Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Tenth Report


JANUARY-JUNE 2003: ADDRESSING THE THREAT FROM IRAQ

THE DECISION TO SEEK A 'SECOND RESOLUTION'

  58.  On 24 February, Britain, the United States and Spain circulated a new draft Security Council resolution relating to Iraq. The draft resolution recalled Iraq's failure to comply with successive Security Council resolutions, noted Iraq's "false statements and omissions" in its declaration to the Council, recognised that Iraq posed a threat to international peace and security, and decided that "Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in resolution 1441 (2002)". The draft resolution was interpreted as an attempt by the US and the United Kingdom to secure Security Council backing for military action against Iraq.

  59.  The Government insisted that its objective in circulating the draft resolution was not to obtain legal authority for military action—which, in its view, had already been secured through successive Security Council resolutions since the 1991 Gulf War.[53] The Government was, instead, seeking a resolution "Because, politically, it is a better way of binding in the international community".[54]

  60.  In response to this initiative, the French government produced a memorandum, which was backed by Russia and Germany. It stated that "While suspicions remain, no evidence has been given that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction or capabilities in this field." It went on:

    Inspections have just reached their full pace; they are functioning without hindrance; they have already produced results. While not yet fully satisfactory, Iraqi cooperation is improving, as mentioned by the Chief Inspectors in their last report.[55]

  61.  The French memorandum called for a clear programme of action for the inspections; the adoption of further measures to strengthen inspectors; the implementation of a programme of work according to a realistic and rigorous timeline; and a report by UNMOVIC and IAEA to the Security Council 120 days after the adoption of the programme of work—an explicit reference to the timetable established by the Security Council in Resolution 1284.

  62.  The French government had insisted earlier in the month that the French and US governments "disagree on one issue, one issue only, what is the timing to decide to move from the inspections to the use of force."[56] The 24 February memorandum stated that

    inspections should be given the necessary time and resources. However, they cannot continue indefinitely. Iraq must disarm. Its full and active co-operation is necessary.[57]

  63.  The Prime Minister's argument with the French memorandum was that "the call is for more time—up to the end of July at least." France, Germany and Russia "say the time is necessary 'to search out' the weapons." However, "to sniff out" Saddam's weapons

    is emphatically not the inspectors' job. They are not a detective agency … The idea that the inspectors could conceivably sniff out the weapons and documentation relating to them without the help of the Iraqi authorities is absurd…The issue is not time. It is will.[58]

The FCO spelled out this message again, in a memorandum to us on 28 April:

    the French Government's memorandum presented on 24 February, while no doubt well-intentioned, was misguided. The rationale it presented for reinforcing the UN inspections regime in Iraq was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the inspections. The UN inspectors were never intended to be detectives; to uncover Iraq's concealed WMD programmes through a massive search effort. Any such effort in a country the size of Iraq would be doomed to fail, however large the inspection teams.[59]

  64.  The call for more time was strengthened, according to some commentators, by the argument that the Iraqi regime was being contained by the presence of inspectors.[60] Dr Blix had made this point on 19 December 2002, when he told the Security Council that

    Inspections of sites have, as one important objective, the verification of industrial, military, research, and other current activities with a view to assuring that no proscribed programmes or activities are regenerated at an site in Iraq. This side of the inspection system can be characterised as a form of containment. Through the other side of the system of reinforced monitoring, there is a continuation of investigations to complete the requirement of disarmament.[61]

  65.  On 7 March, Dr Blix spoke again of the possibility of containment. He discussed the authority given in "the governing resolutions"—i.e. 1284 and 1441—that

    a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.[62]

  66.  The Government continued to reject the containment option, however. On 26 February, the Foreign Secretary told the House that

    Iraq used the four-year absence of inspectors—the so-called period of containment—to build a missile test stand capable of testing engines with over four times the thrust of the already prohibited al-Samoud 2 missile … There is no steady state—the choice is between disarmament or rearmament.[63]

  67.  The Prime Minister told the House on 26 February that any country that supported resolution 1441 should support a second resolution that flows from it, and that

    It certainly would be an unreasonable veto if Iraq is in material breach and we do not pass a resolution, because resolution 1441 made it absolutely clear that Iraq had a final opportunity to comply. If it is not complying, it is in breach. Therefore, that is why I believe that a second resolution should issue and it is also why I believe that, in the end, it will issue.[64]

  68.  On 4 March, the Foreign Secretary remained confident that the Government would secure the 'second resolution'. He told us that "We tend not to put forward resolutions with the idea that they will be repudiated, and there are intensive discussions currently taking place."[65] He also recalled that

    we managed to gain unanimity in the international community by 8 November [when 1441 was passed]. I have to say, as one of the active participants of the negotiating process, it did not feel like that for a long time in the run-up to it, but we finally got there.[66]

  69.  Less than a week later, however, the Government's chances of securing its second resolution were dashed when President Chirac of France told a French television station that

    whatever the circumstances may be, France will vote no, because it considers as of this evening that there are no grounds for making war to achieve the objective that we have set ourselves—namely, the disarmament of Iraq.[67]

  70.  On 12 March, in a final attempt to secure consensus in the Security Council, the Foreign Secretary announced that the Government was circulating "six tests by which Iraqi compliance would be measured." He described these tests as "demanding but deliverable". Iraq was asked to provide a statement by Saddam Hussein admitting that he had concealed weapons of mass destruction, but would no longer produce or retain weapons of mass destruction; to deliver at least 30 scientists for interview outside Iraq, with their families; to surrender all anthrax, or credible evidence of destruction; to complete the destruction of all Al Samoud missiles; to account for all unmanned aerial vehicles, including details of any testing of spraying devices for chemical and biological weapons; and to surrender all mobile chemical and biological production facilities.[68]

  71.  This effort to secure consensus in the Council did not yield results. The Government did not table its draft resolution, and was thus not required to employ the argument, put forward by the Prime Minister on 26 February, that an "unreasonable veto" would not invalidate efforts to reach international agreement over Iraq. The Government may have concluded that it would not have obtained enough votes in the Council even to secure a majority.

  72.  On 14 March, in an interview published in The Guardian, the Foreign Secretary described President Chirac's statement as

    an announcement by France that they were abandoning enforcement of [UN Security Council resolution] 1441 …Unfortunately, [the French] appear to have made the decision not to enforce 1441. That renders it less likely that we get a peaceful outcome.[69]

  73.  Should the Government have predicted that France would refuse to support its 'second resolution'? According to the French Ambassador to the United States, France had been warning for some time that it would not sign up to a second resolution. On 25 March, at a meeting at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, the French Ambassador said:

    One word about the second resolution in the Security Council. I think I can say it now on the record, you have to know that weeks before it was tabled, I went to the State Department and to the White House to say, don't do it. First, because you'll split the Council and second, because you don't need it. Let's agree to disagree between gentlemen, as we did on Kosovo. [70]

    In an interview with Time Magazine on published on 16 February, President Chirac had made it clear that "nothing allows us to say that inspections don't work". He stated that "it's up to the inspectors to say" if Iraqi non-cooperation was preventing them from finding WMD, and that in his view "there's no need for a new resolution. We are in the framework of [UN Security Council Resolution] 1441, and let's go on with it. I don't see what any new resolution would add."[71]

  74.  On 29 April, we asked the Foreign Secretary why, despite indications from the French government that they would not support the second resolution, the Government decided to circulate such a resolution in late February. He replied that "until you put people to the test you do not know … for certain" what they will do. He went on:

    There were plenty of difficulties anticipated with 1441 which did not arise … It was not until [10 March that] we had confirmation by the Head of State of Government in France that we knew that the second resolution was not going to be possible to get passed.[72]

  75.  In our December 2002 Report, we commended the Government's decision to work closely with the United States,

    to produce a strong and unanimous Security Council Resolution establishing an unconstrained weapons inspections regime and demanding Iraq's full disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction.[73]

We conclude that it would have been highly desirable to obtain a further Security Council resolution before taking military action in Iraq.

  76.  We further conclude that seeking a Security Council resolution and then failing to secure its adoption in the Council highlighted the profound disagreements that had emerged between its members by late February 2003.

  77.  We note the Foreign Secretary's comment that the United Kingdom tends "not to put forward resolutions with the idea that they will be repudiated", and recommend that the Government in its response to this Report state whether the failure to secure a 'second resolution' on Iraq in February 2003 should have been anticipated.

THE US AND UK DECISION TO GO TO WAR IN MARCH 2003

  78.  On 16 March, the Prime Minister met with his US and Spanish counterparts in the Azores. In a statement issued after their meeting, he declared that

The United Kingdom, the US and Spain stated that they "would undertake a solemn obligation to help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbours."[75] The following day, President Bush addressed the United States, calling for Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq within 48 hours. "Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing."[76]

  79.  On 18 March, the Government asked the House to consider whether the United Kingdom should join the United States in a war against the government of Iraq. In its motion, the Government stated that

    Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles, and its continuing non-compliance with Security Council Resolutions, pose a threat to international peace and security; notes that in the 130 days since Resolution 1441 was adopted Iraq has not co-operated actively … and is in further material breach of its obligations under successive mandatory UN Security Council Resolutions; regrets that … it has not proved possible to secure a second Resolution in the UN because one Permanent Member of the Security Council made plain in public its intention to use its veto whatever the circumstances; notes the opinion of the Attorney General that … the authority to use force under Resolution 678 has revived and so continues today and endorses the use of all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

The House voted; 412 members supported the motion, and 149 opposed. Two days later, the war in Iraq began.

WHY DID SUCH A DEEP SPLIT DEVELOP BETWEEN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS OVER THE DECISION TO GO TO WAR IN MARCH 2003?

  80.  Security Council members clearly differed in their assessments of the threat from Iraq. In our Inquiry into 'The Decision to go to war in Iraq', we concluded that the Government did believe that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction: "the threat posed to United Kingdom forces was genuinely perceived as a real and present danger and that the steps taken to protect them were justified by the information available at the time."[77] However, the view—held by the French government—that the threat from Iraq was contained, rather than increasing, was supported by evidence from the former Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, who also told us that "containment by sanctions … worked"[78] between 1998 and 2003, and that "All we have learnt since we went into Iraq is actually it worked rather better than we had hoped."[79] Mr Cook also told us that he had "seen nothing to suggest it was right to replace that policy of containment with a major armed invasion of the territory of another state."[80]

  81.  The Government also disagreed with France, Russia and other Security Council members over whether weapons inspectors would be unable to find and destroy these weapons without full and complete co-operation from Iraq. According to the reports of Dr Blix, the weapons inspectors were making progress.[81] However, the Government's view was supported by evidence from the former chief of UN weapons inspections, Terence Taylor. We asked Mr Taylor whether the UNMOVIC inspections from November 2002 until the conflict started were "doomed to failure from the start." Mr Taylor replied that "Their chances of success were low. [Their success] would require a strategic decision by Saddam Hussein himself. On 7 December when they presented their so-called full, final and complete declaration, this was the last chance for immediate compliance and I registered with great disappointment that that declaration was well short … my personal view was that, given the pattern of behaviour, inspections were very unlikely to succeed" after this point.[82]

  82.  Before the war in Iraq, there was evidence from authoritative sources to support both sides to the argument about whether Iraq posed a grave threat to peace and security. In our Report on 'The Decision to go to war in Iraq', we discuss the difficulties inherent in determining the threat from Iraq, which arise from the limited access Western governments had to reliable human intelligence.[83] We conclude that the divisions that emerged among Security Council members between January and March 2003 over how to deal with the threat from Iraq are likely to have been a consequence of genuinely different assessments of the nature and extent of that threat.

WAS THE WAR LAWFUL?

  83.  The United Nations Security Council is the only body able to provide a legal basis for the use of force in the maintenance of peace and security, beyond the circumstances described in the UN Charter.[84] The US government's decision to address the question of Iraq through the UN Security Council is widely considered to have been—at least in part—a consequence of pressure from the United Kingdom.[85] The Government has stressed repeatedly throughout the Iraq crisis that it intends to work within the boundaries of international law. While stressing that agreement in the Security Council was not necessary to ensure the legality of military action against Iraq, the Government made substantial efforts to secure agreement on the international response to the threat from Iraq in the Security Council during late 2002 and early 2003.

  84.  At the end of 2002, after the adoption of resolution 1441, the Government's policy appeared to be bearing fruit; in our last Report on this subject, we accordingly commended the Government's decision

    to work closely with the United States, to produce a strong and unanimous Security Council Resolution establishing an unconstrained weapons inspections regime and demanding Iraq's full disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction.[86]

  85.  As we note above, the United Kingdom undertook military action in March 2003 without obtaining explicit support from the Security Council. We note the Foreign Secretary's recollection that before the adoption of 1441, there had been a

    very intense debate … about whether the resolution that became 1441 should explicitly say, in terms, that military action to enforce this resolution could only be taken if there were a second resolution.

According to the Foreign Secretary, this proposition "was not acceptable to a majority of members of the Security Council [and] it was never put before the Security Council."[87]

  86.  Instead, the Council agreed to "the scheme laid out in the operative paragraphs of 1441 which set very clear obligations on Iraq."[88] These included submission of a

    currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems,[89] and the compliance with the inspectors set out in paragraphs 5 through to 8 and so on, and then a definition in paragraph 4 of what is a further material breach.[90]

The Foreign Secretary told us that "In … circumstances where you have got a further material breach"—as defined by operative paragraph 4 of 1441[91]—

    you then have the Council meeting for an assessment of the situation in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12. But what the Council has to do under 12 is to consider the situation, not necessarily to pass a second resolution.[92]

  87.  The Government stated consistently that it sought a 'second resolution' for political reasons, but that such a resolution was not legally necessary.[93] On 17 March, when it was clear that efforts to convince the Security Council to adopt such a resolution had failed, the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, set out his views of the legal basis for the use of force against Iraq. He stated that

    Authority to use force against Iraq exists from the combined effect of resolutions 678, 687 and 1441. All of these resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allows the use of force for the express purpose of restoring international peace and security.[94]

  88.  Professor Sir Adam Roberts wrote to us that although the

    legal justification for the US-led military action initiated in March 2003 would have been significantly simpler if the US and UK had succeeded in their efforts to persuade the UN Security Council to follow up with a so-called 'second resolution',

there is "some substance" to the argument put forward by the Attorney General that that "past Security Council resolutions provide a continuing, or revived, authority to use force, in a different situation and a dozen years after they were passed".[95] In his memorandum, Professor Roberts outlines a "concept of what I term a 'continuing authority' given by the UN Security Council to certain states to take military action in respect of Iraq." He considers "that this concept constitutes the strongest available basis for justifying the US-led use of force against Iraq."[96]

  89.  Professor Roberts examines the resolutions adopted by the Security Council during the crisis following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 authorises UN member states to use force not just to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but also "to secure international peace and security in the area". Resolution 687, adopted after the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, set out the terms of the cease-fire in some detail. Thereafter, numerous Security Council resolutions—many of them passed unanimously—found Iraq to be in breach of these cease-fire commitments.[97]

  90.  According to Professor Roberts, a provision in the chapter on armistices in the 1907 Hague Regulations suggests that the violation of certain terms of a cease-fire can constitute a justification for an eventual use of force against the violator.[98] He further notes that

    The argument that there can be a continuity and resumption of the authority to use force contained in previous UN Security Council resolutions was asserted repeatedly in crises over Iraq in the 1990s,

including that concerning weapons inspections in Iraq in 1998, when the US and the United Kingdom launched Operation Desert Fox. The conclusion Professor Roberts draws is that

    the strongest case for the legality of military action against Iraq in 2003 rested, not on any general propositions about preventive defence, nor on Resolution 1441 taken in isolation, but upon Iraq's violations of specific UN resolutions and on the continuing authority contained in certain resolutions.[99]

  91.  Professor Roberts points out that the "concept of 'continuing authority' on which this paper focuses has not been widely accepted." He also notes that

    The greatest difficulty with 'continuing authority' in the light of events in Iraq in 2003 concerns not so much the proposition itself which is fundamentally strong, but its particular invocation in this crisis.[100]

There is nothing in his memorandum, however, that contradicts the Attorney General's assertion that the United States and the United Kingdom had legal authority to use force in March 2003 on the basis of Iraq's violation of Security Council resolutions 678, 687 and 1441.


53   The question of the legality of military action is discussed at 83-91 below Back

54   Foreign Secretary, 4 March 2003, Q 155  Back

55   Iraq: French-German-Russian Memorandum, February 24th, 2003, available at: http://special.diplomatie.fr/article_gb134.html Back

56   Address by Jean-David Levitte, Ambassador of France to the US, at the US Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 7 February 2003, available at: http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/2003/levitte_iraq020703.asp Back

57   'Iraq: French-German-Russian memorandum', 24 February 2003, available at: http://special.diplomatie.fr/article_gb134.html Back

58   HC Deb, 25 February, col 125  Back

59   Ev 69 Back

60   The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, argued that "With tens of thousands of troops around Iraq, an international coalition united in support of the inspection process, and now hundreds of inspectors able to go anywhere at any time, Saddam is unable to engage in any large-scale development or production of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons."Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Iraq: What next?, Washington DC, January 2003, p.12 Back

61   Hans Blix, Briefing notes to the Security Council, 19 December 2002, available at: http://un.org/depts/unmovic/index.htm  Back

62   Hans Blix, Report to the Security Council, 7 March 2003, available at http://un.org/depts/unmovic/index.htm Back

63   HC Deb, 26 February, col 273 Back

64   HC Deb, 26 February, col 251 Back

65   Q 156 Back

66   Q 172 Back

67   President Chirac's statement was: "Ma position, c'est que, quelles que soient les circonstances, la France votera non parce qu'elle considère ce soir qu'il n'y a pas lieu de faire une guerre pour atteindre l'objectif que nous nous sommes fixé, c'est-à-dire le désarmement de l'Iraq." Transcript, 'Le Président de la République sur TF1 et France 2', 10 mars 2003, available at: http://special.diplomatie.gouv.fr/article87.html Back

68   Statement by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, at a news conference, London, Wednesday 12 March 2003, available at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/ Back

69   The Guardian, 14 March 2003, available at: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4624831,00.html Back

70   Council on Foreign Relations transcript, available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication_print.php?id=5774&content= Back

71   'France is not a pacifist country,' Time magazine,16 February 2003 Back

72   Q 290 Back

73   Second Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 196, para 120 Back

74   Statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at a UK/US/Spain summit in the Azores, Sunday 16 March 2003. Available at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front Back

75   'Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People', 16 March 2003. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030316-1.html Back

76   'President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours', 17 March 2003, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html Back

77   Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-03, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC 813-I, para 41 Back

78   Ibid., Q 46 Back

79   Ibid., Q 47 Back

80   Ibid., Q 36 Back

81   On 7 March, Dr Blix reported that "In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in the period 1991 to 1998. Some practical matters, which were not settled by the talks Dr ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections … have been resolved at meetings, which we have had in Baghdad." He further reported that Iraq had undertaken the destruction of al Samoud 2 missiles, which "constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament", and that "There is a significant Iraqi effort under way to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991." Dr Hans Blix, Report to the Security Council, 7 March 2003, available at http://un.org/depts/unmovic/index.htm Back

82   Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-03, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC 813-III, Q 292 Back

83   Ibid., paras 8-15 Back

84   In Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter states that "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." If, however, the Council considers that "that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." In Article 51, the Charter further states that: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." See Charter of the United Nations, available at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. For a discussion of the provisions of the Charter in the context of the Iraq crisis, see Second Report, especially paragraphs 141-154.  Back

85   Second report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 196, especially paras 118-19 Back

86   Second report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 196, para 120 Back

87   Q 151 Back

88   Q 151 Back

89   UN Security Council Resolution 1441, operative paragraph 3, available at: http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO2/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement Back

90   Q 151 Back

91   Paragraph 4 states that "false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment inaccordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below." Back

92   Q 151 Back

93   On 4 March, the Foreign Secretary told us that the Government was seeking a second Security Council resolution because "politically, it is a better way of binding in the international community" (Q155). In November 2002, the Foreign Secretary had stated that if the Iraqi government were to commit a further 'material breach' of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions-for example, "action ... seriously to obstruct or to impede the inspectors, to intimidate witnesses, or a pattern of behaviour ... that shows Iraq's intention not to comply"-then "action will follow." The "preference of the Government in the event of any material breach is that there should be a second Security Council Resolution authorising military action". However, the United Kingdom "must reserve [its] position in the event that [the Security Council] does not [adopt a further resolution]. That is the reason why the language of 'serious consequences' is used in paragraph 13 in the event of [Saddam Hussein's] non-compliance." HC Deb, 25 November 2002, col 51-54. Back

94   Ev 64 Back

95   Ev 159 Back

96   Ibid Back

97   "For example, Resolution 707 of 15 August 1991 condemned Iraq's violations of 687 and proclaimed Iraq to be in 'material breach' of that resolution that had established the basis of the cease-fire.5 In 1998, when Iraq ceased cooperation, Resolution 1205 of 5 November 1998 condemned Iraq as 'in flagrant violation' of its commitments. Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002 proclaimed Iraq to be in 'material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions'; recalled that in its Resolution 687 'the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution'; and offered Iraq 'a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations'." Ev 159 Back

98   The relevant provision reads: 'Any serious violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of recommencing hostilities immediately')' Back

99   Ev 159 Back

100   Professor Roberts notes: "Problems that have emerged have included the question of what consequences flowed from the Iraq breaches: in particular, even if the US and partners have continuing authority to use force, it remained a question whether that entitles them to launch a full-scale attack to achieve regime change. In addition the notion of 'continuing authority' might seem to be undermined by the doubtful quality of the evidence that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction in significant quantities. Some unconvincing US and UK reports and presentations before the war weakened the case. There was, inevitably, scope for disagreement as to whether the UN verification system operating under Resolution 1441 should have been set aside in favour of a use of force when the inspectors were able to visit sites throughout Iraq and the disarmament process had produced at least some results. As circumstances change after the war, it is possible that ex post facto other justifications for resort to force will look more convincing." Back


 
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