REACTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
TO THE UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS PROCESS
22. Even by mid-January, the limited consensus
over how to deal with Iraq, established in the Security Council
in late 2002, was breaking down.
23. The United States appeared to have very
limited patience with the weapons inspections process. On 14 January,
President Bush was asked for his reaction to reports that the
inspectors might need until at least March to be able to verify
Iraq's compliance with successive Security Council Resolutions.
He replied that "Time is running out on Saddam Hussein. He
must disarm. I'm sick and tired of games and deception. And that's
my view of timetables."[14]
24. In contrast, France and Germany were
critical of suggestions that it might be time to take military
action against Iraq. On 21 January, in a celebration to mark the
fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, President Chirac
said that "War is always a proof of failure and the worst
of solutions, so everything must be done to avoid it."[15]
25. These differences between states over
how to proceed against the Iraqi government intensified during
February, as the inspections process continued inside Iraq.
The response of the United States, United Kingdom
and Spain
26. The United States, the United Kingdom
and Spain argued that with less than complete co-operation by
Iraq, the UN weapons inspectors would be unable to identify Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction and disarm Iraq. On 21 January, Secretary
of State Colin Powell said that "unless we see [substantial]
change in attitude on the part of Iraq … [UN weapons] Inspections
will not work."[16]
On 5 February, the Foreign Secretary told the Security Council
that
without that full and active co-operation, however
strong the inspectors' powers, however good the inspectors, inspections
in a country as huge as Iraq could never be sure of finding all
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.[17]
27. The United States and the United Kingdom
stated that by 5 February, Iraq was in "further material
breach" of its obligations as set out in Security Council
resolution 1441. The Spanish foreign Minister, Ana Palacio, stated
that Iraq was acting in "flagrant violation of the obligations
established in resolution 1441."[18]
28. The Foreign Secretary recalled that
"Paragraph 4 of 1441 … set two clear tests for a further
material breach by Iraq. First that Iraq must not make 'false
statements' or 'omissions' in its [weapons] declaration",
and "second … that a 'failure by Iraq at any time to
comply with, and to co-operate fully in the implementation' of
Resolution 1441" would constitute "further material
breach". The Foreign Secretary argued that the Iraqi declaration
of 7 December "was neither full, nor accurate, nor complete.
And by anyone's definition, it was a 'false statement'. Its central
premise—that Iraq possesses no weapons of mass destruction—is
a lie". The Foreign Secretary also argued that the inspectors'
reports
have confirmed … that Iraq has no intention
of relinquishing its weapons of mass destruction, no intention
of following the path of peaceful disarmament set out in Security
Council Resolution 1441. Instead of open admissions and transparency,
we have a charade, where a veneer of superficial co-operation
masks wilful concealment.[19]
The Spanish foreign minister likewise stated
that "There is only one explanation for the lack of co-operation
by Saddam Hussein's regime with the work of verifying his programmes
of weapons of mass destruction: the Saddam Hussein has not renounced
his plan to use such weapons as he has undoubtedly used them in
the past." [20]
29. On 14 February, the Foreign Secretary
reiterated the Government's belief that Iraq had not complied
"fully and actively" with Resolution 1441. He told the
Security Council that when Resolution 1441 was adopted, "the
issue was not whether Iraq had [weapons of mass destruction],
but whether Iraq was actively co-operating to get rid of them."
The Foreign Secretary recalled that under the previous inspections
regime, it had taken "the defection of Saddam's own son-in-law
to uncover Saddam's biological weapons programme." [21]
30. In the Foreign Secretary's view, the
"most significant point made by Dr. Blix" on 14 February
was his closing remarks when he said, 'Three
months after the adoption of Resolution 1441, the period of disarmament
through inspection could still be short if the immediate, active
and unconditional cooperation with UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to
be forthcoming.'
The Foreign Secretary argued that "those words
… mean that Iraq has yet to be forthcoming with that immediate,
active and unconditional cooperation,"[22]
and hence that it was in further material breach of 1441. This,
he argued, would justify the use of force, because
if we decide to give unlimited time for little
or no cooperation on substance, then the disarmament of Iraq and
the peace and security of the international community, for which
we are responsible, will not get any easier, but very much harder.
The issue under discussion by the Council was "not
just about Iraq, it's how we deal with proliferators elsewhere
across the globe." [23]
31. The United States and United Kingdom
also initiated their own efforts "to support the core assessments
made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei,"[24]
and to demonstrate that Iraq was concealing an illicit weapons
of mass destruction programme. On 3 February, the Government published
a dossier entitled 'Iraq: its infrastructure of concealment, deception
and intimidation', which outlined how Iraq sought to evade the
investigations of UN weapons inspectors. This effort to make the
case against Iraq backfired on 7 February, when the press reported
that parts of the dossier were copied from public sources, rather
than government intelligence; we have examined this issue at greater
length in our Report on "The Decision to go to War in Iraq."[25]
32. On 5 February, US Secretary of State
Colin Powell made a presentation to the UN Security Council, "to
support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei"
and
to provide [the Council] with additional information,
to share … what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism,
which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier
resolutions.[26]
33. In his presentation, Secretary Powell
alleged that Iraqi government officials were concealing forbidden
weapons from UN inspectors:
Everything we have seen and heard indicates that
instead of cooperating actively with the inspectors to ensure
the success of their mission, Saddam Hussein and his regime are
busy doing all they possibly can to ensure that inspectors succeed
in finding absolutely nothing.
Powell argued that human sources and satellite images
"tell us that the Iraqis are moving not just documents and
hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to keep them from
being found by inspectors". Detailed allegations were made
about Iraq's concealment of chemical and biological weapons, and
forbidden attempts to develop ballistic missile systems, unmanned
vehicles and nuclear weapons. Secretary Powell also warned the
Council of a "sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda
terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations
and modern methods of murder." The Iraqi regime, he argued,
"today harbours a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden
and his al Qaeda lieutenants".[27]
34. By mid-February, the Government and
the United States were asserting that Iraq possessed weapons of
mass destruction, but were arguing strongly that the UN weapons
inspectors would be unable to monitor and verify Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction without a substantially increased level of
co-operation by the Iraqi government. They argued that UNMOVIC
were not meant to be detectives but to report on the nature of
co-operation.
The response of France, Germany and Russia
35. France led opposition to the US and
United Kingdom in the Security Council, though Germany and Russia
remained highly sceptical of the case for early military action.
Their scepticism rested on three questions: whether Iraq posed
an immediate, pressing threat to international peace and security;
whether weapons inspectors were producing results, but needed
more time to make judgements about Iraq's weapons programmes;
and whether the threats posed by inaction were greater than the
threat of action against Iraq.
36. The first question, concerning the threat
currently posed by Iraq, was not answered by weapons inspectors
in the period before war broke out in March. On 14 February, UNMOVIC
had performed more than 400 inspections in Iraq covering more
than 300 sites. Dr Blix reported that "inspections were performed
without notice, and access was almost always provided promptly."
UNMOVIC had
obtained a good knowledge of the industrial and
scientific landscape of Iraq, as well as of its missile capability
… Inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gap in
knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between
December 1998 and November 2002.[28]
At this stage, Dr Blix asked "How much, if any,
is left of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and related proscribed
items and programmes?" UNMOVIC had, by mid-February, "not
found any such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical
munitions, which should have been declared and destroyed."
The inspections process was not over, because "many proscribed
weapons and items are not accounted for." However, "One
must not jump to the conclusion that they exist [although] that
possibility is also not excluded."[29]
37. By mid-February, then, the evidence
that Iraq—through its development of illegal weapons programmes,
and through sponsorship of terrorists—posed a threat to
international peace and security was derived from intelligence,
much of which was provided by the United States and United Kingdom,
and from predecessor UN inspectors' reports.[30]
Some of the weapons inspectors' comments about the intelligence
material may have caused other Security Council members to doubt
its reliability.
38. In his briefing of 14 February, Dr Blix
acknowledged the importance to UNMOVIC of intelligence provided
by governments to assist in the inspections process:
an international organization authorized to perform
inspections anywhere on the ground could make good use of information
obtained from governments with eyes in the sky, ears in the ether,
access to defectors, and both eyes and ears on the market for
weapons-related material.
He further acknowledged that "UNMOVIC has achieved
good working relations with intelligence agencies and the amount
of information provided has been gradually increasing."[31]
39. Dr Blix then went on to say, however,
that "we must recognize that there are limitations and that
misinterpretations can occur." Although intelligence material
had, "in one case … led us to a private home where documents
mainly relating to laser enrichment of uranium were found",
in other cases it had "led to sites where no proscribed items
were found"—although it had been
useful in proving the absence of such items and
in some cases the presence of other items—conventional munitions.
It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the country
and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass
destruction.[32]
Government intelligence regarding suspected WMD programmes
had, when investigated further, been shown by UNMOVIC to reveal
only permitted conventional weapons.
40. Dr Blix made one comment about US Secretary
of State Colin Powell's 5 February presentation to the Security
Council. Secretary Powell had suggested that Iraq had prepared
for inspections by cleaning up sites, and removing evidence of
proscribed weapons programmes. Dr Blix commented on one case,
in which US analysts had identified what they claimed to be the
suspicious movement of trucks for chemical decontamination at
a munitions depot. UNMOVIC was familiar with this particular site,
as it was a declared site, and "was certainly one of the
sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect." Dr Blix argued
that the movements of trucks declared by the US to be suspicious
were taken several weeks apart. The reported
movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been
a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation
of imminent inspection.[33]
41. The IAEA also questioned allegations
by the United States and the United Kingdom that Iraq had sought
to purchase "yellow cake" from Niger. On March 7, Dr.
Mohammed ElBaradei told the UN Security Council that the Niger
documents were forgeries.
Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded,
with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents—which
formed the basis for reports of recent uranium transactions between
Iraq and Niger—are in fact not authentic. We have therefore
concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded.[34]
42. Secretary Powell's presentation to the
Security Council on 5 February did not convince France of the
need to take military action against Iraq. Russia, too, was unconvinced
of the need to take military action against Iraq. In his response,
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov argued that
The information provided today by [the] US Secretary
of State once again convincingly indicates the fact that the activities
of the international inspectors in Iraq must be continued. They
alone can provide an answer to the question to what extent is
Iraq complying with the demands of the Security Council. They
alone can help the Security Council work out and adopt carefully
balanced, best possible decisions.[35]
43. We conclude that by mid-February,
some three months after the passage of UNSCR 1441, the Security
Council had not been given any compelling evidence by UNMOVIC
or the IAEA of Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction.
Information about Iraq's alleged development of prohibited weapons
had been produced by the United States, the United Kingdom and
some independent sources, but the weapons inspectors had not verified
whether the allegations were true. In the case of uranium from
Niger, they had verified that intelligence provided by at least
one government source had proved false.
44. Regarding the second question, the United
States and the United Kingdom had argued that the Iraqis were
not co-operating, and that therefore the inspections would fail.
France's response to this—given that, in their view, the
regime was producing results was—that inspections must
be given more time and greater capacity. On 5 February, Dominique
de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister, argued that "there
still exists an unused space in resolution 1441", and called
on the Council to
move on to a new stage and further strengthen
the inspections. With the choice between military intervention
and an inspections regime that is inadequate for lack of cooperation
on Iraq's part, we must choose to strengthen decisively the means
of inspection.[36]
45. This debate brought to light an apparent
difference between France, Germany and Russia on the one hand,
and the United Kingdom and the United States on the other, over
whether the inspections process could produce results without
full co-operation by Iraq. No member of the Security Council had
argued that Iraq was co-operating fully with the inspections process.
On 14 February, however, the United States and the United Kingdom
argued that Iraq's co-operation was so limited that the inspections
process could not work. Secretary Powell argued that "Resolution
1441 was not about inspections. Let me say that again. Resolution
1441 was not about inspections. Resolution 1441 was about the
disarmament of Iraq".[37]
46. France's approach to inspections was
different. Dominique de Villepin stated that while "There
are those who think that inspections, in their very essence, cannot
be effective at all", in his recollection the restoration
of effective inspections "was the very foundation of 1441."
He further stated that while "each of us wants more",
the inspections are "purchasing some results". On 28
January, he again argued that "If the inspections stop working,
we shall assess things together to try and determine a common
position."[38]
47. Iraqi co-operation did appear to be
improving during February, and the French government used this
in support of their argument that inspections should be given
more time. Dr Blix distinguished between co-operation by the Iraqis
on process, and co-operation on substance. Iraq had been judged
to be co-operative on process since the resumption of inspections
on 27 November, but there had been difficulties regarding the
substance of the work. On 9 February, Dr Blix described co-operation
on substance as "less good … The experience we've had
is a mixed bag".[39]
On 7 March, however, Dr Blix commented that "after a period
of somewhat reluctant co-operation, there has been an acceleration
of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January".[40]
He told the Council that "the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged
interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials (so-called
minders) or the taping of the interviews," although "conditions
ensuring the absence of undue influences are [still] difficult
to attain inside Iraq."[41]
Evidence submitted in our Inquiry into 'Decision to go to war
in Iraq' by the former Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, is relevant
here: Mr Cook argued that UNMOVIC "did get better cooperation,
process and access than we were receiving in 1998."[42]
48. Dr Blix also indicated that disarmament
was actually taking place. UNMOVIC reported that by 7 March, Iraq
was destroying Al Samoud 2 missiles under UN supervision. Dr Blix
commented that
The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial
measure of disarmament—indeed, the first since the middle
of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks.
Lethal weapons are being destroyed.[43]
49. We conclude that Iraq's co-operation
with weapons inspectors was limited and insufficient, but that
UNMOVIC and the IAEA were reporting improvements in Iraqi co-operation,
and some evidence of actual disarmament by Iraq, by early March
2003.
50. The French government argued that inspectors
needed more time to make assessments. This argument was supported
by the text of the Security Council resolution that had originally
created UNMOVIC—a resolution which the United Kingdom had
sponsored in 1999.
51. The United Kingdom acknowledged in 1999
that inspections and disarmament would constitute a long and complex
procedure, and in its 1999 resolution (Security Council Resolution
1284) it set out clear timetables according to which the weapons
inspectors would operate. According to Resolution 1284, UNMOVIC
and the IAEA were to establish a "reinforced system of ongoing
monitoring and verification", and simultaneously draw up
a work programme for the discharge of their mandates "60
days after they have both started work in Iraq". Resolution
1284 then specifies that UNMOVIC would report "progress"
on key disarmament tasks 120 days after the agreement of the work
programme.[44] This initial
progress report, according to the timetable of 1284, would be
made at least six months after the beginning of inspections in
Iraq.[45]
52. In 2002, UNMOVIC inspections resumed
in Iraq on 27 November. Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei presented
an update of their operations to the Security Council on 27 January.
Dr Blix told the Council that, sixty days after the arrival of
the inspectors in Iraq, UNMOVIC had 260 staff members in Iraq
and the operation had managed to inspect 230 sites. By this stage,
however, UNMOVIC was not yet operating throughout Iraq. On 14
February, Dr Blix reported that "We have continued to build
up our capabilities", and that UNMOVIC had
obtained a good knowledge of the scientific and
industrial landscape of Iraq … Inspections are effectively
helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the absence
of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002.[46]
53. On 7 March, in his presentation to the
Security Council, Dr Blix referred explicitly to Resolution 1284
which "not only created UNMOVIC but continues to guide much
of our work." He stated that UNMOVIC's work programme would
be ready for submission to the Security Council in March, as required
by the timetable set out in Resolution 1284. According to the
timetable of 1284, UNMOVIC's work programme would have been submitted
to the Council in March. If UNMOVIC adhered to the 1284 timetable,
progress on Iraqi disarmament would then be assessed by the Council
120 days later, which would have been in July 2003.
54. Dr Blix referred to Resolution 1284
in his concluding remarks to the Security Council on 7 March.
"How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining
disarmament tasks?" he asked.
Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced
by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to
verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant
persons, and draw conclusions.
The inspections process "would not take years,
nor weeks, but months."[47]
55. We conclude that, according to the
timetable for UN weapons inspections agreed by the United Kingdom
and other Security Council members in 1999, it would have taken
inspectors longer to build up capacity and make clear judgements
about Iraqi prohibited weapons and weapons programmes than they
were permitted before the war in Iraq commenced.
56. The third question, of whether the threats
posed by inaction were greater than the threat of action against
Iraq, relates closely to the first question about the level of
threat posed by Iraq. There were grave warnings of the US being
drawn into a long, bloody war: in March 2002, Iraq's deputy prime
minister Tariq Aziz had warned that like the Vietnamese, "the
Iraqi will fight in the streets and in each house ... Against
the Americans, each village (in Iraq) will become for them another
Vietnam."[48] A
UN report detailing potential humanitarian consequences of war
with Iraq was leaked in December; the report stated that "a
future confrontation is expected to develop beyond the preparatory,
and relatively short, aerial bombardment of infrastructure, towns,
and cities into potentially a large scale and protracted ground
offensive, supported by aerial and conventional bombardment. The
resultant devastation would undoubtedly be great."[49]
Likely damage to Iraq's infrastructure and essential services
was discussed, and were potential refugee flows out of Iraq. The
press and commentators also raised the possibility of heavy civilian
and military casualties, which might arise as a consequence of
urban warfare in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities.[50]
57. A number of Security Council members
were not convinced that Iraq posed an immediate, compelling threat
to international peace and security. They did, however, perceive
grave threats to peace and security if military action were launched
against Iraq. These threats were discussed on 20 January, at a
ministerial level debate in the Security Council about international
terrorism. In this debate, the German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fisher told the Council that Germany was "greatly concerned
that a military strike against the regime in Baghdad would involve
considerable and unpredictable risks for the global fight against
terrorism."[51]
On 14 February, Dominique de Villepin suggested that intervention
might "be liable to exacerbate the divisions between societies,
cultures and peoples, divisions that nurture terrorism".[52]
This question of the effect of the Iraq war on the broader 'war
against terrorism' is discussed at greater length in paragraphs
173-180 below.
3 
