Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office
RESPONSE BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE TO QUESTIONS PUT BY THE COMMITTEE (SHOWN HERE IS ITALICS),
1 MAY 2003
QUESTION 1. US SUB-STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
"The Committee is grateful for your
response to the report in the Guardian on 7 March 2003 that the
United States is developing a new generation of sub-strategic
nuclear weapons, but seeks further clarification. The article
stated that the Pentagon had asked Congress to "rescind the
prohibition on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons."
Did Congress accede to this request? If so, can you point the
Committee to the relevant legislative provision?"
REPLY:
Legislation detailed in the US National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (PL 103-160: Section 3136)
prohibits US research and development of low-yield Nuclear Weapons
(defined as weapons with a yield below five kilotons). In its
budget request for 2003, the US Department of Defence asked the
US Congress to rescind this legislation. The request was denied.
The US Department of Defence has repeated the request to rescind
the legislation in their 2004 budget request. The process of Congressional
consideration of the request is now underway.
The Committee might like to note that the US
government stated, in a paper put to the May 2003 second session
of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that: "(The) US
is not developing, testing or producing any nuclear warheads and
has not done so in more than a decade. There is no current requirement
for a new nuclear warhead; the President has not directed such
an action".
QUESTION 2. OUTCOME
OF THE
FIRST REVIEW
CONFERENCE OF
THE CWC
"The Committee wishes to receive a note
on the outcome of the First Review Conference of the Chemical
Weapons Convention."
REPLY:
The First Review Conference of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), which took place in The Hague between
28 April and 9 May 2003, arose through the provision, in Article
VIII of the CWC, for a special session, "not later than one
year after the expiry of the fifth . . . year after the entry
into force", to review operation of the Convention. Article
VIII specifies that such reviews shall take into account any relevant
scientific and technological developments. Within the CWC's Verification
Annex, it is further specified that the first review conference
should review the regime governing other chemical production facilities
(ie producing non-Scheduled chemicals) "in the light of a
comprehensive review of the overall verification regime for the
chemical industry . . . on the basis of the experience gained.
The Conference shall then make recommendations so as to improve
the effectiveness of the verification regime".
The OPCW Executive Council in September 2001
established a Working Group to prepare for the Review Conference.
This initially focused on procedural matters—dates, organisation
of work etc. In Autumn 2002, the Working Group began to consider
the implementation of the provisions of the CWC. The UK played
an active part in these discussions—over 30 meetings of
the Working Group took place. A series of informal UK papers was
presented to the Working Group, to help guide discussion in the
direction of UK objectives. Most of these informal documents were
later presented as formal UK national papers; in one case, in
relation to issues concerning Challenge Inspections, the UK paper
was adopted by the EU and formally tabled as such by the Presidency.
Copies of all 10 UK papers—the largest contribution from
any State Party—have already been placed in the Library
of the House.
The Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador
Davére"de of Argentina, late in April 2003 published
two texts emerging from the consultations: a draft political declaration,
and a more detailed review of the operation of the CWC. These
texts reflected the Chairman's assessment of the state of debate
in the Working Group. They went on to form the basis of much of
the work of the Review Conference. The OPCW Secretariat also published
several factual background papers on key CWC elements. These were
complemented by an overview submitted to the Conference by the
Director-General, Rogelio Pfirter. The Conference also received
the views of the OPCW's Scientific Advisory Board (SAB: experts
appointed by the Director-General to advise him); and the Director-General's
assessment of the SAB's findings.
The first few days of the Conference were devoted
to a General Debate ie a series of national statements setting
out broad views of States Parties on the implementation of the
CWC. Dr Denis MacShane MP delivered the UK statement.[12]
The Conference then moved into its working mode, the Committee
of the Whole, chaired by Ambassador Vogelaar of the Netherlands.
This Committee considered the two drafts texts submitted by the
Chairman of the Working Group. It was quickly evident that, while
large sections of the drafts were uncontentious and broadly acceptable
with minor amendment, opinion on a number of issues was sharply
divided.
The UK was in a relatively good position, in
that UK efforts in the Working Group that preceded the Conference
proper had contributed to Chairman's texts that largely met UK
objectives for the outcome of the Conference. These were as follows:
— to promote universality of the CWC—both
quantitatively, by bringing non-Parties into the regime; and qualitatively,
by improving implementation within States Parties.
— to secure acceptance and further
development of the contribution that the CWC, properly implemented,
can make to the global fight against terrorism.
— to reaffirm the comprehensive nature
of the CWC's prohibitions (ie the proscription of all toxic chemicals
and their precursors unless intended for permitted purposes in
types and quantities consistent with those purposes); and of the
need to enshrine this principle in States Parties' domestic legislation.
— to reinforce commitment to the challenge
inspection mechanism as an important and accepted part of the
verification system, notwithstanding the absence of any such inspection
request since entry into force of the CWC.
— to urge States Parties to meet all
declaration requirements fully and promptly; and to establish
as soon as possible all outstanding national implementation legislation
and other measures required under the CWC.
— to promote acceptance of the need
for verification practice and coverage to adjust so as take account
of changes in industry, and in particular the need for more thorough
inspection of declared facilities dealing with non-Scheduled chemicals.
— to reinforce acceptance of the need
for exporters to continue to apply export controls so as to ensure
compliance with Article I obligations.
— to propose further work in the OPCW
on technical issues: the need to safeguard the identification
of chemicals listed in the CWC Schedules; maintain effectiveness
of laboratories available for OPCW analytical work through improved
testing; maintenance of the use and effectiveness of sampling
& analysis as a verification tool; and reaffirmation of the
requirement for disclosure of national CW protective programmes,
ideally through development of a common format for such information.
The UK effort during the Conference was thus
directed towards maintaining and wherever possible strengthening
these elements in the draft documents as they evolved in the Committee
of the Whole. We worked closely with other western allies, as
well as with key delegations less inclined to share our views.
Progress was slow, not surprisingly given the wealth of material
on the table, but the list of divergences was gradually narrowed.
The Political Declaration was agreed on 8 May. But on the final
day of the Conference, it was evident that stalemate, and no consensus
on the main review document, was a real possibility: a series
of proposals for textual changes had been tabled late by a few
delegations which, if accepted, might have undermined some key
UK and western objectives. Specifically, language was proposed
which would have subjected national export control decisions to
international review; tended to narrow and to some extent to fossilise
the focus of OPCW verification; removed some requirements to study
scientific and technological issues of concern to the UK; and
tended to treat the OPCW as a development organisation as much
as a disarmament/non-proliferation body.
Faced with something of an impasse, the Chairman
of the Committee of the Whole called a meeting of those delegations
most actively engaged in discussions to a private meeting. The
UK, US, Iran and India met for some hours, with the OPCW Director-General
also present. From this meeting, a package of proposed textual
changes emerged. The proposals were based partly on an informal
understanding reached between the UK and Iranian delegations earlier
that day; but more compromise language was required, mainly provided
by the UK, to secure the agreement of India and the US. This package
was presented to the wider Committee, which accepted it with a
few further minor amendments, late on 9 May. The full Conference
was then able to adopt the Review Document by consensus and without
further debate.
The final, agreed documents of the Conference
fully meet UK objectives.[13]
Indeed, agreement by consensus on final documents is itself an
achievement: comparable Treaties—the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention—have
not always been able to achieve such an outcome at their Review
Conferences. Core CWC obligations have been reaffirmed, and States
Parties currently deficient in meeting all CWC obligations are
pressed to act to remedy this. A work programme, including key
UK technical concerns, has been established for practical improvements
across the range of CWC implementation measures. The OPCW Executive
Council, at its next meeting 24-27 June 2003, is likely to set
this process under way, though of course it will be ongoing over
months, and in some cases years.
QUESTION 3. STATUS
OF NON-LETHAL
INCAPACITANTS UNDER
THE CWC
"The Committee wishes to know what is
the status of non-lethal chemical incapacitants under the CWC.
Is the use of so-called calmative chemicals prohibited? Does HMG
consider that the CWC requires amendment in order to deal with
this point? Does the UK possess such chemicals? If so, what is
the policy on their use?"
REPLY:
Under the definition in Article 11(2) of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), "toxic chemicals"
might include lethal, non-lethal, incapacitating, calmative and/or
riot control agents. It seems that the mode of action of the chemical
on life processes is the determining factor here. Generally the
use of any such toxic chemical as a means of warfare is prohibited
under the CWC (NB—ie because they constitute "chemical
weapons" under Article 11(1)).
Global research in this area is a compelling
reason to find potential ways forward for increased transparency
between States Parties. The UK believes that it would be prudent
for States Parties to examine this problem with a view to developing
common understandings in relation to research, development and
production of non-lethal chemicals for either riot control or
other law enforcement purposes. This would help avoid suspicions
emerging over the true nature of work on non-lethal agents.
Following the Moscow theatre siege there was
a Parliamentary Question on the nature of the chemical agent used
on that occasion and whether it contravened the CWC. Mr O'Brien
replied on 4 November 2002, "Following inquiries by the United
Kingdom and others, Russian authorities have announced that the
gas used in ending the siege on a Moscow theatre, on Saturday
26 October, was based on Fentanyl, an opium based narcotic. Fentanyl
is not a chemical scheduled under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Non-Scheduled chemicals are not in themselves prohibited under
the Convention for use in law enforcement, including domestic
riot control purposes. On 30 October, the Russian Health Minister,
Mr. Shevchenko said "I officially declare that chemical substances
of the kind banned under international conventions on chemical
weapons were not used."
It is too early to say whether amendments to
the Convention are going to be necessary, although the UK would
not exclude that possibility at some stage if a consensus were
to emerge that amending the CWC would be the best approach. For
the present the UK is not seeking any amendments.
The UK has declared to the OPCW that it possesses
the riot control agents CS, CR and PAVA. (CR is held only for
counter-terrorist purposes in support of law enforcement.) Any
UK activities in this area will conform to the provisions of the
CWC.
Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
3 June 2003
12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Statement
by Dr Denis Macshane MP, Minister of State for Europe, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, The Hague, 29 April 2003. Back
13
First Review Conference, 28 April-9 May 2003, Committee of the
Whole, Report to the First Special Session of the Conference of
the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, Annexes 1 and 2. Back
|
