The immediate post-war period
113. On 9 April, the US achieved its long-planned
objective of regime change in Iraq. In Baghdad, statues of Saddam
Hussein were pulled down, and scenes of excitement and chaos on
the streets were broadcast around the world. Mohammed Aldouri,
Iraq's ambassador to the UN, admitted that he had lost contact
with Saddam Hussein's regime.
114. Relief at the overthrow of Saddam Hussein
soon developed into looting and chaos, however. In addition to
the widespread theft of commercial goods, other private property
and hospital equipment, it was reported that Baghdad's museums
and the national library had been stripped bare, and centuries
of Mesopotamian cultural heritage lost.
115. Some of the cultural artefacts reported
stolen have since been found, hidden in bank vaults and other
safe hiding places. Others remain missing, perhaps irretrievably.
Hospitals, schools and other public buildings have been gutted.
In Basra, one of the worst effects of the looting has been the
destruction of the water and the electricity system: copper wiring
within the electricity system has been stolen, and will take time
and money to replace.[119]
Countless individuals—many of them already impoverished—have
suffered loss of private property.
116. Jane Corbin told us that she had found,
on visiting Basra, that "the British were unable to control"
the looting.
British troops told me very freely they were
frightened by the way in which the scale of the looting threatened
to overwhelm what had been a victorious entry in to the city …
it was impossible for that number of British troops to effectively
police the city.
She argued that
One of the reasons this had not been given adequate
thought beforehand was there was a hope right up to the last minute
that there would be an uprising from within, both in Basra but
also in other major cities, like Baghdad. Perhaps there was a
forlorn hope that somehow a strong regime would arise from within
that would extend outwards so that the troops could come in and
would then find some degree of control within the city, that did
not happen, there was a vacuum. The regime fled, the Americans
and the British had not quite reached the centre and looting was
the end result of that.[120]
117. In our December 2002 Report on this
subject, we analysed the possible outcomes of war in Iraq and
concluded that
the establishment of the rule of law … in
Iraq after a war would pose formidable challenges … We recommend
that, in its considerations, the Government bear in mind the necessity
for country-wide peacekeeping, civil policing [and] transitional
justice.[121]
118. We note that Amnesty International,
in a report published shortly after the end of the conflict, pointed
out that although
Much planning and resources seem to have been
devoted to securing Iraqi oil fields … there is scarce evidence
of similar levels of planning and allocation of resources for
securing public and other institutions essential for the survival
and well-being of the population. The response to disorder has
been shockingly inadequate.[122]
119. Jane Corbin described to us how the
looting had affected Basra, "a city which has been systematically
starved by the regime of infrastructure" during the years
of Baathist rule. The looting was
a pathetic and sad sight [which] will set that
city even further back because they had nothing to start with
and now they have less than nothing. It will take some time for
it to be built up.[123]
120. Fergal Keane, who arrived in Baghdad
soon after the Saddam statues were pulled down, has been "in
many, many wars and [has] seen worse looting." The difference
with the situation in Baghdad was that
the most modern military force and the most powerful
military force in the world had arrived in a relatively sophisticated
city and that under the noses of this powerful force the city
had been reduced to the most extraordinary scenes: we witnessed
heart monitors being ripped out of hospitals; hospitals being
stripped bare; patients being turned away; nurses carrying assault
rifles to keep the looters away from hospitals, everything that
could be taken being taken.[124]
121. The post-war destruction in Iraq could,
of course, have been far worse. Large scale urban warfare, widely
predicted before the conflict, did not materialise. Fergal Keane
said that he had "been in many cities which were bombed in
a much more severe way than Baghdad was [and] have seen a great
many more civilian casualties."[125]
Coalition forces managed to secure Iraq's oil fields from possible
sabotage by Saddam Hussein's retreating troops. Furthermore, some
public buildings in Baghdad—notably the oil ministry—were
carefully guarded by US forces as soon as the regime fell.
122. The looting was significant, according
to Mr Keane, because it
had two very, very profound impacts, one was
clearly a physical one, the population was left in a situation
where all essential and vital services has disappeared …
There was a second psychological consequence, which was certainly
unintended from the American point of view, people watched American
troops at checkpoints looking very frightened a great deal of
the time, unable, in most cases that I came across, to speak the
local language because they did not have interpreters with them.
The message a lot of people I suspect took from that, because
they said it to us, was that this army was in some way scared,
it was not going after the looters, it was not going after the
armed gangs because it was frightened.[126]
Mr Keane argued that
When people look back at the history of this
time they will regard those [five or six days after the fall of
Baghdad] as one of the great missed opportunities… there
was a real opportunity missed in those days to stabilise the situation
and to allow people the thing they have wanted to feel all of
their lives, and that is to feel safe.[127]
123. We asked the Foreign Secretary to explain
why such extensive looting had occurred after the fall of the
Iraqi regime. He explained that some looting had been expected,
but that the coalition had been surprised by the speed at which
the Iraqi regime had collapsed:
The working assumption had been that the Iraqi
Government, particularly their regular forces, the revolutionary
guard and the special revolutionary guard, would be better organised,
have better command and control and put up much more of a fight
than they did.[128]
124. According to the Foreign Secretary,
"No one is at fault" for failing to prevent the looting;
it is just an inevitable consequence of that
kind of warfare. … If anybody is at fault, it was the fault
of the Saddam regime for there being so little consent and natural
law and order in the country. You smile at this but it happens
to be true because the reason we are, as were other Western democracies,
able to police ourselves with such a light touch is because people
on the whole police themselves.[129]
125. The Ministry of Defence noted in its
7 July report Operations in Iraq: first reflections that
"Although the regime's power has been swept away, pockets
of resistance remain in some areas."[130]
On 24 June, six Royal Military Police officers, who had been training
Iraqi police officers, were killed in the village of Majar al-Kabir,
25 kilometres (16 miles) south of Amara in South Eastern Iraq.
According to the Ministry of Defence, these "tragic incidents
… have underlined the continuing risk of localised violence."
[131]
126. Policing in the immediate post-conflict
period is undoubtedly very difficult, and the deaths of these
Military Police indicate that problems are likely to persist.
We note the Ministry of Defence's statement that "calls for
coalition forces to do more to protect Iraqi civilians, keep order
and prevent looting had to be weighed against the demands of continuing
operations to overcome resistance to Iraqi forces, both regular
and irregular." [132]
However, much time and goodwill may have been lost by the coalition's
failure to re-establish order in the immediate post-conflict period,
and this may have made the task of occupation more difficult in
the medium term. Lessons should be sought from this experience:
the military campaign in Iraq had been planned over a long period,
and was expected to end in regime change. The more rapid establishment
of law and order after the end of armed conflict would have improved
material conditions for the Iraqi people, and would also have
ensured that the US-led intervention was perceived more positively
among Iraqis and elsewhere in the Arab world.
127. We are relieved to learn that the US
and the United Kingdom are now working to establish a "multinational
stabilisation force in Iraq", with US command in Baghdad
and the central sector and the United Kingdom command in the south,[133]
and we hope that this will help to increase the security of the
country for its inhabitants and for British personnel serving
in Iraq.
128. We commend the British armed forces
and their coalition allies for securing Iraq's oil fields and
installations, and for protecting some government buildings in
the capital.
129. We recognise
that a breakdown of law and order immediately following the fall
of the regime was highly probable. We conclude, however, that
the failure of the coalition to restore order more quickly was
deeply regrettable, and hindered progress towards one of the central
objectives of the intervention: to improve the lives of ordinary
Iraqis.
130. We recommend that the Government
consider carefully the lessons from the immediate post-conflict
period in Iraq, and specifically from the tragic deaths of the
six Royal Military Police, who were killed in the village of Majar
al-Kabir on 24 June. We further recommend that the Government
consider whether the United Kingdom should further develop its
capacity for post-conflict civil policing, and should encourage
its allies to do likewise.
101 
