Travel Advice
198. On 12 October 2002, explosive devices
were detonated outside a packed nightclub in Kuta Beach, Bali.
24 Britons were among the 190 people killed. On 21 October, the
Foreign Secretary launched a review of the FCO's travel advice
system. He announced that "all intelligence" relating
to the Bali attack would be made to the Intelligence and Security
Committee (ISC), which would "consider this and then reach
their own conclusions upon it."[206]
On 28 November, while the Travel Advice review was under way,
another terrorist attack occurred at a hotel popular with Israelis
in Mombasa, Kenya.
199. The ISC Report was published on 11
December 2002. It concluded that, prior to the Bali bomb attack,
FCO Travel Advice "did not accurately reflect the threat
or recent developments, although it was proportional to the then
current Security Service assessment." The ISC further stated
that "FCO Travel Advice is not well formulated and consequently
it does not highlight the key points, particularly risksthey
get lost in the complexity of the document... the whole issue
of FCO Travel Advice, its purpose, target audience and presentation
needs to be examined by the FCO as a matter of urgency."[207]
200. We looked at Travel Advice in our own
December 2002 Report, and noted that
No specific warning was issued by the FCO in
advance of the Bali attack, nor were British citizens warned of
a potential attack in Kenyadespite the fact that the German
and Australian governments issued public warnings in mid-November
that militants were planning to attack Western targets specifically
in Mombasa.
We recommended that the Government publish and implement
the results of its review of the travel advice system at the earliest
opportunity, and also that it supply us with a full description
of the process according to which travel advice is agreed among
Government departments and issued to the public.[208]
201. On 3 February, we held an evidence
session with Sir Michael Jay, Permanent Under-Secretary of State,
Mr Dickie Stagg, Director, Information, Mr Rob Macaire, head of
the Counter-Terrorism Policy Department, and Mr Edward Chaplin,
Director, Middle East and North Africa Department. The purpose
of our session was to discuss the FCO's Travel Advice system,
and progress with reform of the system since the Bali bombing.
202. Our discussions with the FCO officials,
and evidence submitted in writing to the Committee, have highlighted
the great difficulties inherent in the provision of sound travel
advice. While Posts are responsible for recommending changes to
Travel Advice, they are also responsible for maintaining good
relations with their host country, and for promoting British commercial
interests abroad. Both of the latter responsibilities might discourage
Posts from recommending changes to Travel Advice.
203. The FCO states that changes to Travel
Advice are prompted in two ways: first, for non-intelligence related
changes, the British post in the country concerned will, on the
basis of its own knowledge and its network of contacts, recommend
changes. Secondly, however, the FCO receives reports and assessments
from the intelligence agencies, which may be the basis for changes
to our Travel Advice. Posts are required to reconsider their Travel
Advice every month, and if they believe a change is needed, they
should recommend this immediately.
It is for the Posts concerned to make a judgement
on changes in the local environment which need to be translated
into changes in the Travel Advice; and for the Counter-Terrorism
Policy Department [CTPD]... to prompt consideration when intelligence
reports appear significant and credible enough to require changes
to Travel Advice.[209]
204. The ISC reported in December that
the volume of intelligence available [to United
Kingdom Agencies] since 11 September has increased by a factor
of at least ten. During the period [leading up to the Bali bomb
attack], they received at least 150 separate reports a day relating
to terrorist activity in more than twenty different countries,
including Indonesia.[210]
The FCO, as the customer of the intelligence agencies,
needs to be able to process this increased amount intelligence
material; accordingly it is increasing staffing levels "all
the way down the chain" in the Counter-Terrorism Policy Department.
The Consular Department is also being expanded to help the FCO
"to cope with what is going inevitably an inexorable growth
of cases."[211]
We commend the FCO's decision to increase staffing levels in
the Counter-Terrorism Policy Department and the Consular Department,
and recommend that the levels currently agreed are kept under
review.
205. The FCO had, by February, already made
a number of changes to its communication of travel advice. All
209 travel advisories on the FCO website have now been revised
"to give a higher profile to the question of terrorism and
the likelihood of terrorist attacks"[212]
and "to make the travel advice more user friendly, more readily
understandable, to try and make certain that it is in better English."[213]
The Plain English Association had been consulted to help ensure
that travel advisories were readily comprehensible to the public.
The FCO is also looking at the travel advice of other countries,
and adding hyperlinks from its own website to the foreign ministries
of other countries. This means that
If a traveller is going to a French African country
where we are not accredited, gets through to our advice and thinks,
'I would quite like to know what the French are saying about this
because they know more about the country' they get through automatically
and get further advice that way.[214]
206. We discussed the FCO's capacity to
deploy staff quickly to support posts in case of emergency. Forty
eight FCO staff are currently on standby to go, at 24 hours' notice,
to provide additional support to posts around the world in case
of emergency. Sir Michael Jay told us that the FCO will be financing
these rapid deployment teams
from re-prioritisation of our resources because
it is clear to us that the ability to respond rapidly either
to consular emergencies or to the need to set up an embassy somewhere
is going to be a pretty constant part of our life in the future
and we need to be able to fund that as best we can.[215]
In June, we heard that an FCO Rapid Deployment
Team had been sent to Riyadh to support the Embassy there in the
wake of the terrorist attack. The team "supported the Embassy
for a period of some 72 hours, working around the clock, and the
Embassy were extremely grateful for the support they had."[216]
The deployment of this team was, according to Sir Michael Jay,
a result of a "lesson we learned from Bali, because in Bali
we did not respond quickly and substantially enough" after
the terrorist attack of October 2002. [217]
207. The FCO is establishing a twenty four
hour 'situation centre' within the building, to bring the resident
office clerks (who operate outside of office hours), press office
staff and consular staff into one location and to 'streamline'
their respective tasks. Sir Michael Jay told us that the FCO
aim here
bring them together into one
situation centre and also have somebody who would be working there
during working hours as well so you do have continuity particularly
in how you would initially handle a crisis as it arose either
out of hours or within hours.[218]
In February, we were told that the situation centre
would be ready by the summer. In June, however, Sir Michael Jay,
Permanent Under-Secretary at the FCO, told us that the situation
centre had been "one of the casualties of the Iraq conflict,
in that we had to put 5 per cent of our total London-based resources
into the Iraq emergency units, and inevitably that meant that
certain things could not be done
one of the things which
we could not do was put the 24-hour/seven Situation Centre into
place as soon as we would have liked." [219]
The plan is now to have the situation centre running "by
the end of August".[220]
We recommend that the Government inform us when the twenty-four
hour situation centre in the FCO is up and running.
208. A number of further developments were
under consideration when we discussed this matter with Sir Michael
Jay and his colleagues in February, including the provision of
medical support to British citizens in emergencies, measures for
evacuation of British citizens, and the establishment of call
centres to inform and support concerned relatives in the United
Kingdom. In June, we heard from Sir Michael Jay that the Rapid
Deployment Team sent to Riyadh did not have a medical component,
but others might: "we will make a decision case by case as
to whether we think there is a case for one."[221]
We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government
detail the FCO's progress towards ensuring that British citizens
affected by terrorist attacks or other emergencies abroad will
have access to adequate medical support, and how the FCO will
ensure that they can be evacuated from the country in question.
We further recommend that the FCO, in its response to this Report,
describe how call centres will be established during emergencies
to help inform concerned friends and relatives of the crisis situation.
209. Sir Michael
Jay told us that
the consular protection services that we provide
are going to become more important over the next two or three
years, higher profile and present us with new, different and quite
difficult challenges.[222]
We agree with his comments, and we are likewise convinced
that the provision of advice and protection to British citizens
travelling abroad will continue to be a very important aspect
of the FCO's work.
166