Examination of Witnesses (Questions 240
- 259)
TUESDAY 29 APRIL 2003
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR PETER
RICKETTS CMG AND
MR EDWARD
OAKDEN CMG
240. And guaranteed in any constitution that
might be allowed?
(Mr Straw) Yes.
Mr Olner
241. Foreign Secretary, you talked earlier this
afternoon and in the House yesterday about the meeting that my
dear colleague Mike O'Brien was attending yesterday in Baghdad.
I wonder whether there is anything you can report back to us as
to how that meeting went. I would be interested to hear what criteria
are being used to identify this representative group of Iraqis.
(Mr Straw) About 250 delegates attended,
which is four times the number who attended the original meeting
in Nasiriyah. They were generally regarded as second tier representatives
because a deliberate decision was made by the US-UK to try and
not have the conference dominated by "names", which
could have led to separate stories and I think that was a wise
move. It brought together a broader range of Iraqi participants
including opposition exile groups and those who were newly liberated.
It did not set up—there was suggestions that it might do
but we certainly thought this would have been premature—an
interim Iraqi authority, but it is part of a consultation process
which will eventually lead to a Baghdad conference for the establishment
of an IIA[3]
about which I spoke in a major speech I gave a few weeks ago.
That is where we are there. It was pretty broadly representative
and there will be further meetings both at a national level but
also at a local level. One of the things I am proud of is that
it was the British forces in the Basra sector who got going the
model of local consultations in Basra itself and townships which
is a model which has been rolled out across the country.
242. Is there any difference between the attitude
of the Americans and ourselves as to who attends and who determines
which groups of Iraqis are entitled to attend?
(Mr Straw) There has not been that I
have been aware of, no.
243. On 28 April you said in the House that
President Bush and the Prime Minister had made it clear that the
United Nations will have a vital role in Iraq's reconstruction.
Can you give us any suggestions, now that the war has finished,
as to what that vital role is going to be and how it can be identified?
(Mr Straw) Yes, of course. First of all, the United
Nations is playing a central role in humanitarian relief and,
as I told the House yesterday, their own office is about to declare
the whole of Iraq south of Baghdad as permissive and that is the
stage before they declare it completely safe as an area in which
the United Nations, its agencies and NGOs can operate, but it
is pretty safe now. The United Nations and the International Commission
for the Red Cross and other organisations are very active in providing
humanitarian assistance. The Oil for Food programme resolutions
have been rolled over on two occasions now, what was Resolution
1472 and then last week 1476, so there has been a good process
of consultation inside the Security Council and 1476 will expire
on 3 June, so there will be discussions in the last couple of
weeks of next month with a view to deciding what further regime
there is for Oil for Food in the weeks and months after that.
That is one area where the UN is already very actively involved.
The Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has appointed a special adviser
to him on Iraq and at the summit in Athens just under two weeks
ago Kofi Annan had discussions with a number of Heads of Government
including the British Prime Minister and with a group of five
Foreign Ministers from the Security Council, Spain, Germany, France,
UK, Bulgaria and, as it happened, Igor Ivanov from Russia, who
was there for the consultation, about the future role of the UN.
Other areas where the UN should be able to play an important role
include support for the new governance of Iraq, working with the
coalition in support of the Iraqi people. There are the issues
I spelt out yesterday about the future of the sanctions policy
which we will have to sort out and associated with that is Title
II oil revenues, the recognition and protection of Iraq's territorial
integrity and the role of the international financial institutions.
So there is a wide range of subjects for the UN to be involved
in. Precisely how the role develops does not just depend, however,
on the view of the United States and the United Kingdom but on
the other 13 members present in the Security Council and critically
on the other three permanent members. If we are able to secure
a co-operative and constructive environment within the Security
Council then there will be one hopefully benign conclusion from
the discussions. On the other hand, if we cannot then there will
be another, but we hope very much for the former.
Mr Hamilton
244. Foreign Secretary, Sir Patrick made reference
to the importance of different religious minorities including
the Jews. I think there is probably about ten Jews left in Iraq,
I know many who are in exile. There is a more important group
than even the religious minorities that need to play a full part
in the reconstruction of Iraq and any future government and that
is its women. Colin Powell said on 14 April that meetings on Iraq's
future will be a forum for all Iraqis. I understand that at yesterday's
meeting there were very few women present and I believe there
was one particular woman who wished to attend from this country
who is an Iraqi refugee in Great Britain but who was, for whatever
reason, not able to attend. I wonder if you could tell the Committee
a little bit more about how the coalition intends to ensure, without
imposing its will on who will or will not make up the future transitional
government, women will play their full part in Iraq's future including
those who are currently in exile in Great Britain?
(Mr Straw) First of all, may I say that
I am trying to find out what happened to prevent the attendance
of this particular woman delegate. That point was raised with
me in a phone call this morning by Patricia Hewitt, the Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry who also has responsibility for
women's policies. Secondly, we had Security Council Resolutions
1325 passed not so long ago which is a clear injunction on all
Member States to ensure the full participation of women at all
levels of government inside our own countries. That is an imperative
for Iraqi people for the interim authority when it is formed as
well as for the United States and United Kingdom. We are doing
everything we can to work this in and will continue to do so.
Even in this country some organisations are more successful than
others in ensuring the proper representation of women within their
organisations and even an organisation that I can think of which
has been successful has only got 25% representation in Parliament,
not the 50% we are looking for.
245. That is better than 1%.
(Mr Straw) Sure.
246. I know how busy you are and I know that
Patricia Hewitt is the Minister for Women. However, the questions
posed on the radio this morning seemed to be more relevant to
your role as Foreign Secretary and I wonder why you were unable
to attend this interview on Radio 4 rather than Patricia Hewitt
who seemed unable to answer the questions because they are more
in your remit?
(Mr Straw) I did not hear the interview. I am hardly
slow in coming forward to do radio interviews.
Sir Patrick Cormack
247. The opposite perhaps.
(Mr Straw) I cannot answer. Although
I am busy, let me just say that I regard ensuring that there is
a decent representation from women within any future government
arrangements in Iraq as almost as important as the need to ensure
a good balance between the different communities.
Mr Hamilton: Thank you, that answers my question.
Mr Maples
248. Foreign Secretary, you have said that the
looting was anticipated. Presumably the possible need for restoring
water and power was anticipated as well. Was there a plan for
dealing with these things?
(Mr Straw) Yes, Mr Maples, but what I
say is that these things were anticipated, for sure, but it is
the nature of armed conflict that what happens does not follow
a neat sequence and war is a disorderly process. That is just
true and the only certainty about warfare is that the unexpected
happens, and within a huge city like Baghdad, it is not possible
to anticipate with precision where the problems will come from.
Indeed the whole point about warfare is to be as unexpected as
you can to the enemy, so it makes for difficulties for all sides.
249. I accept that, but I am talking about what
really happened in the last 20 days or so since Baghdad fell because
I think it seems to many of us that whilst it was all planned
and executed with quite an extraordinary degree of professionalism
and whilst no doubt those commanders could not have anticipated
what would happen, they could have anticipated what sort of resources
would be needed, yet since the fall of Baghdad, and I do not know
if water and electricity have been restored in Basra and Baghdad
yet, but certainly until fairly recently there was no water in
Basra or electricity in large parts of Baghdad. I would have thought
it would be pretty easy to put some sort of security around key
installations which we were going to need to use to run the country,
some of the ministries and hospitals, and I wonder why it has
taken General Garner at least two of those three weeks to get
himself a plan. That is what I mean by a plan because if there
was a plan, it is not obvious what it was.
(Mr Straw) Yes, there was a plan and of course it
was anticipated that we would need to get water and electricity
running again. I may say that huge efforts were made by the coalition
to avoid damage to these essential facilities and to the extent
that they were taken out, I think future analysis will show that
it was much more likely due to action by the Saddam regime than
it was by the coalition. Because of the improvements in technology
of aerial warfare, the targeting this time was much more accurate
than it was in 1991 and in the targeting discussions in which
I was involved over many months before the military action actually
took place, we were down to the detail of, "Did you take
out this particular electricity sub-station and what was attached
to it?" and so on and very great care associated with that
not only to minimise civilian deaths and casualties, but also
to minimise the disruption to civilian life which would be caused
by breaking up water or electricity supplies. In Basra which (a)
is a smaller city than Baghdad and (b) we got to more quickly
than the Americans got to Baghdad because it is closer to Kuwait,
good progress has been made on the restoration of services, very
good progress, and that is best illustrated by the fact that you
are not seeing any stories on the television now suggesting the
opposite. In addition to that, as I told the House yesterday,
in some respects the position in that region is better than it
was before the military action started. The waterway into Umm
Qasr port is now being dredged to take larger-tonnage vessels
than before and British military engineers have reopened the railway
between Umm Qasr and Basra which had been lying unused for some
time, indeed some years before the Saddam regime and they are
intending to open the line from Basra to Baghdad.
250. You have dealt with one or two aspects
of it, but I would have thought that the specific case of early
military security could have been put in around vital installations,
and it does not seem that that happened, and the hospitals were
allowed to be looted as well as important ministries. Why did
Jay Garner take two weeks to get there?
(Mr Straw) I think I have answered the question about
the immediate problem of disorder and looting. It is a matter
of regret. In a more perfect world there would have been a benign
environment more quickly, but that was not the reality. There
was simply a reality on the ground which had to be dealt with.
It was not in anybody's interest, least of all the coalition forces',
that there should have been that disorder, or that the museum
should have been looted, that hospitals should have been attacked
or that ministries should be left unguarded, but commanders on
the ground had to make the decisions which they felt it necessary
to make, both to secure, first of all, the safety of their own
troops and then to ensure military success before they could then
move on to do other, as it were, semi-civilian duties. As far
as General Garner is concerned, I saw him in Kuwait two weeks
ago yesterday. When I saw him it had been only five days after
the fall of Baghdad the previous Wednesday. Actually that meeting
I had with him had to be re-arranged and foreshortened because
he was about to go to Nasiriyah where we had the first meeting,
so he was already into Iraq, but he could not go as a civilian
into Baghdad until he was confident that the premises they were
going to open up in Baghdad were going to be safe, and not just
safe from formal military action by the remnants of Iraqi forces,
but also safe from guerilla warfare and so on, but he went as
quickly as possible. In terms of other collapses of other regimes,
I think the coalition has acted pretty speedily and I think in
retrospect so it will be seen.
Sir John Stanley
251. Foreign Secretary, the US Defence Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld in his press conference on 25 April said, "We
will not allow the Iraqi people's democratic transition to be
hijacked by those who might wish to install another form of dictatorship",
and that was widely interpreted as being an American statement
of policy, that they would not allow the emergence of an Islamic
state in Iraq. Is that the British Government's position?
(Mr Straw) There is a very wide difference
between a state which calls itself Islamic and a dictatorship,
so our position is that we do not wish to see another dictatorship
established for sure. The democratic state we do wish to see established
because we believe, and I believe very strongly, that the idea
of democracy is in the hearts, minds and souls of men and women
of every religion across the world, that kind of state will certainly
be one which has respect for its majority religion which is Islam.
There are other countries around the world which call themselves
Islamic, but where there are peaceful changes of government and
democratic elections and we are seeing the emergence and development
of such states as well. Sometimes it is a painful process, but
you do see this and it is something that we have to encourage.
252. Do you see a risk in Iraq now that what
may emerge is a one-party state which may or may not be described
as a dictatorship, but may be basically a single-party structure
with no right of recourse to universal democratic elections?
(Mr Straw) No, I do not and I think that the diversity
of Iraq is such that that will be avoided. It is a diverse country.
It is ethnically and religiously diverse and what we have to do
is to nurture the development of a pluralist democracy, but one
which, as I say, takes account of Iraq's own traditions and has
respect for Iraq's dominant religion as well as allowing for religious
worship by the minorities.
253. Would you agree that if the pluralist democracy
that you hope for and I am sure we all hope for does not emerge,
the US and UK governments will have no ability for real to prevent
an alternative form of government coming forward?
(Mr Straw) What we have to do is to work on processes
and institution-building which provide the circumstances in which
democracy could operate. As I said earlier in answer to the Chairman,
Iraqis are sophisticated people and they have quite an extensive
middle class, a relatively good education system, a lot of very,
very bright Iraqis outside Iraq who I think will go back to Iraq.
For sure, there will be serious challenges ahead and it will be
some time before you have a perfectly functioning democracy, just
as it has been some time in other countries without Iraq's bloody
history, but I am absolutely convinced that the future for Iraq
and the Iraqis will be infinitely better than its recent past
and also that if we in the international community work effectively
hard and stay with the Iraqis, they will be able to rebuild institutions
there and build new institutions as well.
254. Could I turn to the role of your Department
in Iraq now and its representation in Iraq. Foreign Secretary,
did you give consideration to the question as to whether it might
not be better for Mr Garner's British deputy, who is effectively
the most senior British figure in Iraq at the present time, to
be someone from your Department rather than being a serving officer?
This is no personal reflection whatsoever on Major General Cross,
but in presentational terms and in view of the major policy, diplomatic
and essentially civilian issues which need to be carried forward,
do you not consider that a member of your Department should not
be Mr Garner's deputy?
(Mr Straw) No, I think it is actually very sensible
that in the immediate period post the military action, we should
have had a senior serving military officer in that post. Why?
Because what we are dealing with in the immediate period is the
transition between the military environment and a civilian one
and I happen to believe that the British military are very well
equipped and experienced to deal with that kind of transition
and to deal with a shift from high-intensity to low-intensity
warfare and then to a paramilitary policing environment. Tim Cross,
as I say, is experienced. I had very good conversations with him
when I was in Kuwait a couple of weeks ago. I think he will do
a very good job and he is supported by number of civilians, quite
a number from my Department, from DFID[4]
and from other departments as well. In the UK Government, we are
able to work pretty seamlessly. I chair a Cabinet committee on
Iraq looking at a wide range of issues and bringing government
departments together. May I also, however, Mr Chairman, just say
that we have had plans in hand to establish a British office,
which will be the precursor to a British embassy in Baghdad. We
have got the physical elements of that office in transportable
form in Kuwait and we have got staff identified, so when we judge
the security situation to be acceptable, this British office will
move up to Baghdad and we will have obviously a larger and more
substantial presence in Baghdad.
255. Is Mr Edward Chaplin your senior man in
Iraq at the moment?
(Mr Straw) No. I think, with a bit of
luck, Mr Chaplin is in the office.
256. I hear you say that, but you referred to
him being present at the meeting.
(Mr Straw) He was present at the Nasiriyah meeting
two weeks ago. At yesterday's meeting there was Mike O'Brien,
our parliamentary colleague, one of the Foreign Office ministers,
and Dominic Chilcot, who has been running the Iraq planning unit
as well as Mr Chaplin.
257. I think what the Committee wants to know
is what steps you are taking to get the requisite diplomatic personnel
with the requisite seniority in place and hopefully playing a
very influential role in what is emerging in Iraq, not just leaving
the field clear to our US friends.
(Mr Straw) We are working very collaboratively with
our US friends and we have been right from the start of this.
We have a number of Foreign Office, DFID and other British Government
department staff working inside ORHA[5]
itself, the organisation headed up by Jay Garner. Some of those
are now in Baghdad in the ORHA office. I met most of the British
contingent when I was in Kuwait two weeks ago, so they are there
anyway. Then separately there are advanced plans for us to establish
a British office to represent the United Kingdom and the British
Government in Baghdad as a nucleus of a British embassy once there
is an Iraqi Government to which this embassy could be accredited.
258. But do you not feel you should have a senior
British diplomatic official as your man in Iraq now? These are
crucial moments surely.
(Mr Straw) We do have senior people in
Iraq now.
259. Who is your key person?
(Mr Straw) As I say, Dominic Chilcot is there. We
have got people who are ready to go to form the nucleus of a British
office. If you are asking me whether I am satisfied with the degree
of representation of the United Kingdom in Iraq as well as in
Qatar and Kuwait, the answer to that is yes.
Sir Patrick Cormack
3 Iraqi Interim Authority. Back
4
Department for International Development. Back
5
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Back
|
