Memorandum from Professor Paul Wilkinson
OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW TERRORISM[1]
DEFINING TERRORISM
1. In common with the authors of the American
and Asian viewpoints, I bemoan the absence of a universally accepted
definition of terrorism. The European Union has at last attempted
to agree on a definition, through the result could hardly be described
as a great success. Instead, I will offer an academic definition:
"Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation,
usually to service political ends. It is used to create and exploit
a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate
victims of the violence, often to publicise a cause, as well as
to coerce a target into acceding to terrorist aims. Terrorism
may be used on its own or as part of a wider unconventional war.
It can be employed by desperate and weak minorities, by states
as a tool of domestic and foreign policy, or by belligerents as
an accompaniment or additional weapon in all types and stages
of warfare. A common feature is that innocent civilians, sometimes
foreigners who know nothing of the terrorist political quarrel,
are killed or injured".
2. The weapon of terror can be used for
an almost infinite variety of causes and purposes. Hence, although
it is quite wrong to regard terrorism as synonymous with violence
in general, it is a rather broad politico-strategic concept and
is therefore useful to distinguish between basic forms and contexts
of terrorism based on their underlying causes or political motivation.
3. One basic distinction is between state
and factional terror, the former has been vastly more lethal and
has often been an antecedent to, and contributory cause of, factional
terrorism. Once regimes and factions decide that their ends justify
any means, or that their opponents' actions justify them in unrestrained
retaliation, they tend to become locked in a spiral of terror
and counter terror. Internal terrorism is confined within a single
state or region while international terrorism, in its most obvious
manifestation, is an attack carried out across international frontiers
or against foreign targets in a terrorists' state of origin. But
in reality, most terrorist campaigns of a protracted and intensive
character have international dimensions as the groups involved
look abroad for finance, weapons, safe haven, and political support.[2]
4. Two other key distinctions need to be
made at the outset. First, it is important to distinguish the
New Terrorism characterised by Al Qaeda, from the more "traditional"
longer established terrorist organisations. New Terrorism groups
are based on trans-national networks of cells, preparative cells,
affiliated groups and support networks, have multinational composition,
and do not need to rely on a state sponsor for securing funding,
weapons etc. and specialise in suicide no-warning attacks, often
coordinated multiple attacks, aimed at inflicting large-scale
loss of life, destruction of property, and economic disruption.
Old style terrorism groups tend to confine their campaigns of
violence to one country or locality and have traditional command
structures rather than trans-national networked organisations.
In addition, their long-term goals tend to be more limited and
practicable, and hence have the potential to become "corrigible"
groups in the terms described below, rather than "incorrigible"
like Al Qaeda. The latter's reputation for mass killing and its
absolutist doctrines and political ambitions make it unthinkable
for any democratic government to negotiate with it.
5. One positive development in the recent
history of terrorism is that at least in a few cases of ethno
separatist violence the terrorism appears potentially corrigible.
A combination of political initiatives, diplomacy and peace processes
can sometimes even resolve highly intractable conflicts. For example,
against all predictions the Northern Ireland peace process, though
extremely fragile, is still surviving and terrorist killings in
the Province have been dramatically reduced. An even more remarkable
example where a peace process has made a breakthrough is the Norwegian
inspired initiative in Sri Lanka, which has led to a ceasefire
between the Tamil Tigers and the government security forces and
to peace talks, following a conflict which has cost over 64,000
lives.
AL QAEDA
6. There can been no doubt where Al Qaeda
fits in the above typology. It is the archetype of the New Terrorism,
and its absolutist and grandiose ideology and record of mass murder
of civilians, help to explain why it is now the most severe international
terrorist threat posed to peace and security in the entire history
of sub-state terrorism.
7. Unlike the more traditional types of
terrorist groups it is transnational in its fullest sense: it
has a universalistic ideology aimed not only at forcing the USA
to withdraw its forces from the Arabian Peninsula and to stop
supporting Israel, but also at toppling the governments of Arab
and other Muslim states it accuses of collaborating with the USA
and its allies, and its ultimate aim is to establish a pan-Islamic
Caliphate. It is not dependent on any single regime or government
for its survival and financial resources. It has a presence in
at least 50 countries. Its activists are drawn from a wide range
of Muslim countries, and some originate from the Muslim Diaspora
within Western societies.
8. Secondly, in addition to its central
leadership and coordinating committees on military, legal, media
and other matters, Al Qaeda has a world wide network of operational
and preparative cells and affiliated organisations capable of
being activated at any time and carrying out terrorist attacks
on their own initiative. It is because of this, despite the major
setback of losing its safe haven in Afghanistan, that the global
network is still capable of continuing the terrorist campaign.
This has been clearly demonstrated by a series of terrorist attacks,
including a number that have been thwarted by the authorities.
The use of overseas support networks and international terrorist
attacks is of course nothing new in the history of terrorism.
What is new about the Al Qaeda network is the scale of its diffusion
around the world, and, as demonstrated on September 11 attacks,
the meticulous long term planning and terrorist tradecraft the
network had been able to deploy.
9. Last, but not least, there are major
differences between the more traditional terrorist groups and
Al Qaeda regarding the nature and scale of the violence the latter
employs. Through its suicide airliner attacks on the World Trade
Centre, Al Qaeda has been responsible for the most lethal acts
of terrorism by a sub-state group in history. It is no accident
that bin Laden's network should have been the first sub-state
group to have carried out mass destruction terrorism. An American
scholar once stated "terrorists want a lot of people watching,
not a lot of people dead". Sadly, for groups, such as Al
Qaeda and its affiliated, this no longer holds. Hence, while such
deadly terrorist cells are still at large, the threat to the US,
the UK, Israel and other designated "enemies" of the
Bin Laden network remains an ever-present reality. Moreover, it
is important to note that Al Qaeda has carried out, planned, or
attempted terrorist attacks in a wide range of countries, including
Singapore, Pakistan, India, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Italy, France,
Kenya, Tanzania, Indonesia, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. It is also
very clear that a terrorist group like Al Qaeda which sets out
to kill as many civilians as possible, would have no compunction
about using chemical, biological, and radiological or nuclear
weapons if they manage to weaponise the appropriate materials.
Hence, the threat of CBRN terrorism has been brought a step closer
by the September 11 attacks.[3]
10. Al Qaeda has demonstrated its ability
to survive and adapt in the face of major setbacks it has suffered.
In the wake of the defeat of the Taliban regime which has provided
a useful safe haven, bin Laden and many of his followers slipped
across the border to the tribal areas of Pakistan. Following the
capture of Abu Zubaydah, Al Qaeda's external operations director,
in March 2002, the organisation replaced him with another highly
skilled and fanatical planner of terrorist operations, Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed, the man suspected of masterminding the 11 September
attacks in the United States, captured in Pakistan in March 2003.
Al Qaeda has the resilience and reserves of experienced leaders
to rapidly fill such gaps. Moreover, bin Laden's global network
has managed to circumvent the best efforts of the G7 Finance Ministers'
Task Force and appears to still be able to move funds across borders,
to smuggle diamonds and other valuable commodities, and to use
organised crime, such as credit card fraud, to raise money for
its "holy war". Nor should we underestimate the role
of the Islamic banks and charitable organisations as a means of
siphoning large sums of money to Al Qaeda on the scale required
to support a global network of cells, training camps and other
facilities to wage a jihad with global reach.[4]
11 SEPTEMBER—STRATEGIC
SIGNIFICANCE AND
EUROPE'S
RESPONSE
11. The 11 September multiple suicide hijacking
attack on the United States was unprecedented in the history of
sub-state terrorism in terms of the numbers killed and the scale
of destruction and economic damage caused in a single day. By
its readiness to attack civilians on such a scale and without
any compunction, and by its demonstrated ability to hit the solar
plexus of the US financial sector, Al Qaeda demonstrated that
it had become a strategic threat not only to US national security,
but also to international security. Post mortems on the attack
in the immediate aftermath inevitably concentrated on the failures
of the US intelligence and aviation security, and the shocking
fact that there was no prior warning of the attack and no measures
were taken to help prevent it.
12. However, European governments were in
a similar position. They immediately realised that they too were
handicapped by a huge intelligence deficit on Al Qaeda's activities.
They were also all too well aware that Al Qaeda could launch similarly
devastating attacks on targets within their own borders: there
was no magic immunity against such a ruthless and well prepared
terrorist network with global reach.
13. European governments and security agencies
also woke up rather belatedly to the danger that this new breed
of international terrorism would be capable of using chemical,
biological, radiological or even nuclear attacks if they had the
weapons available. (The US authorities had become concerned about
these dangers rather earlier, and had already started to take
some measures to prevent, or, if necessary, to respond to such
attacks).[5]
There was plenty of evidence to support this revised assessment
of the terrorist threat:
i. Al Qaeda and its affiliates share
an absolutist ideology, and believe they are waging a total war,
a violent jihad in which the end justifies the means.
ii. Al Qaeda does not apparently; feel constrained
by any moral or humanitarian limits to the lethality of their
attacks. They do not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants,
or between civilians and the military. To the contrary, bin Laden
has explicitly urged all Muslims to attack Americans and their
allies, including civilians, whenever and wherever the opportunity
arises.
iii. Al Qaeda cells have planned to carry
out a number of attacks involving chemical weapons and poisons
on targets in Europe, which were fortunately thwarted as a result
of police/intelligence cooperation, for example: a sarin nerve
gas attack on the European parliament, Strasbourg; a cyanide attack
on the water supply to the US embassy, Rome seeking to acquire
and deploy CBRN weapons. Also, volumes 11 and 12 of the Encyclopaedia
of the Jihad, used by the organisation, deals specifically with
CBRN weapons.
iv. In May 2002, US authorities arrested
a US citizen, who had converted to Islam and who is alleged to
have visited Al Qaeda's facilities in Pakistan and Afghanistan,
on suspicion of involvement in planning a "dirty bomb"
attack in the US
14. European public opinion shared the grief
and sadness of Americans over 11 September atrocities. European
governments and security agencies did not need any convincing
that they needed to join President Bush's coalition against terrorism,
and to greatly intensify their individual and collective efforts
to prevent and combat Al Qaeda's mass destruction terrorism. European
NATO allies involved in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
offered full support to their American allies. Without exception
they joined the measures initiated by the UN and the EU to fight
terrorist financing, to strengthen intelligence and police cooperation
and to capture Al Qaeda cells and bring them to justice. It is
also worth noting that the European Union took action, under JHA
"third pillar" to concert action among member states
to freeze terrorist assets, to launch fast track extradition,
and to establish Joint Investigation Teams to deal with international
terrorism. Europol's role in helping to combat terrorism has been
considerably expanded.[6]
None of this suggests any reluctance to strengthen action against
terrorism. Hundreds of arrests of Al Qaeda suspects have been
made in Europe, and it is noteworthy that the only person convicted
for involvement in planning and assisting the 11 September suicide
hijackers is El Motassedeq, convicted by a German court in Hamburg.
IS THERE
ANY TRUTH
IN THE
CLAIM THAT
SADDAM WAS
WORKING IN
LEAGUE WITH
AL QAEDA?
15. It is of course well known that Saddam
provided finance for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers,
and safe haven for a number of secular Palestinian terrorist groups,
such as the Abu Nidal Organisation. However, there is no evidence
to back up the claims made prior to the War in Iraq that Saddam
was involved in operational collaboration with Al Qaeda, or that
he had a hand in planning or assisting the 9/11 attacks in the
US.
16. This is hardly surprising in view of
their totally opposed ideologies and political goals. Bin Laden's
network saw Saddam as an apostate, a non-Islamic ruler who had
betrayed the "true-Islam" (as interpreted by Al Qaeda).
Moreover, bin Laden's network has proved itself capable of surviving
and adapting, despite the loss of its Taliban sponsor regime in
Afghanistan, without the need to depend on any Muslim state sponsor.
They have a global network of cells, affiliates and support, and
still have the trained personnel, finance and expertise to wage
their international terrorism campaign.
17. The oft-repeated story that Mohammed
Atta, the Leader of the 9/11 hijackers, met an Iraqi agent in
Prague has been investigated thoroughly by the Czech security
chiefs and President Vaclav Havel himself has confirmed that there
is no evidence whatsoever that such a meeting took place. The
claims that the Ansar Al Islam enclave in Northern Iraq became
a hotbed of Al Qaeda activity, and that Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi set
up an Al Qaeda network operating out of Baghdad, have also been
discredited. As Jane Corbin has pointed out in the new edition
of her excellent study The Base , the area where Al Ansar had
its enclave was not even under Baghdad's control: the Iranians
and Kurdish groups were the major influences in that region. The
idea that Al Zarqawi or Al Qaeda generally depended on Baghdad
for information on how to make chemical weapons is patently absurd.
Al Qaeda had been experimenting with chemicals in Afghanistan
and they can get the formulas for most chemical weapons and poisons
from the Internet and from their own training manuals. On is forced
to conclude that these claims of collaboration between Saddam
and Al Qaeda were fabricated in Washington, with the aid of defectors
and other dubious sources, to try to persuade the US public and
world opinion that the planned US invasion of Iraq was justified
as a key part of the war on terror initiated by President Bush
after 9/11. To their great credit, the British and European intelligence
Services and the mainstream intelligence community in the US,
refused to give any credence to these stories, knowing that there
was no reliable evidence to back them up. Melvin Goodman, former
CIA Senior Analyst, now Professor of National Security at the
National War College in Washington, has described the efforts
of hawks in Washington to promote these stories as a "case
of the wish being father to the fact".
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
US AND EUROPEAN
APPROACHES TO
COMBATING AL
QAEDA
18. However, although there is strong agreement
between the US and the European governments that combating Al
Qaeda is a top priority requiring maximum multi-lateral cooperation,
there are major differences over the best methods and strategies
to achieve this goal. The US, as the term "war on terrorism",
implies, believes strongly in utility of military action. Most
Europeans supported the use of the military to depose the Taliban
regime which had given safe haven to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan,
but the majority of the European public and some key European
governments (eg France, Germany and Russia) remain deeply opposed
to launching a war against Iraq, a) because they have no convincing
evidence that Saddam played any part in the planning of 11 September
attacks or in supporting Al Qaeda globally and , b) because they
believe that an invasion of Iraq may provide Al Qaeda and other
extremist Islamist groups with propaganda, and that it is likely
to stimulate far more terrorist attacks against the US and other
western countries.
19. Secondly, European governments and publics
are concerned about the apparent willingness of the US authorities
to suspend normal human rights protections of terrorist suspects
by detaining them without trial. They would prefer to see the
US using federal criminal justice system, highly regarded in Europe
for its independence, integrity and fairness.
20. These differences are by no means inconsequential
but I believe their significance has been somewhat exaggerated.
We should not allow them to undermine the intelligence and political
and diplomatic cooperation against terrorism so vital for success
of unravelling the Al Qaeda global network. Al Qaeda's elusive
global network of cells is insensitive to traditional deterrence
of a military nature. The intelligence war against Al Qaeda is
the key to success, and to win this the Americans and the Europeans
and the Asians all need each other. The idea that the US "hyperpower"
is enough to achieve success in the task unilaterally is a dangerous
illusion.
IMPLICATIONS OF
THE "WAR
ON TERROR"
FOR BRITISH
FOREIGN POLICY
21. As I hope I have made clear, the evidence
of Al Qaeda's track record, the recent specific threats in Al
Qaeda, audiotapes against Britain, and the recent major terrorist
attacks by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Bali, Riyadh and Casablanca,
shows that the Al Qaeda network constitutes the prime threat to
British, US and international security. It is therefore an urgent
priority to strengthen global international cooperation to unravel
the Al Qaeda network of cells and support structures including
of course, financial support, and to win the hearts and minds
of young Muslims to persuade them against being lured into Al
Qaeda and its affiliates and hence to greatly reduce the reservoir
of potential suicide attackers.
22. HMG has accomplished a great deal in
contributing to this effort, and despite the damage done to the
efforts by the War on Iraq, I believe much more can be done and
that ultimately, we will succeed in unravelling the Al Qaeda network.
23. I have two major closely connected concerns:
i. Britain's individual voice and special
knowledge and experience of dealing both with terrorism and Middle
Eastern problems will be negated if we become seen as so closely
associated with the neo-conservative hawks' foreign policy in
Washington that we are seen as synonymous with the Bush policy;
ii. A particular danger is that the neo-conservatives
in Washington filled with euphoria about the toppling of Saddam
are already relishing the prospect of trying out their doctrine
of "pre-emptive attack" against a new "axis of
evil" enemy, eg Iran. Even serious talk of this in Washington
will only help strengthen the hardliners in Iran, weaken more
liberal and progressive elements, and, paradoxically, perhaps
help to bring about a real collaboration/coalition between the
hardline Islamic fundamentalists in Iran and Al Qaeda. We know
that there are already Al Qaeda people based in Iran and that
Al Qaeda has had friendly contacts with Iran's client terrorist
organisation Hezbollah
24. Major Recommendations for Action
i. The European Union (EU) should strengthen
and fully implement its agreed measures and enhance its resources
and coordination for combating international terrorism.
ii. The EU should intensify assistance to
EU accession states, especially for fighting against organised
crime and terrorism.
iii. Urgent measures should be taken to
establish a fully coordinated counter-terrorism effort by NATO
and ESDP especially in the provision of civil protection and emergency
planning to deal with CBRN terrorist attacks.
iv. Urgent measures should be taken to strengthen
the security, monitoring and accounting procedures for all CBRN
materials including those used in the civil nuclear industry and
radioactive isotopes used for non-industrial purposes.
v. Major efforts should be made to ensure
that all counter-terrorism policies and measures are fully compatible
with the European Convention of Human Rights and the maintenance
of democracy and the rule of law.
vi. A major programme of public diplomacy
should be launched to show that (a) terrorism is itself a threat
to the most basic human rights and is an illegitimate form of
struggle, (b) to make clear that the campaign against Al Qaeda
and its affiliates is a campaign against terrorism and not Islam,
and (c) to enlist full support and cooperation from the public
and from the private sector to ensure the success of policies
and measures to prevent and combat terrorism. Europe can play
a key part in winning the battle of the hearts and minds of the
young in Europe and beyond.
CONCLUSION
25. The new terrorism poses an unprecedented
threat to the Trilateral countries. The prospect of terrorists
getting access to weapons of mass destruction is not science fiction.
Cooperation is essential. We have mentioned a number of findings
and responses in our report, but we highlight here the ten which
we regard as most significant.
i. Terrorism cannot be solved unilaterally.
Multilateral civilian cooperation will be essential for an effective
response. Military actions and robust independent domestic measures
are only a part of what is needed, and they must be undertaken
in a manner that does not undercut multilateral cooperation. Afghanistan
is a case in point. American military action was essential for
removing the Taliban government that provided a haven for terrorism
but it destroyed only a small portion of Al Qaeda which is a transnational
network with cells in 60 countries. Dealing with such organizations
requires close civilian cooperation in intelligence, information
sharing, tracing financial flows, police work across borders,
and communication among customs and immigration officials.
ii. Officials responsible for home security
should meet regularly to discuss common vulnerabilities and compare
best practices. Ironically, "home" security is an international
issue, because the security of transnational systems is no stronger
than the weakest link in the chain. Though the names of ministries
differ in their different countries, the G-8 leaders should encourage
the relevant ministers to undertake regular meetings and report
to the annual summit.
iii. More work should be done on sharing
of intelligence within and between countries. This should include
analytic intelligence. While tactical intelligence is important
in warning of particular terrorist actions, analytic intelligence
looks for syndromes of terrorist recruitment and for patterns
of vulnerabilities that might attract terrorists. For example,
it might have been impossible to have identified all potential
terrorist actors in 2001, but it would not have been impossible
to have used "red team/blue team" analysis to identify
the fact that terrorist hijackers could turn civil aircraft into
giant cruise missiles, and that strengthened cockpit doors would
have made that scenario less likely.
iv. Wealthier countries should provide assistance
to poorer countries to improve both their counter-terrorism capabilities,
and the effectiveness of their home security offices. Overseas
development budgets should include this among their priorities.
The European Union should make it an area of cooperation with
the new entrants from Central Europe. Given the dangers that can
arise from failed states, assistance to strengthening of relevant
state institutions is an important part of a counter-terrorism
strategy.
v. Dialogues about the protection of civil
liberties in the face of security threats should be a regular
feature of the meetings of home security officials and should
be reinforced by meetings of judicial officials and parliamentarians.
Assistance programs must include attention to human rights issues.
Not only are such values central to the definition of the civilization
that we seek to protect, but over-reactions to insecurity that
infringe civil liberties undercut the soft or attractive power
that is essential to maintain the support of moderate opinion
and to deprive terrorists from recruiting new converts.
vi. A particularly important dimension of
assistance is the Cooperative Threat Reduction program designed
to stabilize the security of the weapons of mass destruction left
in the states of the former Soviet Union after the end of the
Cold War. The agreement of ten countries to add to the planned
expenditures of the US government over the next decade was an
important pledge at the 2002 G-8 summit, but it is crucial that
the pledges be fulfilled and that the issue retains high level
attention.
vii. Further steps should be taken to de-legitimize
the deliberate use of force against non-combatants. While it may
be difficult to arrive at a formal definition of terrorism, the
10 conventions and two protocols so far concluded at the United
Nations need to be reinforced. The work of the UN Counter-terrorism
Committee plays a useful role, as do actions of regional organizations
such as the EU. Political leaders might consider encouraging a
conference of religious leaders to speak out against misuse of
religion by extremists, and to condemn the types of statements
and textbooks that encourage terrorist actions.
viii. More funds should be invested in public
diplomacy campaigns related to counter terrorism. Private channels
in poor countries often promote distorted and dangerous portraits
of the Trilateral countries and incitements to terrorists act.
There is a need to counter such propaganda. This might include
a study of the highly biased and inflammatory textbooks that are
used in some religious schools, combined with coordinated programs
to present countervailing information.
ix. Major efforts should be made to mediate,
conciliate, and resolve issues involved in the serious conflicts
that are seedbeds for the growth of terrorist activities. Progress
on the Middle East peace process would greatly dampen the opportunities
for recruitment by extremist groups, and help to get Islamic countries
more involved in the fight against terrorism. Other difficult
issues such as Kashmir also act as seedbeds for terrorism and
require attention.
x. The metaphor of "war" can be
misleading in planning investments and developing a strategy to
counter the new terrorism. While military force is an essential
part of the struggle, there will not be a definitive battle or
victory, and it would be a mistake to suspend civil liberties
indefinitely. There is no single solution in the struggle against
terrorism, and counter-terrorism policy must be integrated with
other dimensions of domestic and foreign policy such as aid, trade,
institution building and conflict resolution. We are in this for
the long haul.
Professor Paul Wilkinson
University of St Andrews
June 2003
1 This is a revised and updated version of the author's
contribution as European Co-Author of the Tri Lateral Commission
Report-Addressing the New International Terrorism: Prevention,
Intervention and Multilateral Cooperation. Back
2
Paul Wilkinson-Why Modern Terrorism?, in C. Kegley (ed), The
New Global Terrorism, Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 2003,
pp 106-107. Back
3
Paul Wilkinson-The New International Terrorism, Paper to Trilateral
Commission (Europe) Task Force Meeting, London, 20 February 2003. Back
4
For valuable information on current trends in the financing of
Al Qaeda and its affiliated organisations, I am indebted to Herve«
de Carmoy. Back
5
See Europol's first "counter terrorism report" to the
JHA Ministerial Council (Council Document 7514/1/99, 3 May 1999). Back
6
For a detailed account of EU measures, see Frank Gregory, "The
EU's Response to 9/11: An Analysis of the Policies and Key Issues",
Jane's Intelligence Review, and D. Dubois, "The Attacks
of 11 September: EU-US Cooperation Against Terrorism in the Field
of Justice and Home Affairs". European Foreign Affairs
Review, vol 7, 2002, pp 317-335. Back
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