Examination of Witnesses (Questions 226
- 239)
TUESDAY 29 APRIL 2003
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR PETER
RICKETTS CMG AND
MR EDWARD
OAKDEN CMG
Chairman
226. Foreign Secretary, may I warmly welcome
you and your two colleagues again on behalf of the Committee,
Mr Peter Ricketts, who is Director General, Political, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, and Mr Edward Oakden, who is the Director,
International Security at the Office. Foreign Secretary, since
last we met, I believe it was on 4 March[1],
much has happened in Iraq and in the area which we are now covering
yet the waters are far from settled. It seems clear so far that
the worst predictions of those who were questioning you before
the conflict have not been fulfilled: there is no fragmentation
in Iraq, there were no massive civilian casualties, no massive
refugee flows, no involvement of the neighbours in a wider regional
war, no use by the Iraqi regime of weapons of mass destruction
against the coalition forces and against Israel, and no widespread
popular unrest in the Arab world, as you made clear to the House
yesterday, no destabilisation of moderate regimes in the region,
moderate governments such as the Egyptian government and the Jordanian
government, yet clearly the problems of establishing peace are
formidable and for many the first images at the end of the war
were those of the widespread looting in Baghdad and elsewhere.
Was this anticipated?
(Mr Straw) Yes, it was. It is regrettable,
but it is a simple fact that whenever a regime has collapsed and
that has been followed by a vacuum then almost always that has
been accompanied by disorder and looting. I think it is hard to
think of an occasion where there has been such a complete collapse
of any kind of government when such looting and disorder has not
followed.
227. Was the extent of it anticipated?
(Mr Straw) Yes, it was anticipated. The thing that
happened more quickly than was anticipated was the collapse of
the regime. The working assumption had been that the Iraqi Government,
particularly their regular forces, the revolutionary guard and
the special revolutionary guard, would be better organised, have
better command and control and put up much more of a fight than
they did. During the period after 18 March until the collapse
of Baghdad three weeks ago tomorrow in the daily briefings and
War Cabinets we had many serious discussions about what had happened
to the revolutionary guards and the special revolutionary guards
and when they were going to counter-attack and, as it happened,
they did not in any great number, so the collapse happened more
quickly than anticipated.
228. Who was at fault in not anticipating these
steps?
(Mr Straw) No one is at fault, it is just an inevitable
consequence of that kind of warfare. It is greatly to be regretted
that there was disorder and looting on that scale. If anybody
is at fault, it was the fault of the Saddam regime for there being
so little consent and natural law and order in the country. You
smile at this but it happens to be true because the reason we
are, as were other Western democracies, able to police ourselves
with such a light touch is because people on the whole police
themselves. That is why police officers are not routinely armed,
because there is a natural consent for order and a readiness by
the populace itself to support the police. What was extraordinary
was the extent to which what order was there in Iraq was there
imposed only through terror and not through any consent. If you
took the terror away you then got a collapse. If you compare this
degree of disorder and looting with other similar collapses then
it was relatively small and it was got under control relatively
quickly. It does not excuse it, but it was one of the realities
of that collapse.
229. In one of his press conferences the US
Secretary for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, almost rejoiced in the
looting, saying it was a sign of democracy or of people taking
things into their own hands. Do you not share that view?
(Mr Straw) If it is the press conference I am thinking
about I would not share the description that you give of Mr Rumsfeld's
view about this. I just repeat my point that what order was in
Iraq was imposed by terror. People had no history of consent and
it took some time to establish a new order. We were in Basra and
the south-east sector rather earlier than the American troops
were in Baghdad. There was looting and disorder initially at the
British sector but it was quickly got under control and we then
managed to get the police on side, but as I told the House yesterday,
quite quickly the US were able to build up a relationship with
the ordinary Baghdad policemen and 2,000 are now undertaking joint
patrols and you will have seen far fewer pictures and stories
of looting and disorder.
230. You say there is no history of consent.
Do you understand the scepticism of those who regard claims in
the US about a great tide of democracy being established in Iraq
and in the region? Do you share that scepticism?
(Mr Straw) Sorry, whose scepticism are we talking
about?
231. Of those who question that idealistic view
from some in the US administration of a Western style democracy
being established in Iraq.
(Mr Straw) Let us be clear, there are a number of
people who thought that the military action would take a very
long time, there would be very large numbers of casualties and
so on, some people here thought that and they are entitled to
their view, but that has not happened and they will have to re-examine
their own judgments and in the course of re-examining the judgments,
which may just turn out to be inaccurate, they are bound to alight
on the next thing that they think is going to fail and we are
seeing that process take place now. In all the discussions I have
had with American interlocutors I have never heard the phrase
Western style democracy being used. There is sometimes an assumption,
although not from you, that the Americans have no sense of how
the world operates outside its own shores, but that is simply
not the case. They have got a very sophisticated international
relations establishment, sophisticated diplomats and they fully
understand that the kind of democracy you can have operating inside
Iraq will not be just a replication of the kind of democracy we
have in Western Europe or they have in the United States, but
the principles of democracy are not western, eastern, northern
or southern, they are universal and it is having those principles
applied within Iraq which is crucial, but they must be applied
in such a way that takes account of Iraq's own tradition, culture
and, above all, religion just as in Europe our own democracy also
takes account of our culture, tradition and religion.
232. And that includes a spirit of give and
take frequently made through parties. Now that the Baath Party
itself has been effectively destroyed in Iraq, are there other
major centres for coalescing around other than the mosque?
(Mr Straw) Bear in mind, first of all, that mosques
differ in their denominations and persuasions, that is point one.
Point two, there is quite a secular tradition in Iraq and that
well pre-dates Saddam Hussein. It is a relatively advanced country
with a large urban and middle class and yes, what we are seeing
now, as we saw yesterday in the meeting in Baghdad, the so-called
Nasiriyah II meeting, is the beginning of the development of political
parties, some which will be based on religious groups, others
not. It is also just worth bearing in mind before we, if I may
say so, Chairman, adopt a superior attitude to the relationship
between religion and politics in this country that around Europe
there are a large number of parties which have an explicit association
with a particular church, they are called Christian Democrat parties.
They are there and they have had a long tradition to that effect.
There are some countries in Europe which until very recently had
the most explicit association with a particular church written
into their constitution. So this is not something which is unknown
to us. In Europe we have been able to develop principles of democracy
alongside respect for our own religious traditions and in some
cases giving particular authority to particular church establishments
in doing so and yet these democracies have developed and I anticipate
that if we get things right in Iraq we can get a similar development.
233. And you would assume that, say, the Shiite
Party would be as benign as a Christian Democrat party—
(Mr Straw) I am not making any necessary assumptions
there. I was about to use the adjective naive but I withdraw that.
I think it is an error to assume that because people are Shia
they are therefore of one view or because they are Sunni they
are therefore of one view. Bear in mind that the Kurds are Sunni,
but amongst the Kurds they have had a couple of political parties
and they were fighting each other until a few years ago and they
are relatively united now. The Baath Party was Sunni but they
were not exactly an alliance.
Sir Patrick Cormack
234. Foreign Secretary, I would agree very much
with what you have just been saying and, as you know, I have been
a strong supporter of the general line the Government has taken
here, but I would just like to ask you about one area of manifest
failure and that is the looting of the great museums. I find it
difficult to understand why, if the resistance was nowhere near
what was anticipated, it was not possible to give more adequate
protection when everybody knew that these items and these great
collections were at risk.
(Mr Straw) It is a matter of very great
regret both by the American commanders and by ourselves that this
happened, but I am afraid it was a casualty of warfare. The problem
that the United States forces faced in Baghdad, albeit that the
regime collapsed more quickly than anticipated—and to some
extent because the regime collapsed more quickly than anticipated
they then had to move into a vacuum which was left by the departure,
disappearance, evaporation of the Iraqi troops—was that
the American commanders then had to be satisfied that the environment
on the streets was a sufficiently safe one for their own soldiers
to get out of their armoured personnel carriers and tanks and
onto the streets. If they declared a particular sector of Baghdad
safe, their soldiers got out on the streets and the soldiers got
shot dead then that obviously meant that they resorted to safer
tactics until they were sure that the area was secure. Obviously
the first priority was for them to secure the hospitals and other
essential services. You may recall, Sir Patrick, that there was
one occasion where the American troops did indeed get out of their
APCs and tanks in order to provide paramilitary policing of a
hospital and at least one of these soldiers who was simply on
patrol trying to safeguard the hospital was shot dead as he stood
there. In those situations commanders are going to order their
troops to get back into their APCs. That is part of what happened.
For more detail you would have to ask the American commanders.
235. I would just like to follow this up a little
because of course I understand what a terrible predicament these
young men and women faced and they were mostly very young and
one does not question their bravery or anything like that, but
here we have a great national collection of a key civilisation
and world history looted in a way which both you and I would regard
as deeply regrettable.
(Mr Straw) Sure.
236. Do we have (a) an inventory of what did
exist in the museums, (b) a list of those things which Saddam
himself moved out during his evil reign, and we know he did move
things out, and (c) a list of what is now left? What are we doing
to try and remedy this appalling problem?
(Mr Straw) I do not have those specific lists to hand,
but I am happy to provide a supplementary memorandum, Chairman,
to the Committee[2].
What I can say is that I know this is a matter of great concern
to the American administration at every level, they regret it
and aside from anything else, it has not been a good story, of
course not. Since Mesopotamia was the source of much of our civilisation,
it was also the source of much American civilisation as well,
so there are the same linkages. As I told the Commons yesterday,
Tessa Jowell, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport
and her Department are taking a lead in this. They are concerned
to provide as much support as they can to the relevant authorities
in Bagdad. There was a meeting in our British Museum yesterday
or today which is looking at further ways in which the salvaging
of what is left and the rebuilding of the museum could be taken
forward.
237. Thank you for saying you will supply that
information because that would be most helpful. Can we have your
assurance that Her Majesty's Government will continue to attach
very high priority to this and will be prepared to make such resources
as might be needed, either expertise or financial resources, to
put as much right as can be put right?
(Mr Straw) You have my assurance about
the priority we attach to it. On the issue of resources, we will
do everything we can. I cannot make decisions on behalf of other
ministers here before this Committee.
238. But you will bear all this in mind?
(Mr Straw) Yes.
239. Can I just ask you one other thing to do
with the culture in Iraq. You have talked about democracy, you
have talked about the differing opinions within the Shiite, the
Sunni and so on. I am very concerned also about the minority religions
that are in Iraq, the Christians and the Jews in particular. What
steps are being taken to ensure that any democracy that does emerge
is fully inclusive and fully protective of the rights of minorities
to worship properly and not to be victimised in any way?
(Mr Straw) That is something which is obviously extremely
important and should emerge from the process of the formation
of an interim administration and then a government which began
nationally at Nasiriyah some two weeks ago and had its second
stage yesterday in Baghdad. Again, it is worth my reemphasising
a point which I made in the Commons yesterday, which is that it
is now only 20 days since Bagdad fell and in that period we got
through very quickly the period of, yes, highly regrettable looting
and disorder. A degree of policing has been established which
in some areas is very effective and in other areas less effective,
but it has been established. Schools are reopening, hospitals
are restarting and now being pretty adequately supplied. You have
got field hospitals supplied by Saudi Arabia and Jordan which
have been established. When I was in Riyadh two weeks ago I talked
to Crown Prince Abdullah and to Prince Saud, the Foreign Minister,
about what they were doing to support humanitarian relief in their
neighbour country, Iraq, a country with whom at long last they
are looking forward to establishing good relations. You have got
this process of building governance. Given the international community's
imperative to maintain and respect the territorial integrity of
Iraq and given within the Iraqi borders you have such disparate
communities which are from different denominations and traditions
within Islam and then you have Jewish and Christian traditions
well represented as well, we are clear that it will be imperative
that in the formation of government and democracy there has to
be proper freedom of religion and worship allowed, but I think
there will be.
1 Ev 50. Back
2
Ev 92. Back
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