Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office
Letter to the Head, Parliamentary Relations
and Devolution Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, from
the Clerk of the Committee
The Committee has been following with interest
recent developments in North Korea, particularly North Korea's
admission that it has been pursuing a uranium enrichment programme,
and its announcement that it intends to resume activity at the
Yongbyan nuclear facility and to expel IAEA inspectors, in contravention
of the 1994 agreement.
I would be grateful to receive a memorandum
on the situation in North Korea on or before Tuesday 28 January.
Any classified or confidential material should be clearly marked
as such and included as a separate annex.
Clerk
Foreign Affairs Committee
9 January 2003
Letter to the Clerk from the Parliamentary
Relations and Devolution Department, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office
Thank you for your letter of 9 January asking
for a memorandum about North Korea and its nuclear weapons programme.
I enclose an unclassified memorandum which includes a Restricted
annex[1].
I would be grateful if you could ensure that the classification
of the annex is respected, in accordance with FAC standard practice.
Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
January 2003
NORTH KOREA
BACKGROUND
1. In early October, officials from the
North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted to US Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly that the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (DPRK) had been pursuing a clandestine Highly Enriched
Uranium (HEU) nuclear weapons programme. The programme is a breach
of North Korea's obligations under various agreements including
the:
— Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
— Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403)
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
— 1992 bilateral agreement between
DPRK and South Korea (ROK).
— 1994 US/DPRK Agreed Framework.
2. The situation bears some resemblance
to that of 1993-94, when the DPRK was also in breach of its international
agreements and attempted to withdraw from the NPT. The situation
eventually culminated in the 1994 US/DPRK Agreed Framework. Under
the Agreed Framework, North Korea promised to freeze activity
on a separate plutonium-based nuclear programme in exchange for
the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and
provision of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) from the US.
3. Despite statements to the contrary by
the international community. North Korea maintained (and continues
to maintain) that the nuclear issue was a bilateral problem that
could be resolved only by the US. They claimed that President
Bush had been pursuing a hostile policy towards the DPRK, having
referred to it as a member of the "Axis of Evil". They
also claimed that the recent US security reviews (the Nuclear
Posture Review, US National Security Strategy and the US National
Strategy to combat WMD) represented a threat by the US of a pre-emptive
nuclear strike against DPRK. On 25 October, the North Korean Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement demanding that the
US should:
— recognise the sovereignty of the
DPRK;
— refrain from damaging the economic
development of the DPRK: and
— sign a non-aggression treaty with
the DPRK.
4. As a result of the HEU admission. The
Executive Board of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation
(KEDO) decided on 14 November to suspend HFO deliveries, beginning
with the December shipment. The North Koreans saw the suspension
of HFO shipments as a deliberate attempt by the US to stifle economic
growth in the DPRK. They also claimed that the US was itself in
breach of the 1994 Agreed Framework since construction work on
the LWRs had been delayed. (The delay had in fact largely been
caused by DPRK bureaucracy and foot-dragging.)
5. The US has said that it would not respond
to blackmail: there would be no dialogue until North Korea had
dismantled its nuclear weapons programme in a visible and verifiable
manner. Furthermore, no new agreement could be made with North
Korea whilst it was in breach of previous bilateral and international
agreements.
6. The DPRK responded by taking a number
of increasingly provocative steps in the nuclear field, juxtaposed
with declarations that it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons
at this time. On 12 December, it announced that the freeze on
its nuclear activities would be lifted immediately, following
the suspension by KEDO of HFO deliveries. On 21 December, the
DPRK removed seals and monitoring equipment from a mothballed
5MW nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, where spent fuel rods had been
stored under IAEA supervision since 1994. On 27 December, the
DPRK announced that the IAEA inspectors were to be expelled from
Yongbyon. They subsequently left DPRK on 31 December. On 10 January,
the DPRK announced its withdrawal[2]
from the NPT.
US POSITION
7. The US has continued to take a measured
approach, joining in international condemnation of North Korea's
nuclear activities and seeking diplomatic pressure on the regime
to comply with its international obligations. It has declined
to negotiate until North Korea returns to compliance with its
international obligations. At the same time, the US has stated
that it recognises the sovereignty of North Korea, that it has
no hostile intent toward North Korea, and that it has no plan
to resolve the issue by military means. It has consulted widely
with its regional allies Japan and South Korea (ROK) and other
members of the international community. In international fora,
too, the US has been active: in KEDO, where the US is the major
contributor alongside Japan, ROK, the EU and Australia; in the
IAEA and in the United Nations.
8. The US is content for the issue to be
discussed at the UN Security Council. They hope, in the meantime,
that international pressure on North Korea—particularly
from Russia and China (see below)—will help towards resolving
the issue by diplomacy. The latest US proposal, for "P5+5"
talks (involving the five permanent members of the Security Council
plus ROK, Japan, the EU, Australia and DPRK), was rejected by
the DPRK when it was raised by ROK during the recent inter-Korean
talks.
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY
(IAEA)
9. The IAEA Board of Governors has met twice
to pass resolutions on DPRK in response to recent events. The
first resolution was passed on 29 November, urging North Korea
to comply with its international obligations. The removal of seals
and monitoring equipment from Yongbyon provided sufficient grounds
to refer the matter to the UN Security Council, but the Board
of Governors decided on 6 January to issue a second resolution,
giving DPRK one last chance to comply with its commitments before
such action was taken.
CHINESE/RUSSIAN
POSITIONS
10. China and Russia are key players, having
close historical and commercial links with the DPRK. Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Losyukov visited Pyongyang in mid-January, but
almost six hours of talks with Kim Jong II appear to have produced
no tangible results. China is reported to be considering a high
level visit shortly. Both Russia and China have expressed a strong
preference for a diplomatic solution. Western governments have
been encouraging Russia and China to bring home to the DPRK that
the international community is united, and that Pyongyang needs
to take some action to come back into compliance.
JAPANESE/SOUTH
KOREAN POSITIONS
11. Japan and South Korea are the two regional
allies of the US. Neither has diplomatic relations with North
Korea. Japan continues to work closely with ROK and the US for
a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue. Japan's talks with
DPR.K on the normalisation of relations, which had showed signs
of improvement during the latter part of 2002, have been suspended.
12. South Korea is also pressing hard for a
peaceful solution. It has lived with DPRK provocation for almost
50 years, and continues to share with North Korea the ultimate
goal of reunification. Since a ground-breaking Summit in June
2000, there have been a series of inter-Korean contacts up to
Ministerial level, but the DPRK maintains that the nuclear issue
can only be resolved on a bilateral basis with the US. Nevertheless,
a South Korean Presidential envoy is in Pyongyang from 27 to 30
January to raise the nuclear issue with Kim Jong Il.
UK POSITION
13. The UK established diplomatic relations
with the DPRK on 12 December 2000, and opened its Embassy in Pyongyang
in July 2001 as one of the three EU member states (along with
Sweden and Germany) represented there. In London, the DPRK was
represented by a non-resident Chargé d'Affaires until November
2002, when three North Korean diplomats arrived to establish an
Embassy. Bilateral relations have enabled us to raise issues of
concern—including the nuclear issue and human rights—directly
with DPRK officials in Pyongyang and London. Until the end of
2002, the UK held the local EU Presidency in Pyongyang on behalf
of Denmark (a role which passed to Germany in January, on behalf
of Greece).
14. As a Depositary power of the NPT and
a leading supporter of the Treaty, we have a close interest in
resolving the DPRK nuclear issue. We hosted a meeting of the P3
(UK, France, US) on 15 January. As a Nuclear Weapons State and
a member of the P5, we have an important role to play in both
IAEA and UN Security Council discussions. The US has also encouraged
us to take a role in any multilateral discussions that may take
place, in our capacity as an NPT Nuclear Weapons State (NWS).
In the EU, too, we have played an active role both during and
following our role as local EU Presidency in Pyongyang.
15. The UK has made representations about
DPRK's nuclear activities to the North Koreans on a number of
occasions, both in London and Pyongyang. Specifically, representations
were made by our new Ambassador to Pyongyang, David Slinn, who
arrived in mid-November, during his introductory calls on the
President, the Foreign Minister and Vice Foreign Minister. He
also delivered a demarche on behalf of the EU at the end of December.
Further representations were made, including to the DPRK Chargé
d'Affaires in London, on 10 January following the announcement
by the DPRK of its intention to withdraw from the NPT. In all
these contacts, we have made clear our concern to the DPRK authorities,
and have advised them to comply with their international obligations.
EU ACTIVITY
16. The EU has discussed the nuclear issue
regularly. It has expressed support for the US, Japan and ROK,
and has encouraged Russia and China to engage more closely with
North Korea. North Korea claims to hold the EU in high regard,
and has urged it to influence US thinking, despite regular reminders
that the EU fully supports the US position.
17. EU Foreign Ministers discussed North
Korea at the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)
meeting on 18/19 November. Conclusions from that meeting called
upon North Korea to reduce regional tension and to comply with
its international obligations. The GAERC met again on 27 January,
when EU Foreign Ministers agreed that preparations for a possible
future high level visit to Pyongyang should begin.
NEXT STEPS:
DPRK[3]
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
January 2003
1 Not printed. Back
2
(Article X of the NPT makes provision for withdrawal, under demonstration
of "extraordinary events" which threaten the national
interest, after a period of three months notice. North Korea argued
that, since it had suspended its previous withdrawal notice in
1993 with just 24 hours to go, the lifting of that suspension
would enable it to withdraw after 24 hours. This view is not accepted
by the IAEA, the US, Russia, ROK, the EU and others: they maintain
that DPRK remains bound by the provisions of the NPT until the
requisite notice has been provided and served out.) Back
3
Not printed. Back
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