Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence


Supplementary memorandum from the Bahá'í Community of the United Kingdom

The Situation of the Bahá'í Community in Iran

SUMMARY

  1.  The Bahá'í faith is a monotheistic religion with over six million followers in over 200 nations and territories throughout the globe. It started in Iran in the mid-nineteenth century, the birthplace of two religious teachers whom all Bahá'ís revere as messengers or prophets with a divinely ordained mission. The first of these, the Ba«b was executed by the government of the time and the other, Baha«'u'lla«h, was imprisoned, tortured and exiled to Syrian Palestine in what is now Israel.

  2.  From the earliest days of the Bahá'í community in Iran it's members have faced violent oppression. Whilst Iranian Bahá'ís have always endured persecution in the land of their birth, conditions for them deteriorated markedly after the 1979 Revolution. It has been the policy of the Iranian government since the revolution to treat the Bahá'ís as "unprotected infidels" and to deny them fundamental rights. The Iranian state's treatment of this community has included executions, torture, imprisonment, arbitrary detention and the denial of a great number of rights including, the right to education and the right to organise as a peaceful religion. Legal rights, property rights, and pension rights are regularly denied to Bahá'ís and access to employment and travel documents are also often blocked. A concerted campaign of propaganda has been waged by Iran's government to vilify the Bahá'ís and to misrepresent and grossly distort the Bahá'í beliefs and practices to the population at large.

  3.  Violence and repression of the Bahá'í community became so serious that in 1985 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights made specific mention of the issue in a resolution that condemned Iran for human rights abuses. Resolutions at the Commission and also at the General Assembly continued to raise the plight of the Bahá'ís until 2002 when a resolution at the Commission was narrowly defeated. In the period since then the situation for the Bahá'ís in Iran has deteriorated. The government of Iran is known to have an official policy that is aimed at blocking the progress of the Bahá'ís, and makes provision for continuous pressure on the viability of this community. Incidents of discriminatory behaviour towards Bahá'ís are on the increase and the hopes for better human rights for all of Iran's people that have been held out by the reformists in Iranian politics have failed to materialise.

The Bahá'ís of Iran—the current situation

  4.  Outwardly, it would seem that the situation has improved somewhat in recent years There has been a shift away from long-term imprisonment, although four Bahá'ís remain imprisoned on grounds of their beliefs. Since 1998 however the authorities have developed a widespread pattern of short-term detention for Bahá'ís. This practice is more difficult to monitor and report to the international community, but serves well as an effective means of constant harassment.

  5.  Other hopeful signs include measures that enable Bahá'í couples to register their marriages, and the greater ease with which Bahá'ís are now able to obtain passports. There have been several encouraging statements by Iranian representatives in international fora, including comments on new laws on the right to citizenship.

  6.  We welcome these statements, but we have yet to see any evidence that "the right to citizenship" legislation is being implemented. The following patterns of persecution persist:

    —  Bahá'ís are still incarcerated because of their religious beliefs, two of them sentenced to life in prison.

    —  Bahá'ís are subject to arbitrary detention and all Bahá'ís suffer from discrimination in social, economic, legal and educational matters.

    —  Confiscated Bahá'í property has not been returned, and Bahá'í property continues to be confiscated.

    —  The Bahá'í community has for over 20 years been denied the right to elect its administrative institutions, around which the communal, spiritual and social activities of Bahá'ís revolve.

  7.  Iranian representatives have spoken in encouraging terms about improving rights for religious minorities. It is imperative to understand that any language concerning religious minorities probably does not apply to the Bahá'ís. The Bahá'ís are labelled as a "mislead sect" or a political movement of some kind and therefore are consistently not recognised as a religious minority.

  8.  Persecution of the Iranian Bahá'í community is ongoing and current. On January 7 2003 we learned of the case of a Bahá'í, who has had his appeal for the return of his confiscated property rejected by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. A lower court confiscated his property on the grounds that he held Bahá'í classes in this home and that over 900 Bahá'í books were found there. The court upheld the previous ruling.

  9.  The policy of denying Bahá'ís access to education also continues. On July 19 2002 the Bahá'í Institute for Higher Education was holding examinations in several locations across the country. In the city of Shiraz Revolutionary Guards entered three separate premises and undertook to video the proceedings, interviewed several of the students and confiscated the examination papers of 25 students. In the city of Mashad five locations were raided in similar fashion and all examination papers were confiscated, together with Bahá'í books. The government clearly maintains a close level of scrutiny on Bahá'ís seeking to educate themselves.

  10.  In November of last year Iran's Parliament approved a bill granting equal compensation in "blood money" to the recognised minorities of Iran. Bahá'ís are not recognised as such. In March of 2002 Mr Javad Bagshani was found guilty of two acts of involuntary manslaughter, killing Mr Zuhuru'llah Hidayati and Mr Mihdi Fana'iyan, also injuring three others, in a driving accident. Court documents reveal that Mr Bagshani admitted negligence and was subsequently sentenced to three years of discretionary imprisonment. However, the document also notes that the victims, both dead and injured, were Bahá'ís and as such blood money is not applicable to them. The language in the provisional translation of the court documents refers to the "Bahá'í sect" and concludes that ". . . from the perspective of human rights, and as to the issue of blood money, (the court has) decided to acquit the accused and clear him of any obligation." Human Rights Watch's Elahé Sharifpour-Hicks has commented on the inequality of the blood money legislation in a recent interview with Radio Farda.

Developments since the Iranian revolution

  11.  With the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, a new chapter in the persecution of the Bahá'ís of Iran was opened. The new constitution recognised Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians as religious minorities, thus leaving out the Bahá'ís.

  12.  What this has come to mean in practice is that the Bahá'í were to enjoy no rights of any sort, and that they could be attacked and persecuted with impunity. Just one example of this occurred near the city of Rasht on 6 July 1997 when Shahram Reza'i, a young army conscript, was shot in the head and killed by his superior officer, allegedly in error. Once it was determined that the dead soldier was a Bahá'í the officer was released, and a court excused him from paying blood money. A total of seven Bahá'ís have been killed by officers and fellow soldiers whilst serving compulsory military service.

  13.  Courts in Iran have denied Bahá'ís the right of legal redress or protection from assault and killings. Citizens who kill or injure Bahá'ís are not liable for damages because their victims are "unprotected infidels". The Bahá'ís have also found themselves without legal protection in a matters such as the expropriation of their property, denial of pensions and other civil rights.

  14.  The full extent of persecution of Bahá'ís in Iran from 1979 to present day cannot be fully captured in a document of this length. The assault on the Bahá'í community has been extensive and varied in its form, employing methods of outright brutality but also more nuanced and subtle ways of undermining the viability of the Bahá'ís. The Iranian state has waged a campaign against a religious minority of its own citizens that has been characterised by physical, spiritual, psychological and economic means.

  15.  The major hall marks of this campaign can be summarised as follows:

    —  Over 200 Bahá'ís have been executed, assassinated or have died in other violent circumstances. A further number have disappeared and are presumed dead.

    —  Bahá'ís are arrested and imprisoned or detained on grounds of their beliefs.

    —  The right of the Bahá'í community to assemble and maintain its democratically elected governing bodies has been denied. These institutions, known as assemblies, perform many of the functions assumed by clergy in other religions.

    —  An entire generation of Bahá'ís has been systematically barred from higher education unless they recant their faith. The community has established its own higher education programme, the Bahá'í Institute for Higher Education, to offer degree level education to some of their young people. In September of 1998 officers of the Ministry of Information raided a number of homes that were involved in this programme, arresting faculty members, seizing text books and computers.

    —  Bahá'í cemeteries, holy places, historical sites, administrative centres and other assets were seized after the Revolution. None have been returned and many have been destroyed.

    —  The property rights of individual Bahá'ís have been generally disregarded. Large numbers of private and business properties belonging to Bahá'ís have been arbitrarily confiscated.

    —  More than 10,000 Bahá'ís have been dismissed from their positions in government and educational institutions because of their religious beliefs. Recently we have seen the government put pressure on private employers to dismiss Bahá'í employees. The authorities also attempt to block Bahá'ís who try to start a private business. Pensions have been terminated on religious grounds and some Bahá'ís have even been required to return salaries and pensions paid to them before dismissal.

    —  The right to inheritance is denied to Bahá'ís.

The official policy of Iran

  16.  In 1993 UN Special Representative, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl uncovered a secret government memorandum aimed at establishing policy on "the Bahá'í question". The document had been drawn up in 1991 by the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council and is signed personally by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The document specifically calls for Bahá'ís to be treated in such a way "that their progress and development shall be blocked", providing conclusive evidence that the campaign against the Bahá'ís is directed from central government.

  17.  Its provisions appear to grant a measure of protection to Bahá'ís, but its overall aim is to create an environment where the Bahá'í community of Iran will be quietly eliminated. It is clear from the summary of recommendations that the Government aims to keep the Bahá'ís illiterate and uneducated, living at subsistence level and fearful of imprisonment.

  18.  This document is vital to any true understanding of the plight of the Iranian Bahá'í community for several reasons. It demonstrates that persecution of the Bahá'ís comes from the very highest level of Iran's leadership. It also reflects the more sophisticated approach Iran is taking in suffocating the Bahá'í community by means of less high profile abuses of rights.

  This policy has never been disavowed by any representative of Iran's government, including the reformist camp, headed by President Khatami.

International response

  19.  The international community has responded to the persecution of the Bahá'í with overwhelming sympathy, expressing concern for the Bahá'ís and condemnation of the Iranian government. Britain has been robust and consistent in defence of the Iranian Bahá'ís. The Bahá'í community world-wide believes that these outpourings have been a strong force in restraining the Iranian government, preventing a pogrom on a much greater scale.

  20.  The United Nations General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights both approved annual resolutions on Iran from 1985-02, when the resolution fell after a tight vote. Each resolution contained language, specifically mentioning the Bahá'ís. Following a report on Iran by the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Professor Abdelfattah Amor in 1997 resolutions began to call for the emancipation of the Bahá'í community.

  21.  In addition to their capacity to censure Iran for denying human rights to many of its citizens, including Bahá'ís, the resolutions passed at the Commission on Human Rights had the salient feature of mandating a Special Representative on Iran. The Special Representative prepared an extensive report on the human rights situation in Iran. These detailed reports had the value of being independent and lent unimpeachable credibility to the Bahá'í case.

  The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has also stated its concerns about the treatment of the Bahá'ís in its annual human rights reports.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

  22.  The Bahá'í faith has faced persecution since its inception in Iran in the mid 1800s. Early followers faced violent opposition from both the Islamic religious authorities and succeeding dynasties of Iran's rulers. It has been estimated that some 20,000 persons perished in a series of pogroms during the nineteenth century for their allegiance to the Ba«b and Baha«'u'lla«h, the two figures whom Bahá'ís revere as the bearers of a new revelation from God for this age of history.

  23.  The reasons for anti-Bahá'í prejudices that have remained strong within Iran can be classified as having two major impetuses, one of theological origin and one of social origin. Bahá'ís regard the young Iranian merchant, known to history as the Ba«b and the Persian nobleman known as Baha«'u'lla«h as being the authors of a divinely revealed religion. Orthodox Shia Islam interprets a critical surih in the Qu'ran, describing Mohammed as the Seal of the Prophets, as meaning that there can be no messengers from God after him. Bahá'ís therefore have been regarded as apostates for subscribing to a post-Mohammedan religion. Some of the Bahá'ís that have been imprisoned and executed since the Iranian Revolution have been charged with the crime of apostasy.

  24.  Other aspects of the Bahá'í teachings also arouse opposition among some elements of Iranian society. Baha«'u'lla«h advocated a series of highly progressive social principles, including; the elimination of all forms of prejudice, equality between the sexes, recognition of the essential oneness of the world's great religions; the elimination of extremes of wealth and poverty and universal education. Some fundamentalist Muslims view the progressive nature of these teachings, such as the equality of men and women, and the absence of a clergy, as antithetical to the traditions of Islam.

  25.  It should be stressed that the overwhelming majority of Iranian Bahá'ís cannot be distinguished from their fellow countrymen in terms of racial, tribal, linguistic or cultural background and they can be drawn from all classes of society. Their persecution cannot therefore be linked to any underlying issue of an ethnic or political dimension. The Bahá'ís are repressed because of their religious affiliation.

  26.  Throughout their history the Bahá'í community has suffered from a highly distorted public imagine within Iran. Clerical and government bodies have consistently and systematically misrepresented the beliefs and practices of the Bahá'ís to the wider public. In the nineteenth century Bahá'í s were accused of being agents of both the Russian and British empires. More recently this has given way to accusations of spying for Israel. Often when individuals have been arrested in the interest of national security and charged with extremely serious crimes, it is instructive in the real motives behind their arrest to learn that they have been questioned extensively about their membership of the Bahá'í faith and offered freedom if they recant their faith and declare allegiance to Islam.

CONCLUSION

  27.  In recent years there has been encouraging rhetoric from Tehran on issues such as human rights and religious freedoms. The Bahá'í community can only judge the government of Iran on its actions towards our co-religionists in that state, the birthplace of our faith. No high level representative of the Iranian government has ever made a statement that specifically supports giving any rights to the Iranian Bahá'ís.

  28.  The Bahá'ís of Iran continues to survive and maintain their identity in spite of relentless oppression. The pressure of public opinion and expressions of solidarity from other governments and Parliaments particularly add to their strength and determination. Since the fall of the UN resolution at the Commission on Human Rights, which kept Iran's treatment of many minorities, including the Bahá'ís, under international scrutiny, our community can only report that the situation for the Iranian Bahá'ís has continued to deteriorate.

  It is not the actions of the Bahá'ís but the circumstances of Iranian history that have conspired to make the Bahá'í case a litmus test for the sincerity of Iranian public figures who represent themselves as voices of reform or progress.

Bahá'í Community of the United Kingdom

February 2003



 
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