue is about the arrangements
in Russia that will allow the programme to get running.
Mr Maples
216. Foreign Secretary, I am sure you would
agree that in the medium term stabilising the Middle East, finding
a solution if there is one to the Israeli problem, would be a
pretty essential ingredient, and it is difficult to see stabilisation
of the region without finding some way forward to this problem.
Given that Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat were unable,
with all the effort that the United States administration and
President Clinton put into it, to agree the deal that was on the
table at Taba, what makes you think the so-called Quartet group
can achieve anything?
(Mr Straw) Because the imperatives for
agreement are becoming stronger. I think we have to be realistic
about the situation but the grim reality, Mr Maples, is that these
6 million people living in Israel and the 3.5 million living in
the Occupied Territories have only a future if they live in peace,
and we have seen in other situations terrible years and years
of conflict ultimately being resolved. I know it involves fewer
people but take Northern Ireland, which has been less terrible
but not much. In the Northern Ireland conflict there were periods
certainly in the 70s and 80s when I wondered whether it was ever
going to be resolved. To take a situation which I think has led
to a higher number of casualties even than between Israel and
the Occupied Territories, Sri Lanka, off the top of my head I
think 60,000 people have been killed there, and I certainly thought
this was going to go on and on and on in a spiral of killing and
destruction. There is now a reasonably stable, robust, peace process
so I work on the basis that to secure the political route to such
a solution is what people want. Things have improved; I think
a lot of lessons have been learned from the failure of the Camp
David and Taba talks; if you talk to participants there seems
to have been, amongst other things, a lack of understanding about
what was on the table and the time lines and all the rest of it,
so the process is now very much more robust and we are giving
a lot of encouragement to the Palestinian Authority to build up
its own infrastructure so that it works in a better way.
217. The Quartet group has been in existence
for two or three years now and has produced an outline two-page
road map—not even a detailed road map. I put it to you that
it is not going to achieve the objective and you are going to
have to approach this problem in a different way. If Barak and
Arafat could not agree the deal that was on the table at Taba,
nothing that the Quartet group or any member of it can do is going
to persuade Sharon and Arafat to make a deal?
(Mr Straw) I do not accept that. Of course I acknowledge
the difficulties in terms of relationships between President Arafat
and Prime Minister Sharon which are well known, but is there a
desire amongst Israelis of all political persuasions for peace
and security? Yes. Is there an equivalent desire amongst Palestinians?
Yes. You then have to have the political process to put it together,
and that is what we are seeking to do. Now, we could just wash
our hands of it but I am not willing to do that. I would like
also to add in answer to Mr Hamilton that one of the things that
certainly sours understanding of what we are seeking to do with
respect to Iraq's disarmament is the unresolved crisis between
Israel and Palestine. It needs resolving anyway, but if we can
resolve that it takes away a running sore in terms of international
relations.
218. Of course I agree with that which is why
I raise it in this context, but I put to you my point that this
is not going to result in peace and also another proposition which
is that we all know what the terms of the settlement are going
to be. Give or take the odd square mile of territory here or there
or which settlements are included or are not included, we all
know what the deal is going to be—well, we do pretty much
and let me outline it. It is going to be a two-state solution
with Jerusalem as the capital of each of those states; it is going
to involve some limited right of return for refugees; it is going
to involve some security considerations for Israel—these
are the issues that were on the table at Taba—and I would
suggest to you that the parties, certainly under their present
leaders, are never going to agree the settlement and maybe the
way to approach this is for the rest of the international community
to seek to impose it through a Security Council resolution, laying
out the terms of the settlement and saying, "There it is,
you can argue about whether you implement it but if we do this
under Chapter 7 you can no longer argue about what the terms of
the settlement are going to be", because the complication
of getting to Taba always gave each party a way out of the deal
because they would say, "Oh, we cannot possibly accept this;
we cannot possibly accept that", but if the terms of the
deal were set by the United Nations, the terms of a two-state
solution, then what the Palestinians and Israelis would have to
decide is whether they are going to implement it or not, not whether
or not this square mile of territory should be in or out?
(Mr Straw) It is an interesting idea and it begs various
questions about how you get to that point and get agreement inside
the Security Council. I also say, Mr Maples, that it is not something
I rule out but there are many steps you have to take before you
get there. Even where you had a mandatory solution you seek to
impose, you still face difficulties unless there was consent to
the parties. Let us take the issue of Cyprus—
Chairman
219. Can I stop you at this point, because I
think it is important? Mr Maples has written on this point and
I would like a considered reply, please, to Mr Maples' point.
(Mr Straw) Of course[8].
6 Ev 67. Back
7
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Back
8
Ev 67. Back
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