Further supplementary memorandum from
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1. At the 4 March Foreign Affairs Committee
Evidence Session I agreed to write to the Committee on the issues
of assurances from the Turkish Government that Turkey would not
seek to secure parts of Iraqi Kurdistan in the event of military
action in Iraq, and of imposing a settlement on Israel and the
Palestinian Authority.
2. Iraq: Turkey
We have made clear to the Turks our concerns
over any unilateral military action in northern Iraq. We have
received assurances from the Turkish Government, both bilaterally
and through NATO, that they would only intervene militarily in
northern Iraq in self defence, for example in the event of a major
humanitarian crisis or a terrorist attack launched from northern
Iraq, and that any such action would be coordinated with the United
States. They have also repeatedly stressed their respect for the
territorial integrity of Iraq and that Iraq's national resources
should be at the disposal of all Iraqi people.
3. In this context it is also worth noting
the major contribution the Turks have made to the stability of
northern Iraq and the safety of the Kurdish population there through
their hosting of Operation Northern Watch and their role in the
Ankara Process.
4. Middle East Peace Process
During the Evidence Session Mr Maples raised
the issue of imposing a settlement on Israel and the Palestinian
Authority and you asked me to write on a similar proposal by the
International Crisis Group.
5. Mr Maples has suggested that the parties,
under their current leadership, will never agree a settlement
and that the international community should seek to impose it
through a Chapter VII resolution in the UN Security Council. Mr
Maples also wrote to the Prime Minister on this point. As the
Prime Minister said in his reply, we believe that international
engagement with the parties is best sustained through the Quartet.
The Quartet has proved a valuable mechanism for bringing together
key players and in creating the elements of the current international
consensus on the way forward. We remain willing to sponsor a new
UN Security Council Resolution, at the appropriate time, incorporating
these elements. However, the immediate priority must be the implementation
of existing Resolutions, and the formal adoption and implementation
of the Roadmap.
6. The issues of permanent status remain
for negotiation between the parties. An enduring settlement requires
the consent of both parties. Any attempt to impose a settlement
would I believe be counterproductive. It would require not just
the agreement of the international community but the will to enforce
the solution, militarily if necessary. It is not at all clear
that either element could be secured at the moment. In these circumstances
I do not believe there is a better route than the one we are taking—vigorous
efforts to achieve a settlement through negotiation, however difficult
that may be.
7. Following President Bush's speech on
24 June 2002, in which he laid out his commitment to a two-state
solution, the International Crisis Group agreed in its report
"Middle East Endgame I: Getting to a Comprehensive Arab-Israeli
Peace Settlement" that concluding final status negotiations
within three years would not be possible with "no roadmap
. . . on the table, nor any clear international commitment to
making it happen". They proposed that the key international
players present "clear, detailed and comprehensive blueprints
for a permanent Israeli-Palestinian agreement . . . and press
strenuously for their acceptance". They stressed that the
intention would not be to impose a settlement but to generate
a momentum for change that would gradually become irresistible.
At the same time they published their own draft elements for peace
agreements between Israel and its neighbours.
8. I welcome ICG's initiative. Promoting
a clearer idea of what, in some detail, a settlement would look
like is an important way of addressing the fears of Israelis,
Palestinians and others about what they would have to give up,
what they would get in return, and what assurances they would
have that the agreement would be respected. I hope that ICG publishing
their ideas will help encourage the Israelis and Palestinian publics
to focus on the potential for a solution and press their leaders
to work towards it. Only an NGO could have done this.
9. But now, thanks in some part to UK efforts,
we are nearing publication of a roadmap which sets out clearly
the steps that need to be taken by both sides to reach a final
settlement. This settlement to which the Roadmap leads is that
described by President Bush in his 24 June 2002 speech. It is
consistent with all the key international statements of principle
on the dispute since 1967: UN Security Council Resolutions 242,
338 and 1397; the Madrid terms of reference; the principle of
land for peace; existing agreements between the parties; and the
March 2002 Arab League initiative, offering Israel full normalisation
of relations with its neighbours in the context of a settlement.
In Phase One of the roadmap, which will formally begin once it
is presented to the parties, the Palestinians must act against
terrorism; rebuild their security infrastructure; and pursue reform,
including constitutional reform. Israel must facilitate reform;
ease the humanitarian situation in the Occupied Territories; withdraw
its forces to pre-28 September 2000 positions and freeze all settlement
activity. Phase Two focuses on an independent Palestinian state
with provisional borders and a new constitution, and takes up
the Lebanese/Syrian track of the peace process. Phase Three will
see Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on a permanent status agreement.
I have put an informal copy of the roadmap in the House library.
10. We have already made progress in implementing
the roadmap through the January and February meetings on reform
hosted in London and the appointment of a Prime Minister. We will
continue our efforts to help achieve a peaceful settlement for
all the peoples of the region.
Rt Hon Jack Straw MP
Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
2 April 2003
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