Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 300 - 309)

TUESDAY 29 APRIL 2003

RT HON JACK STRAW MP, MR PETER RICKETTS CMG AND MR EDWARD OAKDEN CMG

  300. Can you tell me a bit more about the role you foresee, and the reasons you have for thinking they might, that Saudi Arabia and Egypt might play in this. You mentioned yesterday the role the Egyptian Security Minister or Intelligence Chief had played in getting Arafat to agree.
  (Mr Straw) Yes.

  301. Do you see the need for Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and maybe other Arab leaders, to fulfil what they said at the summit last year which was in exchange for a Palestinian State they would have normal relations with Israel?
  (Mr Straw) I think amongst the leading Arab States there is a very clear understanding that the current situation between Israel and the Occupied Territories is terrible for the whole of the region and it helps to drag down the whole of the region. They want to see in exchange for a viable, separate, dignified state of Palestine the delivery of security to Israel, and that requires in turn that there is proper recognition by the Arab and Islamic states of the State of Israel and its right to exist. The two countries you mention have been playing a constructive role. As far as Syria is concerned, there is an important agenda with Syria. Syria is very influential on Hamas. Hamas were not constructive in the Cairo talks that took place earlier this year under the chairmanship of Omar Suleiman, head of Egyptian intelligence. I hope very much, not least through recent experiences, that there is an acceptance by Syria that they have to act in a different way and to end support for terrorism and to recognise that now they have a more benign neighbour to their east they have opportunities themselves to act more responsibly.

  302. So you are pretty optimistic or reasonably optimistic about the role that Egypt and Saudi Arabia might play. Can I ask you one more question about Syria because during the whole of the Oslo process and Camp David process the Israeli negotiators, whom I have met and spoken to, said that while the issues with the Palestinians were extremely complicated, they were now living with each other since the Oslo process started whereas issues with Syria were relatively simple—they were not even talking to each other, and you are saying that even as recently as last year this was so. It seems from the draft of the road map that we have all seen that peace with Syria is an integral part of this and also to Lebanon and Syria as well. I wonder what makes you say you think Syria has realised that it needs—
  (Mr Straw) I hope so.

  303. I wonder if you could go a bit further. Are there things that make you think that they are willing to be a part of this? Because I can see how between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and particularly the United States, to use my phrase, you could twist the arms of the Palestinian and Israeli governments to reach an agreement, I am just wondering if that is going to work with Syria? Is it vital that that component is in place as well or could you have a deal between Israel and the Palestinians and leave Syria to a later stage?
  (Mr Ricketts) I think they have got to be part of an overall agreement. You could approach it in different phases but there will not be a complete peace until Syria is part of the peace as well.

  304. Do you think they realise this and are they willing to—
  (Mr Straw) I think they are coming to that realisation is the answer. There has always been a Syrian track of the peace process and I think they recognise that.

  305. But it has never really gone anywhere, has it, whereas the Palestinian track from time to time has achieved quite a lot?
  (Mr Straw) If you are going to have a secure State of Israel and a state of Palestine you have to have a normalisation of Syria and Syria with Israel.

  John Maples: I suggest to you arm twisting is going to be involved even if you want to call it something else.

  Mr Hamilton

  306. Foreign Secretary, on 4 March last when I put to you my fears about the impending war in Iraq and the possibility of Saddam firing weapons into Israel you were quite dismissive of that happening, and thank goodness you were right. Now we have got rid of the Saddam regime there is a clear opportunity and a path to peace and we have got the road map which we hope will bring us to that peace in two years' time but of course, as we were told in the United States when we visited two or three weeks ago, the road map is not a document for negotiation, it is not a treaty; it is a plan for action and achievement of peace and security in the region. The problem then is if it is a plan that the United States and Quartet have agreed then it is not open to negotiation. We were told however by Dan Gillerman, the United Nations Ambassador from Israel, that there are certain things which they are not happy about within that road map. How are we going to get over that problem that certainly Israel—and maybe even the Palestinians but I think they have been much clearer they would support the road map—has certain criticisms of that road map and would want to amend it before they even agreed to go down the road.

  (Mr Straw) You get over these things by a process of discussion. Of course Israel is entitled to comment on the road map, as other parties are entitled to do, and they have a profound interest in it and the processes which could lead to the establishment of a viable Palestinian State. However, you are right to say it is a document from the Quartet, it is not a document from the two key parties. If you are asking me am I confident that if and when we get to the final status for Israel and Palestine it will be exactly on the steps set out in the road map? No, I doubt it. Will it require those steps to be made as part of the process? Yes.

  Mr Illsley

  307. Two very quick questions, Foreign Secretary. The first one bearing in mind that UNMOVIC were not designed to be detectives but could not find weapons of mass destruction in the face of non-co-operation, and bearing in mind that we are now in control of the country and we are still having difficulty finding any weapons of mass destruction, is there an argument to say now that the use of weapons inspectors is a failed method of policing proliferation? Is there an argument to say that now and in the future we are looking at regime change as a first option rather than inspectors and then regime change?

  (Mr Straw) No, I do not think that at all. I think inspectors have an important role to play but it is by no means an exclusive role. You need other tools. Inspectors can play a really important role where you have got consent by the governments concerned as, for example, you had most famously in South Africa, or alternatively a wide range of regimes to which we are party and other countries are party having inspection regimes is an important way of ensuring that there is compliance or establishing non-compliance. So it is an important part, to use the current phrase, of the toolbox but not the only one.

  308. Finally, given the time restrains, Condoleezza Rice has said that France has got to be punished for its role in UN negotiations. Colin Powell has also said that France will have serious measures taken against it. Do we subscribe to that or do we think the United States being a little bit too forthright in that situation?
  (Mr Straw) With respect, I have seen these stories but I do not recall having seen direct quotations from either Condoleezza Rice or Colin Powell to that effect, but do not let me argue with you. We want constructive relations with our partners in France and part of the way we achieve those is by overcoming some of the difficulties which have been there in terms of a difference of perspectives which has arisen in the last nine months.

  Chairman

  309. Foreign Secretary, we will negotiate about our five minutes at the highest level afterwards. May I thank you and your colleagues. The debate will continue.

  (Mr Straw) Thank you very much.





 
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