House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Tenth Report

JANUARY-JUNE 2003: THE FCO'S RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Efforts to disable al Qaeda and associated terrorist networks

165. In late 2002, before our last Report in this Inquiry was published, a series of deadly terrorist attacks had taken place in Kuwait, Indonesia, Kenya, Russia and Jordan. Those who perpetrated these attacks seemed likely to have had some connection to the al Qaeda network.[166] In our last Report, we analysed the state of al Qaeda, and concluded that

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166. In May this year, the US administration—perhaps buoyed by its successful removal of the Iraqi regime—was upbeat about progress in combating al Qaeda. On 5 May, President Bush said in a speech in Arkansas that

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167. A week after President Bush's Arkansas speech, terrorists drove a truck bomb into a residential compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 34 people. Then four days later, on 16 May, suicide bombers attacked five targets in Casablanca, Morocco; all twelve bombers and 29 victims died. In the assessment of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, the Saudi attack bore "all the fingerprints of an al Qaeda operation."[169]

THE CAPTURE OF AL QAEDA OPERATIVES

168. There have been a number of recent successes in the war against al Qaeda. Early in 2003, the US government succeeded in apprehending a number of senior al Qaeda planners and operatives. Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, a senior al Qaeda figure who had played a central role in planning the 11 September attacks, was arrested in Pakistan on 28 February. Abu Zubaydah, who ranked third on the US government's list of wanted al Qaeda suspects, and who was implicated in the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa and other al Qaeda plots, was apprehended in late March. On 26 June, Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi, who was thought to be responsible for masterminding the 12 May Riyadh bombings, was captured in Saudi Arabia.

169. These arrests are likely to have provided the US with valuable information, and to have damaged al Qaeda's capacity to plan major attacks. In spite of these major successes, however, Jane Corbin—who has studied al Qaeda for a number of years—assesses that the network is showing "an ability to regenerate and to pass on responsibilities and for new groups and new individuals to rise through the ranks."[170] Al Qaeda has been damaged by arrests of senior figures, but "it does seem to have the ability to find new fanatical groups and individuals." It also has a "department of martyrs"—undoubtedly "an indication of the strength of the recruitment that they have of people willing to give up their lives for the organisation."[171]

170. The most important al Qaeda figure, Osama bin Laden, is likely still to be alive. Jane Corbin believes that "the importance of bin Laden himself as a figurehead and as a charismatic leader obviously should not be underestimated … until he is apprehended or until he is shown to be dead, he will remain a charismatic figurehead and he will presumably continue to put out his messages, his tapes, his writings and he will act as a rallying point."[172] Osama bin Laden does not need to co-ordinate the network or to give directions for terrorist attacks; "his importance is and always has been as the figurehead at the top of it, the man who inspires, the man who gives, if you like, the inspiration for the acts."[173] In terms of the command and control of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri is thought to be far more important. However, the capture of bin Laden is, in Jane Corbin's view, "absolutely essential for the war on terror to be judged a success and to have a real impact on the continued ability of al-Qaeda to recruit."[174]

171. Apprehending al Qaeda 'foot soldiers' is also crucial to the defeat of the network. The scale of this task is daunting. Professor Paul Wilkinson, an expert in international terrorism from the University of St Andrews, warned us that al Qaeda "has more actual trained militants with expertise that can be used in terrorist operations than any previous international terrorist movement that we have known." About 17,000 individuals have been through various al Qaeda training processes.[175] Professor Wilkinson further estimates that al Qaeda operates in between 50 and 60 countries: "That is a terrifically high number compared to the geographical dispersal of any previous international terrorist organisation."[176]

172. We welcome the capture of a number of senior al Qaeda figures, in particular Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, Abu Zubaydah and Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi. We nonetheless conclude that those that remain at large—including Osama bin Laden—retain the capacity to lead and guide the organisation towards further atrocities. We further conclude that al Qaeda has dangerously large numbers of 'foot soldiers', and has demonstrated an alarming capacity to regenerate itself.

THE IRAQ WAR AND AL QAEDA

173. The war in Iraq was justified in part by the United Kingdom and United States on grounds of the risk that terrorists might obtain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime. On 8 March, President Bush stated in a radio address that terrorists would lose a "wealthy patron and protector" if Saddam Hussein were "fully and finally disarmed."[177]

174. In late March, US special forces and Iraqi Kurdish militias destroyed the camps of the terrorist group Ansar al-Islam in Northern Iraq. According to the US government, Ansar al-Islam has links with al Qaeda.[178]

175. In our December 2002 Report, we recommended that the Government "treat seriously the possibility that a war with Iraq could trigger instability in the Arab and Islamic world, and could increase the pool of recruits for al Qaeda and associated terrorist organisations there and in Western Europe."[179] In March 2003, we asked the FCO for an assessment of the short term effects of military action against Iraq on recruitment for, and the threat from, al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups, both in the Islamic world and in Western Europe.

176. The FCO replied that "It is clear that Al Qaeda is trying to exploit events in Iraq for its own purposes. Bin Laden's message of 11 February urged Muslims to unite in support of the Iraqi people in what he characterised as a war against Islam. He welcomed martyrdom operations against the US and Israel. We assess that, in the short term, Al Qaeda's stance on Iraq may encourage some misguided individuals or small groups to try to commit terrorist acts, including against coalition forces in Iraq, and elsewhere in the region or further away."[180]

177. However, the FCO estimated in late April that "In the longer term … al Qaeda's stance on Iraq will be undermined by the benefits of disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, the removal of the current Iraqi regime and evidence that the international community is making a renewed effort to advance the Middle East Peace process."[181]

178. Professor Wilkinson is more sceptical about the possibility that the Iraq war has contributed to the broader war against terrorism. He had found "no substance" to allegations that there had been collaboration between Saddam Hussein's government and al Qaeda.[182] Jane Corbin had likewise "never been able to find any concrete evidence of links between al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime, certainly not organisational links."[183]

179. The war in Iraq might in fact have impeded the war against al Qaeda. Our witnesses were concerned that it might have enhanced the appeal of al Qaeda to Muslims living the Gulf region and elsewhere. Professor Wilkinson told us that

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180. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO set out its understanding of the extent to which the war in Iraq may have affected the fight against al Qaeda and associated terrorist organisations.

AFGHANISTAN AND THE 'WAR AGAINST TERRORISM'

181. Both Jane Corbin and Paul Wilkinson stressed to us the importance of stabilising Afghanistan. Jane Corbin told us that, in her view, Osama bin Laden was likely to be in Afghanistan, "in the southern or eastern portion of the country or perhaps just over the border in what are known as the tribal territories in Pakistan."[185] She added that a

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Our witnesses were concerned that the measures taken since the end of the war in Afghanistan to remove the conditions in which terrorists thrive were insufficient. Paul Wilkinson argued that

if we were looking at it from the point of view of defeating al-Qaeda as a network, then money spent on stabilising Afghanistan would have been, in my view, far more wisely spent

than money spent on the war in Iraq. Afghanistan

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182. The Government has now decided to deploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Afghanistan. The role of the PRTs is "to aid the extension of the ATA [Afghan Transitional Authority]'s capacity, the development of a stable and secure environment in the Afghan regions and to stimulate security sector reform and reconstruction." The PRT "will initially be military-led and deploy for up to two years. It will initially comprise some 50 troops who will liaise with Afghan military forces in the region and provide the team's support and protection." However, the PRT will also include civilian staff from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development, who "will be responsible for providing political and development advice respectively."[188] We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government supply us with a memorandum detailing progress made by the United Kingdom's Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan.

183. Afghanistan was the first case of 'regime change' in the war against terrorism; Iraq is the second. The United Nations plays the leading role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, as it did in many post-conflict situations in the 1990s. The US, with its coalition partners, is leading the operation in Iraq.

184. We conclude that Afghanistan, and now Iraq, demonstrate the profound difficulties inherent in post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction operations. We conclude that the success of both operations is of central importance to the success of the 'war against terrorism'. We recommend that, in addition to devoting substantial resources to these specific operations, the Government review its overall capacity for post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND ACTION TO COUNTER INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

185. On 4 April 2003, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's ambassador to the United Nations, briefed the Security Council on the organisation's efforts to counter international terrorism. He argued that no country could prevent terrorism in isolation: only governments working together could raise global counter-terrorism capacity. Sir Jeremy reminded that Council that "It took a horrific terrorist act less than five miles from this Council Chamber to shake the international community into adopting 1373's legally binding and global standards." The vigour of a central, catalytic body could make a huge difference to the maintenance of global law and order. The UN's Counter-Terrorism Committee had become that.[189]

186. Our previous two Reports on the 'war against terrorism' have described the establishment of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), and its progress in monitoring UN member states' actions to counter terrorism and in co-ordinating international assistance against this threat. We have commended the Government's "high level of commitment" towards the CTC,[190] and have praised Sir Jeremy Greenstock, for his skilful and sensitive chairmanship of the Committee.[191]

187. In January 2003, the Security Council adopted two resolutions relating to the international campaign against terrorism. On 17 January, in Resolution 1455 (2003), the Council decided—acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—to improve the implementation of previous resolutions concerned with freezing the assets of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and to enhance co-ordination and information exchange between Council members in addressing this threat.[192] On 20 January, the Council met at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs for a meeting on Counter Terrorism, which had been called by the French presidency. After a vigorous debate, the Council adopted resolution 1456 (2003), calling on member states to "take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active and passive support to terrorism", and to bring to justice those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens. It called upon the CTC to "intensify its efforts to promote the implementation by member states of all aspects of resolution 1373 (2001)", and noted that co-operation between member states "will help facilitate the full and timely implementation of resolution 1373". International organisations were asked to "evaluate ways in which they can enhance the effectiveness of their actions against terrorism."[193]

188. The CTC has been active in a number of areas. On 6 March, it brought together a huge range of experts, professionals and representatives of States and regional organisations to establish a structured framework for dealing with terrorism.[194] Sir Jeremy Greenstock described the event as important for establishing a global structure in concrete terms—and especially in enhancing the flow of information between organisations.[195] The CTC has also met with representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the World Customs Organization and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), in order to develop better means of ensuring that terrorists do not obtain weapons of mass destruction.[196]

189. Sir Jeremy Greenstock has now handed over chairmanship of the CTC to his Spanish counterpart. At the conclusion of his presentation to the Security Council on 4 April, Sir Jeremy suggested that the Counter-Terrorism Committee might perhaps, one day, become something more than it is now: a full-time, professional and global body of experts, working with the Council, but following up all avenues which resolution 1373 had opened.[197]

190. We agree with Sir Jeremy Greenstock's assertion that no country can prevent terrorism in isolation. We recommend that the Government consider carefully Sir Jeremy's suggestion that the Counter-Terrorism Committee develop into a full-time body of terrorism experts, capable of providing support to member states over an extended period of time.

TACKLING THE FINANCING OF TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS

191. In its response to our last report, the Government informed us that it was "looking to deliver a range of technical assistance programmes to help states with implementing their international obligations" regarding terrorist financing.[198] The FCO is currently funding the Commonwealth Secretariat to assist states in implementing the 12 existing UN counter terrorism conventions, and in drafting domestic counter-terrorism legislation. The FCO is also funding a Charity Commission programme to help charities to ensure they are neither knowingly nor unknowingly misused to support terrorist activities, primarily through financing activities.[199]

192. We welcome these efforts to counter terrorist financing. Progress has undoubtedly been made: Professor Wilkinson told us that $121.5 million in financing for terrorists has been now blocked in Western banks.[200]

193. However, much work remains to be done in stopping terrorists' access to funds. Professor Wilkinson explained that terrorists can avoid Western banks by sending money "through the informal system of transfers in the Middle Eastern banking system". Professor Wilkinson describes this as "a big loophole" in efforts to stop terrorists from obtaining funds.[201]

194. We also heard in evidence from Professor Wilkinson and Jane Corbin that terrorists are using organised crime—"things like credit card fraud, using front companies and then establishing the smuggling of various commodities as another lucrative means of bringing in money." Professor Wilkinson argued that

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195. We remain concerned that al Qaeda and associated organisations retain access to the funds necessary to carry out terror attacks. We recommend that the Government continue to sponsor projects to assist other states in their efforts to prevent terrorists from transferring and accessing funds, through the banking system and through charities—especially with states in the Arab world. We recommend that the Government in its response to this Report provide us with an update of its action in this crucial area.

AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF AL QAEDA

196. Our witnesses felt that progress in addressing the threat from al Qaeda had been exaggerated by the Bush administration. Professor Wilkinson told us that

I do not think that serious observers of al-Qaeda's activities really did believe that the organisation was a finished organisation or that it was in such a very serious state of disarray that one could really talk about it being on the run. The implication was that it was really falling apart. I do not think that that would be an accurate description.[

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Jane Corbin, who has also studied al Qaeda for several years, agreed that although "in the immediate months after the Americans began their war against terror in Afghanistan, there was a huge effect on al-Qaeda,"[204] the network has now been able to regroup. Jane Corbin told us that the waves of al Qaeda operatives who had been trained in Afghanistan went back to the regions from which they came—the Philippines, the Far East, North Africa and the Gulf—and formed "a second drive".[205]

197. We conclude that, in spite of some notable progress, al Qaeda continues to pose a substantial threat to British citizens in the United Kingdom and abroad.

Protecting British citizens from international terrorism

Travel Advice

198. On 12 October 2002, explosive devices were detonated outside a packed nightclub in Kuta Beach, Bali. 24 Britons were among the 190 people killed. On 21 October, the Foreign Secretary launched a review of the FCO's travel advice system. He announced that "all intelligence" relating to the Bali attack would be made to the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), which would "consider this and then reach their own conclusions upon it."[206] On 28 November, while the Travel Advice review was under way, another terrorist attack occurred at a hotel popular with Israelis in Mombasa, Kenya.

199. The ISC Report was published on 11 December 2002. It concluded that, prior to the Bali bomb attack, FCO Travel Advice "did not accurately reflect the threat or recent developments, although it was proportional to the then current Security Service assessment." The ISC further stated that "FCO Travel Advice is not well formulated and consequently it does not highlight the key points, particularly risks—they get lost in the complexity of the document... the whole issue of FCO Travel Advice, its purpose, target audience and presentation needs to be examined by the FCO as a matter of urgency."[207]

200. We looked at Travel Advice in our own December 2002 Report, and noted that

No specific warning was issued by the FCO in advance of the Bali attack, nor were British citizens warned of a potential attack in Kenya—despite the fact that the German and Australian governments issued public warnings in mid-November that militants were planning to attack Western targets specifically in Mombasa.

We recommended that the Government publish and implement the results of its review of the travel advice system at the earliest opportunity, and also that it supply us with a full description of the process according to which travel advice is agreed among Government departments and issued to the public.[208]

201. On 3 February, we held an evidence session with Sir Michael Jay, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Mr Dickie Stagg, Director, Information, Mr Rob Macaire, head of the Counter-Terrorism Policy Department, and Mr Edward Chaplin, Director, Middle East and North Africa Department. The purpose of our session was to discuss the FCO's Travel Advice system, and progress with reform of the system since the Bali bombing.

202. Our discussions with the FCO officials, and evidence submitted in writing to the Committee, have highlighted the great difficulties inherent in the provision of sound travel advice. While Posts are responsible for recommending changes to Travel Advice, they are also responsible for maintaining good relations with their host country, and for promoting British commercial interests abroad. Both of the latter responsibilities might discourage Posts from recommending changes to Travel Advice.

203. The FCO states that changes to Travel Advice are prompted in two ways: first, for non-intelligence related changes, the British post in the country concerned will, on the basis of its own knowledge and its network of contacts, recommend changes. Secondly, however, the FCO receives reports and assessments from the intelligence agencies, which may be the basis for changes to our Travel Advice. Posts are required to reconsider their Travel Advice every month, and if they believe a change is needed, they should recommend this immediately.

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204. The ISC reported in December that

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The FCO, as the customer of the intelligence agencies, needs to be able to process this increased amount intelligence material; accordingly it is increasing staffing levels "all the way down the chain" in the Counter-Terrorism Policy Department. The Consular Department is also being expanded to help the FCO "to cope with what is going inevitably an inexorable growth of cases."[211] We commend the FCO's decision to increase staffing levels in the Counter-Terrorism Policy Department and the Consular Department, and recommend that the levels currently agreed are kept under review.

205. The FCO had, by February, already made a number of changes to its communication of travel advice. All 209 travel advisories on the FCO website have now been revised "to give a higher profile to the question of terrorism and the likelihood of terrorist attacks"[212] and "to make the travel advice more user friendly, more readily understandable, to try and make certain that it is in better English."[213] The Plain English Association had been consulted to help ensure that travel advisories were readily comprehensible to the public. The FCO is also looking at the travel advice of other countries, and adding hyperlinks from its own website to the foreign ministries of other countries. This means that

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206. We discussed the FCO's capacity to deploy staff quickly to support posts in case of emergency. Forty eight FCO staff are currently on standby to go, at 24 hours' notice, to provide additional support to posts around the world in case of emergency. Sir Michael Jay told us that the FCO will be financing these rapid deployment teams

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207. The FCO is establishing a twenty four hour 'situation centre' within the building, to bring the resident office clerks (who operate outside of office hours), press office staff and consular staff into one location and to 'streamline' their respective tasks. Sir Michael Jay told us that the FCO

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In February, we were told that the situation centre would be ready by the summer. In June, however, Sir Michael Jay, Permanent Under-Secretary at the FCO, told us that the situation centre had been "one of the casualties of the Iraq conflict, in that we had to put 5 per cent of our total London-based resources into the Iraq emergency units, and inevitably that meant that certain things could not be done … one of the things which we could not do was put the 24-hour/seven Situation Centre into place as soon as we would have liked."[219] The plan is now to have the situation centre running "by the end of August".[220] We recommend that the Government inform us when the twenty-four hour situation centre in the FCO is up and running.

208. A number of further developments were under consideration when we discussed this matter with Sir Michael Jay and his colleagues in February, including the provision of medical support to British citizens in emergencies, measures for evacuation of British citizens, and the establishment of call centres to inform and support concerned relatives in the United Kingdom. In June, we heard from Sir Michael Jay that the Rapid Deployment Team sent to Riyadh did not have a medical component, but others might: "we will make a decision case by case as to whether we think there is a case for one."[221] We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government detail the FCO's progress towards ensuring that British citizens affected by terrorist attacks or other emergencies abroad will have access to adequate medical support, and how the FCO will ensure that they can be evacuated from the country in question. We further recommend that the FCO, in its response to this Report, describe how call centres will be established during emergencies to help inform concerned friends and relatives of the crisis situation.

209. Sir Michael Jay told us that

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We agree with his comments, and we are likewise convinced that the provision of advice and protection to British citizens travelling abroad will continue to be a very important aspect of the FCO's work.

166 Second Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 196, paras 63-76 Back

167 Ibid., para 76 Back

168 Remarks by the President on the Jobs and Growth Plan, Robinson Center, Little Rock, Arkansas, 5 May 2003, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030505-4.html Back

169 'US worried about more al Qaeda attacks', CNN, 14 May 2003, available at:http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/13/saudi.blast/. Back

170 Q 330 Back

171 Q 330 Back

172 Q 320 Back

173 Q 320 Back

174 Q 320 Back

175 Q 331 Back

176 Q 331 Back

177 President Bush's radio address, 8 March 2003, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030308-1.html Back