DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVES TO REGIME
CHANGE
248. In our December 2002 Report, we noted
that
senior [Bush] administration figures have …
suggested that the United States has a right to change the Iraqi
regime—or other threatening states—in self-defence
… United States policy is now to 'forestall or prevent ...
hostile acts' by adversaries, because 'in an age when the enemies
of civilisation openly and actively seek the world's most destructive
technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers
gather.'[261]
We expressed anxiety about the development by the
US of "an expanded doctrine of 'pre-emptive self-defence,'",
because of the "serious risk that this will be taken as legitimising
the aggressive use of force by other, less law-abiding states."[262]
249. On 28 March 2003, US Secretary of Defence
Donald Rumsfeld issued warnings that "We have information
that shipments of military supplies have been crossing the border
from Syria into Iraq, including night-vision goggles. These deliveries
pose a direct threat to the lives of coalition forces. We consider
such trafficking as hostile acts and will hold the Syrian government
accountable for such shipments." Secretary Rumsfeld also
warned that the Badr Corps, the "military wing of the Supreme
Council on Islamic Revolution in Iraq", was operating in
Iraq from its base in Iran. "The Badr Corps is trained, equipped
and directed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard", Rumsfeld
stated, "and we will hold the Iranian government responsible
for their actions." When asked if the United States was threatening
military action against Syria, he replied: "I'm saying exactly
what I'm saying. It was carefully phrased."[263]
250. Secretary Rumsfeld's comments added
to widespread concern that the US was planning a rolling programme
of 'regime change'.[264]
On 2 April, in response to questions about Rumsfeld's comments,
the Foreign Secretary replied that Britain would have "nothing
whatever" to do with military action against Iran and Syria.[265]
We commend the position that the Foreign Secretary has taken in
the present circumstances.
251. In this and earlier Reports, we have
set out in some detail the months of diplomatic wrangling that
this Government expended on addressing the threat from Iraq. We
have described in this Report how the United Kingdom's participation
in a military operation to secure 'regime change' in Iraq has
divided us from some of our closest allies, and may even have
weakened the intergovernmental organisations that have for decades
helped to foster British and international security. The military
operation in Iraq resulted in the deaths of British service personnel
and many Iraqi civilians; and after the conflict, British troops
and officials remain engaged in a deeply complex and dangerous
operation to stabilise and reconstruct post-war Iraq. The Government's
rationale for undertaking the operation—to end the threat
posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction—is, as we make
this Report to the House, still in doubt.
252. In its response to our December 2002
Report, the Government stated that "Disarming Iraq removes
the very real and catastrophic threat of international terrorists
getting hold of weapons of mass destruction". In a later
memorandum, sent to the Committee in April, the Government made
a correction to its earlier statement: "The Government's
response to the Committee … should have referred to the removal
of 'a' rather than 'the' threat of terrorist access to WMD."[266]
Terrorists might still obtain weapons of mass destruction from
a number of state sources, either through official state sponsorship
of these groups or through poor controls over dangerous materials.
Controlling the development of weapons of mass destruction by
proliferating states must remain a high priority for the Government,
as must securing nuclear materials and other dangerous substances
in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. We are especially concerned
about developments in North Korea since it conceded, in October
2002, that it was pursuing a clandestine Highly Enriched Uranium
nuclear weapons programme in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the Framework Agreement made with the United States in
1994 and other international obligations. We hope that the current
efforts to secure a formula for progress with North Korea in a
regional context will have positive results, but remain deeply
concerned by the dangers posed by this 'arch proliferator'.
253. The Government has diplomatic relations
with North Korea, and has has made representations about its nuclear
activities to the North Koreans on a number of occasions, both
in London and Pyongyang. We welcome the Government's engagement,
bilaterally and through multilateral initiatives, in efforts to
resolve the crisis over North Korea.
254. In addition to engagement in the resolution
of specific proliferation problems, the Government argues that
strengthening international counter-proliferation regimes is important,
and worthwhile: "The multilateral treaty regimes raise the
political cost of pursuing WMD. When underpinned by effective
inspection regimes, such as those of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW), they also raise the economic cost."[267]
The United Kingdom is an active member of the Nuclear Suppliers'
Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control
Regime, which focus on improving national and multilateral export
controls on sensitive materials, technology and expertise.
255. The Government has also agreed to provide
US$750 million over the next ten years to support the G8 Global
Partnership for co-operative threat reduction programmes. The
Global Partnership supports projects to prevent the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, providing for chemical weapons destruction,
safe disposition of weapons-usable plutonium, dismantlement of
submarines and secure storage of nuclear fuel in the former Soviet
Union. It also supports the retraining and employment for former
Soviet nuclear scientists. On 26 June 2003, the Government signed
a "landmark agreement" to enable the United Kingdom
to start spending £30m tackling Russia's nuclear Cold War
legacy. According to this agreement, the United Kingdom will initiate
projects to dismantle decommissioned nuclear submarines and safely
store tonnes of spent nuclear fuel. The Government is also committing
£10m to the Northern Dimension Environmental Programme, which
is managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and which "will include several major projects to deal with
spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste, all of which will
complement the UK's bilateral activities."[268]
We commend the Government's decision to provide substantial
funds in support of the G8 Global Partnership for co-operative
threat reduction, and welcome the agreement signed with the Russian
Federation on 26 June regarding United Kingdom involvement in
the disposal of Russian nuclear materials.
256. We hope
that these measures will help ensure that dangerous technology
and materials do not fall into the hands of terrorists. We further
note, however, that the sale or supply of information and materials
through the internet is crucial but very difficult to for governments
control. We recommend that the Government consider carefully
how it might control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
through the internet.
257. We were pleased to read that the United
Kingdom's objectives at the Chemical Weapons Convention Review
Conference had largely been achieved—in particular, those
ensuring agreement to proposed measures to "reinforce commitment
to the challenge inspection mechanism as an important and accepted
part of the verification system", to
promote acceptance of the need for verification
practice and coverage to adjust so as take account of changes
in industry, and in particular the need for more thorough inspection
of declared facilities dealing with non-Scheduled chemicals.[269]
We welcome the outcome of the May 2003 Chemical
Weapons Conference on challenge inspection, and recommend that
the Government in its response to this Report provide us with
an update on progress in implementing the measures agreed at this
Conference.
258. We believe that inspections mechanisms
may have an important role to play in international non-proliferation
regimes. However, we recall the Foreign Secretary's comments to
the UN Security Council in February, that
without that full and active co-operation, however
strong the inspectors' powers, however good the inspectors, inspections
in a country as huge as Iraq could never be sure of finding all
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.[270]
The Foreign Secretary recalled in February that under
the previous UN inspections regime in Iraq, the inspectors had
found no trace of Iraq's biological weapons programme and it had
taken "the defection of Saddam's own son-in-law to uncover"
the programme.[271]
The Prime Minister told the House on 26 February that "The
idea that the inspectors could conceivably sniff out the weapons
and documentation relating to them without the help of the Iraqi
authorities is absurd."[272]
These comments suggest that the Government has little confidence
in the capacity of international weapons inspections regimes to
uncover biological weapon programmes, except in cases where suspected
governments comply fully and actively with inspectors.
259. The Foreign Secretary argued in his
statement to the Security Council on 14 February that "this
issue is not just about Iraq, it's how we deal with proliferators
elsewhere across the globe."[273]
We recommend that the Government set out in detail the lessons
that can be learnt from the experience of UN weapons inspections
in Iraq for the future monitoring and verification of suspected
biological weapons programmes.
260. We have
examined the prospects for a verification Protocol to the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention at some length, in a Report published
in December 2002, and then in a further Report published in May
2003.[274] The US government
has opposed the establishment of such a Protocol, and in our May
2003 Report, we asked the Government to clarify whether or not
it would support a verification Protocol to the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention only if the Protocol in question were
agreed by the US. The Government replied that "For the Protocol
to be meaningful, it would have to ensure the participation of
other States Parties that are important in global and regional
terms, or in the scale of their biodefence or industrial activities."
To achieve a broad-based agreement on such a Protocol, "US
support remains critical." Clearly US support is not forthcoming—in
fact "For the US the very concept [of a verification Protocol]
was fatally flawed."[275]
261. The Government's approach is that while
it "continues to support the principle of the need to strengthen
the BWC through detailed implementation/verification arrangements
… as long as there is no prospect of the US Administration
accepting the need for such a Protocol, the UK will not support
its establishment; such a Protocol would be meaningless, create
a false sense of security and impose an unfair burden on our industry
and biodefence programmes which would not be borne elsewhere.
"[276] The Government
also states that its "efforts and political capital are better
targeted towards securing a productive outcome in the BWC Review
Conference's work programme for 2003-2005, which will involve
all State Parties", than in efforts to try to resurrect the
BTWC draft Protocol. It states that "Both the UK and US are
already playing an active role in the preparations for this first
Experts' meeting in August. Incremental efforts in the areas identified
by the work programme will, in the Government's view, lead to
a re-engagement by the international community in cooperative
efforts to combat BW proliferation."[277]
262. We recommend that the Government
do its utmost to ensure that international co-operation to combat
the proliferation of biological weapons is reinvigorated at the
August 2003 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference.
263. In its April
memorandum to us, the Government states that "All elements
of the counter-proliferation 'toolbox' are necessary; none is
sufficient in itself." It points out "Proliferation
poses a global challenge and requires a collective international
response"—accordingly "the Government is working
with partners and allies bilaterally, in the EU, the G8, NATO,
and through the United Nations Security Council." It further
argues that
WMD programmes are justified by security concerns
however misconceived these may be. In addition to raising the
costs of such programmes, it is also possible to reduce the perceived
benefits. In that respect, the Government's actions to revitalise
the Middle East Peace Process, to encourage India and Pakistan
to resolve their differences, to bring lasting stability to the
Korean Peninsula and to eliminate the threats posed by Iraq to
its neighbours also further non-proliferation objectives.[278]
264. The Government's comments on non-proliferation
reflect the complexity of security threats which face the United
Kingdom, almost two years after the beginning of the 'war against
terrorism'. We cannot conclude that these threats have diminished
significantly, in spite of 'regime change' in Iraq and progress
in capturing some of the leaders of al Qaeda. In the wake of the
Iraq war, we recommend that the Government make it a priority
to work towards restoring the cohesion of the United Kingdom's
international partnerships, better to face the daunting challenges
of the continuing 'war against terrorism'.
223 
