Examination of Witnesses (Questions 340
- 359)
TUESDAY 3 JUNE 2003
PROFESSOR PAUL
WILKINSON AND
MS JANE
CORBIN
Q340 Andrew Mackinlay: That is a
big portfolio to manage.
Professor Wilkinson: We have to
remember for much of bin Laden's life he was part of a big business
empire, the bin Laden empire that his father made fortune with
gave bin Laden a lot of knowledge of how businesses operated and
how you could develop new techniques for making considerable sums
of money. I think that has been part of the reason for their success
as an international network. They were never dependent on a single
state for financial support in the way that the terrorist movements
of the 70s and 80s were. The clients of Libya, Syria and Iraq
would go round in a sense with a begging bowl and when they were
kicked out by one they often would go and beg for sponsorship
from another. Here you have an organisation which because of bin
Laden and his colleagues having some business knowledge is able
to succeed as a business conglomerate. They can evade a great
deal of the effort made by America and other western countries
by using their business connections and operating what appears
to be a respectable business front.
Chairman: We have gone well beyond our
allotted period for the first half. It is my pleasure to thank
you, Professor Wilkinson, you have been a good friend of the Committee
and been extremely helpful. Thank you very much, Professor Wilkinson.
Witnesses: Ms Jane Corbin, Journalist
and Mr Fergal Keane, OBE, BBC Special Correspondent, examined.
Chairman: Can I now welcome to the second
part of today's session Mr Fergal Keane, who has been a good friend
of the Committee and given valuable evidence in the past, joining
him is Ms Jane Corbin. We hope to concentrate on post-conflict
Iraq and the regional repercussions knowing that both of you have
made extensive visits to the region and can in effect be the eyes
and ears of the Committee having seen at firsthand what is happening
in Iraq. I would like to call on Mr Chidgey to open the questioning.
Q341 Mr Chidgey: It is good to see
you again, Mr Keane. Can I ask a couple of questions regarding
the immediate post-conflict period and then link that to what
is happening now? I am very interested to hear your views about
the failure of the coalition forces to prevent the widespread
looting that followed the immediate overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
We took evidence from the Foreign Secretary a few weeks ago and
when he was questioned on that his reply was: "It is greatly
to be regretted that there was disorder and looting on that scale.
If anybody is at fault, it was the fault of the Saddam regime
for failing to have a climate of natural law and order."
Donald Rumsfeld was more succinct in his response, he said "stuff
happens". You will be familiar with the report in today's
Independent, Mr Keane, from one of your colleagues, which
spells out in some detail the extent of the looting that has gone
on. It is worth pointing out for the record that we are not talking
here about the destruction of the national library and the national
museums in Baghdad, which, of course, resulted in the destruction
and looting of a huge number of artifacts there, we are now talking
about the destruction of two or three ancient Sunnarian cities
occupying areas of 10 square miles or more and destroying the
remains of a civilisation which goes back more than 5,500 years,
that is our civilisation. In that context, and recognising the
responsibilities that the occupying powers have under the Geneva
Convention I would like your response to a series of questions
regarding coalition: Should they have done more to prevent the
looting in the immediate aftermath of the war with Iraq? Should
they have been doing something by now to have met their obligations
as occupying powers?
Mr Keane: I drove into Iraq probably
about 24 hours after the Saddam statue came down in the centre
of the city and I was immediately struck on approaching the city
itself by the fact that road blocks had gone up, with armed men
wearing green headbands, who I later discovered were Shia resistance
movements, who had taken over security on the edge of the city.
There were American checkpoints but there was a preponderance
in areas of the city of these Shia-controlled checkpoints, and
that struck me as something odd that already within 24 hours a
factionalisation like that had been allowed to occur. That impression
was very much strengthened that afternoon, the following day and
indeed on many subsequent days when I drove to what was at that
time called Saddam city, the main Shia area of the city, which
had clearly been taken over and come under the control of the
local religious Shia leaders and they had placed their men with
guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers on various street
corners. I have to say there was no anti-western feeling displayed
towards us. They were perfectly comfortable with our presence
but they were very clearly in control. When we pushed them on
why they were on the streets with guns they said it was in direct
response to the failure of the allies to curb the looting which
had erupted within minutes of the battle for Baghdad beginning,
once people had a sense that the regime was crumbling. On that
looting I have been in many, many wars and I have seen worse looting.
I have been in many cities which were bombed in a much more severe
way than Baghdad was. I have seen a great many more civilian casualties,
but that really is not the point with this war. What struck me
very strongly as an observer was the most modern military force
and the most powerful military force in the world had arrived
in a relatively sophisticated city and that under the noses of
this powerful force the city had been reduced to the most extraordinary
scenes: we witnessed heart monitors being ripped out of hospitals;
hospitals being stripped bear; patients being turned away; nurses
carrying assault rifles to keep the looters away from hospitals,
everything that could be taken being taken. When one approached
American troops about this they did express concern, it certainly
was not a caviler attitude on the part of troops on the ground,
they wanted to able to help, but two things were apparent: One,
the soldier that you spoke to on a checkpoint two blocks away
had no information and no idea of what was happening in another
sector of the city because the information was not passed on to
him; secondly, his commanders had clearly not been given instructions
to interfere. Quite a few American officers at the level of captain
and major said to us: "Look, our view is they have earned
the right to do this, they have put up with the regime for long
enough". That was an initial response. As the days went on
they clearly became much more concerned about it, there were some
efforts to restrict the kind of looting that was going on but
nothing, nothing of the order that was needed. It had two very,
very profound impacts, one was clearly a physical one, the population
was left in a situation where all essential and vital services
has disappeared. They could see this immensely powerful army doing
nothing about it and they had to suffer the physical consequences.
There was a second psychological consequence, which was certainly
unintended from the American point of view, people watched American
troops at checkpoints looking very frightened a great deal of
the time, unable, in most cases that I came across, to speak the
local language because they did not have interpreters with them.
The message a lot of people I suspect took from that, because
they said it to us, was that this army was in some way scared,
it was not going after the looters, it was not going after the
armed gangs because it was frightened. Whenever there was a situation
where I witnessed American troops coming under fire there would
be a massive reaction, a massive reaction. That was always in
a situation where they were attacked. There was very little attempt
to police Baghdad in these crucial five or six days after the
statue came down. When people look back at the history of this
time they will regard those days as one of the great missed opportunities.
There was certainly huge relief on the part of almost every person
I spoke to about the fact that Saddam was gone. This was not people
saying, "death to American, they have overthrown our beloved
leader", far from it. I think there was a real opportunity
missed in those days to stabilise the situation and to allow people
the thing they have wanted to feel all of their lives, and that
is to feel safe.
Q342 Mr Chidgey: Before I ask Ms
Corbin to add her comments can I just put another question to
you, you have mentioned that you have been in many wars in your
career, can you tell me whether you felt on this particular occasion
the reasons for the failure to police, control, or whatever, the
civilian population and the extremists in it was something which
could have been foreseen, something which could have been catered
for in terms of having sufficient resources? Was it just this
particular style of army which was so efficient and so high-tech
but so slim in terms of numbers? Was there something that you
could link to that happening? One assumes that it was an accident,
it was not planned that it should be that way, it was perhaps
lack of foresight? What was your impression?
Mr Keane: I think one would have
to do the impossible and gaze deeply into the inner mind of Donald
Rumsfeld to give you a correct answer—I am not able to do
that. Did we know there was a possibility of a serious breakdown
of law and order in Baghdad? Yes, of course we did. We knew this
was one of the most heavily armed societies on earth. In any situation
where you remove central control, whether that is Yugoslavia,
Rwanda or indeed Iraq, where you remove what has been a heavily
repressive centralised control there must the danger of an upsurge
in violence and lawlessness. Having known that, were adequate
preparations taken to combat that? Of course not.
Ms Corbin: I will not repeat what
Fergal has said about the situation in Baghdad, perhaps I should
speak a little about the situation in the south, in Basra, which
is where the British troops were and which came under British
control. Similar things happened there, by the time the British
troops entered into Baghdad, through the final ring into the centre
of the city, looting was well under way, it had been sparked by
the belief of the local people that so-called Chemical Ali, Saddam
Hussein's cousin, who was the strong man in this city, was dead.
This was the signal for the looting to start. In the early days
the looting in Basra was directed at the regime, offices were
stripped, palaces were stripped, places where the regime had been
powerful were stripped. The hospitals were less of a target, but
the banks very rapidly also became a target. The looting in Basra
was much more directed at the perceived areas where the regime
had been powerful. Again the British were unable to control it.
British troops told me very freely they were frightened by the
way in which the scale of the looting threatened to overwhelm
what had been a victorious entry in to the city. There were round
8,000 men from the Desert Rats, the Seventh Armoured Brigade and
Basra is a city of getting on for two million people, absolutely
vast, and also vast geographically, a huge, sprawling city and
it was impossible for that number of British troops to effectively
police the city. One of the reasons this had not been given adequate
thought beforehand was there was a hope right up to the last minute
that there would be an uprising from within, both in Basra but
also in other major cities, like Baghdad. Perhaps there was a
forlorn hope that somehow a strong regime would arise from within
that would extend outwards so that the troops could come in and
would then find some degree of control within the city. That did
not happen, there was a vacuum. The regime fled, the Americans
and the British had not quite reached the centre and looting was
the end result of that. That certainly happened in Basra. I think
the worst effects of the looting in Basra, which quickly became
apparent, were the destruction of the water system and the electricity
system. A consistent problem has been the looting of copper wiring
within the electricity system, so when people say, why do they
not have the electric system up and running and the answer is
that the wiring simply gets looted all of time, the most basic
of problems. There was no plan to deal with that. However, it
has to be said that the British Army very quickly spread through
the streets of Basra and they took a very different attitude from
that of the Americans troop, they took off their flak jackets
and their helmets as soon as they were able, they moved out and
they mixed with the population and they took a very different
hands-on approach. Talking to many citizens in Basra that was
appreciated, it was felt that the British were not holding the
Iraqis at arm's length. There are lots of reasons for that, obviously
our colonial history in the area is one of them—the British
troops felt more comfortable. There was a noticeable difference
in approach in Basra. I still believe that not enough forethought
was given to what would happen in the vacuum that would almost
inevitably arise in Basra. Basra is a city which has been systematically
starved by the regime of infrastructure, totally different from
Baghdad. It is a pathetic and sad sight and it was even before
the troops got there, and therefore the looting that has taken
place in Basra will set that city even further back because they
had nothing to start with and now they have less than nothing.
It will take some time for it to be built up. The last thing that
remains to be said is that Saddam's militias planned for such
an event, they melted into the population, many of them were not
killed, they took off their uniforms and they went home and they
still persist as a very disruptive element. Their hope is that
they can outstay the Americans and the British, they can foment
trouble, they can continue to provoke violence and looting and
ultimately they will be able to take control again in certain
areas. It is a problem that has to be tackled, it is not something
that we can hope will just go away as the situation reasserts
itself because those elements of the militias are still out there
and they need to be dealt with.
Q343 Mr Chidgey: Turning to the local
police in this regard, we have been advised in evidence that the
local police are on side and we now have 2,000 local policemen
in Baghdad working in joint patrols with the Americans, I just
wondered how effective you felt that was? As recently as last
week the Chief Constable of Hampshire, who was previously the
Chief Constable of the RUC, which is relevant in terms of dealing
with handguns on patrol, has just come back from Baghdad and he
described what he saw there, "the local police are not what
we describe as police officers. They are basically corrupt thugs".
However he did add that some did show willingness and enthusiasm
to be trained as proper police officers. That was one view.
Ms Corbin: In Basra the same thing
happened while I was there, the police took over joint patrols
with the British military. What I found, and I went out on night
patrols with the military, and it was very revealing because at
night people's fears are heightened, people were defending their
own houses, their families, they were taking matters into their
own hands. They told me did not want the old police because many
of them were members of the Baath Party at best, if you like,
and at worst were actually extorting from people anyway and had
been responsible for all sorts of human rights abuses. I think
there is a problem in bringing back in its entirety the old police
force because of the perceptions about that police force in the
minds of the people. It is going to be a long-term project to
find and recruit suitable people and it is all part of the de-Baathification
of Iraq, which is going to take a long time in Basra.
Q344 Mr Chidgey: How long do you
think?
Ms Corbin: People wanted the British
soldiers to stay.
Mr Keane: I think what is happening
is that people are not being patient and are not waiting for the
de-Baathification. Alternative means of security are being organised,
that is what we saw in Saddam city, it is what you are seeing
in many Shiite areas, remember they are the majority of the population.
People are organising security for themselves. One thing that
was very striking, it was just 24 hours after the statue came
down, we were seeing very active street patrols by Shiite organisations.
All of us, the intelligence services, journalists and politicians
clearly underestimated the degree of underground organisation
which existed amongst Shiites. Now the whole question of how security
is brought to the streets, the bonus that will be given to anybody
who does bring security has been seen and seized upon by various
different elements in the Shiite community, they are actively
attempting to provide the security which the United States in
particular has failed to provide.
Q345 Mr Chidgey: Given the obvious
chaos in the civil society with the break down of law and order
can I ask you, in the context that exists now within the civil
society and within Iraq generally if weapons of mass destruction
had existed in Iraq during the war could they in this environment
have been sold and smuggled to terrorist organisations in the
post-war period?
Mr Keane: If there was, as we
were told, an imminent danger of that happening before the war
I think it is valid to pose the question that in a situation where
there has been a complete break down of law and order, where the
country's borders are more porous than they have ever been, particularly
those with Syria and with Iran, less so Jordan, is there not the
possibility that a can's worth of anthrax or sarine, or something
like that, could be taken out. If it is possible to smuggle out
priceless artifacts and a great deal else is it not equally possible
to smuggle out a weapon of mass destruction or a component for
a weapon of mass destruction? If those materials do exist within
the country then in all probability it is possible.
Ms Corbin: I agree theoretically
it is possible for them to be smuggled out. The borders are completely
open, you do not even show a passport, you can move in and out
at will. My own personal view from having studied the weapons
of mass destruction issue for some years is they would not have
been in a readily usable form for a terrorist or somebody who
wished to buy them, ie a phial of anthrax or a ready-made chemical
weapon. It would have been in precursor form and I myself feel
that a very small group round the leadership would be the ones
that would have known of the existence and the whereabouts of
these things and therefore they would have been kept safely. I
personally feel there is less likelihood of them being smuggled
out to the highest bidder or to a terrorist. If they existed I
believe they were kept very closely under the control of a very
small group of people.
Q346 Mr Chidgey: The pack of cards
people?
Ms Corbin: The pack of cards people
and some of the military intelligence and bodyguard elements around
some of those key figures.
Mr Keane: Presuming they existed!
Ms Corbin: Presuming they existed
and also presuming they were not destroyed before the war.
Q347 Sir John Stanley: Can I just
follow what you have been saying, if the weapons of mass destruction
had not been destroyed before the war started and if they were
closely held do you have any views as to whether or not it is
the case that they could have been in a situation where they could
have been deployed within 45 minutes?
Ms Corbin: I think it is very
difficult for a journalist to know that information. We are told
that information has come via intelligence and not open sources.
We have been led to believe in the past and certainly from what
we know of the security organisation that control these, the SSO,
under the control of Saddam Hussein's son Qusay that it was a
very small group of people and that orders could be given directly
within that small group. It may be reasonable to suppose that
orders could be carried out in fairly short time if such weapons
existed. I would not wish to put a figure like 45 minutes, which
seems to me to be an extremely precise figure, I simply do not
have that knowledge. There is a lot of speculation and debate
about where that knowledge came from and what its basis is.
Q348 Chairman: Can you add to that
knowledge?
Mr Keane: I unhappily cannot.
I would rather leave that to Jane.
Q349 Mr Hamilton: Mr Keane, I wanted
to pick up on the point you made about the level of underground
organisation—actually Jane probably made that point—the
point I wanted to pick up on was the thing you said, that support
would be given to those that are able to secure the streets to
make people feel safe and it is actually the Shia groups that
seem to be the best organised in that respect. Do you think that
US attempts to try and get a balanced representation will simply
play into the hands of religious extremists?
Mr Keane: I think what one needs
to realise is that in a country like Iraq when you get an eruption
of this kind on the streets the Mosque becomes civic society in
effect, it is the place to which people will look for security
and for comfort. I think that was always going to happen. Certainly
in the absence of an attempt to prepare to impose law and order
that was always going to happen. Can America have a balanced government
that leaves out the reality that Shiite-led groups and religious-led
groups will form the majority. I do not think so. That was tried
in Algeria when they had an election and Islamic groups came to
power and were then denied it and Algeria was then plunged into
a long and vicious war. Can America deny the religious demographics
of Iraq? I doubt it. I very much doubt it. I would add there are
two things we must realise: the Shia politics in Iraq are not
a monolith, there are different groups with varying degrees of
willingness to cooperate with the West. All of these groups realise
that the United States is going to be a big part of their reality
for the next 10 or 20 years, that nobody can hope to rule Iraq
without the support of the United States, certainly the economic
support of the United States. That acts as a powerful incentive
not to frustrate American efforts but to create what you have
described as a balanced government. Will they cooperate? I tend
to think they will.
Ms Corbin: I think it is important
when we talk of Shia groups to make it clear that those range
from extremely religious groups to extremely secular groups, 55
per cent to 60 per cent of the population of Iraq is Shia and
as one person put it to me that goes from people who will drink
alcohol on one level to people who pray five times a day and obey
very, very strict religious guidelines. There are many Shia groups.
I am personally more optimistic having been in the South where
the Shia groups are at their most numerous. What we are seeing
is after 30 years of repression for the first few days people
could not believe it, nobody wanted to say anything or do anything.
After 30 years being told you could not speak freely people were
afraid. We are now in the phase that came after that, which is
a great thirst for knowledge, for discussion, people are holding
meetings, there are newspapers being published, new groups are
being formed. People are revelling in a certain amount of freedom.
There is chaos as a result of that. I am more optimistic that
the Iraqi people will choose the leaders that they want and they
will find some way of making what they want felt. I think the
British authorities in Basra have made that absolutely clear,
they will not choose—in fact there have been some disastrous
attempts when they have attempted to nominate people—the
Iraqi people will choose. I am a little more optimistic about
what will happen, particularly in the South, and how the balance
of these parties will work out. I think there is an air of realism
about the Shia and knowing where their interests lie in the future.
After 30 years of dictatorship from the top in Iraq they are not
about to hand themselves over to the dictates of, for example,
Iran. The Shia character in South Iraq is an Arab Shia character,
it is not a Persian or an Iranian Shia character, the two things
are quite different and I think we have to keep that perspective
when we think about the situation there.
Q350 Chairman: What is the evidence
of any intervention by Iran?
Ms Corbin: Certainly because the
main Shia groups under Hakim, who was sheltered for many years
in Iran and has strong links with certain individuals in the Government
in Iran because he is still seen to be a very major figure and
he has now returned to the South from exile people suspect that
through him the Iranians are exerting influence. But the speech
that he has made so far publicly I think has sought to allay those
fears and to try to put people's minds at rest. Of course it is
early, we do not know exactly what is happening behind the scenes.
I would say that the signs are not all bad by any means.
Mr Keane: I would like to agree
with that. I am not a pessimist, I believe where the danger exists
is if the United States believes that it can pick the leaders,
even in the short-term, who are suitable for the Iraqi people.
There is no doubt in my mind that the sort of key figures in the
Shia community are willing to do business, the question is whether
the United States are willing to do business with them and recognise
they will have a very significant role in the future of the country.
Quite how that is organised is still a matter for much debate.
The idea that you can postpone, as we are seeing at the moment,
the idea of meaningful representation of the people I think is
very, very dangerous.
Q351 Mr Hamilton: You do not think
we have anything to fear from the increasing role of Shia clergy?
Mr Keane: I think we have something
potentially to fear if the process of democratisation in Iraq
is delayed unreasonably, then these people will say: What did
we tell you, they came here for our oil and they came here to
oppress us and occupy our land, then they will get a greater hearing.
At the moment I do not feel, and I did not feel talking to people
on the ground, that most people believed all of this was about
oil or humiliating them. They were glad to see these people gone.
What everybody said, and I was in Karbula during the greatest
Shia demonstration seen in the country's history, over one million
people, and speaking to a great many people over several days,
all of them said we are glad, without exception, you came and
got rid of Saddam and now we went you to go home soon. They did
not say straight away but soon. The danger is that because the
United States does not the find the kind of people it feels it
wants to work with it will work with the wrong people and then
the extremists, the remnants of the Baath Party will crawl out
of the woodwork.
Ms Corbin: It is a bit unfortunate
as we have heard in the last 24 hours that elections may be put
off for a year now and in the mean time there will be an appointed
political council to act alongside the coalition, the British
and the American individuals there are who the occupying authority.
I think a year is a long time to wait to allow the Iraqi people
to decide who their leaders will be.
Q352 Mr Hamilton: When Fergal was
talking about Baghdad and the American troops not having interpreters,
not being able to speak Arabic, and you mentioned the different
way that British troops treated the people of Basra, did British
troops have interpreters?
Ms Corbin: They did, yes. There
was a shortage of interpreters, not everybody did. Moving round
the city and encountering different groups, for example the Irish
Guards to the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards to the Black Watch each
of them had at least one or two interpreters with them and quite
frequently British troops who spoke Arabic.
Q353 Mr Hamilton: Were there British
officers or troops who spoke Arabic?
Ms Corbin: Yes, there were. And
a lot of local people were volunteering at the gates of the palace
where the British headquarters were to work as interpreters and
they were being taken on and put to work straight away. There
did seem to be a reasonable number of interpreters.
Q354 Mr Pope: I am really perturbed
by this. I did not realise what Jane just said, they put back
for perhaps a year—
Ms Corbin: It has not been settled.
The indication is, perhaps for the record that ought to be checked,
it may take up to a year to hold elections and that in the mean
time an appointed council will sit with the occupying authorities
to decide how to run the country. There is a problem because you
have to balance against that the desire for de-Ba'athification,
which means that within the ministries it has been decided that
certain individuals and certain ranks will not be re-appointed
or allowed to have any power again. You have to fill those vacancies.
It has been compared to de-Nazification in Germany, the Baath
Party is an all-pervasive power, if you remove those officials
you remove large elements of the civil service, etc so there are
practicalities to be overcome. Perhaps originally the Americans
thought they could still appoint people who were associated with
the past regime, that backfired, there were a large number of
demonstrations in the streets, it became clear they could not
do that and they therefore passed an edict saying they would no
longer allow them to serve and now they have a problem filling
those positions. There are undoubtedly practical problems. But
to wait a year for the people to choose is perhaps a long time.
Mr Keane: I do not believe that
the idea of an appointed council is necessarily a disaster, it
depends the people who are appointed. If they are seen as legitimate
representatives of the people and if they are over the process
of six months to a year seen to be able to work together before
elections then that idea of a breathing space might not be a bad
thing. We are not talking about 30 years or dictatorship here,
we are talking almost the entire history of the country being
lived in an undemocratic, anti-democratic context. The idea of
a year as a breathing space is not necessarily a disaster as long
as the people whom you are work with are genuine representatives
of the people. If they are not that year does turn into a vacuum
in which all kinds of extremist groups and old party officials
can thrive.
Q355 Andrew Mackinlay: How does the
currency work? There are markets and there are shops, presumably
the currency will suddenly have no value, there will be nothing
to back it. Is it working? Are they using dollars?
Ms Corbin: In Basra the British
became bankers effectively because of the looting situation, people
were taking the money for safe-keeping with the British troops.
There were huge problems, there were two forms of the currency
already in circulation before the war, which was an old form of
the dinar and a newer form of the dinar. The newer form of the
dinar with Saddam's face on it very rapidly lost currency because
of the war. As I understand it, and I read a report in the Times
today, they are running out of money and therefore they are having
to print more notes and because there is no decision about what
currency will replace it they have had to start reprinting new
notes with Saddam Hussein's face on which in turn has not really
filled people with a huge amount of confidence.
Q356 Andrew Mackinlay: It struck
me that the occupying forces really ought to do what they did
in Germany and produce a note that will be worth so much, like
the Ostmark, and at least you will start from a scratch. If they
have not done that it seems to me foolhardy in the extreme.
Mr Keane: The poor use these Saddam
notes but the rich use dollars.
Andrew Mackinlay: This is something that
we should flag up, we should be mindful of.
Q357 Mr Pope: I wanted to go back
to this issue about the gap between where we are now and an interim
authority being set up. It may not be a year but it is clearly
a way off, it is not about to happen. Into this vacuum we already
have Shia clergy in Baghdad operating a kind of interim form of
justice, settling property disputes, divorces and who knows what
else. The danger I wanted to suggest is if an interim authority
is delayed by many months, up to a year, we will essentially have
a de facto justice system. The old Baath system has gone,
there is not a system to replace it on the horizon and in to this
vacuum you will end up having Islamic justice which in a year's
time will be entrenched and very difficult to replace. We will
end up having a de facto Islamic state by the time we get
round to setting up an interim authority. Following on from that,
should we worry about that? Should not the bench mark of us creating
a free Iraq be that if they want to choose to be an Islamic state
they should able to do that?
Mr Keane: When we use the phrase
Islamic state the instinctual reaction is that is either Iran
or the Taliban. There are many vanities and variations on the
theme of an Islamic state. I think the question is it is up to
the Iraqis to decide it. Whether we say that or whether I say
that that is what they are going to do. The long-term reality
of this is that the Iraqis will one way or another decide what
kind of government they have. The religious leaders amongst the
Shia are by no means amongst the most extreme people you will
meet in the Middle East and they are pragmatic. We were approached
by a representative in Karbula, it was a private approach so I
would rather not give his name, and he said, the message you must
get across to your Government and to people in the West is that
we want to work with them. This was a person of significant influence.
I think they are pragmatic, they know that it is impossible to
run the country. They look next door to Iran and see the economic
consequences of being an enemy of American. They look at other
countries and see what happens to you when you are a long-term
enemy of America. They do not want to be saddled with massive
debt, no economic cooperation, probably divisive wars against
the Kurds and other groups in the country, because that will be
the consequence of an American abandonment of Iraq. I am not pessimistic
on that front. There is a great deal more political sophistication
and shrewdness than we perhaps allow.
Ms Corbin: It is also worth saying
that Iraq is the sum of its constituent parts and it has a great
deal of pride as a nation, although it was fairly recently formed
as a nation as a result of the British drawing of maps earlier
in this century. People in Iraq see themselves as Iraqis, they
do not say I am a Turkoman, I am a Kurd, I am Shia and I am a
Sunni, they see themselves as members of an Iraqi state and that
is going to be very important for what comes next, very important
indeed. The thing you hear constantly, the refrain you hear at
all levels of society is they feel they have been isolated and
ostracised for years through sanctions which have bitten very
deeply into the fabric of society, through a lack of cultural
exchange, the lack of ability to travel. All of these things they
feel have isolated them. They will be very aware of the consequences
of further isolation by electing a government which drives them
in an extreme direction. They want to rejoin the world. They want
to be able to travel. They want to be able to send their children
to be educated abroad. All of these are positive things that will
weigh heavy in the balance when it comes to them deciding their
own future. I agree with Fergal Keane that the key thing is that
Iraqis will decide and Iraqis will choose. There is no sign they
want to perpetuate or continue their isolation in any way, shape
or form.
Q358 Sir John Stanley: As you are
aware the prime responsibility of this Committee is to produce
an assessment of the performance of the British Foreign Office,
I would like to ask a number of questions in that area in relation
to the British Foreign Office's performance in post-war Iraq.
First of all, as we all know, there are very clear legal responsibilities
placed on occupying powers and those are coupled with clear definitions
of their rights. Probably as far as the rights are concerned it
is as important as to what rights do not exist under the relevant
legislation as to the rights that do exist. As we know the key
documents are the Hague Regulations that were published before
the First World War and the Geneva Convention governing the rights
of occupying powers after the Second World War. The question I
would like to ask you both from your time in Iraq after the war
is how well or not did you form the view that British personnel,
both civilian and military, had been briefed as to the rights
and responsibilities of members of occupying powers in the post-war
situation?
Ms Corbin: Speaking from the perspective
of Basra, certainly when I arrived, which was as the troops entered
the city, some of their responsibilities with regard to prisoners
of war, for example, were I think well understood and well appreciated
to the extent that there was often an attempt to keep the media
from filming or interviewing these people, understanding their
rights, that was very clear then. I also think that the British
officers in charge were also very concerned about the water situation.
As an occupying power the responsibility was to make sure that
citizens had access to basic things like food and water. I think
they were very concerned with that as well. Mr Pope raises the
legal question about what happens in a vacuum with the legal system,
I must admit I do not know what is happening in Basra with regard
to law and order. I presume that military rules are still being
followed when looters are apprehended. They have had a big problem
with banks in the Basra area, there was a lot of shooting and
deaths occurred while people were looting banks. I must say I
do not know what the situation is, I presume it is still in the
military phase there. We have not given way to what comes after
it, that is something that should be looked at, and what the rights
of the people are caught up in this situation in Basra. Those
are specific instances that I noted of the British being aware
of their responsibility.
Mr Keane: I was in an area controlled
by American forces and I would make one general observation, that
is about the political priorities in terms of the British Government
in post-war Iraq and the question which was put to me by several
Iraqis, in somewhat dire straits, was, why is your Government
doing nothing to get our power back on? Why is your Government
doing nothing to get law and order restored? They did see American
troops on the streets of Baghdad but they were certainly sophisticated
enough to know that this was a joint enterprise politically.
Ms Corbin: The Deputy Commander
in Baghdad is of course British.
Q359 Sir John Stanley: Have you any
comments you want to make to us as to the adequacy and the speed
of sending out senior British diplomatic representation? As you
know, the decision was taken that initially the senior person
representing the British Government was going to be a military
figure, Major General Cross, who is the effectively the number
two. Do you have any comments on that particular decision and
also on the related question as to whether the British Government
took steps as early as it might have done to establish diplomatic
representation or a diplomatic presence in the country after the
war?
Ms Corbin: I believe that the
British Embassy was secured quite quickly after the toppling of
the regime, I think within a matter of days. Being in Basra I
do not think they would have looked for representation there,
it would have been through Baghdad but of course Basra was effectively
a British area of operation. I do not have any comment on General
Cross's position, I do not really have anything more to say about
that.
Mr Keane: The impression in Baghdad,
certainly amongst most of the journalists who were present, was
that the garner team was having a very unhappy experience. All
of the information being leaked out suggested a somewhat chaotic
atmosphere within the garner team and many disagreements within
the team itself and between the team and Washington in particular.
Certainly when news was announced that a senior British diplomat
was moving from Egypt to Iraq there was a sense of relief and
a belief, what I spoke about a few moments ago, of a sense of
political prioritisation. What one invariably finds happening
in the wake of wars is that the level of enthusiasm and sharpness
and energy tends to drop by about two-thirds, it is not unique
to the aftermath of this war. The importance of prioritising the
political way forward tends to fall away, nothing like the attention
that is paid to the build-up to war. To me that is a tragedy because
within that lies the seed, as we have seen, of future war.
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